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Abstract 
Having a Say: Democracy, Access to Justice and Self-Represented Litigants 
‘Access to Justice’ is one of the most contested issues on the law-and-society 
agenda.  There is a long-standing exchange over its meaning, objectives, and success.  
Beneath that engagement, there is a deeper and more basic debate about the overall 
ambitions for access to justice: – is the goal to improve people’s access to the legal 
process and generate more positive outcomes (the practical thesis), or to enhance 
people’s participation and ultimately their ability to affect justice as an end in itself (the 
democratic thesis)?  This thesis adopts the latter approach. 
The plight of self-represented litigants (SRLs) offers a revealing glimpse into the 
more systemic failings of the litigation process.  This thesis builds on original qualitative 
work that explores SRLs’ experiences and circumstances in their own voices.  The 
challenges presented by their growing numbers bring into question the whole basis for 
understanding and advancing the debate on access to justice.  Indeed, existing ways to 
understand access to justice are found to be seriously lacking.  Instead, a fresh agenda of 
questions and answers recommend themselves to deal with the new realities of the 
existing legal process.  The existence of SRLs does not simply create difficult challenges 
within the legal process, but presents a huge and subversive challenge to the legal process 
itself.  Due to this disconnect between the theory and realities of litigation, any progress 
in improving access to justice demands a transformed approach to further study and 
policy analysis. 
Responding to this new state of affairs is not easy or straightforward.  But it must 
be done if the drive for better access to justice is to make significant and meaningful 
headway.  Consequently, this thesis contributes to the theory and practice of access to 
justice by shifting the discourse about what access to justice should be and how it might 
be pursued.  The democratic approach advocated seeks to encourage the meaningful 
participation by SRLs in the legal and political processes and institutions that impact their 
lives.  In doing so, the hope is to challenge the existing litigation framework and ensure 
that democratic rhetoric matches reality in the pursuit of access to justice.   
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Access to Justice is both an ideal and an undertaking that serves to benefit all 
members of society.  It is difficult to be against a plea for more and better access to more 
and better justice in and through the legal process.  However, the concepts of both access’ 
and ‘justice’ are highly contested.1  Moreover, this contest calls into play a range of 
theoretical issues and practical challenges that further separate scholars, members of the 
public, the legal profession and policy makers.  Indeed, it may be said that a person’s 
stance on access to justice is reflective of certain of their assumptions, both stated and 
unstated, about law and society in the broadest sense.  Thus, in this regard, a person’s 
position on access to justice is further reflective of her commitments to some of the 
foundational assumptions and values about the adversarial system, individuals’ 
relationship with law, and concepts of justice. 
 
 The sociologist of law, Roscoe Pound, noted, “our conception of the problem to 
which our discourse is addressed shapes both.  What we are trying to do, why we are 
trying to do it, and how we are trying to do it, are not wholly separable, and each enters in 
to both definition and discourse.”2  This is particularly true of access to justice.  Each new 
wave of the access to justice movement has not only identified particular problems to be 
solved, but also recommended a particular discourse through which to think about and 
recommend reforms and solutions.  Historically, the lack of access was viewed as a 
problem within the legal system that needed to be corrected through institutional reform 
of that system.  In surveying access to justice and its literature, David Trubek suggested 
that, in the course of addressing the problem, “the original terms of the debate were 
changed as successive waves of reform led to a reconsideration of the original ideas that 
                                                
1 While the concepts of both access and justice have historically been contested, there are certain themes 
and approaches that have influenced the direction of access to justice theory and resulting policy.  These 
are examined in more detail in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
2 Roscoe Pound, “Natural Natural Law and Positive Natural Law” (1960) 5 Nat L F 70 at 70. 
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had defined the concern in the first place.”3  Thus, institutional changes were often 
associated with certain theoretical approaches that, in turn, worked to justify a particular 
course of action.  This cyclical process resulted in the shaping of not only the initiatives 
undertaken to ameliorate a lack of access, but also the underlying justification for those 
initiatives.  Roderick MacDonald has challenged this cyclical reform process in access to 
justice as continuing to “induce the presentation of ideas in a form prefigured for 
implementation within the system.”4  This has the effect of bringing both theory and the 
initiatives derived from that theory within the “existing, stabilized normative order” of 
the official legal institutions and processes.5  The result being that, while the objective 
might be the removal of barriers and the enhancement of access, the process undertaken 
to affect these objectives already contains certain assumptions and values about the 
system that are not easily displaced.   
 
This is a thesis about access to justice as understood through the experiences of 
self-represented litigants.  It includes qualitative work involving self-represented litigants 
and their experiences in the litigation process and, more specifically, their experiences 
making use of self-help legal services when engaged in the civil justice system.  The 
methodological approach undertaken in this research project, which is also consistent 
with the theoretical framework in this thesis, seeks to examine the self-represented 
litigants’ situation, circumstances and views in their own voice.  However, this thesis is 
not intended to be restricted in either content or ambition by that specific focus.  The 
situation and circumstances of self-represented litigants provides a means to shine a more 
critical light on the whole enterprise of access to justice.  The challenges and dilemmas 
presented by the growing number of self-represented litigants bring into question the 
whole basis for understanding and moving forward the debate on access to justice.  The 
                                                
3 David M Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory: The Quest for the Empowered Self” in 
Allan C Hutchinson, ed, Access to Civil Justice (Toronto, Canada: Carswell – A Division of Thomson 
Canada Limited, 1990) at 110-111 [Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory”]. 
4 Roderick A MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice” (1992) 7:2 CJLS 23 at 32 [MacDonald, “Theses 
on Access to Justice”]. 
5 Ibid at 32. 
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plight of self-represented litigants offers a revealing glimpse at some of the larger and 
more systemic failings of the litigation process.  Until recently, these failings had been 
taken for granted within the adversarial model in light of the fact that the litigation 
process was generally working and workable for the insiders that designed and made use 
of it.  
 
Looked at through the experiences of self-represented litigants, this thesis 
suggests that the existing ways to understand access to justice are seriously lacking.  The 
perspective from which people approach access to justice has generated a series of 
questions and a series of answers that no longer correspond with the realities of the 
existing legal process.  Moreover, these new realities raise new questions about whether 
the existing litigation process, together with its underlying operating assumptions, is 
worth saving in the present form.  Due to this disconnect between the theory and realities 
of litigation, if there is to be any progress in improving and enhancing access to justice, 
there needs to be a very different approach taken so that the agenda for study and policy 
change are transformed.  This is not an easy or straightforward matter, but is one that 
must be initiated and debated if the movement to achieve access to justice is to make 
significant and meaningful headway.  Consequently, this thesis is intended to contribute 
to the conversation about the theory and practice of access to justice in a way that shifts 
the discourse about what access to justice should be and how it might be pursued in a 
new direction.  By doing so, the hope is to challenge the existing litigation framework, 
particularly in terms of its failure to meet the new realities within the litigation process, 
and ensure that rhetoric matches reality in the pursuit of access to justice.   
 
Toward a Democratic Approach 
In his classic essay written in 1976, Abram Chayes explained how a paradigm shift was 
taking place in civil litigation.6  He chartered a move from a traditional private law model 
of litigation that was grounded in ideas of 19th century legal liberalism to a public law 
model of litigation that envisioned more flexible procedures and a broader role for the 
                                                
6 Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harv L Rev 1281 [Chayes, 
“The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”]. 
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adjudicator.  In so doing, he identified some of the salient characteristics of the older 
model and demonstrated how they were being challenged and replaced by the new, more 
expansive and different ones.  Not unlike Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts in the 
scientific realm, Chayes’ basic idea was that, within an established model, there were a 
whole set of basic assumptions and operating premises that offered a finite set of 
problems and answers to those problems.7  The existing traditional model represented 
both the wisdom on what the appropriate parameters of civil litigation were and defined 
the conditions, directions and limits of both academic research and possible institutional 
reform of the litigation process or institutions given those parameters.  Thus, within the 
existing model, the participants and the researchers take certain first principles for 
granted and, in so doing, engage on the basis of those shared values and even make 
adjustments based on those same values.  
 
For Chayes, the breakdown of the traditional model and the dawning of a new 
model raised serious questions not only about the efficacy of the older paradigm, but also 
about its legitimacy.  Although his focus was primarily on the broader role of the judge 
within a public law model of litigation and a correspondingly expanded notion of 
procedure, his analysis opened up a whole new approach to thinking about the legal 
process.  His overall assessment was very much to the point – “we are witnessing the 
emergence of a new model of civil litigation and, I believe, our traditional concept of 
adjudication and the assumptions on which it is based provide an increasingly unhelpful, 
indeed misleading framework for assessing either the workability or the legitimacy of the 
roles of the judge and the court within this model.”8 
 
In the same way that Abram Chayes in 1976 charted a paradigm shift that was 
taking place in civil litigation, 9 I want to insist that another paradigm shift is (or should 
be) taking place today.  Whereas Chayes focused on the role of the judge in civil 
                                                
7 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1962) at 10; Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, ibid at 1285. 
8 Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, supra note 6 at 1282. 
9 Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, supra note 6. 
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litigation, I identify and analyze a similar transformation of size and significance that is 
beginning to occur in civil litigation when understood from the perspective of self-
represented litigants.  This shift gives rise to a corresponding imperative to develop a 
broader conceptualization of access to justice.  Self-represented litigants now comprise a 
large portion of litigants.  As I will try to show through exploring the experiences and 
perceptions of self-represented litigants as they grapple with and within the existing 
system of civil litigation, the signs of impending crisis and the resulting need to re-
evaluate the existing adversarial model are plain to see.  The existence of self-represented 
litigants does not simply create difficult challenges within the legal process, but present a 
huge and subversive challenge to the legal process itself. 
 
In some legal settings, self-represented litigants comprise the overwhelming 
majority of litigants.  This fact alone necessitates a serious re-appraisal of the structure 
and dynamics of the adversarial context.  However, when this fact is combined with a 
sense of disempowerment and disengagement felt by those who represent themselves 
and/or those who, for a variety of reasons, do not litigate at all,10 the need for deep and 
systemic change in the system becomes apparent.  The consequence otherwise is the 
continued disengagement and corresponding de-legitimization of legal processes and 
institutions.  Moreover, this continued disengagement from legal processes and 
institutions is inconsistent with the equal application of the Rule of Law in the sense that 
not all members of society are in a position to invoke and/or otherwise benefit from the 
Rule of Law.  As such, I maintain that Chayes’ comments regarding the need for a new 
model of civil justice, that in this case takes account of the failure of the current model to 
include and engage self-represented litigants, are as pertinent now as they were then.  
                                                
10 Due to the nature of the self-help centre and the fact that it offers assistance to a wide range of 
individuals addressing civil legal matters, one particular challenge faced by the staff and highlighted by 
several of the interviewees in this research project was the difficulty in addressing the needs of individuals 
with mental health issues.  On a regular basis, there were often individuals waiting to speak to a volunteer 
lawyer who were suffering from apparent mental health issues as well as issues of homelessness and other 
poverty-related issues.  In these instances, it appeared that the staff found it quite challenging when 
attempting to understand the nature of the individual’s legal problem and how LawHelp Ontario (“LHO”) 
might be able to assist them.  Thus, an important question raised in respect of this research is that while the 
fact is that there are lots of self-represented litigants making use of self-help legal services to resolve their 
legal problems, this fact also begs the question of who is not accessing the self-help services and/or fall 
outside the scope of the services offered by LHO and as such, are unable to get assistance at all. 
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Accordingly, I want to suggest that this changing landscape presents important 
challenges to the legitimacy and continued operation of the prevailing process of civil 
litigation as viewed from the perspective of access to justice.  While there is not yet any 
fixed or settled notion of what a new process or underlying paradigm might look like, 
there are signs that one might be beginning to take shape.  At a minimum, my research 
suggests that, based upon the views from those trying to access the legal system (the self-
represented litigants) and those witnessing and assisting these attempts (the volunteer 
lawyers), there are clear indications that, as the traditional model and its underlying 
assumptions start to falter, a fresh appraisal of the litigation process and its operating 
assumptions is required.  How the legal system responds to these fundamental challenges 
will be a good indication of whether there is a genuine desire to make substantive and 
substantial changes that best promote and advance a broader conceptualization of access 
to justice.   
 
The major contribution of this thesis to the access to justice literature is to 
recommend and defend a more thoroughly and pervasive democratic approach to access 
to justice.  At present, much of the disagreement within the access to justice community 
of scholars, activists and policy-makers can be traced to an important and often ignored 
division over a fundamental operating premise not only within the access to justice 
debate, but also underneath it.  Allegiance to one commitment or another has very 
significant implications for the whole approach of access to justice in both its theoretical 
and practical dimensions.  In short, there is a foundational difference between those who 
assume a different position on the overall framework for understanding and taking steps 
to improve access to justice.  There are two basic orientations that dominate the 
discussion:  
 
 For some, the goal is to improve people’s access to the legal process (through 
legal representation or an equivalent form of legal services that requires 
professional intervention) so as to increase their chances of achieving a more 
positive outcome in their individual legal matter (the practical thesis).   
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 For others, the goal is to enhance citizens’ participation and ultimately their 
ability to engage with law-making and law-administering institutions and 
processes as well as concepts of justice as ends in themselves (the democratic 
thesis). 
 
This basic division influences not only an appreciation of the central problems to be 
addressed, but also the range of possible solutions to be adopted.  While the practical 
thesis has tended to underpin and dominate the access to justice debate to date, the 
primary ambition of this thesis is to deepen and expand upon the democratic thesis and its 
implications for future work and interventions in access to justice.  The democratic 
approach to access to justice contemplates that individuals are provided with more and 
better opportunities to participate in a discourse about law and justice.  In so doing, they 
might contribute to the development of a new legal vernacular that is relevant to and 
reflective of their lives.  In this sense, individuals have an opportunity to reclaim official 
law.  The further benefit in proceeding in this manner is that individuals begin to engage 
in a wide variety of decision-making processes as citizens and the resulting decisions are 
legitimized.  This expansion of a theory of access to justice in accordance with the 
democratic thesis also takes account of my empirical data respecting self-represented 
litigants’ experiences and the implications of their existence and experiences on an 
expanded conceptualization of access. 
 
Furthermore, this expanded theory of access to justice has important implications for 
a transformed view of lawyering.  The rise in the number of self-represented litigants puts 
pressure on the traditional understanding of what the role of the lawyer should be.  By 
emphasizing the democratic approach to access to justice, there is an opportunity to re-
appraise the way that both opposing counsel and lawyers (insofar as they assist self-
represented litigants) think about and approach their duties, strategies and general 
participation in the legal process.11 
                                                
11 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s role(s) in Deliberative Democracy” (2004) 5 Nev LJ 347. 
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The examination of a broader conceptualization of access to justice and the 
research undertaken in this project in respect of this broader conceptualization originates 
out of my experience as a litigator, and a volunteer lawyer at a self-help legal centre in 
downtown Toronto.  In the course of acting as a volunteer lawyer, I provided legal 
information and advice to self-represented litigants representing themselves in the civil 
justice system.  My encounters with self-represented litigants attempting to navigate the 
justice system on their own, together with my experience as a civil litigator, caused me to 
begin to question some of the accepted reasoning about access to justice, its objectives 
and the initiatives derived therefrom.  In the traditional sense, the existence of self-
represented litigants has been viewed as a problem for which the accepted solution has 
been to find ways to provide more and different legal services in order to ameliorate the 
presence of self-represented litigants in the legal system.  However, this seemed to be an 
unsatisfactory approach from both a practical as well as a philosophical perspective.  
Self-represented litigants represent a new reality within the litigation process that this 
approach does not fully address.  More significantly, this approach appeared to disregard 
certain essential factors about the role of law in individuals’ lives in a modern democratic 
society and the importance of ensuring that individuals are able to participate in the 
construction and implementation of the laws that affect them.  Consequently, I began to 
question whether the existing thinking about access was provisional, insubstantial and, 
thus, limited by its response to the perceived problem which was how to provide 
individuals with legal representation.  In this sense, this approach failed to take account 
of individuals’ agency and abilities, while being overly preoccupied with courtroom 
efficiency.  As a result, I wanted to examine a different approach to access that could 
begin to re-frame the discussion about the nature of the issue, the underlying objectives 
and the potential responses in a deeper and more enriched manner.   
 
Charting the Thesis  
The goal of the second chapter in this thesis is to examine, from a historical perspective, 
the different waves of access to justice theory and the corresponding initiatives that have 
evolved out of developments in access to justice theory.  Important to this examination is 
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the role of the dominant practical thesis of access to justice that has influenced access to 
justice theory and practice and how this approach conflates access to legal services with 
access to justice movements.  Subsequently, I will introduce a broader conceptualization 
of access to justice as it is contemplated in the democratic thesis.  This conceptualization 
originates from some of the most recent deliberations on access to justice theory by 
individuals such as Roderick MacDonald and Janice Gross Stein, among others, and is 
further informed by procedural justice scholars.  This democratic thesis frames the 
empirical research undertaken in this project, both in terms of the research questions 
posed and the methodologies employed to address those questions.  
 
In the first part of chapter three, I elaborate on the principles of participatory 
democracy as a theoretical foundation for a democratic thesis of access.  This will include 
a brief discussion of the objectives, as well as benefits, associated with empowerment and 
meaningful citizen participation.  Following this discussion, the chapter will analyze the 
role of law and legal institutions, including both their law-making and law-administering 
functions within a democracy.  Included in this analysis is a discussion about the 
corresponding importance of adopting a participatory approach to both law-making and 
law-administering functions, particularly as it relates to the dual objectives of the 
democratization of law and the creation of a new legal vernacular, which is more 
consistent and relevant to individuals’ lives.  In light of the important role that law plays 
in individuals’ lives, this chapter will further examine how access to justice might 
encourage direct meaningful participation in these important legal processes, particularly 
within the civil justice system.  An access to justice project undertaken in Connecticut 
will be used to underscore the importance of fostering participation and the benefits 
potentially derived from a participatory approach to access to justice.  Finally, this 
chapter will look at some of the previously recognized institutional challenges associated 
with the promotion of participation within the civil justice system.   
 
In chapter four, I will examine the growth of self-representation within the civil 
justice system, and briefly touch upon causes and consequences of this phenomenon.  In 
the course of examining the growth of self-representation, I intend to review some of the 
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particular barriers that previous research has suggested that self-represented litigants face 
when they attempt to engage in the civil justice system.  As a result of the growing 
numbers of self-represented litigants entering the civil justice system and otherwise 
attempting to resolve their legal issues without professional legal representation, there has 
been a corresponding proliferation of access to justice initiatives that are aimed at 
improving individuals’ access to justice.  In the context of such initiatives, the focus of 
this discussion will be on the emergence of self-help legal services.  Self-help legal 
services provide self-represented litigants with legal information and advice in order that 
they may better represent themselves.  I will examine the development of self-help legal 
services in various jurisdictions as well as the potential benefits associated with this 
initiative in accordance with the democratic thesis.  I will also canvass some of the 
critiques associated with self-help legal services both in terms of the particular challenges 
faced by self-represented litigants as well as certain broader critiques including a 
neoliberal critique of self-help services.  With respect to the latter, the critical 
commentary questions whether self-help represents a form of empowerment or 
alternatively, a form of disempowerment.   
 
Chapter five of this thesis will lay the methodological groundwork for the 
empirical work undertaken in this research project.  I will begin by canvassing certain 
recent empirical quantitative work in access to justice and relate it to the broader 
challenges and ambitions of the practical and democratic theses.  In so doing, I hope to 
outline the tension between quantitative and qualitative research methodologies in access 
to justice and the challenges associated with these different methodologies.  This will 
include a discussion of the two research streams that have arisen in access to justice 
research namely, (1) the qualitative and related observational work; and (2) the more 
recent quantitative studies that seek to use randomized methods in an attempt to measure 
outcomes.  With regards to the later approach, I will discuss critically and in more depth 
some of the concerns associated with a focus on legal outcomes and corresponding 
adoption of a randomized quantitative methodology.  I will concentrate on the practical, 
theoretical and ethical issues raised by these studies.  In turn, I will advocate for the 
continuing need for more in-depth qualitative research that examines the experiences, 
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views and perceptions of individuals engaged with the civil justice system.  This is based 
on the belief that qualitative research, which takes account of the individual’s experiences 
attempting to access justice, creates a space in which to think about and debate access and 
meaningful participation from the users’ perspectives.  This discussion will also serve as 
a foundation for a discussion of the methodology adopted in this project.  My critical 
ambition is to relate the empirical debate back to the more fundamental discussion over 
the tension between the practical and democratic theses as a basis for access to justice 
theory and policy.  
 
The focus of my empirical research is on those individuals who, having identified 
their problem or issue as legal in nature, take steps to address it without retaining legal 
representation.  The self-represented litigants interviewed in this project were involved 
with cases in the civil courts in Ontario and had appeared in a variety of different levels 
of courts within the civil justice system. 12  While the participants in this study were 
representing themselves, all of the individuals had made use of self-help legal services in 
Toronto.  This chapter will include a brief description of the self-help centre (Law Help 
Ontario) where the research was undertaken.   
 
Based on the earlier discussions regarding the need for qualitative research, the 
second part of this fifth chapter will outline the actual ethnographic methodology adopted 
in this research project and include a description of the methods employed to obtain an 
understanding of self-represented litigants’ experiences representing themselves.  These 
methods include observation and in-depth interviews with self-represented litigants who 
made use of self-help legal services and the lawyers who volunteer at the self-help centre.  
As such, the last part of this chapter will include a discussion of both the rationale for 
adopting these particular methods as well as the process involved in conducting this 
particular type of research.  I will conclude this chapter with a consideration of some of 
                                                
12 These cases involved a variety of civil matters including housing and tenancy, employment, debt, family 
relationships, motor vehicle and in some administrative context, immigration and the allocation of social 
benefits. 
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the methodological and ethical challenges that flow from these research methods, 
particularly as it relates to the in-depth interviews conducted. 
 
In the sixth chapter, I will begin by introducing the participants in this research 
project and contextualizing the setting for the research through a brief discussion of some 
of the observations made at Law Help Ontario (“LHO”).  Following this, I will frame the 
two overarching themes derived from the narratives provided by the participants in this 
study – empowerment and disempowerment.  These contrasting themes are situated 
within the previously discussed literature on participatory democracy and citizen 
engagement.  Next, I will discuss each of these themes in greater depth.  In so doing, I 
will draw on those aspects of the participants’ experience as described in their interviews 
that animate these themes.  Finally, I will canvass the impact that these contrasting 
themes have had on the participants’ conceptualization of access to justice and 
engagement more generally.  Throughout the discussion in this chapter and in keeping 
with the democratic thesis, I hope to give expression to the participants’ experiences 
through their own voices, whenever possible.  
 
In the concluding chapter, I intend to discuss two important aspects of a shift from 
the practical thesis to the democratic thesis of access to justice.  In the first part, I will 
suggest that the adoption of the democratic thesis is consistent with democratic objectives 
and, more importantly, reflective of certain aspects of the self-represented litigants’ 
experiences gathered in this research project.  Thus, as part of this discussion, I intend to 
propose that what is needed from a theory of access to justice is a commitment to 
enhancing more meaningful and direct participation by individuals as opposed to a 
predominant focus on representation by lawyers.  Assuming that individuals wish to 
participate but struggle to do so, it will be necessary to make significant changes to the 
way access to justice is conceptualized and operationalized.  Thus, to paraphrase Chayes, 
“the traditional conception of [access to justice] and the assumptions on which it is based 
provide an increasingly unhelpful, indeed misleading framework for assessing either the 
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workability or the legitimacy of civil litigation as a realization of [access to justice].”13  
The result is a need for broader systemic changes as well as more immediate and 
practical changes that will encourage and support self-represented litigants.  Therefore, 
the second part of this concluding chapter will introduce the idea that the litigation 
process must change to better address and redress the self-represented litigants’ 
disempowering experiences.  This transformation, which is aimed at enhancing greater 
participation by self-represented litigants, signifies a broader paradigm shift in the 
litigation model and one that is both necessary and urgent, if we are to live up to our 
democratic ideals.   
 
Conclusion 
Recent thinking about access to justice has questioned the dominant role played by 
lawyers.  As an alternative, it has begun to explore the role that ordinary citizens can and 
should play in the creation and operation of law that is more consistent with the 
participatory goals and principles of democracy.  The recent rise in the number of self-
represented litigants in the civil justice system has concretized the need to explore this 
question in a more immediate fashion.  By employing the methods of ethnographic 
research and socio-legal critique, this thesis aims to examine a broader concept of access 
to justice that adopts, more centrally, a democratic perspective.  The hope is that this 
approach will not only enhance the positive benefits associated with direct engagement 
by self-represented litigants, but also address the challenges and continued barriers that 
cause self-represented litigants to lose confidence in the civil justice system, feel 
disempowered and, therefore, unable or unwilling to participate.  As part of the 
examination of a broader conceptualization, the concepts of empowerment and 
disempowerment will play a key role in both understanding the experiences of self-
represented individuals and proposing innovations and changes that will empower 
individuals to participate in a more meaningful fashion.  This applies not only in the 
context of the civil justice system, but also in a myriad of political and legal forums and 
processes.  In so doing, the ambition will be to re-think access to justice generally so that 
                                                
13 Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, supra note 6 at 1282. 
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it will better advance the practical efficacy of the legal process as well as its democratic 
agenda and corresponding legitimacy.  
 15 
 
CHAPTER TWO  
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
 Access to justice is a truly contested concept.  There is little agreement about 
what the term access to justice means among scholars and policy makers.  Moreover, this 
continuing lack of agreement respecting the concept of access to justice could be traced 
to an “evolution in thinking about what access to justice in a liberal democracy entails.”1  
This has resulted in heated and divergent debates over its meaning, its objectives and its 
successes.  That said, my approach is to take much more seriously than has been done to 
date the commitment to a democratic perspective on access to justice.  Instead of 
pursuing or refining a practical thesis that commits to the goal of improving individuals’ 
access to the legal process through legal or professional representation in the hope of 
generating more positive outcomes, I will explore access to justice as a means of 
enhancing citizens’ participation that potentially improves citizens’ ability to engage with 
law-making and law-administering institutions and processes as well as concepts of 
justice as ends in themselves.  
 
 By way of laying the groundwork for this democratic approach, the goal of this 
chapter is to examine the different permutations of access to justice theory and the 
corresponding initiatives that have evolved out of access to justice theory.2  The purpose 
                                                
1 Roderick A MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Scale and Ambitions in Julia Bass, 
WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – The Way Forward 
(Toronto, Canada: The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) at 19 [MacDonald, “Access to Justice in 
Canada Today”]. 
2 In a discussion of the critical moments in the evolution of access to justice, David Trubek considers the 
relationship between legal theory, legal institutions and legal practices that are relevant in the context of 
thinking about how access to justice theory is constituted.  Specifically, he states, “[t]he relationship 
between legal theory and legal institutions and practices is complex.  Theory and practices are loosely 
related.  Theory neither determines practice, nor practice theory.  Theory is both normative and descriptive.  
It is a way of explaining what we do and why we do it.  It can operate as justification: legal theory is often a 
rationalization (in the Freudian sense) of practices in light of broadly held normative understandings.  
Because theory must have a normative component, it also can be a source of critique.  Thus theory can be 
transformative.”  David Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory: The Quest for the 
Empowered Self” in Allan C Hutchinson, ed, Access to Civil Justice (Toronto, Canada: Carswell - A 
Division of Thomson Canada Limited, 1990) at 110 [Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice 
Theory”]. 
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in proceeding in this fashion is to trace the evolution of access to justice theory and, thus, 
better understand how different influences have shaped the current approaches to access 
to justice.  An important aspect of this examination is the role played by legal 
professionals in both the construction of theories of access as well as the implementation 
of those theories through various policy initiatives.  In the first part of this chapter, I will 
examine the ‘waves’ of access to justice movements that have evolved over time.  In so 
doing, I will also examine the policy initiatives that have been developed in accordance 
with those theoretical waves.  Next, I will investigate critically the dominant practical 
thesis of access to justice that has shaped much of the policy direction in access to justice.  
I look at the implications that this approach has for self-represented litigants attempting 
to access justice.  In particular, I emphasize how this approach conflates access to legal 
services with access to justice; this is grounded in serious and legitimate concerns about 
the ability of individuals to represent themselves without professional legal assistance.  
Finally, I will discuss a broader conceptualization of access to justice as it is 
contemplated in the democratic thesis and that originates from some of the most recent 
deliberations on access to justice theory.  This democratic thesis frames the empirical 
research undertaken in this project, both in terms of the research questions pursued and 
the methodologies employed to address those questions.  
 
The Evolution of Access to Justice Theory and Policy 
In North America, approaches to thinking about access to justice have been characterized 
as ‘waves’ that began subsequent to World War II.3  Much prior to this time in the late 
eighteen and early nineteen hundreds, access to justice was viewed essentially as a “right 
of access to judicial protection” which contemplated the formal rights an individual may 
have to either assert or defend a claim.4  This approach to access to justice was consistent 
                                                
3 Marc Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability” (2010) 37:1 Fordham Urb 
LJ 115 [Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”]; Mauro Cappelletti & 
Garth Bryant, (eds), Access to Justice: A World Survey, vol 1 (Milan, Italy: Sitjoff & Noordhoff- 
Alpehenaandenrijn, 1978); Albert Currie, “Riding the Third Wave: Rethinking Criminal Legal Aid within 
an Access to Justice Framework”, Government of Canada.  Available online at 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/rr03_5/rr03_5.pdf. 
4 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth, eds, A World Survey, vol 1 (Milan, Italy: Tipografia MORI & C, 
1978) at 6 [Cappelletti and Garth, A World Survey]. 
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with ‘classic legal thought’ that pervaded certain thinking about law and procedure 
during the nineteenth century.  In accordance with this approach, individuals as legal 
subjects were viewed as “fully-constituted, self-contained actors capable of autonomous 
choice” who were free to make choices within formally delineated spheres defined by 
regulation. 5  Elements of this approach to procedure and dispute resolution still shape 
certain current thinking about the legal process and, thus, by extension, continue to 
impact how we think about the promotion of access to justice.6  In this sense, the 
development and reform of theoretical approaches to access to justice were intimately 
tied to theories and approaches to civil procedure.7  However, an individualist and 
formalistic approach to procedure and dispute resolution and, by extension, access to 
justice, fails to take account of both great inequalities that effectively prevent a majority 
of citizens from accessing the justice system and the value-laden role of procedure.  
Recent articulations of access to justice theory arose once it was acknowledged that it 
would be necessary for the state to take steps to actively protect and promote certain civil 
and social rights.8   
 
The work of Mauro Cappelletti, Bryant Garth and others has been instrumental in 
developing the characterization of access to justice in waves.9  In the course of his work 
on access to justice, Cappelletti originally set out the development of access to justice 
theory and policy in three broad waves.  Cappelletti’s description of waves of thinking in 
                                                
5 David M Trubek, “The Handmaid’s Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil 
Procedure” (1988) 51:4 Law & Contemporary Problems 111 at 112-114 [Trubek, “The Handmaid’s 
Revenge”]. 
6 For example, one of the underlying assumptions was that procedure would not impact the outcome of a 
dispute but rather serve as a framework in which disputes were subjected to pre-existing rules and resolved 
accordingly.  In this sense, procedure was a scientific instrument that had no effect on the goals or values of 
the participants using the system.  See Trubek, “The Handmaid’s Revenge”, supra note 5 at 114-115. 
7 Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory”, supra note 2 at 111. 
8 Cappelletti & Garth, A World Survey, supra note 4 at 7. 
9 In his article entitled “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”, Galanter attributed 
the phrase ‘access to justice’ (as it is currently understood) and the expansion of its meaning to 
developments made by Mauro Cappelletti during the Florence Access to Justice Project which ultimately 
embodied a series of publications about access to justice.  The Florence Access to Justice project cultivated 
a concept of access that was expanded to include a focus on achieving justice in a variety of forums.  See 
Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”, supra note 3 at 116. 
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access were grounded in part in his work on the Florence Access to Justice Project (a 
partnership between the Italian government and the Ford Foundation in the United States) 
which aimed to “examine and seek solutions for the pressing problems of making justice 
more accessible.”10  The work on access to justice at this time was also grounded in 
various institutional changes that were occurring in the United States.11  MacDonald 
expanded this characterization to provide for more recent elaborations on access to justice 
theory and situate the discussion in a uniquely Canadian context.12  Different countries 
developed initiatives in varying manners and time frames.  Generally speaking, as the 
notion of access evolved and expanded, access to a variety of different institutions and 
processes, both judicial and non-judicial, were contemplated.  As noted, David Trubek 
argues that the theoretical framework of access of justice, which ultimately resulted in a 
broad range of institutional reforms across jurisdictions, can be linked back to efforts to 
change the theory of civil procedure.13  Viewed in this manner, the ‘waves of access to 
justice’ can be better understood as an interaction between theoretical claims and changes 
to institutional practices which in turn, led to new theoretical claims and so on.14 
 
The first wave of access to justice saw the birth of poverty law and the 
development of ‘storefront’ legal clinics that were aimed at providing legal services to 
low-income individuals.  In Canada, this mode of thinking led to the emergence of legal 
aid initiatives that included certificate programs, duty counsel and eventually legal 
clinics, some of which provided specialty legal services or addressed particular legal 
needs.  Beginning around 1973, there was federal funding for legal assistance programs 
                                                
10 K.-F. Koch, Access to Justice, An Anthropological Perspective, vol IV (Milan, Italy: Tipografia MORI & 
C, 1979), at v; see also Cappelletti and Garth, A World Survey, supra note 4 at 7 in which Cappelletti notes 
that the “task in this Report will be to trace the emergence and development of a new and comprehensive 
approach to access problems in contemporary societies.” 
11 Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”, supra note 3 at 116. 
12 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1. 
13 Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory”, supra note 2 at 111. 
14 Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory”, ibid at 110. 
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that encouraged the growth of legal aid.15  At this time, there was also a focus on 
procedural rights in criminal law and the development of civil rights litigation. 16  
Notwithstanding the different iterations, the focus was on providing lawyers and legal 
services to those who would not otherwise be able to afford them.   
 
In the second wave of access to justice through the 1970’s, there was a 
recognition that issues within the institutional organization of the civil justice system 
impacted individuals’ ability to access to justice.  The judicial system’s performance 
regarding the procedures used in both the criminal and civil context was scrutinized and 
consequently found to be slow, inefficient and inconsistent.  As a result, non-judicial 
institutions and processes were established as a means of dealing with certain types of 
civil claims.17  In an effort to reduce costs and enhance timely access for those in need of 
specific types of remedies, this wave in thinking led to an expanded landscape of dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  This included workers’ compensation boards, human rights 
tribunals, and other quasi-regulatory bodies and schemes that operated outside of the 
purview of the traditional justice system.  While the goal during this period might have 
been to provide additional means by which individuals could resolve their legal problems 
outside the traditional legal system in a timely and efficient manner, the development of 
these bodies and regulatory schemes did not necessarily dissuade individuals of the need 
for professional legal assistance.  The quasi-judicial nature of these regulatory regimes 
meant that there were still many complex procedural requirements that necessitated the 
need for legal assistance.  Moreover, in certain contexts, the failure to have legal 
representation potentially placed the individual at a significant disadvantage.  Having said 
that, there was an acknowledgement of the need to develop alternative means of resolving 
individuals’ legal problems.  In keeping with this acknowledgement, this period also 
witnessed the emergence of alternative dispute resolution processes.   
                                                
15 Ab Currie, “Riding the Third Wave: Rethinking Criminal Legal Aid within an Access to Justice 
Framework” (Government of Canada).  See http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csj-sjc/ccs-
ajc/rr03_5/rr03_5.pdf [Currie, “Riding the Third Wave”]. 
16 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 19. 
17 Ibid at 20.   
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Galanter suggests that in the 1970’s, ideas about access to justice were 
accompanied, as well as influenced, by the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
movement and the dispute perspective.  These fields were born of,  
 
an expansion of accountability and remedy fostered by courts and 
legislatures in the years between the end of World War II and the mid-
1970’s.  An enlargement of remedies, an expansion of standing, abolition of 
old immunities, and the promotion of civil rights provided ordinary people 
with new occasions for using the courts and a greater likelihood of success 
when they did.18   
 
The dispute perspective in legal research examined how disputes were constructed 
and ultimately resolved (or not resolved) within a legal framework.  This body of inquiry 
influenced Felstiner, Abel and Sarat’s influential work on the naming, blaming and 
claiming process that occurs when individuals are confronted with an injury or problem.  
A key component of this mode of analysis was the development of the litigation pyramid 
that had, at its pinnacle, the small number of cases that actually proceed to the legal 
system for resolution.  Galanter suggests that the realization that only a small number of 
disputes are resolved in the formal legal system had important implications for access to 
justice theory.19  In particular, it uncovered various barriers that prevented individuals 
from both identifying issues and resolving those issues.  The dismantling of these barriers 
became important access to justice objectives.  Moreover, the development of a litigation 
pyramid that highlighted the fact that only a limited number of disputes are resolved 
through formal legal processes also served to raise broader questions about the purposes 
and interests served by the justice system; these questions remain integral to the access to 
justice agenda.  In this regard, it could be said that ADR provided a partial answer to the 
challenges raised by the dispute perspective, particularly as it relates to the legitimacy of 
the formal dispute resolution process.  MacDonald contends that the emergence of ADR 
                                                
18 Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”, supra note 3 at 117. 
19 Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability”, ibid at 118. 
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also served to spark public legal education programs and the use of plain language as 
means of demystifying law and thereby making it more accessible.20   
 
Interestingly, as ADR was embraced by corporations and courts for its cost-
effectiveness and its potential for faster results as well as tailor-made solutions for the 
affected parties, there was a shift in thinking about ADR as a means of enhancing access 
to justice.   In fact, in subsequent years, there have been critiques of ADR that challenge 
the notion that it enhances access to justice.21  In her discussion of ADR, Sally Engle 
Merry suggested that wealthy corporate parties and government were keen to make use of 
the ADR process (and thus chose to make use of ADR initiatives) because it offered a 
less time-consuming and inexpensive process, which they could abandon if it did not 
work.  However, for the working poor, ADR was required or at a minimum, encouraged 
because “their problems were defined as undesirable or inappropriate for the courts.”22  
The former group was likely able to make use of private lawyers if need required.  
However, the latter group were often either without representation in the court system or 
dependent on state assistance.  In this regard, the argument was that certain groups were 
removed from the court system and relegated to a second-class system of justice.   
 
                                                
20 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 22; however MacDonald was 
subsequently critical of attempts to make legal language more accessible because it either discounted non-
official law as non-legal or attempted to convert non-official law rather than allowing for the construction 
of a legal language by citizens directly.  See Roderick A MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice” (1992) 
7:2 CJLS 23 at 32 [MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”].  
21 For example, in her article entitled, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice (For Ordinary 
People),” Laura Nader expressed a skepticism regarding the development of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) mechanisms as a means of resolving disputes outside the courtroom.  Specifically, she questioned 
whether instead of improving access to justice, ADR is an unregulated process motivated by a desire to 
unburden the courts and control the populace, neither goal of which served the justice interests of the 
ordinary person.  See Laura Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice (For Ordinary 
People)” (1990) 10 Windsor YB Access Just 496 at 511 [Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to 
Justice”].  In terms of another critique, MacDonald suggested that the popularity of ADR was, in part due 
to the adoption by the legal community of an alternative to the ‘prosecution of rights in court’ that 
maintains a legal framework but transfers to a “‘therapeutic’ terrain all those conflicts which threaten to 
reveal the partiality of the office of the judge and of the structure of professionally-defined rights.”  See 
MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”, supra note 20 at 30.  
22 Sally Engle Merry, “Varieties of Mediation Performance: Replicating Differences in Access to Justice” 
in Allan C Hutchinson, ed, Access to Civil Justice (Toronto, Canada: Carswell – A Division of Thomson 
Canada Limited, 1990) at 261. 
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Following a period that explored alternative forums as well as modes of dispute 
resolution, the 1980’s saw a third wave of access to justice reforms that was focused on 
issues of equality and the corresponding development of substantive measures that were 
aimed at ensuring equality in legal outcomes as well as procedures.23  Most significantly, 
this was influenced in Canada by the inception of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms24 (the “Charter”) in 1982.  This was particularly true in the criminal context 
whereby the scope of challenges to different aspects of criminal procedure was expanded 
and, as a result, new iterations of rights were articulated.  In this respect, legal aid in 
Canada was also significantly impacted due to the increase in the number of cases being 
brought before the courts.25  Notwithstanding the specific impact that the Charter had on 
access to justice in the criminal context, it also had a broader impact in the sense that it 
raised difficult questions about equality, the need to ensure equal access and what equal 
access entailed.  MacDonald maintains that this also required an equality of outcomes.  
This aspect of the access agenda remains a live issue from both a theoretical as well as a 
practical perspective.  Ongoing questions about inequality in society are directly linked to 
broader issues of marginalization and disengagement, both of which have profound 
effects on individuals’ ability to access justice.   
 
Through the 1990’s, there was a growing recognition by legal scholars that access 
to justice would need to include access to non-traditional means of resolving disputes as 
well as provide better access to public legal education.  This would enable citizens to 
understand their rights and responsibilities and potentially gain access to the law-making 
processes.26  These initiatives were motivated by an acknowledgement that access needed 
to include access to law-making as well as law-administering institutions and forums.  
Underlying this acknowledgement was a more fundamental concern that law creation 
also needed to take account of issues of access to justice.  In order to do so, it was 
                                                
23 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 20-21. 
24 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11 [the “Charter”]. 
25 Currie, “Riding the Third Wave”, supra note 15 at 2. 
26 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 22. 
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necessary that citizens engage in the law-making processes.27  In the Canadian context, it 
was during this time that the government sought to “enhance citizen participation in 
Parliamentary committees and the rule-making hearings of administrative bodies in 
accordance with this expanded concept of access to justice.”28  Expanding the sites at 
which it is recognized that access is both required and deeply inadequate represented an 
important shift in access to justice theory.  Galanter has suggested that prior to this shift, 
“access to justice programs have focused on ‘unmet legal needs’” and thus, the programs 
have been principally concerned with removing barriers to the existing system.29  Further 
underlying this focus was the assumption that access to courts will result in access to 
justice. 30   In accordance with this assumption, concepts of ‘justice’ are linked 
predominantly to court processes.  However, this provides for a limited conceptualization 
of justice; it fails to take account of the “justice to which we seek access.”31  As society 
evolves and socio-political and legal conditions change, justice becomes a moving 
frontier that must be defined and re-defined by those directly impacted by either its 
fulfillment or, alternatively, its failures.  In this regard, the ability to engage in 
discussions about justice and how it is implemented in society become crucially 
important.  Thus, to the extent that law permeates significant aspects of individuals’ lives, 
the ability to engage in a discourse about justice at different law sites is a crucial 
component of access. 
 
Finally, the fifth and most recent wave of access to justice theory has built on and 
responded to some of the themes that have emerged over the past 30 years.  The most 
recent approaches to promoting access to justice contemplate an expanded notion of 
access that includes access to the “official and myriad of unofficial institutions where law 
                                                
27 See the discussion of Janice Gross Stein’s legal vernacular and the need for access to facilitate citizen 
discourse on concepts of justice in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
28 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 22. 
29 Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Social Capability”, supra note 3 at 123. 
30 Janet E Mosher, “Lessons in Access to Justice: Racialized Youths and Ontario’s Safe Schools” (2008) 46 
Osgoode Hall LJ 807 at 815 [Mosher, “Lessons in Access to Justice”]. 
31 Galanter, “Access to Justice in a World of Social Capability”, supra note 3 at 124. 
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is made and administered.”32  This approach to access includes the recognition that in 
order for people to be able to affect justice in their lives – a critical objective of 
promoting access – citizens must be able to participate in all of the institutions were law 
is made and administered.  As such, the promotion of access to justice cannot be 
restricted to access to the formal court processes.  More importantly, there is an 
acknowledgement that meaningful access to justice that enhances individuals’ ability to 
participate in a variety of legal institutions and processes is not limited to access to legal 
representation.  Instead, MacDonald stated, 
 
[i]n a liberal democracy, true access to justice requires that all people should 
have an equal right to participate in every institution where law is debated, 
created, found, organized, administered, interpreted and applied.  This 
means providing equal opportunities for the excluded to gain full access to 
positions of authority within the legal system.  Improving access to legal 
education, to the judiciary, to the public service and the police, to 
Parliament and to various law societies is now seen as the best way of 
changing the system to overcome the disempowerment, disrespect and 
disengagement felt by many citizens.33 
 
 
A New Wave? 
Following from this broader conceptualization of access to justice, the question that now 
arises is whether access to justice is on the cusp of a new wave.  This is shaped by existing 
as well as evolving themes in access and motivated by attempts to address the challenges 
stemming from a continued lack of access.  I believe that there are several considerations 
that may affect the emergence of this latest shift in the access to justice movement.  First 
of all, recent socio-legal research on access to justice, including ongoing research on the 
unresolved justiciable issues of vulnerable groups,34 has highlighted the fact that there is a 
                                                
32 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 23. 
33 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, ibid at 23. 
34 Pascoe Pleasance, Nigel J Balmer, Alexy Buck, Aoife Grady & Hazel Genn, “Multiple Justiciable 
Problems: Common Clusters and their Demographic Indicators” (2004) 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 301; Ab 
Currie, “A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low-and Moderate-Income Canadians: 
Incidence and Patterns” (2006) 13:3 Int’l J of the Legal Profession 217; Amanda Dodge, “Access to Justice 
Metrics Informed by the Voices of Marginalized Community Members: Themes, Definitions and 
Recommendations Arising from Community Consultations”  (March 2013) Paper prepared for Envisioning 
Equal Justice for the Standing Committee on Access to Justice, Canadian Bar Association. Available online 
at http://www. cba.org/CBA/Access/PDF/Community_Voice_Paper.pdf.  
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link between a lack of access to justice and the continued social exclusion of certain 
individuals and groups within society.  In his article on social exclusion and civil law, 
Pascoe Pleasance states, “the existence of a defining framework of civil law applicable to 
many problems of every day social life and social well-being, and the possibility for 
utilizing legal services and process to reach solutions to such justiciable problems, means 
that the infrastructure of civil justice today plays an important role in realizing social 
justice.”35  His research on vulnerable groups underscored the fact that “the socially 
excluded often face multiple problems…[and] there is a clear overlap between those 
demographic characteristics associated with social exclusion and vulnerability, such as 
living in temporary accommodations or being on a low income, and the experience of 
justiciable problems.”36  In the Canadian context, the Canadian Bar Association’s Report 
entitled “Envisioning Equal Justice” recently highlighted the significant role that access to 
justice has to play in alleviating social exclusion when it was stated that, 
 
[t]he reality today is that not everyone has meaningful access to justice 
regardless of income. The justice system is aggregating, rather than 
mitigating inequality.  The growth in income disparity and social exclusion 
is a leading public policy concern and has specific ramifications for justice 
policy.  Providing suitable legal advice and assistance can play a crucial role 
in helping people move out of some of the worst experiences of social 
exclusion.  Timely intervention in a life crisis can make all the difference.37   
Incorporating concerns of marginalization and social exclusion within the framework of 
access to justice objectives represents a further deepening of how access to justice is both 
conceptualized and reformed.38   
                                                
35 Alexy Buck, Nigel Balmer & Pascoe Pleasance, “Social Exclusion and Civil Law: Experience of Civil 
Justice Problems among Vulnerable Groups” (2005) 39:3 Social Policy and Administration 302 at 305 
quoting an earlier article by the same authors.  [Buck, Balmer & Pleasance, “Social Exclusion and Civil 
Law”]. 
36 Buck, Balmer & Pleasance, “Social Exclusion and Civil Law”, ibid at 318. 
37 Canadian Bar Association, “Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to Envision and Act”, Report of the 
Action to Justice Committee of the CBA, (August 2013).  Available online at http://www.CBA.org/CBA 
/equaljustice/secure_pdf/Equal-Justice-Summary-Report-Eng.pdf at 12. 
38 See also Trevor Farrow’s discussion of a new conceptualization of access to justice that requires legal 
professionals, policy-makers and academics recognize “the complex, multidimensional realities of every-
day social and legal problems.”  This includes the need to expand the examination of a problem beyond its 
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 In accordance with the acknowledgement that access to justice has a role to play 
in ameliorating social exclusion in society, there has also been a corresponding call to 
ensure that access to justice takes better account of the civil justice system users’ 
perspectives and needs as opposed to the views and perspectives of those who work in 
the civil justice system.  In other words, individuals attempting to make use of the justice 
system to resolve their legal issues need to be heard in terms of both designing and 
administering dispute resolution processes.  Most recently, the Action Committee on 
Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters’ Final Report highlighted the need for a 
cultural shift in both how access to justice is conceptualized and how the corresponding 
reform is approached.  Specifically, one of the objectives articulated in the report 
included,  
 …a need to change our primary focus.  Too often, we focus inward on how 
the system operates from the point of view of those who work in it.  For 
example, court processes — language, location, operating times, 
administrative systems, paper and filing requirements, etc. — typically 
make sense and work for lawyers, judges and court staff.  They often do 
not make sense or do not work for litigants.  The focus must be on the 
people who need to use the system.  This focus must include all people, 
especially members of immigrant, aboriginal and rural populations and 
other vulnerable groups.  Litigants, and particularly self-represented 
litigants, are not, as they are too often seen, an inconvenience; they are 
why the system exists.  Until we involve those who use the system in the 
reform process, the system will not really work for those who use it.39   
This sentiment was also emphasized in the Canadian Bar Association’s report on access 
                                                                                                                                            
legal perspective.  Farrow states that “[t]o the extent that we improve how we address everyday social 
issues (including legal issues) in order to provide those things that people need and want, then – in line with 
a more modern view of justice – we succeed in improving access to justice.  And to do so, we need to start 
from the premise of what the public needs, not  - at least as a starting point  - what the legal system 
currently can offer.”  See Trevor Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform in Canada” in Adam 
Dodek & Alice Woolley, eds, In Search of the Ethical Lawyer (Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2016) 164 
at 167 [Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform”]. 
39 Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Access to Civil and Family Justice: 
A Roadmap for Change”, Final Report (October 2013) at 12.  Available online at http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/sites/default/files/doc/2013/Ac-Report_English_Final.pdf [Action Committee, Final Report on 
Access to Civil and Family Justice]. 
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to justice.40  It has been operationalized in research undertaken by Trevor Farrow who 
sought to ask members of the public what they thought about concepts such as ‘access’ 
and ‘justice.’  Farrow’s ethnographic research project was based on the belief that “[t]he 
public, which uses the system, needs to be at the centre of how we think about, 
understand, and reform the system” and this was consistent with a “growing body of 
public-centered access to justice literature and justice reform initiatives.”41   
 A user-centric approach to access to justice theory and related reform is further 
consistent with the present realities of the civil justice system.  One of the present 
realities and most pressing issues facing the civil justice system is the increasing number 
of self-represented litigants who are obligated to represent themselves within a system 
that, to date, has not taken serious account of their particular needs or objectives.  While 
there is no question that efforts have been made to simplify court processes and reform 
complex procedures, these measures have, more often than not, been shaped by those 
professionals who work within the system rather than those who use the system.  This 
approach to reform has, in turn, underscored the continuing influence that legal 
representation and legal services more generally have on the development of concepts of 
access to justice and implementation of access initiatives.  The continued weight afforded 
to legal representation as a means of improving access to justice is now running up 
against the practical reality of self-representation and the need to address this 
phenomenon.  Moreover, this has begun to call existing practices and approaches to 
access into question.  The presence of significant numbers of self-represented litigants 
has also begun to challenge certain underlying assumptions about the dispute process 
and, more particularly, the role of the key actors in the dispute process, including how 
lawyers and judges interact with self-represented litigants.  When read together, all of 
these factors signal another potential shift in the access to justice movement and one that 
contains the possibility of fundamentally challenging certain accepted understandings of 
what access entails. 
                                                
40 Canadian Bar Association, “Reaching Equal Justice: An Invitation to Envision and Act”, Report of the 
Action to Justice Committee of the CBA, (August 2013).  See http://www.CBA.org/CBA/equaljustice 
/securepdf/Equal-Justice-Summary-Report-Eng.pdf 
41 Trevor CW Farrow, “What is Access to Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 at 961 & 966. 
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 These broader concepts of access to justice theory form part of the framework for 
the present analysis of self-representation and the role of self-help legal initiatives in 
promoting access to justice.  While this approach to access to justice represents a broader 
concept of what access should entail, there is still a tension between this broader concept 
as expressed by the democratic thesis, which contemplates participation in a variety of 
legal and political institutions that impact individuals’ lives, and a concept of access as 
described by the practical thesis, which is focused on providing individuals with access to 
lawyers and legal services as a means of obtaining justice.   
 
The Practical Thesis of Access to Justice  
Despite very recent shifts in access to justice theory that have begun to take account of 
the role of citizen participation in various legal and political forums, the ‘waves’ of 
access theory and policy that have developed over the past 60 years have tended to 
assume that participation by individuals is best achieved through improved access to legal 
representation that, in turn, promoted access to institutionalized dispute resolution 
processes.42  It was further assumed that if, “we increase people’s access to courts and 
tribunals by lowering wait times, making trials more efficient, and to the extent that we 
increase the availability of lawyers, perhaps by increasing the number of lawyers who can 
practice law in a given jurisdiction or decreasing what they charge, we increase access to 
justice.”43  The predominant paradigm about what access should include and how access 
achieves justice has largely focused on the belief that access to lawyers will assist 
individuals in getting a better outcome; a better outcome was typically defined as justice 
within the particular context of the individuals’ cases.  Notwithstanding whether the 
lawyer pursued the client’s interests as the client saw fit, the assumption was that 
representation by a lawyer allowed the individual to participate fully in the legal 
system.44  These assumptions have continued to influence the development of the ‘waves’ 
of access to justice over the past 60 years.  In this regard, the continued focus on legal 
                                                
42 Christine B Harrington, “The Politics of Participation and Non-Participation in Dispute Processes” 
(1984) 6 Law & Pol’y 203 at 205 [Harrington, “The Politics of Participation”]. 
43 Farrow, “A New Wave of Access to Justice Reform”, supra note 38 at 166. 
44 Ibid at 205. 
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representation calls the metaphor of the ‘wave’ into question.45  Specifically, to the extent 
that a focus on legal representation—present in the earliest conceptualizations of 
access—has continued to influence thinking about access to justice and direct the reform 
initiatives, it cannot be said that each new development in access is like a wave.  This is 
particularly true when it is considered that, once a wave has reached its peak, it recedes 
and is ultimately replaced by another one.46  In the example of access to justice, this has 
not been the case.  To the extent that there have been different iterations about the points 
of access, certain dominant views about how best to enhance access have continued to 
shape access policy.   
 
Underlying this paradigm are certain assumptions about what people are believed 
to want from the legal system. 47  The first assumption is that individuals’ only desire is to 
win their case.  A further assumption is that the formal justice system represents the 
complete landscape of access to justice and that access to the formal legal system (with 
the assistance of lawyers) can affect justice in people’s lives.  This is perhaps more 
problematic than the first assumption because there is an underlying belief that “existing 
law is substantively just” and individuals, once unencumbered by procedural barriers to 
the formal legal system, will be in a position to obtain justice.48  This belief fails to take 
account of the political nature of attempting to obtain justice and also serves to underplay 
the importance of obtaining access to the many other institutions (e.g., legislatures) where 
law is constituted and the possibilities of obtaining justice delineated.  Instead, citizens 
are limited to participating in formal legal institutions by way of professional agents who 
re-construct their issues, problems and struggles within a legal framework that those 
                                                
45 Mosher, “Lessons in Access to Justice”, supra note 30 at 817. 
46 Mosher, “Lessons in Access to Justice”, ibid at 817. 
47 Susan Silbey & Sally Merry, “What Do Plaintiffs Want?  Re-Examining the Concept of Dispute” (1984) 
9:2 The Justice System Journal 151.  Certain empirical research has questioned the validity of this 
assumption.  In her research on the plaintiffs’ motivation for commencing medical malpractice claims, 
Tamara Relis suggests that plaintiffs’ objectives often include various non-economic and extra-legal aims 
such as an admission of fault, prevention of recurrences; answers and apologies.  However, these objectives 
are ultimately transformed or reduced by the plaintiffs’ lawyers to pure economic claims consistent with 
what lawyers consider to be “legal system realities”.  See Tamara Relis, “‘Its Not About the Money!’: A 
Theory of Misconceptions of Plaintiffs Litigation Aims” (2007) 68 U Pitt L Rev 701. 
48 MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”, supra note 20 at 26-27. 
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same individuals had no part in constructing and little opportunity to reform.  The result 
is a very limited ability of citizens to engage in discussions about and ultimately define 
concepts of justice that have direct bearing on their lives.   
 
The adherence to a conceptualization of access to justice as access to formal legal 
institutions with the assistance of legal representation has also shaped the thinking about 
how access is achieved.  In particular, it assumes that the removal of certain types of 
barriers will improve individuals’ ability to obtain access to justice.  MacDonald 
categorized certain of these barriers as being ‘material.’  These include access to the 
physical institutions such as courts, administrative agencies and court offices, and are 
further focused on the delay, cost and complexity of legal processes and institutions.  In 
addition, barriers to access are also characterized as ‘subjective’ in the sense that certain 
justice-seekers (i.e., non-white, female, and poor individuals) do not see themselves as 
able to access the formal legal institutions.49  However, taking a step back from these 
categories of barriers, it is important to take note of the fact that the equation of access to 
justice with access to legal representation in formal legal institutions represents a 
particular barrier for individuals who self-represent.  If it is assumed that access to legal 
representation provides for access to justice, then it may also be assumed that self-
represented litigants (who proceed without legal representation) will be unable to access 
justice.  Given the ever-increasing number of individuals who are compelled or, 
alternatively, choose to represent themselves, these assumptions about how access is 
achieved (i.e., the removal of barriers) represent a hollow account of access to justice and 
one that fails to take account of more deeply-rooted barriers to access. 
 
The Crisis in Access to Justice 
In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of individuals who 
either choose or are compelled to address a legal issue without the assistance of legal 
representation.  This dramatic increase is reflective of even more troubling statistics that 
                                                
49 MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today”, supra note 1 at 26-28. 
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reveal a serious lack of access to justice in Canada manifest in unmet legal needs.50  
Specifically, statistical data in Canada suggests that approximately 12 million people will 
experience at least one legal problem in a given three-year period.51  Underlying this 
statistic is the fact that many individuals do not identify or characterize their problem as 
‘justiciable’ or seek assistance in addressing the problem, even if they are able to identify 
the issue as legal in nature.52  One of the consequences in this regard is that a significant 
portion of the population may be unaware of the rights they hold as citizens, unable to 
exercise their rights and/or recognize those same rights in other citizens; all of which is 
inconsistent with the principles underlying a democratic society.  Research has further 
demonstrated that unresolved legal problems can lead to further and more complicated 
legal problems, as well as lead to other types of socio-economic problems.53  Moreover, 
given the increasingly long “reach of law” into individuals’ daily lives and the significant 
socio-political role that legal institutions play in our society,54 the inability of citizens to 
identify and address legal problems signifies a critical disengagement by significant 
portions of the population.  Thus, the consequence of not addressing these problems can 
be profound. 
 
In Canada, it is believed that approximately “50% of people try to solve their 
problems on their own with no or minimal legal or authoritative non-legal assistance.”55  
In certain legal contexts such as family law, the percentages are significantly higher.56  In 
these circumstances, individuals do not retain a lawyer to address their legal matter on 
                                                
50 Action Committee, Final Report on Access to Civil and Family Justice, supra note 39 at 2. 
51 Action Committee, Final Report on Access to Civil and Family Justice, ibid at 2. 
52 William LF Felstiner, Richard L Abel & Austin Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
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at 374 [Rhode, “Access to Justice”]. 
55 Action Committee, Final Report on Access to Civil and Family Justice, supra note 39 at 4. 
56 Action Committee, Final Report on Access to Civil and Family Justice, supra note 39 at 4. 
 32 
their behalf.  However, a certain percentage of self-represented individuals seek out 
various forms of legal advice or sources of legal information that will help them to 
address their problem and maneuver through the legal system.   
 
Prior to examining the underlying reasons that individuals may have for 
addressing their legal problem without legal representation, there is a preliminary issue 
raised in the access to justice literature regarding the appropriate nomenclature respecting 
individuals who manage their own legal matter without legal counsel.57  It has been 
suggested that the term ‘self-represented’ is preferable to ‘unrepresented.’  The latter 
connotes a lack of representation due to an insufficiency of financial resources, which, in 
turn, conveys negative images of the litigants that follow them through the civil justice 
system.  In contrast, Rollie Thompson suggests that ‘unrepresented litigant’ is the more 
accurate term because unrepresented litigants “would like to have a lawyer but can’t 
afford or find one.  The ‘self-represented’ might be able to afford a lawyer, but don't want 
one or can’t keep one.”58   According to these understandings, the ‘unrepresented 
litigants’ category would likely represent the overwhelming number of non-lawyers in 
the civil justice system.  However, it is important to note that the term ‘self-represented’ 
is not without negative connotations and the assumptions that come with such 
connotations. 59   Julie MacFarlane offers a different interpretation of the relevant 
nomenclature on self-represented litigants.  She states that the term ‘unrepresented’ 
suggests a level of intention and choice to appear without a lawyer that mischaracterizes 
the motives of the vast majority of the respondents in her study.  MacFarlane further 
asserts that the decision to adopt the term “self-represented” as a generic term throughout 
her Report is reflective of the conclusions of the Lord Chancellor’s Civil Justice Council 
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“Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants in the Canadian Justice System” A White Paper 
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Working Group in the United Kingdom.  This group rejected the use of the term 
“unrepresented” saying that it assumes that the “norm is representation by lawyers and 
this assumption can no longer be made.”60  Moreover, in its report on self-represented 
litigants in England and Wales, the Civil Justice Council acknowledged that there were 
important considerations underlying the change in nomenclature from ‘litigant in person’ 
to self-represented litigant.  The Report states that two general points about language lay 
behind this change.  First, there is the importance of using language that those 
representing themselves will recognize; plain language as opposed to legal terminology.  
Second, there is an obligation to use language that both emphasizes that representation of 
a party does not only exist when there is a lawyer, as well as acknowledges that the terms 
employed do not imply a deficiency in the fact of self-representation.61  Finally, the 
Canadian Judicial Council’s Statement of Principles on self-represented litigants makes 
note that the term self-represented litigant is 
used to describe persons who appear without representation.  The use of 
the term is not meant to suggest inferences about the reasons the individual 
is without representation, nor the quality of their self-representation, and 
recognizes that some individuals prefer to represent themselves.62   
 
Data collected from several socio-legal research projects in the field of access to 
justice indicates that the main reason that individuals represent themselves relates to their 
inability to pay for legal representation.63  While the self-representation phenomenon is 
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not entirely new, the scale and scope of self-representation has increased dramatically.64  
Data suggest that this trend will continue as legal fees are priced out of the reach of more 
individuals.  The result is that individuals are compelled to represent themselves.  The 
further consequence is a concept of self-representation that is at odds with the traditional 
practice of law and the legal institutions that were designed by and for lawyers and 
judges.65  More specifically, a lack of knowledge, experience and skills about both the 
legal processes and institutions place self-represented litigants at a serious disadvantage 
when acting on their own.  This, in turn, limits individuals’ access to justice.66  In the 
preamble to its statement of principles on self-represented litigants and accused persons, 
the Canadian Judicial Council acknowledges that self-represented litigants both face and 
present special challenges that necessitate efforts to ensure that “self-represented litigants 
are provided with fair access and equal treatment by the court.”67 
 
 As noted, various socio-legal studies have indicated that the most notable reason 
that individuals represent themselves relates to an inability to afford legal 
representation.68  In this regard, the research reveals that a disproportionate percentage of 
self-represented litigants are either low or moderate-income individuals for whom the 
costs of legal services are out of reach.  Recent empirical research in Canada has 
identified various characteristics of self-represented litigants which include individuals 
with a lack of social resources (such as low income, low education levels and/or low 
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literacy), individuals living with social barriers (such as mental or physical challenges, 
language or cultural barriers), individuals living in remote areas as well as individuals 
that are unable to find a lawyer or lose their lawyer in the course of a lengthy case.69  
Moreover, research by Balmer in England and Wales has suggested that inaction among 
certain groups (e.g. low and moderate income individuals) was also connected to the 
individual’s level of awareness regarding legal rights: data indicated a link between 
greater awareness of legal rights and higher income levels.70  Similar conclusions have 
been made as a result of research data collected in Canada.71  However, more recent 
research has suggested that increased levels of income do not necessarily mean that 
individuals are less likely to either suffer justiciable issues or represent themselves when 
faced with a legal problem. 72   In their article on justiciable problems and the 
corresponding use of lawyers, Pascoe Pleasance and Nigel Balmer stated that, while the 
type of legal problem experienced may be different as between individuals of different 
income levels, research data collected from Canada, New Zealand, England and Wales 
among other jurisdictions demonstrated that low-income is most associated with 
problems of welfare and housing.  In contrast, individuals with higher income are likely 
to experience problems as owner-occupiers, issues of employment or consumer 
problems.73  Thus, while the type of problem faced may differ, the pervasiveness of law 
in “contemporary bureaucratic societies” means that a significant majority of individuals, 
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including middle-income individuals, have justiciable issues that they cannot afford to 
retain a lawyer to address.74  Even in the case of individuals who start out by hiring legal 
representatives, they may ultimately become self-represented as the retainer paid upfront 
to the lawyer runs out and the legal matter remains outstanding.  
 
As a result of these factors, individuals may offer three responses: take no action 
to try and resolve their problem, thereby ‘lumping’ the problem;75 attempt to take some 
action on their own; or try and find some limited assistance that includes other forms of 
legal services.76  Moreover, while it is assumed that individuals falling within the middle-
income category may be in a better position to secure some form of legal assistance other 
than legal representation, these alternative forms of legal services often provide a 
patchwork remedy at best.  For example, individuals may be able to access self-help 
resources, information centres (e.g. the family law information centres), specialty legal 
clinics (e.g. the Family Legal Health Program at the Hospital for Sick Kids), as well as 
duty counsel in certain courts (e.g. the amicus curiae program at the Ontario Court of 
Appeal).  However, these services tend to work independently of each other.  Thus, 
individuals are unlikely to obtain complete or comprehensive assistance when attempting 
to resolve their legal issue.  Compounding the patchwork nature of available services is 
the fact that certain of the legal services available have income limits and are not 
accessible to those in a middle-income bracket.77  As a result of these circumstances, 
many low- as well as middle-income individuals are compelled to proceed alone and in 
so doing, navigate the justice system without legal assistance.   
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Notwithstanding that a significant number of individuals become self-represented 
out of financial need, it is also important to acknowledge that a certain percentage of 
individuals may choose to represent themselves for other reasons.78  A recent study on 
legal needs in Ontario found that approximately one-third of low- and middle-income 
individuals surveyed indicated that they would prefer to settle their legal matter 
themselves with appropriate advice.  This did not necessarily mean with the assistance of 
a legal representative.79  This decision to self-represent can be based on a variety of 
considerations.  For example, individuals may believe that the legal matter is simple 
enough to be handled without a lawyer’s involvement.  In this sense, the type and/or size 
of the legal matter will impact the individual’s decision to seek legal representation.80  In 
the American context, Deborah Rhode contends that the growth in self-representation 
has, in part, resulted from increased consumer consciousness coupled with cutbacks in 
government-subsidized legal assistance. 81  This growth has, in turn, led to more interest 
in the concept of self-help strategies and the corresponding expansion of ‘do-it-yourself’ 
legal documents and online programs that individuals can access from a variety of 
different sources.  
 
With respect to the latter, a recent development in dispute resolution theory and 
practice that reflects this shift toward self-help is the growth of online dispute resolution 
(ODR) processes. 82   ODR processes contemplate the use of technology to create 
                                                
78 Herbert M Kritzer, “To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: That is the Question” (2008) 5:4 J Empirical Legal 
Stud 875 [Kritzer, “To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer”]. 
79 R Roy McMurty, Marion Boyd, John Camus & Lorne Sossin, “Listening to Ontarians” - Report of the 
Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project (May 2010) at 4. See 
www.lsuc.on.ca/media/may3110_oclnreport_final.pdf. 
80 Kritzer, “To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer”, supra note 78 at 900. 
81 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 54 at 399; Jeff Giddings & M Robertson, “‘Lay People, for God’s 
sake! Surely I Should be Dealing with Lawyers?’ Toward an Assessment of Self-help Legal Services in 
Australia”(2002) 11:2 Griffith LR 436 at 438-439. 
82 Darin Thompson, “The Growth of Online Dispute Resolution and Its Use on British Columbia” (March 
2014), Paper presented at the Civil Litigation Conference, CLE BC.  Outside of a corporate context, the 
Dutch legal aid pioneered the use of ODR in the fields of divorce and separation and landlord-tenant law.  
Through an internet platform, individuals in the Netherlands can “learn about their legal options while 
receiving rich support for an interest-based dialogue between the people involved.”  As well, the platform 
provides mediation, arbitration and a review of all agreements.  The Rechtwijzer (Dutch legal aid) website 
suggests that ODR technology “empowers people in various domains where they used to be more 
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platforms and processes on the Internet through which individuals attempt to resolve their 
dispute.  While these initiatives are still in their infancy, it is possible that ODR processes 
could provide an additional opportunity for self-represented litigants to participate 
directly in the resolution of their legal dispute.  Its original use by entities such as Ebay 
and Amazon, was in the context of e-commerce whereby consumers could resolve 
disputes that arose in the course of transactions that occurred over the Internet.  However, 
the ability to resolve disputes online through a combination of electronic submissions and 
real-time exchanges between disputants is consistent with conceptualizations of self-help 
that support individuals in resolving their disputes directly and without legal 
representation.  Rather than simply automating traditional disputes processes, ODR seeks 
to “create new processes using technology.”83  In this sense, ODR could incorporate 
processes that are reflective of self-represented litigants’ abilities and experiences (as 
opposed to those developed and administered by lawyers), and in so doing, provide self-
help services that encourage individuals’ participation in these new processes.  Moreover, 
the fact that individuals would be able to engage online rather than be physically present 
in a courtroom could also serve to alleviate certain challenges faced by self-represented 
litigants living in remote areas or otherwise encountering physical barriers to access.   
 
Alternatively, individuals may decide to represent themselves because they have 
lost confidence in the ability of members of the legal profession to represent their 
interests. 84   A recent report of the Canadian Bar Association suggested for some 
individuals who might otherwise be in a position to afford legal representation, the 
decision not to hire a lawyer was based in part on the individual’s distrust of lawyers 
                                                                                                                                            
dependent on experts.”  See the Rechtwijzer website available online at 
http://www.hiil.org/project/rechtwijzer.  The United Kingdom is also in the process of implementing an 
online dispute process that is modeled on the Dutch example.  See Roger Smith, “Online Dispute 
Resolution: ten lessons in access to justice (2015).  Available online at http://www/judiciary.co.uk>. 
83 Ibid at 1.1.2. 
84 Scott Barclay, “Decision to Self-Represent” (1996) 77 Social Science Quarterly 912 [Barclay, “Decision 
to Self-Represent”]; see also John M Greacen, “Self-Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Services 
Responses to Their Needs – What We Know” (2000).  Paper prepared for the Center for Families, Children 
and the Courts, California Administrative Office of the Courts. Available online at 
www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf. [Greacan, “Self-Represented Litigants and 
Court”] 
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and/or a confidence in her own ability to represent herself in the legal system.85  In the 
American context, statistical data collected from various studies on self-represented 
litigants in the United States confirmed that, while financial concerns were the 
predominant reason for not hiring a lawyer, individuals also expressed concerns over 
delays caused by lawyers, as well as distrust in lawyers.86  
 
In another regard, empirical research has suggested that the decision to self-
represent is for certain litigants a means of compelling the court to address the issues as 
defined by the litigant rather than the lawyer.  In examining the decision to self-represent, 
Scott Barclay distinguished between what might be a ‘successful legal decision’ and a 
‘sound legal decision’.  If litigants are aware that their choice may result in losing the 
case, the decision to self-represent in order to ensure that the issues as they see them are 
before the court rather than how a lawyer may characterize the issue, may not be 
successful, but it can constitute a sound decision.87  The idea that individuals would 
decide to represent themselves in order to ensure that their voice is heard has important 
implications for how access to justice is conceptualized and how the types of initiatives 
that are aimed at ensuring individuals are heard are developed and implemented.   
 
Given these different accounts of why individuals might decide to represent 
themselves, the traditional focus on access to justice as being about how to increase 
access to lawyers may be quite different when looked at from the public’s standpoint.  
Instead, what might be needed is a greater emphasis on achieving justice rather than 
achieving more access to lawyers.88  This shift in priorities is consistent with the most 
recent wave of access to justice theory and policy that is more focused on direct 
                                                
85 Nicholas Bala & Rachel Birnbaum, “The Rise of the Self-Representation in Canada’s Family Courts: The 
Complex Picture Revealed in Surveys of Judges, Lawyers and Litigants” (2013) 91 Canadian Bar Review 
67. 
86 Greacen, “Self-Represented Litigants and Court”, supra note 84. 
87 Barclay, “Decision to Self-Represent”, supra note 84 at 921. 
88 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 54 at 399.  It is important to note that Roderick MacDonald called 
for a shift in thinking about access, such that the goal is participation by individuals in the legal institutions 
and decision-making processes that affect them rather than the relinquishment of their voice to legal 
professionals.   
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engagement by individuals in the legal process that affects their lives.  In this regard, 
there would be a corresponding shift away from strict reliance on traditional modes of 
legal representation and a move toward more varied means and forums for accessing 
justice.  Individuals would have a better say and be heard and, in so doing, participate 
directly in the development of both a theory and practice of justice.  Rhode further 
suggests that a focus on achieving justice, as opposed to a focus on increasing legal 
representation, further contemplates providing individuals with the means to address 
legal problems in ways that are “timely, fair and affordable.”89  This may ultimately 
envisage individuals pursuing their own legal strategies.  
 
In addition to addressing the reasons underlying individuals’ decision to represent 
themselves, two of the main themes in the literature on self-representation relate to the 
significant challenges that self-represented litigants face when representing themselves, 
as well as the impact that self-represented litigants have on the administration of the 
justice system.  For a significant portion of self-represented litigants, the challenge lies in 
being able to represent themselves within a professionalized and complex justice 
system.90  This challenge is rooted in certain assumptions about the reality of the existing 
adversarial system, the role of the professionals within the adversarial system, the right of 
opposing parties to a timely resolution of disputes, and the associated need for the justice 
system to run in an efficient and timely manner.91 
 
The Democratic Thesis of Access to Justice 
Given the growing numbers of self-represented litigants in the civil justice system and the 
challenges they face, it is necessary to revisit the efficacy of the existing waves of access 
to justice theory and the corresponding implications for access to justice policy.  An 
important element of this examination is the need to take critical account of some of the 
                                                
89 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 54 at 399. 
90 Russell Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal about 
When Counsel is Most Needed” (2010) 37:37 Fordham Urb LJ 2. 
91 A more detailed description of these challenges is contained in chapter four and in the research findings 
discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. 
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underlying ideas about what constitutes access, why access is important, and for whom 
access is pursued.  As I have sought to insist, one of the manifestations of this re-
examination involves reference to the more basic debate about the underlying premises of 
access to justice—is the goal to provide individuals with legal representation so that they 
may assert legal rights and resolve legal problems in a favourable manner (the practical 
thesis) or is it to enhance their direct engagement with a variety of law-making 
institutions and processes such that they are able to participate in and ultimately affect 
concepts of justice relevant to their lives (the democratic thesis).  My discussion about 
and research on access to justice is premised on the democratic thesis of access to justice.  
In accordance with this broader approach to access to justice, the means by which an 
individual participates span a continuum from self-representation through to 
representation with the assistance of lawyers whose ambition and expertise are directed 
toward encouraging clients to share in the decision-making processes that affect them.  In 
the course of engaging in the decision-making processes that affect them, individuals are 
able participate in a discourse about justice and further develop certain practical skills, 
which facilitate additional participation.  Unlike the practical thesis, which is more 
narrowly focused on achieving a specific outcome in a particular legal matter with the 
assistance of legal representation, the democratic thesis is more broadly focused on 
encouraging individuals’ engagement in law-making and law-administering institutions.  
Importantly, the result would be the “returning of official law to ordinary people.”92 
 
This broader conceptualization of access to justice is further premised on a belief 
that there are a significant number of individuals in society who are disengaged from law-
making processes, whether these processes take place in the legal system or through the 
legislatures.  Moreover, the present reality for many citizens living in highly bureaucratic 
societies is that law permeates a broad range of activities in their lives.  However, they 
have little say in how laws that impact them are either constituted or administered.  As a 
result of this continuing disengagement, many individuals are not provided with any 
                                                
92 MacDonald, “Thesis on Access to Justice”, supra note 20 at 43. 
 42 
opportunity to contribute to definitions of justice relevant to their lives.93  If the political 
and legal institutions that govern individuals’ lives are to remain legitimate and relevant, 
it is important that those ultimately affected by the decision-making processes in these 
institutions are able to participate in the relevant decision-making processes.  Otherwise, 
there remains a continuing disconnect between citizens and the laws to which they are 
subject such that democracy is weakened and de-legitimized.  For these reasons, it is 
important to democratize law and re-enlist individuals in defining both law and justice in 
their own language.  This applies fully and squarely to access to justice. 
 
Aside from the theoretical considerations, there is also a practical reality that 
underscores this broader conceptualization of access.  Not only are there not enough legal 
professionals to address all of the legal issues that individuals’ experience, but there are a 
wide variety of relationships and issues that individuals would likely prefer to mediate 
outside of formal legal frameworks.  Finally, it is arguable that an attempt to provide 
legal representation of this nature without substantial reform of the existing system of 
dispute resolution would potentially cause the existing legal system to collapse in on 
itself both in terms of delay and volume of matters litigated. 
 
I have emphasized that part of the explanation for a move toward a broader 
conceptualization of access to justice also lies in the corresponding shift away from 
reliance on the traditional dispute resolution process as the exclusive means by which 
individuals are able to obtain justice.  This shift is derived, in part, from the earlier waves 
of access that influenced the development of ADR.  MacDonald characterized this as a 
movement to de-judicialize and de-institutionalize justice.  Merry and Harrington suggest 
that some of the early motivations underlying the development of alternative dispute 
resolution included ideas about community building, participation and empowering 
individuals to handle conflict at a local level.  All of these benefits are thought to assist in 
                                                
93 In his article “Theses on Access to Justice”, MacDonald critiqued Quebec’s Task Force on Access to 
Justice for its failure to formally recognize the importance of promoting legal information and knowledge 
such that it enables “citizens to participate more effectively in the legal process by lobbying legislatures, 
city councils, or administrative agencies”.  See MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”, supra note 20 at 
40. 
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disabusing citizens of the assumption that justice was imposed on the citizenry by the 
state.94   
 
While subject to certain criticisms, alternative dispute resolution processes 
potentially provide individuals with an opportunity to have a more ‘direct say’ in the 
process as opposed to being passive bystanders in the context of the traditional court 
system.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that this can facilitate greater democratic 
participation in the sense that, “some forms of facilitated settlement, including mediation, 
mini-trials, and some settlement conferences, involve greater, rather than lesser, 
participation from the actual disputants, ‘control’ of the dispute by the parties involved 
may make some forms of dispute resolution more responsive to the parties, rather than 
professionals’ interests.”95  This is, again, contrasted with the passive role traditionally 
played by non-lawyers in the legal system.  On this basis, alternative dispute resolution 
processes provide a means by which individuals may have the opportunity to participate 
directly in the resolution of their own dispute and, in the course of doing so, become 
more accepting of the resolution.96  In her article on the level and scope of participation 
in mediation and court processes respectively, Christine Harrington also suggests that the 
flexible and accommodative nature of mediation allows account to be taken of individual 
histories and circumstances, which in turn, allows for participatory problem-solving by 
the parties.97  While such processes may not provide for individuals’ participation in the 
articulation of public norms of justice, Menkel-Meadow offers an alternative and 
                                                
94 Lauren B Edelman & Mia Cahill, “How Law Matters in Disputing and Dispute Processing (Or, the 
Contingency of Legal Matters in Information Dispute Processes)” in Bryant G Garth & Austin Sarat, eds, 
How Does Law Matter (Illinois, USA: Northwestern University Press, 1998) at 20.  Carrie Menkel 
Meadow, “Whose Dispute is it Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defence of Settlement (in some 
cases)” (1995) 83 Geo LJ 2663 [Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute is it Anyway?”]. 
95 See also Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute is it Anyway?” ibid at 2689. 
96 Research by Lissak and Sheppard in the context of fairness criteria in alternative dispute processes 
determined that while various participants in the study focused on issues such as “getting at the facts” and 
ensuring there is a fair process were important criteria “the relative importance of criteria is somewhat 
dependant upon what is in dispute and who is doing the rating.”  See Robin I Lissak & Blair H Sheppard, 
“Beyond Fairness: The Criterion Problem in Research on Dispute Intervention” (1983) 13:2 Journal of 
Applied Science 45 at 58. 
97 Christine B Harrington,“The Politics of Participation and Non-Participation in Dispute Resolution 
Processes” (1984) 6:2 Law and Pol’y 203 at 209 [Harrington, “The Politics of Participation”]. 
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democratic interpretation of the settlement derived in an alternative dispute resolution in 
which, “[s]settlement (and its sometimes rejection of law) could just as easily be seen as a 
democratic expression of individual justice where rules made for the aggregate would 
either be unjust, or simply irrelevant to the achievement of justice in individual cases.”98  
Again, this is contrasted with the formal adjudicatory process whereby ostensibly neutral 
general principles are imposed on the parties in the form of a judgment rendered by the 
adjudicator.99  In light of these considerations, one of the key lessons that may be learned 
from the ADR movement and subsequently applied in the context of a broader 
conceptualization of access is the centering of the individual (rather than the professional) 
in the decision-making and problems-solving process.  In this way, such processes are 
consistent with the democratic thesis of access.   
 
For the purposes of my research project, an examination of the tension between 
the broader ‘democratic’ concept of access and a concept that has focused on ‘practical’ 
legal outcomes facilitated by legal professionals is situated within a study of the role of 
legal self-help in assisting self-represented litigants.  This context provides a useful site at 
which to examine the objectives and merits of the different concepts of access from the 
perspective of the self-represented litigant.  In so doing, it may be possible to evaluate 
critically the legitimacy of a broader conceptualization that takes account of self-
represented litigants’ ability and willingness to engage in legal and political processes.  
This critical evaluation is made possible, in part, by the fact that there are valid practical 
concerns associated with self-represented parties’ ability to participate meaningfully in a 
judicial system that is designed by and for lawyers and judges.  Arguably, the legal 
process as it has been developed and administered historically has not been conducive to 
participation by non-lawyers.100  “Is the  
However, if the benefits derived from the adoption of a broader conceptualization of 
access are worth pursuing (and it is my view that such goals are not only worthwhile, but 
                                                
98 Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute is it Anyway?”, supra note 94 at 2676. 
99 Harrington, “The Politics of Participation”, supra note 97 at 209. 
100 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as Legal 
Institutions and Roles Evolve” (2004) 57 Current Legal Problems 82. 
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necessary for a more robust democratic society), then it is imperative that the existing 
system be critically examined with a view to adopting a broader concept of access.  Thus, 
to the extent that access to justice initiatives promote direct engagement by citizens in the 
decisions that affect them (an example of which is self-help), it is important that existing 
court systems and procedures, as well as the key players in that system, be assessed from 
the perspective of civil justice system’s users.  The ultimate ambition is to reshape and 
support a process that better facilitates participation.101  
 
Conclusion 
The historical evolution of access to justice as both a theoretical approach and policy 
initiative has been shaped by a variety of concerns that include individuals’ ability to 
assert legal rights and the fair administration of justice.  One of the predominant forces in 
this evolutionary process has been the role of the legal representative, both in terms of 
shaping the conceptualization of access and in facilitating or controlling individuals’ 
access to justice.  However, more recent thinking about access has questioned the 
dominant role played by lawyers: it has begun to explore the role that the ordinary citizen 
can and should play in the creation and operation of law that is more consistent with 
principles of democracy.  The recent rise in the numbers of self-represented litigants in 
the civil justice system has concretized the need to explore this question in a more urgent 
fashion.  As a result, my project aims to examine a broader concept of access to justice 
within the particular context of self-represented litigants’ experiences participating in the 
civil justice system.  However, prior to engaging in that examination, it will be important 
to explore the more general objectives and merits of a participatory approach to 
democracy that might inform a broader conceptualization of access.  This exploration 
will also need to take account of the particular challenges that the civil justice system 
poses in respect of direct citizen engagement.  Consequently, the next chapter will 
examine the concept of participatory democracy and the role of law in a democracy.
                                                
101 The implications of non-participation are profound.  Low- and moderate-income individuals are 
disproportionately among those individuals without access to the legal and political institutions and thus, 
are unable to influence the laws and policies that affect their daily lives.  The problems associated with 
disengagement and disempowerment are intertwined in the sense that individuals without access cannot 
impact the laws and policies that affect them and are often disproportionately influenced by the law’s 
application in a variety of intrusive ways.   
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CHAPTER 3  
DEMOCRACY AND LAW 
 
The modern era is one in which private law and public law regulate a broad range 
of everyday activities of life.  Many aspects of citizens’ lives and the problems that they 
experience in a modern bureaucratic society incorporate a legal dimension.1  Elements of 
personal injury, consumer relations, and debt as well as almost all areas of economic and 
social interaction are regulated by the law.  In a common law system, decisions about 
familial relationships, housing and employment, social benefits and immigration matters 
made in the traditional legal institutions such as the civil law courts, as well as various 
regulatory and administrative regimes, are just some of the types of decisions that can 
affect individuals’ daily lives in significant ways.2  In this sense, courts and tribunals 
“create a body of law that directly governs and indirectly guides, through both the full 
light and the shadow of the common law, much of what we do in our daily lives, 
including both individuals and corporate actions.”3  Moreover, in many instances the 
matters encompassed by these areas of law can affect the “cohesiveness and inclusiveness 
of the bonds that tie people together as both members of a community and as citizens 
more generally.”4  Notwithstanding the pervasiveness of civil law in our society and the 
impact of its creation and administration on our lives, the reality is that citizens are too 
often bystanders in such matters; they are either represented by lawyers, and/or required 
to resolve civil law problems themselves without the assistance of legal representation.  
                                                
1 Ab Currie, “A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low and Moderate Income Canadians:  
Incidences and Patterns” (April 2005).  Available online at http://cfcj-fcjc/docs/2006/currie.en.pdf  [Currie, 
“A National Survey of Civil Justice Problems”].  As noted in chapter two, there are the legal issues for 
which many individuals do not obtain formal legal assistance and many of these problems may be such that 
they do not even characterize the issue as a legal problem or are unaware or unable to address as a legal 
problem and thus end up ‘lumping’.  See William F Felstiner, Richard L Abel & Austin Sarat, “The 
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:  Naming, Blaming and Claiming…” (1981) 15:3/4 Law & 
Soc’y Rev 631 [Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes”].  
2 Mark Rix & Scott Burrows, “The Foundations of Legal Citizenship: Community Law, Access to Justice 
and the Community Legal Sector” (2005) 30:3 Alt LJ 126 [Rix & Burrows, “The Foundations of Legal 
Citizenship”]. 
3 Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press, 2014) at 251 [Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy]. 
4 Rix & Burrows, “The Foundations of Legal Citizenship”, supra note 2 at 126. 
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In effect, the history of court processes and the development of law within these court 
processes has involved a stylized conversation between elite judges and lawyers: ordinary 
citizens were typically excluded and, even if included, had little familiarity or dexterity 
with its routines.  The development of the regulatory state has, in certain ways, provided 
avenues for individual members of society to engage more directly with the laws and 
regulations that impact their lives.  However, not unlike the traditional court processes 
settings, many tribunal settings are attempting to address the fact that these forums are 
either replete with legal representatives and/or encountering an increased presence of 
unrepresented individuals.  The consequence of this is to raise questions about the 
fairness and workability of the regulatory procedures.5   
 
The essence of democracy is that it engages ordinary people in government and 
governance.6  It contemplates a “regime of popular self-government which not only 
allows for, but relies upon participation by citizens in the formulation and enactment of 
laws that govern their lives.”7  In its strong incarnation, democracy encompasses “politics 
in the participatory mode where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent 
ground through a participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation and the 
creation of a political community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals 
into free citizens and private interests into public goods.”8  In furthering a concept of 
strong democracy, the question that arises is how best to increase the scope and nature of 
individuals’ participation in the institutions, processes and decision-making that impacts 
their lives.   
                                                
5  Robert Thomas, “From ‘Adversarial’ v ‘Inquisitorial’ to ‘Active, Enabling and Investigative’: 
Developments in the UK Administrative Tribunals” in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Baglay, eds, The Nature of 
Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes, (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013) 
Thomas, “From ‘Adversarial’ v ‘Inquisitorial’”]; See also Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s 
Refugee Determination System: An Empirical Assessment” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 [Rehaag, “The 
Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System”]. 
6 Christian Welzel & Ronald Inglehart, “The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization” (2008) 19:1 
Journal of Democracy 126 at 128. 
7 Hutchinson, The Province of Jurisprudence Democratized, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
at 137 [Hutchinson, The Province of Jurisprudence]. 
8 Benjamin R Barber, Strong Democracy – Participatory Democracy for a New Age, (Berkeley, USA: 
University of California Press, 1984) at 132 [Barber, Strong Democracy]. 
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 In the first part of this chapter, I examine the fundamental principles of 
participatory democracy, including a brief discussion of the objectives, as well as 
benefits, associated with meaningful citizen participation.  Following this discussion, the 
next section of this chapter will analyze the role of law and legal institutions, including 
both their law-making and law-administering functions, within a democracy and the 
corresponding significance of adopting a participatory approach to both functions.  In 
light of the important role that law plays within a democracy, this chapter will then 
explore how access to justice might further democratic participation in these important 
legal processes, particularly within the civil justice system.  At this stage, an access to 
justice project in Connecticut will be used as a means of examining the ways in which 
participation may be fostered and the benefits potentially derived from a participatory 
approach to access to justice theory.  These benefits include the democratization of law 
and the creation of a new legal vernacular that is more consistent with and relevant to 
individuals’ lives.  Finally, this chapter will outline some of the challenges associated 
with the promotion of more and better participation within the civil justice system.   
 
Democracy and Participation 
Democracy in a participatory mode is not simply about conducting free elections in 
which every citizen is provided with the opportunity to vote.  Rather, it involves a 
“diffuse and urgent hope that the people themselves can become moral and political 
actors in the civic fabric of our society.”9  Subject to casting votes in regularly scheduled 
elections, citizens in a representative system of democracy do not directly participate in 
the creation of the laws and policies that govern them.  As a result, they become the 
“passive constituents of representatives, who, far from reconstituting the citizens’ aims 
and interests, usurp their civic function and deflect their civic energies.”10   
 
                                                
9 Lani Guinier, “Supreme Democracy: Bush v Gore Redux” (2002) 34 Loy U Chicago LJ 23 at 27 quoting 
from Catherine Eschle, Global Democracy, Social Movements and Feminism (Boulder, USA: Westview 
Press, 2001) at 17 [Guinier, “Supreme Democracy”]. 
10 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 147. 
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By contrast, participation requires that citizens regularly and frequently engage in 
debate, deliberation and decision-making respecting the development of policy and 
deployment of power that impacts their collective lives.  Drawing on Habermas’ theories, 
Finlayson suggests that political systems work well when the decision-making processes 
are porous to the input of civil society and there are channels through which members of 
civil society can provide public opinion that influences and impacts policy.11  From a 
theoretical standpoint, there is a presumption that communication, dialogue and 
deliberation by citizens and decision-makers together can produce better and more 
legitimate outcomes.12   
 
The assumption is not that citizens, as opposed to elected officials, will resolve all 
of the complicated issues that face modern democratic societies.  Rather, it is that citizens 
will participate through dialogue and deliberation.  In so doing, they develop public ends 
that reflect the concerns and needs of the citizenry, including collective normative 
concepts, such as justice and equality, and the promotion of positive social change.13  
While it is not assumed that individuals will always agree about the definition of public 
norms or public ends and about how such norms may be adopted and implemented within 
the fabric of society, it is assumed that the ability to participate in the discussion and 
delineation of such norms encourages and strengthens individual empowerment.  This is 
due to the fact that as individuals contribute to the dialogue, are heard and their views and 
concerns are reflected in the resulting articulation of public ends, they experience a sense 
of connectedness and engagement that is further empowering on an individual scale.  
Moreover, the development of public ends and the expression of collective normative 
values is consistent with a community that is engaged in acts of collective self-
                                                
11 James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas - A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
12 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy” (2005) 5 Nev L Rev 347 
[Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy”]. 
13 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 154-155.  Participation in this mode contemplates a broad 
spectrum of activities and goals that range from the development of policy and law-making to information 
exchange and deliberation of public issues.   
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government as opposed to representative government or, alternatively, a political system 
that is focused almost exclusively on individual needs.   
 
In light of the objectives associated with political participation (i.e., the 
encouragement of individual empowerment, development of community and a greater 
citizen engagement in a wide variety of decision-making processes), the question that 
arises is whether these objectives are achievable within a representative democracy.  
Typically, in a representative democracy, the elected politicians are entrusted to 
determine what is in the public’s interest.  As such, there is often assumed to be little or 
no further need for citizen engagement once the electoral process is complete.14  From a 
practical standpoint, this approach can be particularly significant in respect of policies 
that require that citizens play an active role in the administration of specific policy 
initiatives, such as disease control and environmental protection.15  To the extent that, 
beyond the electoral process, individuals are disengaged and disaffected, there are serious 
questions about the legitimacy of resulting laws and regulations; there are also questions 
about the implementation and operation of those laws.  However, an even more 
substantive critique of large-scale representative democracies calls into question the 
validity of a political system in which the “masses are relegated to voting for 
representatives, joining interest groups (few of which have adopted internal participatory 
procedures), and providing the elites with new recruits.” 16   Acknowledging the 
difficulties associated with direct democracy in a large and pluralistic society, Susan 
Lawrence questions the validity of modern democratic theory that has abandoned an 
                                                
14 Jocelyne Bourgon, “Why Should Governments Engage Citizens in Service Delivery and Policy-
making?” in Focus on Citizens: Public Engagement for Better Policy and Services (2009) 199 at 201.  
Available online at www.oecd.org/gov/publicengagement [Bourgon, Why Should Governments Engage 
Citizens?]; In her critique of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v Gore, Lani Guinier suggests that 
voting is a poor means of fostering political participation.  Moreover, she challenges the Court’s 
conceptualization of democracy as being the act of holding elections that “function as a test to narrow the 
electorate to those who are qualified, i.e., those who successfully maneuver through complex machinery, 
the untrained poll workers, and the inconvenient polling hours to actually cast a vote.”  See Guinier, 
“Supreme Democracy”, supra note 9 at 26. 
15 This is contrasted with a neo-liberal critique that is discussed further in the context of certain critiques of 
the legal self-help initiative.   
16 Susan E Lawrence, “Justice, Democracy, Litigation, and Political Participation” (1991) 72:3 Social 
Science Quarterly 464 at 466 [Lawrence, “Justice, Democracy, Litigation”]. 
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educative/community-building function in favour of this reliance on political elites and 
limited citizen engagement in the political decision-making processes.  In this regard, 
there is a critical distinction between individuals merely “having a vote” in a 
representative democracy and individuals also “having a say” in the matters that affect 
them pursuant to the principles of participatory democracy.17    
 
Drawing on the work of classic democratic theorists, such as Rousseau and Mill, 
Carole Pateman articulated certain principles of participatory democracy.  She ultimately 
concluded that a theory of participatory democracy is built on a central assertion that 
individuals and institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one another.18  In 
further reflecting on classic conceptualizations of participatory democracy, Susan 
Lawrence has, more recently, suggested that a mutual dependence of each citizen on 
others creates a sense of belonging to a community that, in turn, serves as a mechanism 
for community-building and self-government.19   
 
Thus, not only are individuals and institutions inter-related, but so too are those 
individuals within a community.  Theories of empowerment characterize this inter-
relatedness as two sides of the same coin; personal empowerment occurs at a level of 
consciousness that requires internal strengths, while political empowerment necessitates 
organizational conditions that enable the individual to exercise her new abilities as an 
empowered citizen.20  Thus, participation requires that an individual obtain certain 
training or skills and also be in a position to access the appropriate forum or institutional 
setting in which to exercise those skills.  
 
 
                                                
17 Bourgon, “Why Should Governments Engage Citizens?”, supra note14 at 201. 
18 Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 
at 42 [Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory]. 
19 Lawrence, “Justice, Democracy, Litigation”, supra note 16 at 465. 
20 Elisheva Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice: Theory and Practice of People-Focused Social 
Solutions (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers, 1997) at 76.  Available online at www.mpow.org 
[Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice]. 
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Empowerment as an Antecedent to Participation  
Individual empowerment plays a crucial role in a participatory democracy.  It works both 
in terms of an individual’s ability to initiate participation as well as engage in ever greater 
and more frequent types of participation.  In particular, individual empowerment is a 
necessary prerequisite for open debate and the exchange of ideas; both of these are 
integral to meaningful participation.  Elisheva Sadan contends that individual 
empowerment results in the enhanced ability to participate, an ability to cope with 
frustrations, and a desire to influence decision-making processes.21  This sense of 
individual empowerment begins on a personal level with the advent of self-confidence 
and self-efficacy; this is associated with enhanced skills, abilities, access to resources, 
and knowledge.  Moreover, Sadan contends that because an individual’s self-perception 
is based on their experiences and achievements in their lives, there is a positive 
relationship between the “development of self-confidence and reinforcement of personal 
ability.”22  The accumulation of these attributes contributes to the further ability and 
willingness to engage in the social world.  This does not mean that empowered 
individuals will automatically obtain more political power.  Rather, by being empowered, 
individuals can become enabled-participants in a variety of political and democratic 
forums and decision-making processes.23  As such, personal empowerment becomes a 
necessary precondition for meaningful participation in a variety of different contexts.   
 
In answering the question of how greater citizen participation might evolve, 
Pateman suggests that there is a need for the social training of citizens in the ways of 
democracy in order to ensure that citizens are able to maximize their participation within 
                                                
21 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, supra note 20 at 75. 
22 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, supra note 20 at 84. 
23 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, supra note 20 at 77.  A recent report of the United 
Nations on legal empowerment of the poor characterized legal empowerment as “the process by which the 
poor become protected and are enabled to use the law to advance their rights and their interests, vis-à-vis 
the state and the market.”  This conceptualization focuses on legal empowerment as a means to affect social 
change, namely the reduction of poverty.  In this regard, legal empowerment travels from the bottom up 
such that change starts at an individual level, whereby empowerment encourages the exercise of certain 
behaviours and skills that provide an environment for change.  See Commission on Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor, Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, vol 1, United Nations 
Development Program (2008) at 26 [United Nations, Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor]. 
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a democracy.   She envisions this training as occurring in many different spheres of 
society and involving ever-greater acts of participation.  The benefit of participating in 
different social and political spheres is that the individual develops “attitudes and 
psychological qualities” that, in turn, foster further participation.24  Thus, one of the 
significant functions and effects of democratic participation is educative.  Participation 
serves as a “learning process that educates citizens with the skills needed to sustain 
democracy”, including the skills necessary to both engage in political processes and be 
effective in those same processes.  As individuals participate in making decisions and 
solving problems, they learn in an experiential manner and this leads to further changes 
in behaviour, confidence and leadership.   
 
From a participatory perspective, each encounter by a citizen provides an 
opportunity for that individual to gain self-confidence and knowledge of the community 
around them.  This inculcates the capacity to negotiate and deliberate which spills over 
from one area of life to another.  This ‘spill-over’ has a cumulative effect on the 
individual’s ability and potential willingness to engage in different forums.25  Of course, 
this characterization presupposes that participation is both meaningful and productive.26  
Individuals also gain practice asserting democratic skills, which potentially provide them 
with the confidence to participate in ever more complex spheres of decision-making.  As 
this happens, participation becomes self-sustaining because individuals voluntarily 
continue to use the skills and information obtained to engage further in debate and 
deliberation about the laws and policies that affect them. 27   Democracy is then 
strengthened by the fact that input from citizens and the resulting decision-making is 
derived from wide and frequent participation.  This, in turn, further empowers individuals 
                                                
24 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, supra note 18 at 43. 
25 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 384. 
26 A discussion of the meaningfulness of individual engagement is contained in the later section of this 
chapter.   
27 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, supra note 18 at 43.  In his discussion of strong 
democracy, Benjamin Barber distinguished between individuals lacking interest in politics versus a lack of 
interest in political decision-making.  He argued that a myriad of surveys reflected individuals’ interest in 
the latter.  Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 266. 
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and allows them to expand the nature and scope of their participation.28  As individuals 
participate positively and meaningfully in decision-making processes that impact their 
lives, the argument is that they will be more willing to engage further in dialogue and 
deliberation and in more diverse contexts.  Thus, there are educative benefits associated 
with learning from participation in public spheres that potentially carry forward for the 
individual as well as broader community.  In the context of self-represented litigants 
compelled to engage directly with the decision-making processes in the civil justice 
system, one of the questions becomes whether individuals’ experiences are educative in 
the positive sense of providing them with participatory skills, information, knowledge 
and confidence such that they are able to further participate in other decision-making 
processes.  Another more fundamental question that arises is whether self-represented 
litigants’ experiences participating in the civil justice system will ultimately encourage or 
discourage further and broader participation in other contexts.   
 
A key component of this process involves the individual as a citizen in the 
political sense.  In this regard, citizenship is learned through “education, socialization, 
exposure to politics, public life and day-to-day experiences.” 29   Benjamin Barber 
distinguishes between masses (as in ‘government of the masses’) and citizens.  While 
masses do not govern themselves, citizens self-govern through participatory processes 
and evolve as they engage in deliberation and decision-making processes .30  Within a 
theory of participatory democracy, citizenship requires more than voting from the 
individual members of society; it requires that individuals actively engage in creating and 
implementing the political and legal rules and processes that shape their lives and the 
lives of their communities.  This concept of participation necessarily entails direct 
deliberation, direct action and direct contribution.  
 
                                                
28 NC Saxena, “What is Meant by People’s Participation” in Andrea Cornwall, ed, The Participation 
Reader (London, UK: Zed Books, 2011) at 32. 
29 Lisa Veneklasen, Valerie Miller, Debbie Budlender & Cindy Clark, eds, A New Weave of Power, People 
& Politics – The Action Guide for Advocacy and Citizen Participation (Warwickshire, UK: Practical 
Action Publishing Ltd., 2011) at 31. 
30 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 145-150. 
 55 
In this sense, ‘strong democracy’ is defined as a means of resolving conflict 
through a participatory process that engages citizens in a political community.31  Barber’s 
definition of a strong democracy contemplates a public element to citizenship that obliges 
individuals to think and act in common.  However, the kind of participation contemplated 
in a strong democracy exists on a small scale, as well as a national political scale, in 
terms of issue, forum and/or geography.  In fact, the small-scale focus of much 
participation offers a sense of connectedness because people are more likely to be 
comfortable engaging in dialogue and reaching sustainable solutions on a local level, as 
opposed to being thrust in to large national forums where the issues and policy choices 
can be quite complex.32  
 
In this regard, the local realm can arguably become one of the important sites at 
which to learn and develop collective action by cultivating “face-to-face settings and 
manageably sized groups in which people talk, listen and think, and act together.”33  The 
argument made by Jaime Lee regarding the potential for the new governance model to 
support marginalized voices is based, in part, on the belief that even rare opportunities for 
incremental change assist in alleviating deeply entrenched marginalization.  For instance, 
small, localized, examples of engaged decision-making can support “learning by doing” 
which is then potentially applied in different contexts.34  Again, in the context of the self-
represented litigant’s experiences in the civil justice system, the question becomes 
whether their participation in the dispute processes in the civil justice system represents 
an example of localized engaged decision-making that has the potential to offer an 
                                                
31 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 151.  A good example of the transformation from private 
individuals to public citizens through the assistance of a volunteer lawyer is Laura Nader’s research on a 
community lawyer project in Connecticut.  See Laura Nader, “Processes for Constructing (No) Access to 
Justice (For Ordinary People)” (1990) 10 Windsor YB Access J 496 [Nader, “Processes for Constructing 
(No) Access to Justice”].  The community lawyer project is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
32 Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought” (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342 at 383. 
33 Asciano Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering” (2006) Clinical L Rev 541 at 
610 [Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering”].  
34 Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?: Making Participatory Governance Work for the Poor” 
(2013) 7 Harv L & Pol’y Rev 405 at 440 [Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now”]. The New Governance Model 
contemplates the participation of a broad array of stakeholders in a decentralized problem-solving process 
and includes the notion of ‘learning by doing.’   
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opportunity to learn by doing.  The assumption being that, to the extent that individuals 
are able to participate in a ‘face-to-face setting’ (i.e. civil justice forums) and are 
provided an opportunity to engage with and learn important participatory skills as a result 
of having engaged in these settings, they will be better prepared and perhaps more willing 
to expand the scope of their participation.  Such would be consistent with principles of 
participatory democracy.   
 
Ever-greater citizen participation encourages the development of a community to 
the extent that individuals begin to think publicly as citizens, establish connections to 
other citizens, and, in feeling connected, are prompted to consider the “welfare of the 
community as a whole.”35  This process influences the setting of collective goals because 
all of the members of the community are given the opportunity to deliberate over the 
construction and development of those goals.  In this sense, community has,  
 
a meaning of life that is more egalitarian, participatory and intimate than life 
in society at large, which demands the objectification of man and 
anonymous obedience to authority and law.  The ‘community’ as an image 
is a kind of antithesis of the bureaucratic, hierarchical, formal, and judiciary 
society.  The concept is to a certain extent abstract, but at the same time 
concrete, because it operates in the geographical, the ethnic, and the 
functional sense.36   
 
Thus, the development of a community and the enhancement of meaningful participation 
become mutually constitutive.  Participation in a community encourages individual 
empowerment because it contemplates self-efficacy, the making of group decisions, the 
solving of common problems and the mobilizing of local resources for common causes.37     
 
Furthermore, the concept of community-building is related to the potential for 
individual self-transformation that is often associated with participation.  By participating 
in various decision-making processes, individuals are also able to fulfill certain “innate 
                                                
35 Jocelyne Bourgnon, “Responsive, Responsible and Respected Government: Towards a New Public 
Administration Theory” (2007) 73:1 International Review of Administrative Sciences 7 at 16. 
36 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, supra note 20 at 90. 
37 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, ibid at 90. 
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and basic developmental needs for agency and for living up to one’s potential” which 
reinforces the individual’s sense of autonomy.38  However, by engaging in deliberation 
and dialogue, this autonomy is balanced against individuals taking account of other 
world-views and becoming attentive to the interests of others.  Again, a key manifestation 
of empowerment is the notion that individuals move from the private to the public.  This 
means that the person becomes engaged in a political sphere that expands beyond self-
interest and takes account of both the socio-political influences around them and the 
individuals’ ability to affect outcomes in respect of these conditions.  A recent report of 
the United Nation on the topic of legal empowerment suggested, “democracy and legal 
empowerment are kindred spirits, and are better synchronised than sequenced.  In the 
absence of empowerment, societies lose the benefits that come from the free flow of 
information, open debate, and new ideas.”39 
 
Acknowledging that it is not possible to have both significant inequality and 
meaningful participation, 40  a prospective benefit of participatory democracy is the 
potential to create measures and forums that re-engage those members of society that are 
presently disenfranchised and/or disempowered.  By developing avenues through which 
all citizens are given the opportunity to be heard and affect decision-making, individuals 
are also given the opportunity to re-engage as equal members of a community: they begin 
to think and act in common.  This could, in turn, work to negate the concept of the ‘other’ 
associated with exclusion and inequality.  At the same time, it fosters inclusivity.  While 
this represents a promising and positive consequence of meaningful participation, it is 
also important to take account of the ways in which inequality, social exclusion and the 
marginalization of certain individuals and groups in society preclude their ability to 
                                                
38 Audrey G McFarlane, “When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community 
Participation in Economic Development” (2000) 66 Brook L Rev 861 at 909.  [McFarlane, “When 
Inclusion Leads to Exclusion”]. 
39 United Nations, The Report of the Commission of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 23 at 4. 
40 For instance, according to Joshua Cohen, a Habermasian discourse requires equal ‘participatory rights’ of 
all individuals such that each individual is able to “propose issues for the agenda, propose solutions to the 
issues on the agenda, offer reasons in support of or in criticism of proposed solutions…[and] an equal voice 
in the decision.”  See Joshua Cohen, “Reflections on Habermas on Democracy” (1999) 12:4 Ratio Juris 
385. 
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engage at all.  In this sense, it is important to stress that ‘meaningful engagement’ seeks 
actively to ensure that the voices and needs of historically-excluded groups are heard.  In 
the particular context of engagement in the civil justice system, Patricia Hughes suggests 
that this requires the need to ensure that the solutions implemented are not generic but 
rather that,  
[i]deally, responding to the challenges facing individuals who cannot afford 
lawyers challenges us to apply the lessons offered by the rich scholarship 
exploring the complete dynamics in the relationship between dominant and 
marginalized groups or communities or even the simpler understanding of 
the relationship of marginalized groups to the legal system.  It requires us to 
apply what we know about why particular groups and individuals are 
exclude from access to justice.  Without doing so, we cannot expect to 
provide adequate solutions that will promote access to justice.41  
 
Meaningful Participation 
Notwithstanding the benefits associated with greater citizen engagement, there are 
challenges to the pivotal notion of ‘meaningful participation’.  First and foremost, there is 
an assumption that any or all participation is good participation.  Sherry Arnstein 
challenges this idea.  She maintains that participation must result in the real possibility of 
redistributing power and resources to those without resources or power if it is to be 
meaningful and legitimate.  This presupposes that the participation will be effective and 
of consequence.  Even more fundamentally, it assumes that there will be a willingness 
and agreement among those who maintain power to share power and decision-making 
authority.42  Failing that, participation is an empty process used by those with power to 
justify a course of action that only certain members decide on and from which only 
certain members of society are likely to benefit.43   
 
                                                
41 Particia Hughes, “Advancing Access to Justice Through Generic Solutions: The Risk of Perpetuating 
Exclusion” (2013) 31 Windsor YB Access Just 1 at 22 [Hughes, “Advancing Access to Justice Through 
Generic Solutions”]. 
42 Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”, supra note 34. 
43 Sherry Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation” (July 1969) AIP Journal 216 at 216 [Arnstein, “A 
Ladder of Citizen Participation”]. 
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Given this requirement, if participatory democracy is to be effective and 
beneficial, it must account for the “economic and social determinants” that impact 
individuals in society and affect their ability to participate in a meaningful way.44  Lucie 
White suggests that, in many instances, the lack of power held by an individual or a 
particular group in society will do more than prevent them from being heard.  Even more 
fundamentally, it will structure consciousness; preventing individuals from attempting to 
engage in the discussion at all. 45  This makes any notion of participation worthless.  For 
Gramatikov, individuals’ belief in their ability to solve legal problems (a key component 
of legal empowerment) will differ depending on a variety of factors.  However, an 
important factor is the distribution of power in the relationship.46   
 
Gramatikov’s conceptualization of legal empowerment incorporates the belief that 
empowered individuals are those who see their position in a relationship as being as 
important as the other party and, therefore, perceive that they are afforded relatively 
equal power in resolving the relevant dispute.  As Sadan noted in a more general context, 
“people have testified that in their empowerment process, they did not necessarily acquire 
more social influence or political power but they did become able participants in the 
political process and in local decision-making.”47  Thus, empowered individuals are those 
who have developed confidence in the sense that they believe that they have the ability to 
solve their problems and the corresponding means by which they can attempt to resolve 
them.48  These beliefs are then manifest in individuals exercising certain abilities and 
taking certain actions.  The downside of this characterization of the empowerment 
                                                
44 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 146; Roderick A. MacDonald, “Access to Justice and Law 
Reform#2” (2001) 19 Windsor YB Access Just 317 at 320 [MacDonald, “Access to Justice and Law 
Reform”]).  Pateman also relies on the Rousseauian requirement that participation contemplate economic 
equality and independence among citizens.  Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, supra note 18 
at 22. 
45 Lucie E White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power (1988) Wis L 
Rev 699 [White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein”]. 
46 Martin Gramatikov & Robert B Porter, “Yes I Can: Subjective Legal Empowerment” (2011) 18:2 Geo J 
on Poverty L & Pol’y 169 at 169 [Gramatikov & Porter, “Yes I Can: Subjective Legal Empowerment”]. 
47 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, supra note 20 at 78. 
48 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Practice, ibid at 76. 
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necessary for participation is reflected in Gramatikov’s research results on legal 
empowerment.  His research results suggested that, when there were significant power 
imbalances among individuals and/or groups, the result was a “disbelief in perceived 
personal capabilities for using the law to solve problems.”49   
 
As such, when significant power imbalances exist, it is unlikely that those with 
less power will adopt the belief that they have either the abilities or the means by which 
to act.  The further result of this is continued disengagement and a corresponding sense of 
disempowerment.  Thus, individuals who are subordinated in the sense that they have 
internalized the isolation and/or the belief that it is either their fault or immutable position 
in society are unable to articulate who is responsible for their situation and will further 
distrust the existing legal and political systems.  Indeed, in these circumstances, it may be 
impracticable to suggest that there can be meaningful participation without a profound 
change in the actual distribution of power to these individuals.50   
 
The link between distributions of power and the ability to participate is seen in 
one example that took place during apartheid-era South Africa.  In that example, the 
black town members of Driefontein were threatened with forcible removal orders 
pursuant to which the white South African government would relocate the individuals to 
resettlement camps.  These camps were located in impoverished rural areas that lacked 
even basic resources.  Because the government action was sanctioned by South African 
law, the black community had “few clear cut legal rights” and few protections against the 
removal.51  Notwithstanding what appeared to be limited legal options, the community 
was able to resist the removal order.  In so doing, it was necessary for the members of the 
black community to challenge the existing structures of apartheid domination and create 
their own source of power in the government’s vulnerabilities.  Historically, the majority 
of the community would have placed all of the power in the hands of the white apartheid 
government.  However, by beginning to talk about the legality and the morality of the 
                                                
49 Gramatikov and Porter, “Yes I Can: Subjective Legal Empowerment”, supra note 46 at 196. 
50 White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein”, supra note 45 at 758-760. 
51 White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein”, ibid at 720. 
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removal order, as well as the validity (or invalidity) of the South African law from a 
justice perspective, the community members recognized, through their own conversations 
about these issues that they ‘had the collective power to reason about justice.’52   
 
This type of conversation can be likened to other political dialogue that becomes 
an “embodiment of the procedural and substantive goals that a democratic society can 
aspire to achieve; it improves and strengthens itself through constant practice and 
usage.”53  To the town members of Driefontein, the ability to engage in discussions about 
what was happening to them, what they felt about what was happening, and what might 
be done about the situation allowed them to define their circumstances on their own terms 
and then begin to think about transforming it in a political manner.  The conversation 
further fostered confidence in the collective perspective that the proposed action by the 
South African government was unjust. 54   This confidence and corresponding 
consciousness around issues of justice, in turn, motivated the community to mobilize and 
develop strategies and courses of action that were outside traditional legal approaches and 
grounded in different sources of power.  Once there was an acknowledgement of existing 
power relations, there was an opportunity to think about how to shift the power held by 
the community based in part on its mobilization.  As a result, the community was able to 
ultimately stave off the relocation with the assistance of a volunteer lawyer and a 
community worker.   
 
However, following the transition from apartheid to democracy, the challenges 
associated with facilitating participation and addressing asymmetries of power were still 
present in South Africa.  An analysis of three participatory forums that were established 
following apartheid raised questions about the viability of deliberative policy-making 
                                                
52 White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein”, supra note 45. 
53 Allan C Hutchinson, “Talking the Good Life:  From Liberal Chatter to Democratic Conversation” in 
Allan C Hutchinson & Leslie J M Green, eds, Law and Community – The End of Individualism, (Toronto, 
Canada: The Carswell Co. Ltd., 1988) at 171 [Hutchinson, “Talking the Good Life: From Liberal Chatter to 
Democratic Conversation”]. 
54 White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein”, supra note 45 at 727-728. 
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through discourse between groups in formal institutions of policy-making.55  In the 
context of the three participatory organizations examined, it was held that the entrenched 
power of the ruling ANC government meant that, despite a commitment to the idea of 
participation, the government was not necessarily motivated to relinquish its own control 
over policy direction and thereby engage in meaningful participation with various civic 
groups.  As a result, the researchers maintain that without a re-distribution of power and a 
corresponding genuine interest in societal participation, citizens may be wise to continue 
to make use of power in the informal public sphere (through protest and pressure) that 
can then be expended in more institutional settings.56   
 
Harris and Gabel contend that alienation is best described as the “inability of 
people to achieve genuine power and freedom.”  This alienation is most often associated 
with a hierarchical society.  This hierarchy ultimately diminishes the community and, 
 
…forces people into a lifelong series of isolating roles and routines within 
which they are unable to fully recognize one another in an empowering 
and mutually confirming way.  By contrast, the development of 
community through dialogue, deliberation and the articulation of common 
objectives further engagement and continued participation.  Absent the 
development of community, people come to experience one another as 
powerless and passive in relation to the hierarchies within which they live 
and work.57   
 
                                                
55  Lucio Baccaro and Konstantinos Papadakis, “The Downside of Participatory-Deliberative Public 
Administration” (2009) 7 Socio-Economic Review 245 at 264 [Baccaro & Papadakis, “The Downside of 
Participatory-Deliberative Public Administration”].  In their article, the authors examine the efficacy of the 
three participatory forums on the basis of two contrasting theories of participatory democracy – 
participatory-deliberative public administration which suggests that members of society engage with 
government in resolving issues of public-policy and in so doing, reach better and more efficient solutions 
and Habermas’ theory of deliberative politics, and more specifically, the role of moral discourse in the 
informal public sphere, which remains skeptical of citizens’ ability to impact official sources of power 
through participation. 
56 Baccaro and Papadakis, “The Downside of Participatory-Deliberative Public Administration”, ibid at 
267. 
57 Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, “Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the 
Practice of Law” (1982-1982) 11 Rev L Soc Change 369 at 371 [Gabel & Harris, “Building Power and 
Breaking Images”]. 
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The result is that individuals begin to self-identify as powerless, passive and alienated 
within the social order.  Without engaging in a dialogue about these common objectives, 
the justice of the South African government’s actions and their options, these individuals 
would have likely remained powerless.   
 
The consequence of not providing legitimate means and opportunities by which 
power can be re-distributed is that the participation remains ‘cosmetic’ in nature; this 
potentially leads to alienation and the deeper marginalization of certain stakeholders.58  
This deeper sense of marginalization results from the entrenchment of existing beliefs 
that only certain voices will be heard and only certain viewpoints are actually considered 
in the decision-making process.  The likely outcome in this scenario is not only the 
continued exclusion of certain individuals and groups from the dialogue, deliberation and 
decision-making processes, but also the further belief that only certain individuals or 
groups are worthy of being heard.  This, in turn, perpetuates continued disengagement by 
those who have been excluded historically.  Without the capacity to be heard and impact 
the decision-making process, this necessarily implies that power is not shared among the 
relevant stakeholders.  As such, participation may prove to be a faux-engagement.  
The meaningfulness of citizens’ engagement within various democratic contexts 
will, in part, be judged by the actual impact that citizens have on the decision-making 
process.  This is not to assume that the individual will always be able to change the 
outcome.  Rather, the individual will be able to ‘have a say’ and that there will be 
opportunity for their voice to be reflected in the decision-making process that ensues.  
For this to occur, there must be dialogue that “demands more than the existence of speech 
somewhere by someone; it demands a realistic opportunity to have that speech heard and, 
preferably responded to by others.”59  Thus, an important component of this dialogue is 
individuals’ belief that they were heard which is validated, in part, through the nature of 
                                                
58 Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”, supra note 34 at 406. 
59 Hutchinson, “Talking the Good Life: From Liberal Chatter to Democratic Conversation”, supra note 53 
at 172. 
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the response provided, notwithstanding the final outcome achieved.60 Susan Lawrence 
argues that the legal system can provide this opportunity to individuals in the context of 
their private law case because individuals are required to make legal and factual 
arguments, have these arguments responded to, and in turn, respond to those counter 
positions – a process that does not occur directly in other political settings.61  
Thus, within a participatory context, engaging in dialogue and deliberation is 
different from engaging in traditional political debate.  Unlike political debate, which 
seeks to expose weaknesses and score points for the debater, the former approach seeks 
to ensure that there is a considered exchange of different views and perspectives prior to 
making informed decisions.62  A focus on listening as much as speaking fosters citizens’ 
belief that their views and perspectives are not only being heard, but also being 
considered.  In order to have such an impact, citizens as well as the decision-makers must 
be in a position to communicate and, in so doing, engage in conversation; this again 
involves more than simply speaking.  Specifically, it involves “receiving as well as 
expressing, hearing as well as speaking, and empathizing as well as uttering.”63   
 
Such communication plays an important role not only in terms of decision-
making, but also in terms of ensuring that all individuals, including those previously 
silenced or unable to access the conversation, are able to engage in dialogue and 
deliberation before decisions are made.  This component of meaningful participation 
presupposes a second important educational pre-requisite—that individuals are provided 
with access to adequate information about the issues, processes and policies prior to 
being expected to deliberate about those same issues, processes and policies.  Without 
                                                
60 The need to be heard underlies certain legal approaches to questions of procedural fairness.  One such 
approach suggests that the ‘ideal procedural value’ must involve a “fair hearing of contrary claims” in 
which competing claims are heard.  See Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative 
Democracy”, supra note 12 at 113.  However, as will be discussed later in this paper, this particular 
procedural value loses significance when it is examined in the context of self-represented litigants. 
61 Lawrence, “Justice, Democracy, Litigation”, supra note 16. 
62 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, “Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal 
Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice” (2009) 2 J Disp Resol 269 at 278. 
63 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 173. 
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adequate and reliable information, certain individuals and/or groups remain 
disadvantaged and thus, unlikely or unable to participate. 
 
However, there are certain practical realities involved in promoting meaningful 
dialogue that must also be addressed.  While the majority of individuals may “possess the 
intuitive capacity to reason practically and therefore participate in political decision-
making, it is naïve to assume communicative skills are distributed equally in society.”64  
Moreover, even if it is assumed that all individuals are capable of participating, many 
individuals are busy with their own lives; they have neither the time nor the inclination to 
participate in various political processes.65  In such circumstances, there is a concern that 
participatory democracy will fail to achieve the critical mass of committed political 
citizens that is necessary to meet the ambitions of participatory democracy.  In addressing 
these concerns, there are a couple of different considerations.  First, it should be noted 
again that, while not all citizens are prepared to participate in every decision-making 
process, what is important is that individuals understand that they can participate if they 
so choose; they must be provided with both the requisite opportunities to participate as 
well as the support necessary to do so when they do so.  Moreover, the political and 
democratic institutions must be designed to encourage participation.  The forums and 
contexts in which citizens participate are expanded and made accessible to citizens.  
Accepting the reality that not all citizens will participate in all decision-making 
processes, Benjamin Barber stated that, “if all of the people can participate some of the 
time in some of the responsibilities of governing, then strong democracy will have 
realized its aspiration.”66   
                                                
64 Lorne Sossin, “Redistributing Democracy: An Inquiry in Authority, Discretion and the Possibility of 
Engagement in the Welfare State” (1994) 26 Ottawa L Rev 1 at 12-13.    
65 One justification for such a critique was raised by Ilya Somin who commented that from a fatalistic 
position, even altruistic individuals assumed to be working for the public good do not waste the time 
needed to gain the political knowledge necessary to participate because they know their vote has so little 
impact – in effect, voters know they do not have any chance of effecting outcomes.  While attempting to 
demonstrate the inefficacy of a participatory mode, this argument seems to highlight the failings of a 
representative democracy and reinforce the notion that the existing system has perpetuated perceptions of 
alienation and disengagement.  See Ilya Somin, “Deliberative Democracy and Political Ignorance” (2010) 
22:2-3 Critical Review 253. 
66 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 267. 
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Furthermore, the failure of individuals to exercise willingly their power to 
participate may have less to do with their ability to do so and more to do with the fact that 
the present political system excludes all, except certain specialists who become vocal 
interest groups and experts.  All of these individuals engage in the day-to-day political 
activity on behalf of citizens through a representative democracy.  In so doing, they 
perpetuate a language and process that is removed from and unfamiliar to ordinary 
citizens.67  By contrast, the purpose of promoting a participatory mode of democracy is to 
create a community in which citizens engage in dialogue and deliberation that will 
“oblige and empower people to wrest control of responsible decision-making from the 
technical experts, like lawyers and bureaucrats.”68  Secondly, while individuals may be 
frustrated with politicians and political processes as they presently exist in a 
representative democracy, it does not mean that they do not want or are not interested in 
having a voice and role in the policies, rules and decisions that affect their daily lives and 
the lives of their communities.  Experience would suggest that, to the extent that 
participation begets further and expanded participation (and individuals are provided with 
the opportunity to participate), the assumption is that individuals want more participation 
and engagement, not less, so long as it is meaningful.  However, as noted fostering 
meaningful participation requires a re-distribution of power such that those who have 
been excluded historically are able to engage and those who have held power are 
prepared to relinquish it or at a minimum, share it. A redistribution of power may not 
alone be sufficient to foster meaningful participation.  But, at a minimum, it may 
constitute an important criterion for meaningful participation.  Such a redistribution of 
power must also take account of existing and inadequate socio-economic infrastructure, 
differences in knowledge bases and difficulties faced by certain groups who have been 
impacted by historical alienation, exclusion and distrust.69  These considerations involve 
a gamble that those who have historically been disengaged and disempowered will be or 
                                                
67 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 152. 
68 Allan C Hutchinson, “Talking the Good Life: From Liberal Chatter to Democratic Conversation”, supra 
note 53 at 168. 
69 McFarlane, “ When Inclusion leads to Exclusion”, supra note 38 at 925. 
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become in a better position to place themselves in the conversation and ultimately the 
decision-making processes.   
 
Given these challenges, if participation is to be effective, it is important that 
participation be fostered in a variety of forums and institutions that contemplate 
individuals participating on local as well as national levels.  By offering a variety of 
forums and avenues for participation, individuals are able to gain the experience, skills, 
self-confidence and knowledge that encourage further participation.  However, this also 
means that participation will not look or operate the same in all areas of political, social 
and economic life.70  The very nature and structure of a particular participatory process 
may be influenced by theoretical frameworks of deliberative democracy and discourse 
theory as well as questions of operationalization and differing participatory objectives.71  
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that all individuals will participate in all forums or 
decision-making processes and in respect of all issues.  Rather, the goal is that individuals 
are able to participate as they choose.  This is particularly so in situations where the 
policies being decided affect citizens’ lives and/or where “significant power is being 
deployed” against them. 72   
 
Therefore, if participation is to be meaningful, it is important that the requisite 
political and legal institutions provide for and encourage engagement at a variety of 
different stages, at different levels, and in different ways.  To accomplish this, there is 
also a need for corresponding systematic institutional reform within the various political 
and legal institutions.  However, because many of the barriers to participation are 
context-specific, the reforms must be examined within the particular forum in which 
greater participation is sought.  If participation is to be sustaining and meaningful, these 
reforms cannot be piecemeal, but must be system-wide and complementary.73 
                                                
70 Allan C Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep – Corporate Governance for a Democratic Society 
(Toronto, Canada: Irwin Law Inc., 2005) at 71. 
71 Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s Role(s) in a Deliberative Democracy”, supra note 12 at 11-112. 
72 Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 8 at 151. 
73 Barber, Strong Democracy, ibid at 265. 
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The Role of Law in a Democracy 
As a “robust, retrospectively looking public dispute resolution system, as well as a 
predictable, accessible and just prospectively looking common law based-regulatory 
regime,” 74 courts are an integral part of democracies that profess to be bound by the Rule 
of Law.  Consequently, it is acknowledged that law-making by courts is a historical as 
well as institutional fact of common law jurisdictions.75  As such, any serious account of 
participatory democracy must examine the role of courts in developing law and 
preserving democracy. 
 
More specifically, the civil justice system represents a significant component of a 
democratic society.76  Courts resolve the private disputes of parties that come before 
them, as well as the public disputes that arise in the constitutional context and beyond.  In 
so doing, courts and the judges who sit in these courts perform a distinctly political 
process within a democracy – namely rule-making and rule-administering whether it be 
in a private, public, or constitutional context.  In a paper that Chief Justice McLachlin 
delivered on the legal profession, she stated that,  
 
[c]ourts are seen as ways of compensating for the weaknesses of electoral 
decision-making and contributing to deliberative democracy by providing 
a forum where citizens can test laws for conformity to the fundamental 
values upon which the society is premised…[these values]…are 
fundamental to deliberative democracy, the goal of which is decisions that 
best represent the interests of the community as [a] whole.  Independent 
courts thus emerge as an essential condition of democracy.77  
                                                
74 Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy, supra note 3 at 26; Barber, Strong Democracy, ibid 
at 252. 
75 See the discussion in chapter two of Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy, ibid. 
76 Carrie Menkel-Meadow commented that total access to courts that run well and are inclusive ensures 
access to a leading democratic institution.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Bryant G Garth, “Civil 
Procedure and the Courts” in Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical 
Legal Research (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010) [Menkel-Meadow, “Civil Procedure and the 
Courts”]. 
77 Rt. Hon Beverly McLachlin, PC, “Judges in a Multicultural Society” (paper presented at Chief Justice of 
Ontario’s Advisory Committee on Professionalism on the Legal Profession, “Inaugural Colloquium on the 
Legal Profession,” 20 October 2003, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario) at 3-5-3-6, available 
online at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/mclachlin_judges_multicultura_society.pdf. 
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In recognizing the importance of active participation in the decisions that affect 
individual citizens, Susan Lawrence also suggests that “through litigation, citizens can 
participate in decisions about how the law will be applied to them and, sometimes about 
how the law should be.” 78   While Lawrence acknowledges that litigants are not 
necessarily the final decision-makers (as that function is reserved for the adjudicator 
assuming the matter proceeds to trial in the civil justice system), the argument is that 
concepts of participation do not require that the individual be the final decision-maker in 
order to gain benefits typically associated with a participatory approach.  What is more 
important is individuals’ “participation in the dialogue preceding the final decision that 
provides the educative benefits to the litigant.”79   
 
Notwithstanding the important role that adjudication plays in constructing and 
enforcing law, there is continuing debate and discussion about both the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the courts’ law-making function from a democratic perspective.80  More 
specifically, there is a criticism that the courts should adhere to a practice of judicial 
restraint in decision-making in recognition of the supremacy of the elected bodies’ law-
making powers in a democracy.  Pursuant to this critique, engagement by the courts in 
law-making processes tends towards being illegitimate and undemocratic.  Antithetical to 
this criticism is a further critique that not only challenges the ability of the existing court 
system to affect positive social change, but also claims that, through its law-making 
function, courts maintain existing power relationships in society.81  
 
                                                
78 Lawrence, “Justice, Democracy, Litigation”, supra note 16; see also David Luban, “Settlements and the 
Erosion of the Public Realm” (1995) 83 Geo LJ 2619.  
79 Lawrence, “Justice, Democracy, Litigation”, ibid at 467. 
80 Gabel & Harris, “Building Power and Breaking Images”, supra note 57 at 370. 
81 White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Drefontein”, supra note 45.  In this regard, Gabel & Harris 
suggest that the legal system is an important public arena in which the State attempts to legitimate the 
existing social order – a social order from which many individuals are alienated and disengaged.  A later 
section of this thesis will engage in a further critical examination of the role of the civil justice system in a 
democratic society.  See Gabel & Harris, “Building Power and Breaking Images”, ibid. 
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Despite the critiques proffered in respect of the role that courts do or should play 
in a liberal democracy, a pressing challenge in a society that claims to be democratic is to 
bring the work of the courts as much as possible in line with the demands and disciplines 
of democratic principles and practices.  As such, if courts are engaged in the process of 
making laws and governing people’s lives, it is arguably vital that as many citizens as 
possible play meaningful and informed roles in that process.82  One of the questions that 
arises in this regard is whether this role is best played by legal representatives who act on 
behalf of citizens (as has historically been the case within the civil justice system) or 
whether citizens should play a more direct role in the development of the laws that 
govern them and the articulation of prospective concepts of justice that reflect the society 
in which they live.  The challenges associated with this fundamental question have 
become particularly relevant given the fact that a significant number of individuals are 
compelled to enter this process overwhelmed and underprepared; this strongly suggests a 
crucial failing in democratic governance.  This troubling state of affairs is particularly 
acute in the case of self-represented litigants and, as a result, has important implications 
for access to justice theory and policy. 
 
Given the important role that law and the legal system plays in a democracy, there 
are further challenging questions about whether the work undertaken by lawyers and 
judges within the framework of the civil justice system is compatible with the 
commitments of a truly democratic society.  In a democratic society, the civil justice 
system is engaged in the adjudication of legal rights and the delineation of legal duties 
                                                
82 In her article on the lawyer’s role in promoting deliberative democracy, Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests 
that the value of participation, which is articulated by the fact that “legitimate laws are authored by the 
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the liberal ideology in which it is assumed that the legal order is “created and maintained through 
politically legitimate institutions like the courtroom where competing political claims to justice may be 
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client does not typically speak for herself, it is assumed that the individual will be treated justly through the 
“neutral and autonomous application of the law to their claims of right as those claims are evaluated 
through a democratically constituted proceeding.”  Adherence to this ideology contributes to a failure to 
acknowledge the political nature of individuals’ issues and a corresponding disengagement from process 
that are cloaked in law and legal process but remain inherently political.   
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and responsibilities by an independent appointed judiciary.  Courts, through the creation 
and application of law, construct the ways in which individuals’ real life problems and 
disputes are situated within a particular legal framework and then subjected to a range of 
possible solutions that are established within that same legal framework.83  Lawyers 
contribute to this process by transforming individuals’ disputes and reframing clients’ 
experiences and claims into legal causes of action that are only recognizable to lawyers 
and judges.  In many instances, this may be contrary to or inconsistent with the clients’ 
wishes:84 this contributes to a sense of disengagement by clients who feel unable to 
participate in the resolution of their legal problem.  This reframing of disputes and claims 
within a legal framework understood only by lawyers and judges has the added effect of 
reinforcing the idea that law is impermeable to the input of the ordinary citizen.   
 
In the course of this transformative process, the lawyers and judges who 
participate (almost exclusively) in the justice system also engage in critical political 
discussions.  They shape not only the claims brought forward, and the content of the 
laws, but also the underlying values and norms adopted by and reflected in society.85  
                                                
83 In their qualitative research on how ordinary people both think about and interact with the law, Patricia 
Ewing and Susan Silbey commented that many of their interviewees experience the imposition of law in 
their life as a “disturbing force”.  In this regard they state “[n]ormal appearances are shattered when our 
motives, relationships, obligations, and privileges are explicitly redefined within ‘legal’ constructs and 
categories…[t]he tragic, but sadly commonplace, aspects of life become strangely transfigured through 
law: harsh words between feuding co-workers become harassment, or the brutal violence committed by a 
husband against his wife is euphemistically labeled a domestic dispute.  In short, when we confront our 
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awesome mundane.”  See Patricia Ewing and Susan B Silbey, The Common Place of Law (Chicago, USA: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998) at 15-16 [Ewing & Silbey, The Common Place of Law]. 
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(2007) 68:3 Pitts LR 701 at 704 [Relis, “Its not about the Money!”]. 
85 In his analysis of comparative federalism, Gerald Baier refers to the concept of the “attitudinalists” which 
arises in the context of a political science interpretation of judicial power.  An attitudinal approach begins 
with the assumption that judges are making “conscious, political decisions in the way that they interpret the 
constitution or any other law.”  Moreover, the behaviour and attitudinal characteristics of the judges are an 
integral indicator of judicial decisions.  See Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism – Judicial Doctrine in the 
United States, Australia and Canada, (Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2006).  More generally, in his 
critique of private settlements and the corresponding need for public adjudication, David Luban states, 
“legal rules and precedents are valuable not only as sources of certainty but also as a reasoned elaboration 
and visible expression of public values.”  See David Luban, “Settlement and the Erosion of the Public 
Realm” (1995) 83 Geo LJ 2619 at 2626. 
 72 
One manifestation of this norm-creation occurs in the context of precedential judgments 
whereby judges are not only resolving private parties’ disputes, but also engaging in the 
regulation of future behaviour and the future outcome for similarly situated parties in 
similarly situated cases or negotiated settlements.86   
 
In his work on the transformation of the traditional litigation model to a newer 
public law model of litigation in 1976, Chayes examined the expanded role of the judge 
in the newer litigation model.  In so doing, Chayes commented that this expanded judicial 
role within public law litigation contemplates a judicial process that operates as “an 
effective mechanism for registering and responding to grievances generated by the 
operation of public programs in a regulatory state.”87  But, perhaps more significantly and 
more directly relevant to the political nature of the litigation process, Chayes suggests 
that the process of fact-finding within public law litigation, 
 
begins to look like the traditional description of legislation:  Attention is 
drawn to a ‘mischief’, existing or threatened, and the activity of the parties 
and the court is directed to the development of on-going measures 
designated to cure that mischief.  Indeed, as is often the case, the decree 
sets up an affirmative regime governing the activities in controversy for 
the indefinite future and having binding force for persons within its ambit, 
then it is not very much of a stretch to see it as, pro tanto, a legislative 
act…88 
 
The civil justice system articulates citizens’ legal rights and duties and, in some 
instances, the system will protect citizens’ rights vis-à-vis the state.  However, the 
judicial process is criticized as being inconsistent with democratic principles because 
while it may be “for the people,” it is certainly not “by the people.”89  One of the 
                                                
86 Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization and Democracy, supra note 3. 
87 Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv L Rev 1281 at 1308 
[Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”]. 
88 Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, ibid at 1297. 
89 Some maintain that because the law favours maintaining the status quo and the courts apply the law, the 
legal process in the judicial system forms an “integral part of the general apparatus which holds the existing 
governmental arrangements in place and places a series of obstacles in the way of those who struggle to 
bring about political change.”  Hutchinson, The Province of Jurisprudence, supra note 7 at 167.  See also 
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objections being that decision-making in the courts, and even more particularly so in the 
context of constitutional review, is antithetical to the concept of majority-rule, a 
cornerstone of democratic systems.90  In speaking about the United States Supreme 
Court, John Hart Ely stated, “[t]he Court may be purseless and swordless, but its ability 
importantly to influence the way the nation functions has proved great, and seems to be 
growing all the time.”91   Within the United States, the debate continues over the extent of 
the political nature of the legal process and the corresponding appropriateness of 
unelected judges defining public policy that unavoidably includes the delineation of 
societal norms and values.92  
 
In the outset of the Charter-era in Canada, Patrick Monahan predicted that the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms93 was likely to have a significant impact on 
public policy outcomes.  As such, both the political nature of the Supreme Court’s role 
and the underlying political theory guiding the Supreme Court in cases of constitutional 
review needed to be openly acknowledged and articulated.94  In acknowledging the 
political nature of the decision-making process, the Supreme Court would “identify the 
background political ideals which give shape and substance to the Charter as a 
whole…[and that] constructing such a background political theory is a normative 
exercise, as well as a descriptive one.”95  By engaging in this exercise, Monahan 
contended that the Court would be better equipped to make “excruciatingly difficult 
                                                                                                                                            
Allan C Hutchinson, “A ‘Hard Core’ Case Against Judicial Review”, (2009) 121:7 Harvard Law Review 
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93 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
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94 Monahan, The Charter, supra note 90 at 10. 
95 Monahan, The Charter, ibid at 12. 
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moral and political choices demanded by the Charter.”96  The assumption underlying this 
exercise was the fact that the process relied on by the Supreme Court was political, 
impacted public policy, and, therefore, involved important normative discussions about 
the values that were fundamental to the citizenry affected.  The focus of this discussion 
has been on the political nature of public law, including its impact on the development of 
public policy.  However, it is important to not overlook the significance of private law 
and in particular, the court’s role in resolving disputes between private individuals.  This 
broad sphere of law also engages critical political discussions that generate norms and 
regulate various aspects of our day-to-day lives.   
 
Despite the pervasiveness of civil law in our society and the impact of its creation 
and administration on our lives, the reality is that citizens are too often spectators in such 
matters; they are either represented by lawyers and/or required to resolve their legal 
problems themselves without the assistance of legal representation.  In effect, the history 
of court processes and the development of law within these court processes has involved 
a stylized conversation between the elite ranks of judges, and lawyers and clients 
including wealthy individuals and corporate parties financially secure enough to initiate 
and continue litigation.  Ordinary citizens played little or no role.97  Notwithstanding the 
increase of self-represented parties and attempts to make the institutional processes user-
friendly, the legal language deployed in the civil justice system continues to be the 
specialist vernacular of lawyers.  Even with procedural reform, it is very difficult for 
ordinary citizens to participate in the process without legal representation.  Despite this 
difficulty, growing numbers of individuals are compelled to proceed without legal 
representation.98  As a result, many self-represented litigants express anxiety, frustration, 
                                                
96 Monahan, The Charter, ibid at 12. 
97 However, the democratic process involving majority rule might also be characterized in this manner; the 
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powerlessness and, ultimately, disengagement when they appear in court without legal 
assistance.99  To the extent that the political nature of the adjudication process and the 
important role that it plays in a democracy is acknowledged, the fact that a significant 
portion of individuals are unable to access the adjudication process is inconsistent with 
the applicability of the Rule of Law as well as principles of democracy.  In the recent 
Supreme Court of Canada decision regarding the constitutionality of hearing fees in 
British Columbia, Chief Justice McLachlin linked explicitly the importance of access to 
justice to the Rule of Law in a democracy.  In this regard, she reiterated the comments 
made by Newbury JA in an earlier decision when she stated that,  
 
[i]n the context of legislation, which effectively denies people the right to 
take their cases to court, concerns about the maintenance of the rule of law 
are not abstract or theoretical.  If people cannot challenge government 
actions in court, individuals cannot hold the state to account — the 
government will be, or be seen to be, above the law.  If people cannot 
bring legitimate issues to court, the creation and maintenance of positive 
laws will be hampered, as laws will not be given effect.  And the balance 
between the state’s power to make and enforce laws and the courts’ 
responsibility to rule on citizen challenges to them may be skewed.100   
 
This Supreme Court of Canada decision offers encouragement to the challenge to 
improve access to justice.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s rhetoric about access to 
justice as a basic constitutional principle (based on section 96 of the Constitution) that 
flows from the Rule of Law goes some of the way towards recognizing the importance of 
access to justice in a democracy.  However, it does not go far enough; the thrust of the 
Supreme Court’s decision recommends a much fuller and more substantive effort to 
ensure meaningful access to justice given the democratic significance associated with 
individuals being able to raise issues or make claims particularly in relation to 
government policy and/or action in Court.  If the Supreme Court’s words are taken 
seriously, it will mean that more constructive and affirmative action will need to be taken 
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the National Self-Represented Litigants Project (May 2013). Available online at:  
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to ensure that the courts are truly open to all citizens, even and especially those that 
cannot afford lawyers in order that those citizens may actively and meaningfully 
participate in law-making and law-administering processes integral to a democracy.  This 
citizen participation is crucial to legitimizing the democratic process and individuals’ 
ability to play a role in the democratic process.  
 
The resulting disengagement of ordinary citizens also has serious and lasting 
consequences for the justice system as well as for the democratic process more generally.  
To the extent that individuals are unable to participate in the political and legal decision-
making processes that affect their lives, they remain disempowered and alienated.  The 
recent United Nations Report on Legal Empowerment noted that, with legal 
disempowerment, one of the core principles of democracy is undermined because 
“legitimate power is derived from the freely expressed will of the people.”101  Thus, to 
the extent that individuals are unable to participate, the democratic objective is 
compromised.   
The problems associated with disempowerment and disengagement are 
exacerbated for those living in poverty or otherwise marginalized communities.  Deborah 
Rhode has suggested “the poor experience more legal difficulties than the average 
[person]” and are less likely to be in a position to address their problems without 
assistance.102  In this regard, empirical research has demonstrated that there is a strong 
link between unresolved legal problems and social exclusion.103  Social exclusion is both 
a cause and effect of individuals experiencing justiciable problems.  More often than not, 
these individuals experience a combination of problems that include among other things, 
unemployment, poor skills, low income, lack of housing, high rates of crime and 
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breakdown of the family.104  Alone or in combination, these problems perpetuate social 
exclusion, disempowerment and alienation, thereby making it difficult for individuals to 
resolve issues on their own and almost impossible for them to affect justice in their 
lives.105  This disempowerment and corresponding inability to access legal processes in 
order to address issues or problems reinforces and perpetuates individuals’ 
disengagement: this de-legitimizes the authority of the legal system, the Rule of Law, as 
well as broader principles of democracy.  In this regard, Roderick MacDonald stated that,  
 
the interests disfavoured by the substantive law today are the very same 
interests that are systematically under-represented in the civil justice system.  
There is no separating the social forces that produce inaccessible civil 
justice from the social forces that produce substantially disempowering 
rules of law.  These social forces are in fact, the same.106   
 
Thus, in light of the cyclical nature of disengagement and marginalization that is both 
potentially created, as well as reinforced, by a lack of access to justice, these 
consequences can be particularly severe for individuals who are already disenfranchised.  
Moreover, the failure to take account of disadvantaged groups or individuals when 
conceptualizing and/or implementing access to justice initiatives runs the risk of further 
creating an “underclass of people that are still excluded from the legal system”107 with no 
ability to make use of the access to justice reforms offered.108  One of the ways in which 
to protect against this negative consequence involves the active engagement of all 
citizens in discussion and deliberation that ultimately contributes to the creation of a ‘new 
legal vernacular.’109  Through meaningful participation that is inclusive of the diverse 
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groups and interests in society and reflective of the “complex dynamics between 
dominant and marginalized groups”, the development of a ‘new legal vernacular’ could 
assist in developing a community’s legal knowledge as well as normative concepts of 
justice that are applicable to all members.  This would foster citizens’ further ability to 
understand, engage in and ultimately shape legal institutions and processes.  
 
In considering participation within the specific context of the judicial system, 
there is a particular need to address the disconnect between the traditional legal 
framework that focuses on an adversarial process undertaken by more or less evenly 
matched legal professionals and the modern realities that include significant numbers of 
self-represented litigants who are at serious disadvantage when engaging the traditional 
legal system.  Unlike professional lawyers, self-represented litigants suffer from a lack of 
knowledge and familiarity with the formalized processes and procedures, as well as the 
presence of hostile players (i.e., lawyers, judges and clerks).  Given the modern reality 
facing many self-represented litigants, the question that will be examined in the next 
section is whether, in the particular context of the civil justice system, access to justice 
might take account of participatory principles so that self-represented litigants are able to 
participate in the legal system in a meaningful manner.   
 
In accordance with a broader conceptualization of access to justice that 
encourages citizen engagement, it is necessary to examine access to justice through the 
lens of participatory democracy and the democratic benefits and objectives associated 
with increased citizen participation.  In this way, access to justice theory and the policy 
initiatives that flow from that theory may take account of the potential objectives and 
benefits associated with participatory democracy.  In so doing, it might be better able to 
improve citizens’ meaningful access to justice.   
 
Democratic Participation and Access to Justice  
In the most recent waves of access to justice, I have noted that there is a shift toward a 
focus on citizen participation.  MacDonald stated that “access to justice means most of all 
that people are able to find justice in their everyday encounters with public officials; it is 
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about transparency, accountability, integrity and ethics in the delivery of public 
services.”110  This characterization of access to justice as a ‘public service’ leads to 
questions about how it might be possible to provide opportunities for ordinary citizens to 
engage fully in the judicial, legislative and administrative processes in which law is made 
and administered.111  While the practices and procedures followed in the civil justice 
system may be very different from the procedures adopted by city council when holding 
public meetings, the theory is that, by participating in one forum, individuals will gain 
confidence and skills respecting how political and democratic institutions are 
administered and how they might subsequently engage in decision-making processes; this 
is consistent with a robust democratic system.  Moreover, individuals’ engagement in 
decision-making processes fulfills important needs related to empowerment, ‘voice’, self-
government and community-building; all of these are important aspects of a healthy 
democratic society.  It is in this way that Pateman suggests that participation becomes 
self-sustaining.112   
 
By contrast, the failure to promote participation leads to continued disengagement 
by citizens that is inconsistent with democratic principles.  Among other concerns, there 
is a corresponding loss of legitimacy in the legal institutions where law is made and 
applied.113  From a pragmatic standpoint, an approach to access to justice that is informed 
by principles of participatory democracy and focused on promoting participation by those 
engaged with the civil justice system is also consistent with the evolving modern realities 
of self-representation in that same justice system.  The question that arises in this regard 
is pertinent—whether access to justice initiatives can empower individuals to participate 
meaningfully in the legal decisions and processes that affect their lives and, by extension, 
the democratic process?   
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In answer to this pertinent question and based on the dual role of the courts in 
“rule-of-law-based democrac[ies],” there is a strong argument that access to justice 
theory should take account of direct citizen involvement in these adjudicatory law-
making processes.  Again, this position is bolstered by Susan Lawrence’s arguments 
about the potential democratic nature of participation in the civil justice system.  Because 
courts are passive institutions in which judges only engage in decision-making in respect 
of the cases brought before them, “litigation is an important form of self-government in 
that it allows the individual to invoke the power of the state on his own behalf.”114  The 
parties, particularly plaintiffs, must bring a case forward for consideration and, in so 
doing, raise the issues upon which the adjudicator will hear and rule.  As a result, in 
deciding whether to bring forward a case, individuals have the potential to affect 
participation in terms of issues that impact their lives.  The assumption underlying this 
argument is that the barriers to engagement have been removed such that all of those 
individuals who wish to raise an issue in a legal context are able to do so.  Thus, taking 
account of both criticisms of the adversarial process and the practical reality of courts’ 
law-making function, the focus of this part of the chapter is not to suggest that litigation 
(and the justice system more generally) is the only forum in which participation should be 
fostered.  Rather, as a political process, litigation plays an important role in constructing 
and administering law in democratic societies.  As such, in accordance with democratic 
principles, litigation is legitimized by meaningful citizen engagement.  
 
However, prior to undertaking this analysis and offering some tentative 
suggestions for how participation might inform and direct access to justice policy, it is 
necessary to examine access to justice theory and initiatives from the perspective of 
meaningful citizen participation consistent with the principles of participatory 
democracy.  This will include an examination of an approach to access to justice that is 
consistent with the democratic thesis: this approach takes particular account of the need 
for a new legal vernacular and a corresponding dialogue on concepts of justice.  This 
relationship between access to justice and the principles of participatory democracy is 
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further examined within the context of a specific access program undertaken in 
Connecticut to enhance access to justice through participation.  Notwithstanding this 
encouraging example from Connecticut, the inherent weaknesses in the structure and 
operation of the civil justice system raise serious questions about whether, for self-
represented litigants, meaningful participation is a legitimate or viable foundation for 
developing access to justice initiatives.  
 
Consistent with a concept of ‘strong democracy’, meaningful participation allows 
citizens to move away from reliance on experts and toward wider and more frequent 
direct participation in a variety of legal and political forums.  This engagement increases 
the likelihood that decisions ultimately reached are reflective of the citizens’ own 
understanding of law and views about justice.115  Access to justice as a goal that both 
promotes and provides for meaningful engagement by its citizens further allows 
individuals to participate directly in defining their own conceptualizations of justice.  In 
this regard, access to justice that encourages meaningful participation provides an 
opportunity for citizens to contribute to the development of social, political and economic 
forms of justice in society consistent with democratic values and principles.  Of course, 
this theoretical framework entails a commitment to the democratic thesis and a broad 
involvement by all citizens.    
 
In examining whether access to justice policy might benefit from the infusion of 
participatory principles, it is important to review some of the objectives associated with 
the promotion of participation in order to determine whether such goals are consistent 
with or achievable in the context of access to justice initiatives.  As my discussion of 
participatory democracy more generally shows, one of the objectives associated with the 
promotion of participation is wide and frequent citizen involvement in the decision-
making that affects their lives and their communities.  Another of the objectives 
associated with greater citizen participation is the collective acceptance of the decisions 
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made in the course of participation.  To the extent that individuals are able to provide 
opinions and deliberate on the issues that affect them, it is maintained that they will be 
more willing to abide by the decisions that are ultimately made.   
 
This does not mean that every decision will be reached through consensus nor 
does it mean that all participating individuals will be satisfied with the result obtained in 
every situation but it does mean that citizens are provided with the opportunity to 
deliberate, to take action and, in some instances, revisit issues previously decided upon 
when changes in society dictate.116  While the opportunity to be heard may seem like 
small or cold consolation for the party that loses its case, safeguarding the right to be 
heard contributes to the overall legitimacy of the justice system and citizens’ confidence 
in the fairness of a legal process.117  This is particularly relevant in the context of 
decisions affecting self-represented litigants who are typically compelled to engage the 
civil justice system on their own.   
 
A participatory approach to access to justice suggests a move away from an 
exclusive focus on improving access through the provision of traditional legal services or 
legal representation (the practical thesis).  In this context, the provision of traditional 
legal representation that is focused on meeting “unmet legal needs” is criticized as 
representing “tokens of power achievement”.118  Instead, there would need to be a move 
toward “redefining the traditional roles played by both the citizens and the legal 
profession”119 so that individuals are able to gain direct access to various democratic 
institutions and processes.  This applies not simply to where law is administered, but also 
where law is constituted.  This approach also takes account of the social and political 
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nature of law so that the evaluation of access to justice initiatives is based on how the 
initiative provides individuals with opportunities to engage meaningfully with the 
democratic process on their terms.   
 
One of the more potentially specific and positive effects of individuals’ direct 
engagement with the legal institutions is the potential for the ‘democratization of law’.  
This entails a shift away from the professionalization of law that has necessitated the 
need for full representation and a tentative move toward self-representation and direct 
engagement. 120   By contributing through legal processes directly, there is also an 
opportunity for individuals to develop and incorporate their own distinctive concepts of 
justice.  In developing these ideas, individuals will contribute to and be more likely to 
accept a legal system that is legitimate and transparent; these objectives are both 
consistent with democratic values and principles.  By contrast, the failure to facilitate 
participation (as a consequence of a lack of access) results in disengagement by citizens 
from conversations about justice and from the legal system more specifically.121  Further 
consequences associated with this disengagement include the loss of citizens’ voluntary 
adherence to the legal system and a corresponding lack of legitimacy in the legal system.   
 
Given both the potential benefits as well as potential detriments, numerous 
scholars, including Janice Gross Stein, Lucie White, Marc Galanter and Roderick 
MacDonald, recommend that the goal of improved access must include direct 
engagement by all citizens in the legal and political processes that affect them: this is 
different from more reliance on legal professionals.  While this approach does not rule 
out assistance by lawyers or even full representation by lawyers (and in fact, recognizes 
the important role that lawyers could play given their training and knowledge base),122 it 
does contemplate a more engaged and balanced relationship between lawyer and client.  
Pursuant to such a relationship, the lawyer would take better account of the importance of 
ensuring that individuals are able to participate in the decision-making processes that 
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affect them.  With the aid of certain relevant information, advice and skills, citizens 
would be able to engage in the construction of a new language of law – a language that is 
more reflective of the meaning and vocabulary of the citizens it governs.  This, in turn, 
provides an opportunity to further fosters citizens’ ability to both understand and 
participate in the legal system.123  The failure to cultivate an ordinary language of law and 
justice disempowers individuals because the use of an “official language,” by necessity, 
demands official interpreters.  Therefore, it serves to exclude ordinary citizens from 
discussions about justice; a discussion that citizens are capable of having in ordinary 
language.124  In this regard, MacDonald stated,  
 
the imposition of legal language on lay expressions of normativity has the 
effect of subjecting implicit, variegated pluralist law to explicit, 
homogeneous, monist law.  It thus produces a demand for professional 
characterization and interpretation, a monopoly of coercive remedy, and a 
hierarchy of standards of justice.125   
 
By contrast, citizens’ direct engagement in legal processes and institutions is 
reflective of the “living law of everyday human activity”.126  From a practical standpoint, 
the de-mystification of law means that law is made less technical and more relevant to the 
ordinary citizens that it purports to regulate.127  This de-mystification contributes to and 
encourages the development of the “new legal vernacular” through which citizens further 
“participate in redefining, reforming and shaping the law and its institutions.”128  As a 
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result, citizens’ engagement with and shaping of the legal system becomes self-
perpetuating and ultimately contributes to common ideas about justice. 
 
Underlying this development of a “new legal vernacular” are assumptions that 
litigants’ understanding of law, legal processes, experiences in law and expectations of 
fairness affect their legal engagement.129  All of these may be either encouraged or 
thwarted by the efforts undertaken in promoting access to justice.  Individuals’ 
experiences, perceptions and expectations of law can be determinative of whether they in 
fact ‘turn’ to law and/or continue to engage with law-making and law-administering 
processes that form the basis of the modern political authority.130  Stuart Hampshire 
suggests, “[r]espect for a process can, as a matter of habit, coexist with detestation of the 
outcome of the process, and this is particularly in democracies.”131  The procedures for 
conflict resolution may be challenged and subject to reform in order to ensure fairness, 
but their existence is necessitated as a way of resolving political and moral conflict.132   
 
In the particular context of the civil justice system, considerable socio-legal 
research has suggested that when evaluating the fairness of a legal process, individuals 
are more likely to express satisfaction with the legal process if they feel that they were 
able to speak and be heard by the decision-maker.133  In many instances, the litigants’ 
positive evaluation of the process is less tied to a particular outcome in the proceeding, 
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but more tied to ‘having a voice’.134  Thus, by ensuring that the parties are able to express 
their viewpoint and be heard in a meaningful manner, the parties may begin to feel that 
the justice system operates fairly, notwithstanding the particular result obtained.135  
Individuals are also more likely to accept the decision made if they believe that the 
procedure through which the decision was derived involved a fair process; a process in 
which they were able to participate.136  Nowhere is this more significant than in the case 
of self-represented litigants who do not have an advocate speaking on their behalf; they 
are speaking directly within the adjudicative process.137  For self-represented litigants, it 
could be argued that having a voice and being heard potentially has an immediate and 
direct impact on their perceptions about the legitimacy of the particular process as well as 
their potential willingness to participate in other contexts or forums.   
 
The promotion of greater participation and engagement by individuals in the legal 
institutions and processes that affect them also has the added affect of strengthening the 
legitimacy of the justice system as part of the greater democratic process.  Direct 
participation in the judicial system’s law-making processes has the potential to 
corroborate the democratic aspects of this law-making process.  Drawing on themes of 
legal consciousness and democratic dialogue, it is through individuals’ engagement with 
law and legal practices that “ordinary people give flesh and meaning to what is otherwise 
an abstract but binding form.”138  In his discussion of legal consciousness, Barclay 
suggests that individuals’ everyday interaction with law and decisions about law,    
 
offers the potential for new interpretation, new legal claims, the introduction 
of legality into realms of social life that it had never before occupied, or the 
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re-shaping of common understanding of that social life.  Thus, even as 
legality constrains the range of accepted options for individual action, 
people nevertheless have opportunities to redefine and challenge these 
constraints.139   
 
Moreover, through meaningful participation in the development and administration of the 
laws that govern them, individuals will be in a better position to infuse those laws with 
their own conceptualizations of justice, freedom and equality.  The impact of these 
changes potentially extends beyond the individual’s particular circumstances.140   
 
Lucie White has suggested that the practice of law has cultural meaning and, as 
such, can and should include a dialogue about social justice.141  Thus, to the extent that 
individuals are able to move away from the traditional roles played by clients and lawyers 
within the legal system and engage directly in this conversation, they have the 
opportunity to participate in the development of norms of justice and equality that are 
reflective of their collective lives and experiences.  This is consistent with a broad 
concept of ‘ethico-political’ justice envisioned by Agnes Heller.  She argues that justice 
includes the “perspective, principles and procedures for evaluating institutional norms 
and rules.”142  In this regard, like Janice Gross Stein, Heller’s concept of justice is not 
limited to a concept of justice that is based on distributive principles, but rather includes 
the key component of citizenship.  This enables individuals to deliberate about problems 
in the community and attempt to confront those problems in a collective manner that is 
“without dominance and with mutual tolerance of difference.”143  Thus, according to 
Heller, the ‘good citizen’ is one that is “committed to value discourse as the just 
procedure;” the resulting norms and values are accordingly validated through consensus 
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such that just procedures provide a framework for the possible good lives for all 
citizens.144   
 
In a similar vein, Benjamin Barber suggests that terms such as ‘justice’ are not to 
be understood as abstract terms, but rather as political values that cannot be apprehended 
or practiced except in the setting of citizenship.145  Moreover, the concepts of democracy 
and justice are contingent and interdependent: justice is not sustainable when delivered as 
a command and democracy is weak when it is restricted to counting votes as a means of 
obtaining a political outcome.146  Through democratic dialogue, concepts such as justice 
become the subject of debate, challenge, valuation and transformation in accordance with 
the needs and circumstance of the particular political communities.147  This is not to 
suggest that the concepts are only relative and relevant to the immediate will of citizens.  
Rather, it is that these terms are truly reflective of a citizenship that has, through 
meaningful dialogue and deliberation, encapsulated certain ideas and perspectives.  In 
this regard, ‘voice’ becomes an important prerequisite for a discourse on justice.  
Concepts of justice or injustice can be developed and assessed from the perspective of the 
participant (or aspiring participant) in a society that is more or less attuned and 
committed to giving full and effective ‘voice’ to its members. 148   Sarat’s 
conceptualization of justice contemplates, as a pre-condition, participation that includes a 
“situated exploration of a legal order’s particular self-understanding and 
arrangements.”149  Lawrence contends that the reality is that “courtrooms are only one of 
the few remaining forums where justice is debated daily.”150  Thus, in a modern 
democracy, a significant portion of this dialogue and deliberation about concepts such as 
justice occurs in the civil justice system.  Consequently, meaningful participation by 
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individuals in the civil justice system may provide an opportunity for deliberation on 
concepts of justice.  As a result, the gap between institutions and citizens may be better 
bridged and even abridged. 
 
This abridgement is accomplished in part by creating an “enabling environment” 
in which the opportunities for participation are expanded.  As such, in the context of the 
civil justice system where barriers have resulted in the continued exclusion of ordinary 
citizens, creating an environment that expands and encourages opportunities for citizens 
to participate is an important consideration. 151  This continued exclusion, in turn, leads to 
important debates and discussions within the access to justice literature regarding the best 
means to address and surmount these barriers.152  
 
A Case Study from Connecticut on Participation and Access to Justice  
By way of confirmation, anthropological research conducted in respect of a participatory 
democracy project highlights the importance of a participating citizenry.  It establishes a 
link between participation and community-building and the corresponding benefits 
associated with ‘democratic participation’ as a means for individuals to access justice in 
society.153  This community lawyer project was undertaken in Winsted, Connecticut.  A 
lawyer was hired to assist members of the town in building civic education and 
participation at the local level.  Local government did not hire the lawyer: she was funded 
through a private charitable organization.  The lawyer’s task was to provide individuals in 
the community with the “means by which they could translate personal concerns about 
the community into community action.” 154   Unlike a traditional lawyer-client 
relationship, the lawyer in this case study did not assume responsibility for the 
community members’ legal issue but rather provided advice and information that allowed 
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the citizen to take action.  By providing individuals with information on the relevant law 
and procedures of local government, advising them on the use of media and lobbying, 
attending public meetings to ensure that officials followed procedures, and compiling 
information regarding emerging issues in the community, the lawyer was able to assist 
citizens “participate and become involved in the process of governing themselves.”155  In 
describing her role in the community, the lawyer stated that “citizens without adequate 
information cannot exercise their rights and do not know what to expect from their 
government because they do not know what to demand” or presumably how to make 
demands.156  This lack of information was seen as directly impairing the citizens’ 
capacity to engage in public dialogue.  In turn, this further undermined both the ability of 
citizens to participate in the decision-making process and the accountability of the 
governing officials.   
 
The nexus between a lack of information about rights and processes and an 
individual’s incapacity to engage in the democratic process at any level is relevant in the 
context of access to justice.  Even more so, it is pertinent to self-represented litigants’ 
direct participation in the civil justice system.  The community lawyer project provides a 
concrete example where the dissemination of legal information and related skills was 
thought to have a direct impact on citizens’ ability to participate and ultimately self-
govern.  In light of the fact that certain access to justice initiatives such as self-help are 
directed at providing self-represented litigants with legal knowledge so that they may 
navigate the civil justice system more effectively, it might be asserted that such 
initiatives, like the community lawyer project, promote opportunities for greater citizen 
participation; they provide much needed information and advice about particular legal 
processes.  Thus, to the extent that access to justice theory is informed by principles of 
participatory democracy and direct citizen engagement, a central question that is how 
access to justice initiatives might be developed to further enhance meaningful 
participation.  Related to this question are also questions about how such initiatives might 
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be reconciled with new approaches to lawyering that take better account of the need to 
foster decision-making by individuals in their own legal matters.  The challenge in 
substantiating these initiatives is to account for the myriad of issues that arise when 
individuals are engaged in legal matters in a direct manner. 
 
The Possibility of Meaningful Participation in the Civil Justice System 
In examining the possibilities for meaningful participation, it is important to canvass 
some of the questions that are raised in respect of the viability of meaningful participation 
in the civil justice system whereby individuals are able to have an impact on the decision-
making process.  In addition to various informational, procedural and operational barriers 
that specifically impede participation by non-lawyers, 157  there are also substantive 
questions about the nature of the adversarial system and whose interests the civil justice 
system is in a position to serve.    
 
These questions are particularly pertinent for any individual attempting to assert a 
social justice agenda within the traditional court system.  Gary Bellows suggests that “[i]f 
a major goal of the unorganized poor is to redistribute power, it is debatable whether the 
judicial process is a very effective means toward that end.”158  Gabel and Harris further 
contend that the legal system and, more particularly, the court system and the lawyers 
that act within it serve to legitimate the existing power structures in society.  Thus, 
notwithstanding the significant and growing number of self-represented litigants engaged 
in the civil justice system, the existing legal system and the organization of the legal 
profession are criticized as being primarily designed to resolve the private disputes of 
corporations and wealthy individuals able to afford legal representation.159  The civil 
justice system is, as it were, part of the problem, not the solution to a democratic deficit. 
                                                
157 These barriers are discussed in greater detail in chapters seven and eight. 
158 Anthony V Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law and A Theory of Dialogic Empowerment” (1987-
88) 16 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 659 at 689 [Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law”] quoting Gary 
Bellows, “The New Public Interest Lawyers” (1970) 70 Yale LJ 1069. 
159 Stephen Wexler, “Practicing Law for Poor People” (1970) 70 Yale LJ 1049 [Wexler, “Practicing Law 
for Poor People”]. 
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This criticism underscores the need to take account of the existing distribution of 
power and the potential for re-distribution of power when assessing whether meaningful 
participation is possible.  In responding to the question of whether Canada has adequate 
access to justice, Chief Justice McLachlin answered in the negative: “Among those 
hardest hit are the middle class and the poor.  We have wonderful justice for the 
corporations and for the wealthy.”160  In this regard, courts are characterized as “venues 
that simply distribute power to power.”161  This skepticism is further reflected in the 
claim that “the legal process is strongly aligned with the interests of the established order 
which is better able to access its formidable authority and institutional resources in order 
to resist change and/or to divert those transformative efforts into debilitating and 
decelerating channels.”162  Thus, to the extent that the justice system only serves certain 
groups’ needs and certain existing power structures, increased participation by excluded 
groups may fall victim to claims of empty or cosmetic participation.  This is due to the 
fact that there is no legitimate opportunity for the excluded groups to affect the 
redistribution of power and thereby affect decisions and change the legal vernacular.   
 
Because the civil justice system is built on the resolution of individual cases,163 
there is also continued skepticism over whether it is possible for individuals who are 
already disempowered or disengaged from society to have any meaningful impact on the 
existing social and political systems through litigation.  In the specific context of poverty 
law, Alfieri suggests that the direct service tradition of providing civil legal assistance to 
the poor has been marred by the “dominant tendencies prescribing the routine treatment 
of poor clients as isolated and passive individuals without common attributes or 
bonds.”164  The result is a failure to address legal disputes in a contextual manner thereby 
                                                
160  Michael McKiernan, “Lawyers Integral in Making Justice Accessible: Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachlin”, Law Times, 21 February 2011, http://www.lawtimesnews.com/201102218262/Headline 
News/Lawyers-integral-in-making-justice-accessible-McLachlin. 
161 Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy, supra note 3 at 28. 
162 Hutchinson, The Province of Jurisprudence Democratized, supra note 7 at 156. 
163 This is notwithstanding the emergence of class actions in specific legal contexts. 
164 Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law”, supra note 158. 
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inhibiting attempts at client politicization, consciousness-raising and potential 
mobilization.165   
 
By contrast, what is really required is collective political action and the 
opportunity to engage in “dialogue regarding the economic, political and social forces 
engendering and surrounding legal conflict.”166  This is unlikely to occur in the context of 
the civil justice system.  Moreover, the corresponding failure to contextualize individual 
cases within larger discussions of class and power reinforces “dependence, isolation, 
passivity and fragmentation in poor communities.”167  The very fact that individuals’ 
claims are isolated, in the sense of being independent and singular, suggests that the 
system has a limited ability or willingness to affect broader social and political systems.  
The isolation associated with individual cases combined with the fact that, typically, there 
are limited legal resources available to assist these individuals means that claims may be 
framed in standard legal patterns that are easier for the trained lawyer to resolve and 
‘move on’ to the next client in need.  Proceeding in this manner does not encourage 
active client involvement and the client empowerment that comes with being engaged in 
the decision-making process, particularly when it is remembered that the resources 
available to these individuals and the legal professionals who assist them are very limited.    
 
This concern about the negative impact of isolation is magnified when the 
individual attempting to engage is a self-represented litigant.  Thus, even if individuals 
are able to articulate a claim in the civil justice system, the overall impact of such a case 
may be minimal if it is assumed that the implications of the case are limited to the facts of 
the particular case.  To the extent that this portrayal is reflective of how the judicial 
system operates, the provision of information or skills that allow an individual to assert a 
claim and articulate a position in the civil justice system may fall victim to Arnstein’s 
criticism about empty participation reflected in an inability to redistribute power and 
                                                
165 Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law”, supra note 158 at 684. 
166 Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law”, ibid at 684.   
167 Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law”, ibid at 683-685 
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resources and a reinforcement of perceptions of disengagement and powerlessness.168  
Existing power and income inequalities may also reinforce the idea that courts, and the 
adversarial system more generally, are likely to work in favour of those parties that 
already enjoy power advantages in the greater society.169   
 
However in an effort to end this discussion on a positive note, Trevor Farrow 
suggests that there are “many disputes for which the court system, guided by fair 
procedures administered under the watchful eye of the public, is more appropriate for 
redressing power imbalances and resulting injustices that can have far-reaching 
implications for disputants as well as the wider community.” 170   Thus, although 
substantive concepts of justice and fairness will presumably vary over time and across 
communities, fair and just procedures that ensure that individuals are able to engage in 
the resolution of conflicts and to dialogue about substantive concepts of justice represent 
a “fundamental kind of fairness.”171  In this regard, a key means of providing for both fair 
procedures as well as fair institutions is a reinvigorated adherence to the maxim, ‘hear the 
other side’.  This prescription allows for the “fair weighing and balancing of contrary 
arguments” and for taking account of the distribution of power.  Otherwise, this might 
prevent certain parties from having a say and being heard.  Both of these are necessary 
precursors to not only conflict resolution, but also meaningful justice discourse.  Thus, 
recognizing the role that procedural processes play in both promoting and protecting 
meaningful access within the formal court system, the imperative question arises—how 
how can and should the design and enforcement of these procedural processes take 
account of who is attempting to access the processes and their abilities in so doing?  
 
 
 
                                                
168 Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation”, supra note 43 at 216. 
169 Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change” 
(1974) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev 95. 
170 Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy, supra note 97 at 28-29. 
171 Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, supra note 131 at 4. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the principles of participatory democracy in so far as they 
inform and enrich a concept of access to justice that promotes meaningful participation 
by citizens in a variety of political and legal decision-making processes and institutions 
(the democratic thesis).  In light of the benefits associated with nurturing meaningful 
participation, empowerment and engagement are worthy objectives for a broader 
conceptualization of access to justice.  Moreover, the fulfillment of these objectives is 
consistent with the important role that law and legal institutions play in individuals’ lives 
and in a democracy more generally.  However, while these may be worthwhile goals, 
there are serious questions about the possibility of cultivating meaningful participation 
within the civil justice system.  This is particularly so given the existing structure of the 
legal system, the manner in which the adversarial system is operationalized, and the role 
that the legal system insiders play in administering the system.   
 
In light of these challenges, the next chapter will examine the particular context of 
self-represented litigants.  They are uniquely situated within this discussion due to the 
fact that they are attempting to participate directly and without the assistance of lawyers.  
Instead, they are seeking to participate with the assistance of self-help legal services.  The 
question that arises in this regard is whether self-help legal services are construed as a 
form of empowerment (and therefore, consistent with a broader conceptualization of 
access) or are a form of abandonment that contributes to the self-represented litigants’ 
disempowerment and disengagement.   
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CHAPTER FOUR  
SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND SELF-HELP SERVICES 
 
The crisis in access to justice in Canada has both driven and resulted in a variety 
of policy initiatives that aim to address the problem.1  Many of these initiatives have been 
directed at assisting the growing number of self-represented litigants who continue to 
enter the civil justice system.2  In statistical terms, a recent report in Ontario suggests that 
approximately 40% of civil law litigants represent themselves and this percentage 
increases dramatically in certain legal fields, such as family law, where as high as 60-
70% of litigants in family court are self-represented.3  Moreover, it is known that, as 
retainers run out and clients are unable to pay their mounting legal bills, the percentage of 
self-represented litigants also increases.4  As a consequence of being unable to afford 
legal fees, individuals are unable to resolve legal problems at earlier stages and their 
problems can become worse.5  Moreover, low- and moderate-income individuals have 
                                                
1 In her foreword to the Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters’ Final Report, 
Chief Justice McLachlin comments “as Canadians celebrated the new millennium, it became clear that we 
were increasingly failing in our responsibility to provide a justice system that was accessible, responsive 
and citizen-focused.  Reports told us that cost, delays, long trials, complex procedures and other barriers 
were making it impossible for more and more Canadians to exercise their legal rights.”  See Action 
Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Access to Civil and Family Justice – A 
RoadMap to Change” Final Report (October 2013).  Http://www.cfcj.fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/ 
AC_Report_English_Final.pdf [Action Committee, Final Report on Access to Civil and Family Justice]. 
2 Trevor CW Farrow, Diana Lowe, QC, Bradley Albrecht & Martha E Simmons, “Addressing the Needs of 
Self-Represented Litigants in the Canadian Justice System”, A White Paper Prepared for the Association of 
Canadian Court Administrators (March 27, 2012).  Available online at www.cfjc.fcjc.org [Farrow et al., 
“Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”]. 
3 Julie MacFarlane, “Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”, Final Report of the 
National Self-Represented Litigants Project (May 2013) at 86.  Available online at 
www.lsuc.onca/uploadedfiles/For_The_Public?About_The_Law_Society/_Decisions/2014/Self_Represent
ed_Project.pdf [MacFarlane, Final Report of the National Self-Represented Litigants Project]. In the 
American context, the President of the American Bar Association recently commented that approximately 
“80% of litigants remain unrepresented in all civil matters.”  See Victor Li, “William Hubbard Speaks 
about the Importance of Technology in Expanding Access to Justice” (March 17, 2016) ABA Journal.  
Availableonlineat:www.abajournal.com/news/article/william_hubbard_speaks_about_the_importance_of_t
echnology_in_expanding_access. 
4 Ontario Bar Association, “Getting it Right”, Report of the Ontario Bar Association Justice Stakeholders 
Summit (June 2007).  Available online at www.OBA.org/en/pdf/Justice%20Summit.sml.pdf. 
5 Action Committee, Final Report on Access to Civil and Family Justice, supra note 1.   
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historically been among those likely to be self-represented.  However, while these 
individuals are disproportionately self-represented, the latest empirical research in 
Canada indicates that 50% of the self-represented litigants surveyed had a university 
degree and approximately 40% of those interviewed had an income of over $50,000.00 
per year. 6  In seeking to better understand who resolves their legal problems through self-
help, Ab Currie stated that, 
 
[i]n statistical terms, the relationship between the action taken to resolve 
problems and most socio-economic characteristics is statistically significant 
but extremely weak. There appears to be a slight tendency for self-helpers to 
be older, to have higher incomes, to be somewhat better educated and to be 
single or married or a couple with no children.  Respondents who are self-
helpers were less likely to report that they have a physical or mental health 
problem.7   
 
This data appears to be reflective of a shift in the demographic make-up of self-
represented litigants.  As self-representation expands to include members of the 
traditional middle class, more people are attempting to resolve their legal problems 
without professional assistance. 8   In the American context, this phenomenon was 
observed by Sande Buhai who, citing a 1994 American Bar Association report, noted that 
there was,  “an increasing number of middle-income individuals choosing to resolve their 
legal issues without the help of a lawyer.”9  However, as discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis, the assessment of who is representing themselves needs to take account of the 
                                                
6 MacFarlane, Final Report of the National Self-Represented Litigants Project, supra note 3 at 8. 
7  Ab Currie, “Self-Helpers Need Help Too” (Draft 2010) at 8.  Available online at 
http://www.lawforlife.org.uk/data/files/self-helpers-need-help-too-ab-currie-2010-283.pdf/ [Currie, “Self-
Helpers Need Help Too”]. 
8 There are different ways to define the middle class; if you define it by income earned, it would encompass 
families that earn between $32,000.00 and $95,000.00 per year (approximately 40% of Canadians meet this 
criteria.  However, it may also be defined in terms of the amount of discretionary income that a family has 
to spend on non-essential items or to save.  Research done by Statistics Canada in 1991 suggested that this 
only constituted 25% of the population.  Please see Tasmin McMahon, “Who Belongs to the Middle Class 
in Canada?” (MacLean’s, February 26, 2014)  Available online at:  http://www.macleans.ca/economy/who-
belongs-to-canadas-middle-class/. 
9 Sande L Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective” (2009) 42 
Loy LA L Rev 979 at 983 [Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”]; see also Consortium on 
Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans: Major Findings 
from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study (1994) available online at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/SC/aid/legalneedsstudy.pdf. 
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reasons that an individual represents him- or herself and the fact that different groups of 
individuals are typically addressing different kinds of legal problems.10  In light of all of 
these dimensions, a shift in demographics has important implications for how we think 
about access to justice and how we develop initiatives that are aimed at assisting self-
represented litigants achieve justice.  To the extent that a broader spectrum of individuals 
(including for example, those who are university-educated and not otherwise dealing with 
issues of marginalization and exclusion) are self-represented, it becomes important to 
examine how access to justice policy might better support their attempts to do so.  As part 
of the development of strategies and initiatives that support self-represented litigants, it 
will be necessary to ensure that self-represented litigants are able to engage with the legal 
processes and institutions essential to the resolution of their legal matter.  The promotion 
of self-represented litigants’ direct engagement with various legal processes and 
institutions is consistent with the democratic thesis that seeks to engage citizens directly 
in the decision-making processes that affect them.  
 
As noted in chapter three, the development and administration of law has 
historically been the exclusive domain of specialists, namely members of a trained legal 
profession and a judiciary derived from the legal profession. 11   In contrast, self-
represented litigants who do not rely on an intermediary (i.e., a lawyer or paralegal) have 
an opportunity to influence directly the legal decision-making that is relevant to their 
particular legal problem consistent with the ‘politics of amateurs’ rather than the ‘politics 
of specialists.’  This opportunity to be heard and potentially influence the decision-
making process not only impacts the individual’s perceptions about the fairness and 
justness of the particular process but also potentially creates a history and context for 
further participation.12  To the extent those individuals believe that they were provided 
                                                
10 Please see chapter two of this thesis. 
11  Participatory democracy has been described as the ‘politics of amateurs’ whereas representative 
democracy involves the ‘politics of specialists.’  See Benjamin R Barber, Strong Democracy - 
Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, USA: University of California Press, 1984) at 152 [Barber, 
Strong Democracy].  
12 Lucie E White, “Mobilization on the Margins of Litigation: Making Space for Clients to Speak” (1987) 
16 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 535 [White, “Mobilization on the Margins”].  In her article, White suggests 
that the objectives associated with mobilizing poor people to affect welfare change should take account of 
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with an opportunity to ‘have a say’, they may be more inclined to believe that they are 
entitled to a say.  Consequently, they may begin to exercise a right to have a say in other 
forums or contexts.   
 
In this chapter, I intend to review briefly some of the particular barriers that it is 
assumed self-represented litigants face when they attempt to engage in the civil justice 
system without traditional legal representation.  These include operational, attitudinal, 
and structural barriers within the operation of the civil justice system.  Ultimately, the 
concrete nature and presence of these various barriers will be examined in greater detail 
in chapter 7 in the context of a discussion about self-represented litigants’ experiences in 
this research project.  However, prior to doing so and in the course of examining the 
viability of meaningful participation by self-represented litigants and the role of self-help 
legal services in furthering meaningful participation, it is necessary to flag some of the 
potential challenges faced by these individuals.   
 
Due to the fact that the numbers of self-represented litigants are increasing, there 
has been a corresponding proliferation of access to justice initiatives that are aimed at 
improving the individual’s access to justice.  One such initiative targeting self-
represented litigants directly is self-help legal services.  The objective of self-help legal 
services is to provide self-represented litigants with legal information and advice in order 
that they may better represent themselves.  In accordance with the democratic thesis, this 
initiative potentially offers an opportunity for self-represented litigants to enhance the 
meaningfulness of their participation.  Thus, in this chapter, I will examine the 
development of self-help legal services in various jurisdictions as well as the potential 
benefits associated with this initiative from a democratic perspective.  Finally, I will 
canvass some of the critiques associated with self-help legal services.  This will include 
an examination of certain broader concerns about whether self-help represents a form of 
empowerment or a form of disempowerment and whether there is a corresponding 
abdication of responsibility by policy-makers, government and the legal profession.   
                                                                                                                                            
the fact that the benefits associated with engaging poor clients may be quite modest and less comprehensive 
however that does not diminish the potential impact on future action by those individuals. 
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Operational Barriers to Access 
Operational barriers inherent in civil justice procedures make it difficult for non-lawyers 
to enter and navigate through the system.  Examples of this include courthouses that 
remain relatively inaccessible in terms of hours of operation and location (i.e., outside of 
highly populated areas) and court staff that are not typically in a position to provide extra 
assistance to self-represented parties who are unfamiliar with the court processes or 
forms.13  Moreover, assistance by court staff has historically been viewed as involving 
the provision of legal advice, which only lawyers are regulated to provide in all Canadian 
jurisdictions by virtue of their regulatory bodies.  The adherence to procedures, which are 
generally unknown to non-lawyers and difficult to understand without legal intervention, 
compound the problems for self-represented litigants. This is further complicated by the 
fact that individual courts may invoke different local practices and procedures that are 
typically only familiar to the lawyers who regularly attend in that particular court.  In 
light of these concerns, there have been calls to understand better the legal needs of self-
represented litigants, particularly poor and disadvantaged self-represented litigants, when 
attending in court.14  The response has been a variety of studies that have examined the 
accessibility of courts, including the processes and procedures undertaken by individual 
courts and the staff that operate within these courts.15 
 
As a result of this field of research and the burgeoning number of self-represented 
litigants, there have been some efforts to re-design court processes in order to ensure that 
the civil justice system is more user-friendly for non-lawyers.16  This has precipitated a 
move toward streamlined, as well as less formal, procedures and forms.17  In Ontario, 
                                                
13 Farrow et al., “Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”, supra note 2. 
14 Hazel Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice” (1993) 56 Mod L Rev 393 at 397 [Genn, “Tribunals and 
Informal Justice”]. 
15 For example, see Ronald W Staudt & Paula L Hannaford, “Access to Justice for the Self-Represented 
Litigant: An Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers and Lawyers” (2002) 52 Syracuse L Rev 1017 
[Staudt & Hannaford, “Access to Justice for the Self-Represented Litigant”]; Bonnie Rose Hough, 
“Evaluation of Innovations Designed to Increase Access to Justice for Self-Represented Litigants”.  
Available online at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/equalaccess/evaluation.   
16 Farrow et al., “Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”, supra note 2. 
17 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, supra note 14 at 397. 
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examples of this include simplified procedures and higher monetary limits in small 
claims courts where there are a significant numbers of self-represented individuals 
appearing; the inclusion of more duty counsel who facilitate self-represented litigants’ 
interaction in the civil justice system; and the simplification of court forms which 
incorporate plain language such that non-lawyers can complete the forms without legal 
assistance and then file the forms electronically.18  These initiatives represent some of the 
operational reforms that have been undertaken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  
It is acknowledged that these types of operational changes are necessary in order to 
remove some of the more tangible barriers to access.  However, it is also important to 
note that there are ongoing challenges associated with undertaking procedural reform.   
 
There is first and foremost a criticism that the procedural reform undertaken is not 
sufficient; it is piecemeal at best and not likely to improve significantly access to justice 
on a broad scale.  Moreover, significant procedural changes that might better serve self-
represented litigants’ needs are often met with concerns about the litigation process that 
are grounded in a continued adherence to a traditional model of litigation that is created 
and administered by lawyers.19   
 
Recognizing the need to undertake procedural reform that is consistent with 
access to justice, Supreme Court Justice Karakatsanis recently stated that the “balance 
between procedure and access struck by our justice system must come to reflect a modern 
reality and recognize that new models of adjudication can be fair and just.”20  At issue in 
that case was the scope of a motion court judge’s decision-making powers in summary 
judgment procedures.  Speaking for the Court, Justice Karakatsanis concluded that 
procedure must be interpreted with a view to promoting the timely and efficient 
                                                
18 For example, see Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 4.01(3) – electronic filing; OR 
439/08 – increase in Small Claims Court limit to $25,000.00.  Moreover, LawHelp Ontario (LHO) now 
provides volunteer legal representation in Ontario Superior Court, Ontario Court of Appeal and Chambers 
as well as Divisional Court.   
19 A discussion of certain assumptions regarding the traditional adversarial model and the litigation process 
employed is contained in chapter eight. 
20 Hryniak v Maudlin, 2014 SCC 7 at para 2 [“Hryniak”]. 
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resolution of legal matters consistent with enhanced concepts of access to justice.21  By 
expanding the scope and the flexibility of certain procedural steps, such as summary 
judgment motions, the argument is that the civil justice system would better serve those 
who may not otherwise be able to afford to pursue a long and protracted trial process.  
While it is important that this decision acknowledged the need to infuse the development 
and implementation of procedural rules with concerns about access to justice, it is also 
important to examine critically the implications of certain procedural changes on those 
most affected by a lack of access to justice – self-represented litigants.  Thus, the 
question that arises in the context of this case is whether expanded summary procedures 
(that potentially include the use of oral evidence whereby individuals have an opportunity 
to ‘tell their story’ early in a proceeding) assist a self-represented litigant or whether early 
in the proceeding, complex procedural steps are particularly onerous for self-represented 
individuals who are likely struggling to understand the relevant procedural and 
substantive law.  This question led the National Self-Represented Litigant Project to 
conduct a survey of summary judgment applications and judgments in reported 
decisions.22  Comparing the number of reported decisions in 2004 with 2015, the survey 
suggested that there has been an increase in the use of summary judgment motions 
against self-represented litigants.  The survey further indicated that in Ontario, 88% of 
the cases where a represented party brought a summary judgment application against a 
self-represented litigant, the represented parties were successful in obtaining judgment 
against the self-represented litigant.  This led the researchers to conclude, 
  
[w]hile SJPs offer an opportunity to deal efficiently with cases that are 
without merit, it is equally important to consider their unintended 
consequences.  This is especially critical at a time of great change due to 
the influx of large numbers of SRLs. SRLs who face the end of their claim 
as a result of a summary judgment often feel that they have been denied 
access to justice and unfairly treated by our legal system.  SJP cases 
                                                
21 Hryniak, ibid. 
22 Julie MacFarlane, Katrina Trask & Erin Chesney, “The Use of Summary Judgment Procedures Against 
Self-Represented Litigants: Efficient Case Management or Denial of Access to Justice?”  (November 2014) 
Available online at http://representingyourselfcanada.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/nsrlp-the-use-of-
summary-judment-procedures-against-srls1.pdf [MacFarlane, Trask & Chesney, “The Use of Summary 
Judgment Procedures Against Self-Represented Litigants”]. 
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illustrate the dilemma of how to fairly and appropriately hold a SRL to 
account when their case is unlikely to succeed (the premise of SJPs).23  
 
To the extent that the latter is the case, it would seem that procedural reforms aimed at 
providing expedient resolutions actually work to disadvantage self-represented litigants 
who are attempting to get up to speed.  At the same time, these procedural reforms 
provide a potentially unfair advantage to the opposing counsel who are already familiar 
with that particular procedural step. The lesson in this regard is while action may be taken 
to simplify and potentially streamline procedures, it is important that the action 
undertaken takes account of the particular needs and capabilities of those seeking access.  
More significantly, this also means taking account of the perspectives of those 
individuals or groups that have not historically participated in conversations about 
procedural reform.   
 
There is an even more fundamental challenge associated with designing informal 
alternatives to the courts that are simpler and presumably more accessible than traditional 
court processes, but still maintain a commitment to fair and just proceedings in 
accordance with the Rule of Law.24  Specifically, empirical research conducted in the 
United Kingdom suggests that, while there has been a general shift away from the formal 
processes of the civil justice system to less procedurally formal tribunal processes as a 
means of addressing the growing number of self-represented parties, the result has been 
that “in the absence of the conventional protections of formality, such as representation, 
and the rules of evidence, the cases of those appearing before informal tribunals and 
courts may not be properly ventilated, and the law may not be accurately applied, and 
ultimately justice may not be done.”25  In light of this concern, the challenges involved in 
addressing operational and information-based barriers as well as procedural barriers to 
participation in the civil justice system remain daunting.   
 
                                                
23 MacFarlane, Trask & Chesney, “The Use of Summary Judgment Procedures Against Self-Represented 
Litigants”, ibid at 13. 
24 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, supra note 14 at 398. 
25 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, supra note 14 at 398. 
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In this sense, it is important that attempts to simplify court processes and 
procedure take account of the larger adversarial context in which the procedure operates, 
as well as the role played by the insiders (i.e., lawyers and adjudicators) who have and 
continue to dominate the litigation process.  Even if the requisite procedures are 
simplified and self-represented litigants receive constructive assistance and, as a result, 
are prepared and willing to engage in the legal system, the legal system is not necessarily 
equipped to deal with them.  Again, from a procedural standpoint, many of the existing 
legal institutions, processes and rules that non-lawyers are obligated to engage with 
remain difficult to navigate without ‘insider’ knowledge.  In this regard, the procedures 
can be anachronistic and appear counter-intuitive for individuals not trained as legal 
professionals.  Moreover, despite attempts to simplify various legal processes, many of 
the procedural aspects of these processes remain overly complicated.  Challenges 
involving the procedural aspects of the adversarial process can be made worse by the fact 
that, in many instance, lawyers may be prepared to spend significant amounts of time 
arguing over procedural entitlements. 
 
Interestingly, the move to simplify various legal processes by making the system 
less formal and presumably more accessible for non-lawyers has also resulted in a 
criticism regarding the negative and misleading impact that informal processes may have 
on self-represented litigants.26  Small claims courts (with low monetary limits) are 
common venues in which the formal court rules have been relaxed and/or re-drafted with 
a view to making the process more accommodating of self-represented litigants, 
unfamiliar with legal process.  However, research in small claims courts by O’Barr and 
Conley suggests that, “although the freedom to speak without the assistance of 
representation and without being constrained by formal rules of evidence was welcomed 
by many litigants, this may be a mechanism by which informal procedures substitute 
expressive satisfaction for the enforcement of rights.”27  In other words, self-represented 
                                                
26 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, supra note 14 at 403-404. 
27 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, ibid at 403-404 quoting W M O’Barr & J M Conley, “Litigant 
Satisfaction versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives” (1985) 19 Law & Soc’y Rev 661 
[O’Barr & Conley, “Litigant Satisfaction”]. 
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litigants may find it easier to engage in a less technical and more relaxed process from a 
procedural perspective, but this does not necessarily mean that the self-represented 
litigants are affecting the results they wanted or expected.  In fact, the informality of the 
procedural process may mislead individuals to believe that the decision-making and 
application of substantive law carried out by the adjudicator will involve the same 
informality as is present in the procedures governing the hearing more generally.  In this 
sense, there can be a disconnect between the informal rules that govern the hearing 
process and the more traditional and formal process that governs the adjudicator’s 
decision-making process.  In these instances, self-represented litigants are led to believe 
that they are able to present their case in their own way and in their own voice, but are 
ultimately confronted with a formal application of evidence and law in the course of the 
decision.  In the recent context of small claims court process, there has been another layer 
added to this critique.  The concern is that, as the monetary limits in small claims courts 
increase, so too does the presence of lawyers.  Thus, while the procedures are drafted in a 
less formal manner, the existence of lawyers gives rise to proceedings that are influenced 
and formalized by lawyers’ traditional training and operation in the civil justice system.   
 
In addition to the traditional civil courts, there are a variety of administrative 
tribunals that address a variety of legal issues including landlord/tenant, social services, 
employment, workers’ compensation and human rights issues.  The theory being that 
administrative tribunals “can be more responsive to the real situations people face.”28   
However, like recent trends in small claims court, the Access to Legal Services Working 
Group – tasked with the goal of encouraging innovation and action in the delivery of 
legal services – notes that citizens are increasingly appearing in tribunals with legal 
representation.29  Notwithstanding the fact that many of these administrative tribunals and 
regulatory processes contemplate citizen participation without lawyers, it is noted that the 
‘proliferation’ and complexity of certain of these regulatory bodies and processes have 
                                                
28 Alison MacPhail, Report of the Access to Legal Services Working Group (May 2012) Action Committee 
on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters at 3.  Available online at 
www.cfjc.fcjc.org/sites/default/files/doc/2012 [MacPhail, Report of the Access to Legal Services Working 
Group]. 
29 MacPhail, Report of the Access to Legal Services Working Group, ibid at 3. 
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not necessarily encouraged engagement by ordinary citizens. 30   In other words, 
procedural reform and related attempts to simplify legal processes in tribunals has not 
always resulted in better processes for self-represented individuals.31 In many respects, 
the process remains complex both in terms of procedure and in the application of the 
relevant regulatory framework.  Alternatively, Hazel Genn argues that there is a 
possibility that informal procedures and simplified steps in various tribunals may present 
traps for unwary self-represented parties who are lulled in to a false sense of comfort 
about the process.32  Moreover, similar to the critique of small claims courts, while the 
processes within the tribunal setting may be informal and thereby provide increased 
opportunity for direct participation, the statutory regime within which the tribunal 
operates may remain legally complex and heavily reliant on traditional legal principles 
and stylized modes of interpretation.  Some of the concerns underlying this critique are 
responded to, in part, by more recent calls for active adjudication in administrative 
settings.  The call for active adjudication is grounded in questions about “whether the 
judicial model of adjudication is the most appropriate way to adjudicate administrative 
matters” given the increasing numbers of self-represented litigants.33  As such, more than 
developing simplified procedures, active adjudication calls on adjudicators to actively 
shape or direct the hearing process for the parties.  In one sense, active adjudication 
“attempts to eliminate or at least mitigate some of what has traditionally made lawyers 
indispensable to the proper functioning of the hearing” and “create a process that is fair 
an accessible to all parties.”34  
                                                
30 See also Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An Empirical 
Analysis” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 at 82.  In her Report on Access to Legal Services, Melina Buckley 
suggests and it is interesting to note that in a “diametrically opposed trend”, administrative tribunals have 
seen an influx of legal representation in processes that were originally designed to be ‘counsel-free’ and 
courts have seen an dramatic increase in the number of self-represented parties.  See also Genn, “Tribunals 
and Informal Justice”, supra note 14. 
31 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, supra note 14.  Michelle Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, 
Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias: Issues in Administrative Law” (2015) 38:1 Dalhousie LJ 
119 at 122 [Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”]. 
32 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, ibid. 
33 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, supra note 31 at 
126 & 129.  Chapter eight of this thesis contains a broader discussion of active adjudication. 
34 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, ibid at 131. 
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Another critique offered in respect of a move toward informal processes as a 
means of providing access to individuals who cannot afford legal representation, suggests 
that a shift toward less formal hearings represents a “downgrading of the problems of the 
poor and a relegation of their disputes to second-class forms of justice.” 35  In other 
words, the type and/or scope of problems relegated to adjudicatory processes, like small 
claims courts, may be low in terms of monetary value, but no less significant to those 
involved than matters that remain in the more formal superior court.  This is also true of 
the characterization of the legal issues raised and adjudicated upon by self-represented 
litigants against represented parties.  While this critique might raise legitimate concerns 
about the motivations underlying certain procedural reforms, it remains important to 
balance this critique against the benefits associated with developing processes that 
promote access to justice for non-lawyers and providing procedures that are proportional 
to the claims in dispute.  Again, the recent pronouncement by Justice Karakatsanis 
highlights this need for proportionality when designing and implementing procedures to 
resolve disputes in the civil justice system.  In this regard, she stated that “[i]ncreasingly, 
there is recognition that a culture shift is required in order to create an environment 
promoting timely and affordable access to the civil justice system.  This shift entails 
simplifying pre-trial procedures and moving the emphasis away from the conventional 
trial in favour of proportional procedures that are tailored to the needs of the particular 
case.”36 
 
Attitudinal Barriers Imposed by Insiders 
Coupled with a concern that direct participation by certain self-represented litigants may 
be, at best, shallow (given complex procedural requirements and/or reliance on simplified 
process), there is an added concern that the existing legal process and its institutions are 
neither designed for, nor accommodating of, participation by self-represented litigants.  
Attitudinal barriers prevalent among the key players in the civil justice system are also 
                                                
35 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice” supra note 14 at 397. 
36 Hryniak, supra note 20 at para 2. 
 108 
thought to negatively impact self-represented litigants’ attempts to access the civil justice 
system.  Members of the legal profession, along with some members of the judiciary, 
have historically viewed self-represented litigants as not only vexatious or frivolous 
litigants, but also the cause of much delay in the judicial system.37  One author has 
rejected the call to better accommodate self-represented litigants.  He characterizes pro se 
litigants (self-represented litigants in the American legal system) as having “disrupted the 
efficiency of the courtrooms, causing courtroom delays and overburdening judges, 
attorneys, and court staff.”38  Perhaps even more significantly, self-represented litigants 
were characterized as “‘pests’ or ‘nuts’ who are an ‘increasing problem’ clogging our 
courts.”39  The consequence of these attitudes by both lawyers and members of the 
judiciary is that self-represented litigants often feel uncomfortable or intimidated in 
speaking to judges or with opposing counsel; they believe that judges and lawyers are 
either impatient with the self-represented litigant or attempt to take advantage of the self-
represented litigants’ lack of knowledge and experience.40  The particular experiences of 
the self-represented litigants interviewed in this research project (discussed in chapter 7 
in greater detail) corroborate these sentiments.  Thus, in terms of the attitudinal barriers 
faced by self-represented litigants, there are significant questions about the existing 
ethical, as well as legal, guidelines and responsibilities that direct lawyers’ and judges 
conduct when dealing with self-represented litigants.   
 
In this regard, the basis for some of these attitudinal barriers may be grounded in 
the manner in which lawyers perceive their role within the adversarial model; this is a 
role that is now being challenged by a new reality of the litigation process.  However, 
notwithstanding the new reality of more non-lawyers within the civil justice system, there 
                                                
37 Deborah Rhode, “Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice” (2004) 17 Geo J Legal Ethics 369 
at 402-403 [Rhode, “Access to Justice”]. 
38 Drew A Swank, “In Defence of Rules and Roles:  The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance 
and Accommodation in Litigation” (2004) 54 Am U L Rev 1537 at 1547 [Swank, “The Need to Curb 
Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance”]. 
39 Swank, “The Need to Curb Extreme Forms of Pro Se Assistance”, ibid at 1548. 
40 The interviews conducted with self-represented litigants and lawyers as part of this research project 
reflect this concern.  MacFarlane, The Final Report of the National Self-Represented Litigants Project, 
supra note 3 at 91-92. 
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has not been a corresponding formal recognition by the profession of how lawyers might 
need to treat self-represented parties differently.41  It is not surprising that this failure to 
delineate any specific responsibilities or expectations of lawyers underscores the anxiety 
and frustration that many self-represented litigants feel when representing themselves.  
Again, the failure to outline particular ethical responsibilities when dealing with self-
represented litigants is even further complicated by the ‘zealous advocate’ mindset that 
continues to permeate the way that lawyers practice law.42  Arguably, a lawyer’s singular 
commitment to ‘winning’ the client’s case may rationalize aggressive behaviour that 
opposing lawyers might be able to handle but does not take account of the self-
represented opponent who is not likely operating on an equal playing field. 
 
On occasion, lawyers and their governing professional bodies have also been 
criticized for their resistance to the development of programs that would assist 
individuals to represent themselves better when faced with a legal problem.43  The legal 
profession, in its practicing and regulating guises, has characterized this resistance as 
                                                
41 It should be noted that there are informal guidelines provided on the Law Society of Upper Canada’s 
website in the context of Practice Management Topics – Dealing with Self-Represented Litigants.  These 
guidelines make reference to certain professional rules of conduct that require lawyers be reasonable in 
providing or withholding consents and courteous and civil in the lawyers’ dealings with other opposing 
parties.  Available online at www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=2147499412. 
42  Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 51 [Farrow, 
“Sustainable Professionalism”]. 
43 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 37 at 81.  It is worth noting that the Law Society of Upper Canada 
(“LSUC”), the legal profession’s regulatory body in Ontario, was resistant to relaxing the need for conflict 
of interest searches in the self-help setting notwithstanding that such a course of action would allow 
volunteer lawyers to meet with more individuals during the course of a day as they did not need to wait for 
the results of conflict searches.  Although the LSUC’s conflict requirements were eventually relaxed for 
lawyers volunteering at the self-help centre, the process by which the LSUC was persuaded to change its 
position took a significant amount of time and drew on the already limited resources of the pro bono 
organizations that were required to make submissions to the LSUC.  See Rule 3.4-16.3 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which contemplates a relaxed conflict search process in the case of short-term 
limited legal services to pro bono clients.  The Rules of Professional Conduct state “short-term limited legal 
services” means pro bono summary legal services provided by a lawyer to a client under the auspices of 
Pro Bono Law Ontario’s Law Help Ontario program for matters in the Superior Court of Justice or in Small 
Claims Court, with the expectation by the lawyer and the client that the lawyer will not provide continuing 
legal representation in the matter.”  See also Paul Paton’s discussion in his article, regarding his criticism of 
the Law Society of Upper Canada’s position on the regulation of paralegals.  Paul Paton, “Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place: The Future of Self-Regulation – Canada Between the United States and 
English/Australian Experience” (2008) The Professional Lawyer.  Available online at 
papers.ssrn/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1226802. 
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protecting litigants from the risks associated with receiving incorrect or misleading 
advice.  However, a different explanation for the legal profession’s resistance is linked to 
the profession’s concerns about unrestricted competition.  As a result of non-lawyers 
being better equipped to handle legal matters, the need for traditional legal representation 
might be reduced.  This explanation reflects a perceived threat to the legal profession’s 
longstanding monopoly on the provision of legal services.44  Changing these existing 
attitudes to include an approach that contemplates greater accommodation of self-
represented parties runs contrary to many of the legal profession’s entrenched ideas about 
how the adversarial system works and what the lawyer’s role is within that adversarial 
system.   
 
Although based on different concerns, members of the judiciary do not escape 
some of these attitudinal criticisms.  Again, earlier research data collected from self-
represented litigants suggests that judges can appear unsympathetic and even antagonistic 
toward self-represented litigants who do not appear to understand the nature of the 
proceedings or the legal processes in their courtroom.45  In fairness to many judges who 
are confronted with significant numbers of self-represented litigants on a daily basis, they 
may be unsure of how to balance the self-represented litigants’ needs in the courtroom 
with their own obligation to remain impartial as part of their traditional role in the 
adversary system.46  Moreover, Deborah Rhode suggests that, in certain courts and 
                                                
44 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 37 at 81. 
45 In one recent and extreme example, an American judge ordered that the sheriff attending in court give the 
self-represented accused a shock through the accused’s security ankle bracelet because the judge felt that 
the individual was wasting the court’s time by raising superfluous arguments.  The judge was immediately 
removed from the bench by the state bar.  See Richard Zorza, “Judge Orders Self-Represented Litigant to 
be Given Electric Shock” (September 9, 2014).  See http://accesstojustice.net/2014/09/09/judge-orders-self-
represented-litigant-given-electric-shock/. 
46 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 37 at 403.  Some commentators note that many judges are unclear 
about how to help self-represented litigants within the adversarial system without appearing biased.  For 
instance, Jona Goldschmidt observes that, in contrast to the operating premises of the traditional adversarial 
system, “in cases involving an SRL and a represented party, judges are faced with the difficulty of 
providing impartial justice on an uneven playing field.  The SRL, who often represents herself out of 
necessity due to insufficient funds, must navigate a confusing legal process without the same familiarity or 
expertise about the rules of game that will allow her to present her issues effectively and substantiate her 
case.  If judges remain passive and merely rule on procedural violations, SRLs have a substantial 
disadvantage and the truth-finding function of the hearing is severely curtailed.”  See Jona Goldschmidt, 
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particularly in a portion of the cases involving self-represented litigants, the nature of the 
cases are “symptomatic of broader social and personal problems: mental health 
disabilities, substance abuse, and inadequate employment of financial management skills, 
coupled with local shortages in jobs, housing, and health services.”47  As a result, trial 
judges lack the time and resources to deal adequately with all of the issues that have 
potentially affected the self-represented litigant’s life.48  Regardless of the underlying 
motivations, the results are the same—self -represented litigants are often made to feel 
excluded or outsiders in the civil justice system by those who operate inside the system.   
 
While it may be the fact that many cases are delayed due to self-represented 
litigants’ inexperience with the legal procedures or the substantive law, the challenge is to 
find ways to make the judicial system more hospitable to self-represented litigants 
without compromising the integrity of the justice system.  Notwithstanding recent 
developments aimed at ameliorating self-represented litigants’ participation and in light 
of the persistent operational and attitudinal barriers, the continued exclusion and 
disengagement of non-lawyers raises serious questions about whether even well informed 
self-represented litigants will be in a position to participate fully and effectively.   
 
 Underlying these observations about ongoing barriers to access is the recognition 
of a need for continuing and comprehensive change to the civil justice system.  This 
change would need to include the measures necessary to ensure that self-represented 
individuals are able to engage in the civil justice system in a meaningful manner.  
Presumably, the implementation of such measures would need to take account of existing 
operational and structural barriers that continue to impede self-represented litigants from 
participating.  In so doing, new procedures and processes might be developed that take 
account of non-lawyers’ needs and abilities.  As noted by Benjamin Barber, changes 
aimed at encouraging meaningful participation cannot be implemented in a piecemeal 
                                                                                                                                            
“’Lawyers’ Perceptions of the Fairness of Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants” (2012) 30 
Windsor YB Access Just 139 at 171. 
47 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 37 at 403. 
48 Rhode, “Access to Justice”, supra note 37 at 403-404. 
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fashion.49  These types of changes must also balance the requirement that the legal 
processes be fair and consistent with concepts of procedural justice, the Rule of Law and, 
at the same time, take account of the practical realities of administering a legal system 
that includes a significant number of self-represented parties who are unfamiliar with 
those very legal processes.  In this regard, the growing presence of self-represented 
litigants necessitates the need to consider whether and to what extent the existing 
adversarial process may be maintained and/or how new processes might be shaped by an 
inquisitorial or active adjudicative approach to dispute resolution in the civil justice 
system.  
 
Legal Self-Help and Citizen Participation 
Notwithstanding the criticisms that are leveled at the structure and administration of the 
civil justice system in terms of individuals’ direct participation, the principles and 
objectives of participatory democracy imbue and recommend a broader concept of access 
to justice.  The question becomes how to develop access to justice initiatives that are 
consistent with this broader conceptualization.  More specifically, to what extent, can or 
should an access to justice initiative like self-help legal services play a role in facilitating 
meaningful participation?  The criticisms raised in respect of the civil justice system 
would tend to suggest that meaningful participation by non-lawyers is minimal and a very 
challenging endeavor for any self-represented litigant.  However, being aware of the 
educative function of participation and learning from the case of the Connecticut 
community lawyer, it is possible to see how an initiative such as self-help might expand 
and multiply the opportunities for citizen empowerment and meaningful participation.   
 
The purpose of civil law self–help centres is to provide self-represented litigants 
with the information and skills necessary for them to pursue and resolve their own legal 
issues without legal representation.50  The provision of legal information, skills and tools 
                                                
49 See discussion of Barber, Strong Democracy, supra note 11 and in chapter three of this thesis. 
50 There are several self-help legal centres in Canada as well as hundreds in the United States that provide a 
variety of legal services and information to self-represented individuals, typically on a ‘first come, first 
serve’ basis.  The development of these centres has been linked to a corresponding decrease in legal aid 
support and increase in the numbers of individuals who are unable to secure legal representation.  See 
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arguably allows the individual to engage with the civil justice system in a more, if not 
perfectly meaningful manner.  By obtaining information and advice that helps to 
demystify the substantive law as well as the governing procedures, individuals might be 
in a better position to convey their position to opposing parties as well as members of the 
judiciary.51   
 
For instance, part of Ab Currie’s research on the viability of self-help as a means 
of problem-solving sought input on what people who ‘took care of it on their own’ would 
have done in retrospect.  Respondents with problems that had been resolved at the time of 
the interview who had chosen the self-help option were asked if they thought that the 
outcome would have been better if they had obtained some other form of assistance.52 
When asked what type of assistance this might include, Currie confirmed that of the 
respondents questioned, “[t]he most frequent first response was additional or better 
information, 30.4%.”53  Moreover, through direct participation in the legal process, 
individuals are afforded an opportunity to raise and frame the legal problem in a manner 
that is relevant to their lives; they can potentially engage in a dialogue that includes the 
formulation and expression of arguments and opposing positions.  To the extent that this 
results in the construction of decisions that are more consistent with the organization of 
ordinary citizens’ lives and reflective of their own conceptualizations of law and justice, 
it can be concluded that self-help has a role to play in advancing individuals’ meaningful 
participation.   
 
This view is reinforced by the notion that, in other non-law contexts, self-help 
programs provide an opportunity to foster consciousness-raising and the development of 
certain social skills including the ability to problem-solve; these promote empowerment 
                                                                                                                                            
Merran Lawler, Jeff Gidding & Michael Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of 
Self-Help Legal Resources to Citizens in Need” (2012) 30 Windsor YB Access Just 185 at 188 [Lawler, 
Gidding & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Resources”]. 
51 Of course, in accordance with Arnstein’s comments about power this requires that the key players in the 
system relinquish some of their power over both the processes and the language used in the justice system.   
52 Currie, “Self-Helpers Need Help Too”, supra note 7. 
53 Currie, “Self-Helpers Need Help Too”, ibid at 10. 
 114 
and provide for the opportunity to engage in a meaningful manner.  In fact, Elisheva 
Sadan suggests that,   
participation in a self-help group is considered to be an ideal (though not 
exclusive) means of encouraging individual empowerment, for such a group 
produces empowerment beyond the individual as well: people receive 
emotional and social support in the course of a change process in which they 
provide concrete help to others and acquire new skills, including the 
development of ability for future public action.54   
 
While Sadan contemplates the development of individual empowerment through self-
help in a non-law context, there are some similarities with legal self-help.  Namely, in 
helping oneself, there are certain social skills, abilities and knowledge acquired that are 
necessary and relevant for further action.   
 
One of the challenges in this regard is to ensure that, while civil law self-help 
centres provide individuals with the legal tools necessary to engage in deliberation and 
decision-making about civil law, the provision of legal advice and information does not 
result in a continued dependency on lawyers by non-lawyers.55  In other words, civil law 
self-help centres must provide individuals with the information necessary to engage in the 
civil justice system and, at the same time, assist the individuals in disabusing themselves 
of the need to rely on the language of experts; they cease to be passive bystanders whom 
decisions are made about and for.   
 
The purpose in providing individuals with the information they require to 
participate is not to eliminate all assistance by lawyers.  Rather, it is to democratize the 
language and substance of law such that individuals are able to participate directly in its 
development, meaning and administration.  This presupposes that to the extent that self-
help legal services centres provide legal information, skills and tools, individuals will be 
able to make use of the information and engage with and ultimately influence the 
                                                
54 Elisheva Sadan, Empowerment and Community Planning: Theory and Practice of People-Focused Social 
Solutions (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers, 1997) at 81-82 [Sadan, Empowerment and 
Community Planning]. 
55 Marc Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Orderings and Indigenous Law” (1981) 19 J 
Legal Pluralism 1 at 18 [Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms”]. 
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development of the civil law.  However, given the existing legal framework with all of its 
traditional notions of adversarial and professionalized participation, the question that 
remains is whether this might be practically achievable.56   
 
Research on self-help initiatives in Australia as well as California reflects the 
growing significance of these initiatives across different jurisdictions. 57   The data 
collected from these endeavours suggest that there are still more questions about who 
might be best helped by self-help services and how these services might be delivered to 
ensure that the information and advice provided corresponds with individuals’ needs and 
the overall objectives of the initiative.58  A variety of the studies on self-help have 
examined why self-represented parties chose self-help and whether the initiatives are 
efficient in assisting individuals to resolve their legal issues.  However, many of the 
studies did not take account of broader objectives that might be achieved in the context of 
this type of assistance.  These studies have not examined how the provisions of self-help 
                                                
56 Interestingly, this approach has been observed in one unique and successful setting where participation 
by members of a tribal community in the local justice system has resulted in the development of a system 
of laws that are directly related to the community members’ needs and concerns.  Over four hundred years 
ago, the Zapotec Indians of Mexico were granted a right by the Spanish to administer their own local 
courts.  The local court hears cases involving family, land, and debt, among other matters traditionally 
classified as “civil” law matters.  Democratically-elected individuals in the community administer the court 
system.  Plaintiffs play an active role in the proceedings in which there are no lawyers and, unlike in North 
American judicial systems, there are no “typical” plaintiffs.  In other words, the plaintiffs are male, female 
and derive from all socio-economic levels in the community.  The result has been the development of a 
body of laws that are directly linked to and arguably reflective of the users’ needs rather than abstract 
concepts and principles derived from the legal reasoning of judges and arguments of lawyers.  The results 
obtained through litigation generally reflect the communities’ desire to find a remedy for the dispute rather 
than uphold an abstract principle of law.  However, notwithstanding the obvious limitations of this 
particular justice system, it provides a useful point of discussion regarding a correlation between an 
approach to access to justice that encourages direct citizen participation and “participating citizenry”.  By 
having meaningful access to justice that both contemplates and provides for direct involvement in the 
dispute resolution system, the citizens in the Zapotec community actively participate in the definition of 
justice, and the administration of justice and in so doing, they are able to participate in the process of self-
governing.  Laura Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice (For Ordinary Citizens)” 
(1990) 10 Windsor YB Access J 496 [Nader, “Processes for Constructing (No) Access to Justice”]. 
57 Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, “’Lay People, For God’s Sake!  Surely I Should be Dealing with 
Lawyers?’  Toward an Assessment of Self-Help Legal Services in Australia” (2002) 11:2 Griffith LR 436 
[Giddings & Robertson, “Toward an Assessment of Self-Help Legal Services in Australia”]; Lawler, 
Giddings & Robertson, “Oppurtunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal Resources”, 
supra note 50; Jessica K Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice?  Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled 
Legal Services” (2010) 18 Geo J on Poverty L & Pol’y 453 [Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”]. 
58 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Oppurtunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Services”, ibid at 210. 
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information and advice might impact self-represented litigants’ views about their ability 
to engage with the civil justice system in a meaningful manner, regardless of the outcome 
achieved.  Moreover, earlier research on legal self-help has not looked at self-represented 
litigants’ inclination to participate further or in other forums or contexts.  Consequently, 
in accordance with a broader conceptualization of access that seeks to incorporate citizen 
participation in the development of the law more generally, self-help provides a 
compelling site at which to examine self-represented litigants’ perceptions about their 
engagement in civil law processes and institutions, as well as their inclination to 
participate in other political and legal process that affect their lives and communities.   
 
Self-Help Legal Services Defined 
The increasing number of self-represented litigants in the civil justice system has given 
rise to a variety of access initiatives that are aimed at assisting self-represented 
individuals address their legal issue and, hopefully, improving their access to justice.59  
One such initiative has been the creation of legal self-help programs.  To a varying 
degree, research in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom indicates that 
this type of program has evolved in response to the growing number of self-represented 
parties who are obliged to represent themselves when engaged in civil law matters, but 
who have little legal knowledge or experience about law, legal processes, or the 
administration of the civil justice system.  The growth of self-help services has also 
resulted generally from a corresponding reduction in legal aid budgets in these 
jurisdictions.60  A useful working definition of self-help legal services includes, “services 
that allows or encourages a legal consumer to take personal responsibility for some or all 
                                                
59 John M Greacen, “Self-Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Response to Their Needs – What we 
Know” (2000) at 1. Available online at www.courts.ca.gov/partners//documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf. 
60 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, supra note 50 at 188; however it is worth noting an exception to the general fact that legal aid 
budgets have been reduced in several jurisdictions.  In Ontario, throughout 2015, Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) 
received additional funding that allowed it to expand its access initiatives to vulnerable groups such as first 
nations clients and people with mental illness.  The additional funding has also allowed LAO to increase 
the level of financial eligibility by 6% over three years thereby increasing the number of individuals that 
meet the financial eligibility requirements for assistance.  Finally, LAO has been able to commit additional 
funding to expand its clinic law services that are offered throughout the province.  See 
http://www.legalaid.on.ca/en/info/ legaleligibility_qanda.asp#q02. 
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of the activities necessary to complete a legal transaction.”61  An added understanding is 
that the legal services offered would be free to the legal consumer.  Thus, the term self-
help legal resources may be more broadly characterized as “encompassing all those 
resources, support mechanisms, structures and services which are designed to assist 
people to work through their own legal problems either independently or substantially 
independently of formal and comprehensive legal assistance.”62  Practically speaking, 
self-help initiatives may include telephone hotlines, online assistance with court forms 
and processes, self-help centres and duty counsel.  In Ontario, there is a continuum of 
services that offers information, advice and assistance to individuals representing 
themselves in the justice system.  In addition to self-help centres that are discussed below 
in greater detail, this spectrum of services includes the provision of information and 
advice respecting a particular area of law.  For example, legal advice and information are 
provided by the Family Law Information Centres (FLICs) located throughout Ontario.  
Specifically, FLICs provide information and advice about various aspects of family law 
as well as referrals to other legal and non-legal resources. 63   In other contexts, 
information about individuals’ legal rights is available in pamphlet form, and through 
online services and community legal clinics.  Community Legal Education Ontario 
(CLEO), established in 1974, “provide[s] practical legal rights education and information 
to help people understand and exercise their rights.”64   
 
There are also a variety of duty counsel projects that provide legal assistance to 
individuals appearing in different courts without representation.  The assistance provided 
may include support with court forms and document preparation, advice regarding 
substantive law and/or representation in court.  The scope of assistance may vary 
depending on the court context in which the duty counsel operates.  Notwithstanding the 
                                                
61 Giddings & Robertson, “Toward an Assessment of Self-Help Legal Services in Australia”, supra note 57 
at 436-437. 
62 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, supra note 50 at 189. 
63 Information about the Family Law Information Centres is contained on the Attorney General’s website. 
See http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/infoctr.php. 
64 See the Community Legal Education Ontario website.  See http://www.cleo.on.ca/en/about-cleo. 
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scope of the legal advice or information provided, the underlying assumption is that the 
self-represented party (and not the legal representative providing the assistance) retains 
control over their own legal problem.  While it is not suggested that these services 
represent the complete terrain of self-help initiatives, it is important to be acquainted with 
the scope of services available to self-represented litigants when exploring the role of 
self-help within a broader conceptualization of access to justice.  In this sense, one of the 
common denominators respecting these initiatives is the provision of legal advice and 
information that allows individuals to better understand their legal rights and 
responsibilities.  However, it is also worth noting that these services are somewhat 
narrow in terms of the scope of the particular program’s engagement with self-
represented litigants.  In this regard, individuals who attend at self-help legal centres are 
offered a broader range of assistance, which extends beyond the provision of legal 
information.  It is self-represented litigants engagement with a self-help legal centre 
(discussed below in greater detail) that forms the basis of this research project. 
 
While the self-help model of legal services may vary across different jurisdictions 
and take on different forms,65 self-help legal centres generally make use of a combination 
of paid staff and volunteer lawyers acting on a pro bono basis.  The lawyers who 
volunteer at these centres typically meet with self-represented litigants and provide 
summary legal advice and information respecting their legal issue or problem.  Normally, 
the lawyer does not assume carriage of the matter on behalf of the self-represented 
individual.  It is assumed that the individual will maintain responsibility for his or her 
own file as it moves through the civil justice system or is otherwise resolved.  This 
includes responsibility for the necessary procedural steps, the strategies adopted, and the 
materials prepared in support of the matter.   
 
                                                
65 In some jurisdictions, such as California, which have extensive self-help services for self-represented 
litigants, self-help is expressly defined as providing “neutral, non-confidential information to all court-
users” but this does not include advice and does not provide for an ongoing solicitor-client relationship.  
See Richard Zorza, “An Overview of Self-Represented Litigation Innovation, its Impact, and an Approach 
for the Future: An Invitation to Dialogue” (2009) 43:3 Fam LQ 519; see also Russell Engler, “And Justice 
for All – Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators and Clerks” 
(1999) 67 Fordham L Rev 1987 at 1904 [Engler, “And Justice for All”]. 
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This approach to assistance is contrasted with unbundled legal services whereby 
the client seeks a lawyer’s assistance on a limited basis, typically to provide certain 
advice or to complete a specific task on the file; the lawyer does not assume 
responsibility for the entirety of the file in the traditional sense.66  To the extent that the 
individual receives unbundled legal services, the services are still performed by the 
lawyer as opposed to self-help centres where the lawyer may explain a particular step or 
advise on how a task is to be completed.  However, it remains the client’s responsibility 
to act.  
 
Self-Help Initiatives in Other Jurisdictions 
In the United States, one of the first legal self-help centres provided information and 
resources to self-represented litigants; it originated in Arizona in the early 1990’s.67  One 
recent survey by the American Bar Association suggests that court-based, self-help 
centres in the United States (of which there are about 500) assist approximately 3.7 
million people annually.68  However, while the number of self-help programs operating 
throughout the United States has increased dramatically, research in a number of state 
jurisdictions suggests that, “most self-help programs serve only a fraction of the self-
represented litigants in their jurisdiction.”69   
 
                                                
66 Samreen Beg & Lorne Sossin, “Should Legal Service be Unbundled?” in Michael Trebilcock, Anthony 
Duggan & Lorne Sossin, eds, Middle Income Access to Justice (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press, 2012) 193 at 195 [Beg & Sossin, “Should Legal Services be Unbundled?” in Trebilcock, Duggan & 
Sossin, Middle Income Access to Justice]. 
67 American Bar Association, Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services, “The Self-Help 
Center Census: A National Survey” (August 2014) at 1.  Available online at 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal__services/ls_del_self_help_center_c
ensus@authcheckdam.pdf [ABA, “The Self-Help Center Census”]. It is worth noting that in the American 
context, there is a distinction between providing legal advice and legal information in a self-help setting – 
the focus being on the provision of legal information rather than advice.  See also Russell Engler, “Non-
Lawyer Forms of Assistance to Middle-Income Earners” in Trebilcock, Duggan & Sossin, Middle Income 
Access to Justice, ibid at 157.  See also John M Greacen, “Self-Represented Litigants and Court and Legal 
Services Responses to Their Needs – What We Know” (2000).  See 
www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf. 
68 ABA, “The Self-Help Center Census”, ibid.  
69 Ibid at 2. 
 120 
Since its inception, this initiative has evolved in a myriad of ways – providing 
services at self-help centres over the telephone or in-person (typically located in or near 
court houses); assistance with court appearances; and assistance with the preparation and 
review of documents.  More recent developments include offering assistance and 
resources for individuals appealing a judicial decision.  Until very recently, appeals and 
appellate related work have ‘fallen between the cracks’ in terms of assistance for self-
represented litigants.70   
 
Self-help resources in Australia can be traced back to 1995.  At that time, non-
profit community legal centres began to develop self-help resources in order to “bridge 
the gap between legal services provided by the Legal Aid Commissions and those 
provided by the private profession.” 71   For-profit organizations had been offering 
information packages and telephone support in certain legal contexts (e.g., how to 
proceed in probate court) since 1982.72  Recent research in Australia indicates that “there 
is indeed a growing and significant category of legal services that contain a self-help 
dimension” and this trend is likely to continue and expand.73  In fact, it is assumed that, 
                                                
70 Meehan Rasch, “A New Public-Interest Appellate Model: Public Counsel’s Court-Based Self-Help 
Clinic and Pro Bono ‘Triage’ for Indigent Pro Se Civil Litigants on Appeal” (2010) 11:2 J App Pr & Pro 
461.  Ontario now offers assistance to self-represented litigants seeking to appeal a decision and further 
offers individuals the ability to obtain an opinion regarding the validity or likely success on a motion for 
leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.   
71 Merran Lawler, Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, “‘Maybe a Solicitor Needs to Know that Sort of 
Thing But I Don’t’: User Perspectives on the Utility of Legal Self-Help Resources” in Alexy Buck, Pascoe 
Pleasance & Nigel J Balmer, eds, Reaching Further-Innovation, Access and Quality in Legal Services 
(Norwich, UK: TSO, 2009) at 39 [Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Maybe a Solicitor Needs to Know that 
Sort of Thing But I Don't”]. 
72 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Maybe a Solicitor Needs to Know that Sort of Thing But I Don’t”, ibid 
at 37. 
73 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, supra note 50; Giddings & Robertson, “Toward an Assessment of Self-Help Legal Services in 
Australia”, supra note 57 at 437-439.  In their article, Giddings and Robertson suggest that through the 
1990’s there was shift in the delivery of legal services influenced by the ‘ideology of the marketplace’ 
pursuant to which “legal practice became a business” and the role of the citizen, as a ‘legal subject’ was 
recast as a ‘legal service consumer’.  In accordance with the ideology, concerns about competition and 
efficiency became paramount.  The authors continue to suggest that this ideology also permeated the 
discourse on access to justice where it was assumed that enhanced competition and efficiency would 
increase access to law and this combined with increased access to information technology and a retraction 
of traditional legal services by publicly funded legal aid services led to the focus on “self-directed legal 
services”.  
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as a policy initiative, self-help legal services will continue to increase in keeping with the 
growing needs of self-represented parties that are reflected in a burgeoning demographic.   
 
The United Kingdom has also witnessed an increase in the number of self-help 
legal services.  This has been the result, in part, of cuts to government legal aid spending 
and a corresponding reduction in the scope of legal services available to individuals; this 
includes reductions in the field of social welfare cases.74  The findings of a report on 
Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants) prepared in 2011 
by the Civil Justice Council highlighted some of the agencies that function in the United 
Kingdom to provide advice to self-represented litigants.75  One of the largest and most 
common is the Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB).  This organization is not strictly limited 
to legal advice, but rather provides advice on a myriad of topics ranging from “debt and 
employment to housing and immigration plus everything in between.”76   
 
Currently, there are approximately 3,300 CAB locations in designated advice 
centres, hospitals, courts and prisons across England and Wales.  Within certain of these 
centres, pro bono lawyers work to provide legal assistance to self-represented parties.  
For example, the Royal Courts of Justice Advice Bureau has paid, as well as pro bono, 
lawyers who provide legal advice and information services to self-represented litigants 
appearing before the Court of Appeal, High Courts, County Courts, family courts and 
bankruptcy courts.  The lawyers provide both procedural and substantive advice.  In 
addition to offering advice to individuals in person, there is also access to information 
and advice through telephone hotlines and email services.  In total, the CAB, through a 
                                                
74 Civil Justice Council, “Access to Justice for Litigants in Person (or Self-Represented Litigants)” A 
Report and Series of Recommendations to the Lord Chancellor and to the Lord Chief Justice (November 
2011) at 18-19.  Available online at www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/report-on-access-
to-justice-for=litigants-in-person-nov2011.pdf  [CJC, “Access to Justice for Litigants in Person”]. 
75 CJC, “Access to Justice for Litigants in Person”, ibid at 49. 
76 “Key Facts about the Citizens Advice Service”, available online at: https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/ 
about-us/how-citizens-advice-works. 
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network of agencies, make use of over 22,000 volunteers who provide advice on a variety 
of topics and assist individuals in resolving “legal, money and other problems.”77   
 
The Civil Justice Council’s report also highlighted the fact that there are a variety 
of advice services that provide information about different legal contexts and on how to 
navigate the civil legal system.  In so doing, these services are able to provide self-
represented litigants with advice on the merits of a legal matter and the requisite legal 
processes.  However, one of the critiques of these advice services relates to the 
inconsistency in services provided throughout. 78   In examining the needs of self-
represented litigants, the Civil Justice Council emphasized the important role that advice 
centres play, particularly in the context of early advice on the merits and as a source from 
which self-represented litigants can draw information when first facing a legal issue.  
Interestingly, the Report makes note of the fact that the provision of early advice and 
information can help to ensure that individuals with meritorious claims are afforded an 
opportunity to pursue their claim; this is an important and potentially overlooked 
consideration in terms of the objectives often associated with self-help.  Ensuring that 
people are able to pursue their claims is consistent with individuals’ direct participation 
in law-making and law-administering processes.  In this regard, the provision of advice 
and information is not viewed simply as a means of assisting self-represented litigants 
administer their specific cases or ensure a more efficient legal process.  Rather, it also 
characterizes the provision of advice as a means by which citizens can be supported when 
attempting to raise political and/or legal issues or concerns (not unlike the example of the 
volunteer lawyer in Connecticut) in a meaningful and hopefully constructive manner.  
This is not to suggest that self-help advice will promote certain types of cases or that all 
claims brought forward are necessarily meritorious.  Instead, the provision of advice and 
information serves to support individuals in their decision to bring a claim forward.  In 
                                                
77 Ibid. 
78 CJC, “Access to Justice for Litigants in Person”, supra note 74 at 49. 
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certain instances, this has the added benefit of potentially contributing to the development 
of a body of law in a particular field.79   
 
The fact that self-help legal services continue to expand both in terms of scope 
and prevalence across these various jurisdictions reinforces the need to examine certain 
challenges and questions about this initiative.  These include what further or expanded 
role self-help services might play in a broader theory of access to justice that encourages 
direct and meaningful participation and how self-help might be expanded going forward.  
Part of this later analysis would also need to take account of the practical considerations 
associated with developing an expanded self-help regime.  These include challenges 
associated with implementing more services, as well as funding issues.   
 
The Self-Help Initiative in Canada 
In Canada, the establishment of civil law self-help legal services has been both more 
recent and more limited in scale than other jurisdictions.  In certain jurisdictions, many of 
these services were originally offered in the context of family law (for example, Family 
Law Information Centres) where self-represented litigants are more widespread.  Family 
Law Information Centres located in several provinces were among the first centres to 
open in the late 1990’s.80  The first civil law (non-family) self-help legal centre in 
Toronto, Ontario (LawHelp Ontario) opened in 2007.  LawHelp Ontario (LHO) is located 
on the main floor of the civil courthouse in downtown Toronto.  The majority of these 
centres tend to be located either in or near courthouses and act as an immediate source of 
legal information and advice for self-represented litigants appearing in those courts.  At 
present, there are varying forms of self-help legal services in the majority of the 
                                                
79 In the Canadian context, this sentiment was recently highlighted by Supreme Court Justice Karakastanis, 
in her discussion of the importance of proportionate legal procedure in promoting access to justice.  As a 
justification for proportionate procedure, Justice Karakastanis stated that “[w]ithout public adjudication of 
civil cases, the development of the common law is stunted.”  See Hryniak v Maudlin, 2014 SCC 7 at para 
1. 
80 See Legal Services Inventory on the Canadian Forum for Civil Justice website.  Available online at 
http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/legal-services-inventory. 
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provinces.81  In certain circumstances, the services may be provided via telephone 
hotlines staffed by lawyers or online.  In other instances, centres are established in which 
volunteer lawyers attend, meet with clients and provide legal advice.  The volunteer 
lawyer may, on occasion, act as duty counsel on behalf of a self-represented party who is 
scheduled to appear in court.  The report prepared on LHO one year after opening 
described the underlying philosophy of the LHO project as, “striv[ing] to address self-
represented litigants procedural and substantive barriers to justice so they can better 
navigate the justice system.  Specifically, LHO provides a continuum of legal services 
based on a triage system that assesses litigant need and allocates resources based on those 
needs.”82  My research project focuses on the type of legal services provided at LHO and 
the experiences of the self-represented litigants who make use of the services at LHO.   
 
Objectives and Benefits Associated with Self-Help 
The development of the self-help legal services model has been driven both by the 
practical realities surrounding the increasing number of self-represented individuals in 
need of advice and information and by certain broader educative objectives.  The 
practical reality driving the expansion of the self-help initiative is that there are a 
significant number of self-represented litigants currently attempting to navigate the legal 
system with little or no information about the relevant processes; online research is their 
only tool.  Moreover, it is likely that these numbers will continue to increase.  While 
there are a myriad of causes associated with this increase in self-representation, the fact 
that legal services are being priced out of the reach of not just low-income individuals but 
also the middle class is significant.  In fact, there is an argument to be made that the 
poorest of individuals are, in limited circumstances, able to access some forms of 
assistance.  The poorest clients may be able to access legal aid to obtain assistance with 
                                                
81 Please see the Legal Services Inventory of the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, which lists various 
programs across Canada.  Examples of the various programs include: (i) Alberta and Nova Scotia have 
family law information centres similar to Ontario; (ii) Prince Edward and Alberta offer advice over the 
telephone ; and (iii) British Columbia has several Justice Access Centre Self-Help and Information Services 
(formerly BC Supreme Court Self-Help Information Centres). Available online at: http://www.cfcj-
fcjc.org/legal-services-inventory. 
82 See An Evaluation of LawHelp Ontario as a Model for Assisting Self-Represented Litigants in the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice at 393 University Avenue in Toronto (November 2009).  Available from 
the author upon request.   
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criminal matters and extremely limited civil law matters.  However, generally speaking, 
this group of individuals has virtually no assistance with a wide range of civil litigation 
cases: these cases form the subject matter of my study.83 
 
Notwithstanding any limited assistance provided (typically in the criminal 
context), the working poor and middle-income individuals are left to fend for themselves.  
In examining the link between access to the civil justice system and issues of social 
exclusion, Pleasance highlighted the importance of access to legal advice in the sense that 
“legal advocacy and legal advice for the poor and excluded is an effective engine for 
social inclusion and fighting poverty through insuring and expanding rights to critical 
benefits and services, and giving a voice to grievances and empowering people and 
communities.”84  Moreover, as discussed earlier, even for those initially able to afford 
legal services, the duration and potentially complicated nature of many civil legal matters 
results in legal representation becoming more expensive than many individuals can 
afford.  Thus, while a person may initially be able to pay a retainer and hire a lawyer, 
individuals are unable to pay the mounting fees as the retainer runs out and the legal 
matter remains unresolved and the lawyer withdraws from the file.  A majority of these 
individuals are unable to provide another retainer to a new lawyer.  As such, they are 
compelled to enter the legal system unaware and unprepared for the legal aspects of their 
case or about the legal processes in which they must engage.  The consequence is that a 
lack of legal knowledge places these individuals at a serious disadvantage in a complex 
legal system that employs a highly professionalized language and body of rules.  
 
As a result of these ongoing challenges, there is an argument that self-help legal 
services can be beneficial to the extent that they offer practical legal information and 
                                                
83 As previously noted, Legal Aid Ontario has recently announced increases in its budget that will allow it 
to offer services to more individuals as well as individuals at a higher income level however it is not 
expected that this will address the myriad of civil law legal issues experienced by individuals in Ontario 
who cannot afford a lawyer.  Please see discussion in chapter two of this thesis. 
84 Alexy Buck, Nigel Balmer & Pascoe Pleasance, “Social Exclusion and Civil Law:  Experiences of Civil 
Justice Problems among Vulnerable Groups” (2005) 39:3 Social Policy & Administration 302 at 304 
[Buck, Balmer & Pleasance, “Social Exclusion and Civil Law”] quoting J Stein, “The Future of Social 
Justice in Britain: A New Mission for the Community Legal Service” (2001) Centre for Analysis of Social 
Exclusion, London School of Economics 48.   
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advice to a broad range of individuals who might choose or otherwise be compelled to 
proceed on their own without any legal assistance.85  One of the rationales underlying this 
assumption is that, in certain instances, “many clients need only limited representation to 
resolve legal problems fairly.”86  This is accompanied by the adage that some information 
is essentially better than no information.  From a practical perspective, Gary Bellows 
suggested that,   
[e]ven a cursory glance at the numbers makes the ideal of enough lawyers for 
poor people a chimera. On the other hand, there are literally thousands of 
poor people whose lives would be made somewhat easier and less vulnerable 
if they had a clearer sense of what were legally protected grievances, more 
knowledge of ways of pursuing them, higher expectations about what was 
possible to achieve through asserting claims in the existing system, and the 
availability of responsive forums and competent representation if they needed 
them.87 
To the extent that the practical reality is that laypersons are engaging the legal 
system with little or no information about the legal processes or substantive law 
governing their rights and responsibilities, any information provided at a self-help centre 
could provide them with some assistance.  This assistance potentially helps them to 
navigate the legal system in a more meaningful manner.  Moreover, there is also an 
argument that perceptions about the fairness of a process are linked to how well an 
individual understands the process and is provided assistance when attempting to access 
that process.  Based on survey data collected from over 6,000 individuals, Ab Currie 
concluded that “[r]egardless of the type of assistance received, people are more likely to 
                                                
85 Empirical research undertaken with respect to self-represented litigants and access to justice initiatives 
like self-help has focused on whether and to what degree the initiative assists the individual in obtaining a 
specific legal outcome.   
86  Michael Millemann, Nathalie Gilfrich and Richard Granat, “Rethinking the Full Service Legal 
Representation Model: A Maryland Experiment” (1997) Clearinghouse Review 1178 at 1179 [Millemann, 
Gilfich & Granat, “Rethinking the Full Service Legal Representation Model”]. 
87 Gary Bellows, “Legal Services to the Poor: An American Report” in Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, 
eds, Access to Justice in the Welfare State: An Introduction (European University Institute) as quoted in 
Currie, “Self-Helpers Need Help Too”, supra note 7 at 10. 
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have positive perceptions about the fairness of the justice system if the assistance they 
received was perceived as helpful.”88 
 
Finally, given the number of self-represented litigants in the civil justice system, 
the self-help format provides an opportunity to disseminate basic information and advice 
to significantly more individuals than could be reached in a traditional lawyer-client 
relationship; this improves the overall reach of access to justice in society.  As a result of 
having received assistance from a self-help centre, more individuals will be better 
informed when addressing their particular legal matter.  This, in turn, enhances access to 
justice and promotes the administration of justice.89  This also may assist individuals if 
and when they are compelled to deal with legal issues in the future by providing them 
with, at a minimum, some understanding of legal process and legal rights. 
 
While it may be assumed that self-help services reach a wider spectrum of 
individuals, proponents of self-help programs do not suggest that self-help is the only 
means by which to enhance self-represented parties’ access to justice.  Rather, self-help 
should, combined with other initiatives, form a spectrum of services that individuals can 
access to address their differing legal needs and capacities.  In acknowledging the 
different capacities and needs of self-represented litigants, John Greacen has stated, 
 
[s]elf-represented litigants and their cases present an endless variety of 
situations, ranging from highly educated and capable persons seeking to 
obtain the simplest forms of court relief (such as a change of name) to 
persons with limited education, limited English capability, and other 
handicaps (ranging from hearing and sight impairment to mental illness) 
seeking to obtain relief in the most complex sorts of legal proceedings…some 
litigants can obtain all the assistance they need to vindicate their legal rights 
from court-provided forms and information. Others need limited legal advice 
                                                
88 Ab Currie, “‘A Lightning Rod for Discontent’: Justiciable Problems and Attitudes Towards the Law and 
the Justice System” in Alexy Buck, Pascoe Pleasance & Nigel J Balmer, eds, Reaching Further Innovation, 
Access and Quality in Legal Services (Norwich, UK: TSO, 2009) at 109. 
89 One caution in this regard pertains to the criticism that initiatives such as self-help have less to do with 
improving the self-represented litigants’ experiences in the civil justice system and more to do with 
ensuring that the judicial system is efficient and less subject to the delays and challenges that come with 
having lay persons participate in the system.   
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to enable them to represent themselves.  Others need full legal representation 
because of the complexity of the factual or legal issues involved in their case 
or because of their lack of the basic skills needed to present them to a court.90 
Empirical research conducted in respect of family law pro se initiatives in 
Maryland highlighted the importance of recognizing that many self-represented 
individuals have varying levels of need and ability that influence the impact of self-help 
in a particular case.91  Based on the data collected from interviews with clients who made 
use of the family law pro se program, it was also concluded that self-help programs 
should form part of a larger continuum of legal services made available to self-
represented parties: the continuum “should include several different legal services levels, 
incrementally more intensive, between the information-only and full service poles.”92   
 
In light of the recognition that certain litigants run a higher risk that their interests 
will be compromised if they are compelled to represent themselves in the civil justice 
system, it has been suggested that programs directed toward self-represented litigants 
including both self-help legal services and a civil right to representation (as contemplated 
by Russell Engler) should form part of the same access to justice strategy; different types 
of legal service would be available in different contexts depending on the needs of 
particular litigants.93  This approach to access is predicated on the belief that there are 
certain factors that affect whether particular litigants are able to make use of self-help 
services and represent themselves.  These factors include the vulnerability of the litigant 
and the seriousness of the right at stake.  The consideration of some of these factors led 
the Supreme Court of Canada to recognize a right to state-funded legal representation in 
cases where the state was applying to remove a child from parental custody.  In 
determining that an individual, in those circumstances, would have a right to legal 
assistance, Chief Justice Lamer stated,  
                                                
90 John M Greacen, “Resources to Assist Self-Represented Litigants: A Fifty-State Review of ‘The State of 
the Art’” (June 2011) Paper prepared for the Michigan State Bar.  Available online at 
https://GreacenReportNationalEdition.pdf.    
91 Millemen, Gilfrich & Granat, “Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model”, supra note 
86. 
92 Milleman, Gilfrich & Granat, “Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model”, ibid at 1178. 
93 Milleman, Gilfrich & Granat, “Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model”, ibid. 
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Section 7 guarantees every parent the right to a fair hearing when the state 
seeks to obtain custody of their children.  For the hearing to be fair, the parent 
must have an opportunity to present his or her case effectively.  Effective 
parental participation at the hearing is essential for determining the best 
interests of the child in circumstances where the parent seeks to maintain 
custody of the child.  While a parent need not always be represented by 
counsel in order to ensure a fair custody hearing, in some circumstances, 
depending on the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the 
proceedings, and the capacities of the parent, the government may be required 
to provide an indigent parent with state-funded counsel.  A consideration of 
these factors leads to the conclusion that, in the circumstances of this case, the 
appellant’s right to a fair hearing required that she be represented by 
counsel.94  
 
Several facts—self -represented parties’ differing abilities, the importance of certain civil 
law issues to individuals’ lives, and the potential imbalance created when they are 
expected to engage in a professionalized legal system without representation—raise 
challenging questions about the efficacy and scope of self-help initiatives.  
 
In addition to the practical realities that have driven the growth of self-help legal 
services, there is also an educational consideration that has influenced the development of 
these services.  Underscoring this consideration is the recognition that access to justice 
initiatives can serve to ameliorate individuals’ lack of information and corresponding 
sense of confusion about law and legal processes.  The purpose is to “simplify and 
demystify the law and the system, including its language.”95  Research conducted in 
Australia on different self-help resources noted that the information packages prepared by 
legal aid and community legal centres sought to “convey both propositional knowledge 
(by way of information about the substantive law) and procedural knowledge (by way of 
information about the process-oriented steps).”96  The objective in preparing materials 
that encompass both substantive as well as the procedural information is to provide 
community legal education about a variety of legal processes and legal institutions.  
                                                
94 New Brunswick (Ministry of Health and Community Services v G. (J.), [1999] 3 SCR 46. 
95 CJC, “Access to Justice for Litigants in Person”, supra note 74 at 10. 
96 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, supra note 50 at 220. 
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Arguably, in receiving procedural as well as substantive legal information, individuals 
are better informed about their rights and responsibilities.  They are potentially better 
equipped to identify and avoid legal problems or address legal problems when they arise; 
this potentially avoids or minimalizes similar problems in the future.   
 
The Australian researcher Jeff Giddings has suggested that this educative 
component is based on an underlying belief that promoting community legal education 
through the use of self-help resources will empower citizens by enhancing “increased 
public awareness about law and legal process generally.”97  In this context, legal 
education through self-help seeks to achieve the broader goals of community 
development, engagement by those educated, consciousness-raising and, ultimately, the 
“imparting of legal knowledge that assists people to participate more actively in and 
‘own’ a legal system.”98 
 
 Practically speaking, in many instances, it can be difficult for self-represented 
litigants without legal information to even “know which agency to approach with what 
problems, or how to organize their information and evidence for presentation.”99  As 
such, it has become increasingly important that information provided through initiatives 
such as self-help legal services expand beyond technical information.  This might include 
the skills and tools necessary to engage in a variety of forums and institutional settings, as 
well as more generalized information about why certain steps are undertaken and how the 
various steps fit together.  Similar to the services provided by the community lawyer in 
Connecticut, the information made available to self-represented parties must ensure that 
individuals are better able to understand their rights and responsibilities and identify the 
appropriate forum and process for addressing them.  By providing individuals with 
information about the legal and political options and forums available to them in a 
                                                
97 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, ibid at 220. 
98 Rosemary Hunter, Cate Banks & Jeff Giddings, “Australian Innovation in Legal Aid Services:  Lessons 
from an Evaluation Study” in Alexy Buck, Pascoe Pleasance & Nigel J Balmer, eds, Reaching Further 
Innovation, Access and Quality of Legal Services, (Norwich, UK: The Stationery Office, 2009) at 26. 
99 Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice”, supra note 56 at 508. 
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broader educative sense, legal self-help offers an opportunity for individuals to gain legal 
knowledge; they also receive the practical means to access the different political and 
democratic institutions that impact their lives.   
 
In this regard, Genn has suggested that ‘unpreparedness’ is one of the single most 
significant determinants of any individual’s ability to participate in the decision-making 
process.100  This is a problem that is experienced disproportionately by self-represented 
parties.  Consequently, in attempting to address this dilemma, self-help can assist 
individuals gain skills and tools that allow them to engage; this includes how to gather 
and organize information that they may need to submit in a particular institutional setting 
and present such information to an adjudicator.  The inclusion of the practical skills and 
tools that are necessary for participation also potentially encourages opportunities for 
citizen participation outside of the specific context of the civil justice system.  This will 
provide an opportunity for further engagement with a variety of government processes, 
forums and different decision-making capacities. 
 
Criticisms of the Self-Help Model 
Despite the growth of self-help programs and the potential benefits associated with them, 
there are several criticisms connected with a reliance on self-help centres as a means of 
promoting access to justice.  One of these critiques is grounded in the concern that self-
help initiatives fail to take account of the professionalization of law that often 
necessitates the need for full representation.101  In this context, self-representation is 
viewed as a barrier to accessing justice rather than as a means to access justice.  Flowing 
from this concern is a further critique about whether self-help is legitimately capable of 
assisting individuals to participate; such programs might provide a false sense of security 
to self-represented parties who are compelled to represent themselves in a legal system 
                                                
100 Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice”, supra note 14 at 404. 
101  Nourit Zimmerman & Tom R Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A 
Psychological Perspective” (2010) 37 Fordham Urb LJ 473 [Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between Access to 
Counsel and Access to Justice”]. 
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that has historically been unequipped to deal with them and in some circumstances, is 
hostile to their presence.  Finally, there are broader political questions about the 
motivations that drive the development of self-help programs.  These questions suggest 
that, rather than being a form of empowerment, self-help represents a form of 
abandonment by both government and the legal profession.  This abandonment is then 
rationalized through the use of terms such as ‘empowerment’ that contemplate 
individuals assuming responsibility for the decision-making that impacts their lives and 
for the action necessary to implement the decisions.  Several of these critiques merit 
greater attention. 
 
One of the most compelling criticisms of self-help programs involves questions 
about the ability of individuals to represent themselves in the existing legal system.  
Recent research on the outcomes that self-represented litigants were able to achieve when 
representing themselves in busy housing courts in New York challenges the assumption 
that lay persons are able to successfully manage their own legal case.  Specifically, 
Carroll Seron, Martin Frankel and Gregg Van Ryzin suggest that unrepresented tenants 
face “swift eviction…with minimal judicial involvement.”102  The data collected further 
suggests that, once the tenant had legal representation, they were up to 19% more likely 
to stave off eviction by the landlord.  Rebecca Sandefur’s meta-analysis of various 
empirical research projects also concluded that, in a variety of different legal contexts 
when individuals are represented by lawyers, they are, on average, more likely to win 
than individuals who are not represented.103  The implication of this research becomes 
more problematic when account is taken of the broad range of individuals who are 
                                                
102 Russell Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal about 
When Counsel is Most Needed” (2011).  See http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id+1641269 
at 4 [Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon”]; Caroll Seron, Martin Frankel & Gregg 
Van Ryzin, “The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing 
Court: Results of Randomized Experiments” (2001) 35 Law & Soc’y Rev 419; Rebecca L Sandefur, “The 
Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence” (2010) 9:1 Seattle Journal of Social Justice 51 
[Sandefur, “The Impact of Counsel”]. 
103 Sandefur, “The Impact of Counsel”, ibid at 52; it is worth noting that certain of this research data has 
subsequently been challenged by Jim Greiner and his fellow researchers who dispute the actual impact that 
counsel has in certain legal contexts.  A more detailed discussion of this assertion is contained in chapter 
five of this thesis. 
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compelled to represent themselves.  Russell Engler suggests that a significant number of 
self-represented litigants are vulnerable and, for a variety of different reasons, also lack 
power.  This lack of power places them at a disadvantage in most legal forums.  He 
continues that the, “greater the power lined up against a litigant and the more vulnerable 
the litigant, the greater the likelihood litigants will forfeit important rights, absent 
representation.” 104  
 
In light of the data respecting the impact of counsel, a critique of self-help 
initiatives maintains that there are some litigants and some cases where it is imperative 
that the individual receive full legal assistance.  As noted in the Supreme Court of Canada 
case of New Brunswick v G.(J.), the loss of custody of one’s child to the state was one 
such circumstance.  In these types of cases, the provision of advice and information in a 
self-help setting is not sufficient to ensure that the individual will be able to participate in 
a meaningful manner.  Given concerns about vulnerability and the unequal distribution of 
power between parties, critics of self-help initiatives suggest that such initiatives are not 
only unhelpful, but may even be harmful for certain individuals in certain cases.  At a 
minimum, these concerns call for a nuanced assessment of who is in a position to be 
assisted (and able to make use of the assistance) and what is at stake in the particular 
case.  From a research and policy perspective, the challenge is to identify those 
individuals who may require full representation because of their particular vulnerability, 
the type of case involved, and the kind of forums in which full representation is required.   
 
Taking account of the need to distinguish between these situations, the consequent 
question is how such traditional legal representation might be reconciled within a broader 
conceptualization of access that contemplates meaningful and direct participation by the 
individual litigant where possible.  In this regard, Engler is not suggesting that self-help is 
ineffective (and, therefore, not worth pursuing).  Rather, he is proposing that, “programs 
providing assistance short of full representation need to understand where their assistance 
is most meaningful, and where a referral to programs providing counsel is a better use of 
                                                
104 Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon” supra note 102 at 13. 
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resources.”105  This analysis would need to take account of factors such as the particular 
circumstances of the parties, the case in question, the type of forum, the complexity of 
legal issues, and the outcome at stake.  Having taken account of these various factors, it 
would be possible to better understand who might be served by self-help and who 
requires a different form of assistance in order to ensure that they have meaningful 
access.   
 
Equally significant is the fact that the legal language spoken by members of the 
legal profession and judges remains inaccessible to non-lawyers attempting to engage 
with members of the profession and/or the judiciary.  Rather than demystifying law, self-
help services may be criticized for contributing to the continued mystification of legal 
processes and legal institutions because self-represented litigants are trained to act as 
quasi-lawyers.  In short, they are encouraged to speak the language of lawyers without 
the benefit of the training and experience that actual lawyers receive.  As a result, self-
represented litigants are expected to complete tasks as if they were lawyers.  This is 
without having experience in doing so or a clear understanding of why they are required 
to perform the tasks in question.  By proceeding in this manner, the advice and training 
that self-represented litigants receive also overlooks and devalues the non-legal skills and 
abilities of the litigants.106  Instead, it attempts to train the individual to participate in the 
traditional legal system in a pseudo-legal capacity.   
 
The result is a disconnect between the limited training provided to the individual 
and the expectations that they both place on themselves and are placed on them by 
judges, opposing counsel and court staff.  This is particularly problematic when self-
represented litigants adopt some of the legal terminology through self-help assistance and 
then make use of that same terminology in court or in dealing with opposing counsel.  At 
this point, the adjudicator and/or opposing counsel may make certain assumptions about 
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the scope of the self-represented litigant’s knowledge and experience: this could affect 
the way in which they interact with the self-represented litigant and further inhibit the 
way in which the self-represented litigants are able to present their case. 
 
Self-Help as a Form of Disempowerment 
Elizabeth McCulloch further challenges the idea that self-help ‘empowers’ individuals.  
Following research on pro se divorce courses in Florida in which individuals learn how to 
complete their own divorce without legal representation, she concluded that self-help was 
not a form of empowerment, but rather worked as a form of disempowerment.  First of 
all, the self-help services were offered as an alternative for those individuals who could 
not afford traditional legal representation.  As such, the decision to attend the course did 
not represent a decision that the self-represented party necessarily had a choice in making 
or would have made if their financial circumstances were different.  Arguably, this is true 
of many self-represented litigants who make use of self-help legal services.107  The reality 
is that, if they were able to afford legal representation, they would likely retain a lawyer 
to represent their interests.108  McCulloch further observed that, in some instances, self-
represented litigants developed unrealistic expectations about the outcomes that they 
would be able to achieve on their own.  It is debatable whether the completion of the 
divorce course ensured that the individuals felt they were in a position to assert their 
rights in court or as against opposing counsel.  Moreover, after completing the pro se 
divorce course, individuals are expected to ‘go it alone’ in a legal system that is 
unprepared to deal with them and, in some instances, hostile to their presence.109  
McCulloch asserts that this can ultimately lead to feelings of isolation and frustration 
rather than empowerment and engagement.  In this example, it is conceivable that 
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individuals who experience isolation and frustration in attempting to participate are not 
likely to engage willingly in other processes or forums on their own.   
 
In their research on the efficacy of self-help initiatives in Australia, Merran 
Lawler, Jeff Giddings and Michael Robertson compared the motivations of self-help 
users (i.e., self-represented individuals) in seeking self-help resources with those of the 
self-help program designers responsible for developing various self-help initiatives 
(through both for profit and not-for profit organizations).  While they acknowledge that 
empowerment, promotion of participation, and community legal education were 
important objectives in the design of certain self-help legal resources, this did not always 
correspond with the objectives of those seeking to make use of self-help programs.  They 
concluded that self-help users, while “emotionally invested in the outcome of their legal 
issue,” also “measured the utility of legal self-help resources by whether those resources 
allow them to quickly, easily and directly enter and exit the legal system.”110  The 
individuals were less concerned with empowerment and education and more concerned 
with negotiating a resolution of their legal matter in the most efficient manner.  This 
sentiment was particularly evident in the context of legal matters such as probate where 
individuals highlighted the importance of having the information necessary to navigate 
the probate process as quickly as possible.  Another example in which this was evident 
was in the field of family law.  In particular, in matters involving custody, individuals 
are, in every respect, concerned with the particular outcome of their case.  Again, the 
self-help users’ evaluation of the utility of a self-help service was based on achieving a 
particular result: this contrasted with the self-help providers’ objectives of community 
legal education and individual empowerment.111  As a result of the discrepancy between 
the two groups’ objectives, there were certain instances where the users expressed 
frustration with the materials or services provided; they suggested that the self-help 
initiative in question did not meet their needs.  While this may not represent a criticism of 
self-help legal services, the Australian research does highlight the importance of clearly 
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Resources”, supra note 50 at 210. 
111 Ibid at 218. 
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outlining the objectives and goals of self-help services when designing and implementing 
these initiatives.   
 
A Neo-liberal Critique of Self-Help Initiatives 
From a theoretical perspective, the development of the self-help model can also be 
examined through a neo-liberal lens.  The argument that self-help represents an 
abdication of responsibility by government and the legal profession stands in sharp 
contrast to self-help advocates’ claims of empowerment and engagement.  In this regard, 
Jeff Giddings has suggested that “as legal jurisdictions across the western world grapple 
with the problem of stretching limited legal aid budgets even further, there has been an 
increasing pressure upon individuals with legal problems to ‘help themselves’ through 
the use of legal self-help resources.”112  This problem is compounded by the fact that 
legal services continue to be priced out of the reach of more and more individuals.  
Consequently, the high price of legal fees and the corresponding reduction in legal aid 
budgets by governments in Australia, United Kingdom, Canada and the United States has 
resulted in individuals having no or little choice other than to represent themselves.113  To 
the extent that these non-lawyers have begun to enter the legal system in significant 
numbers, there are corresponding concerns about delay and additional costs as a result of 
the self-represented litigants not being familiar with the legal rules or processes.  This 
potentially poses significant challenges for opposing counsel who must engage with self-
represented litigants who are unfamiliar with the substantive and/or procedural rules.  
Consequently, self-help programs are developed not to empower individuals and enhance 
their participation.  Rather, they are intended to address the delays and inefficiencies 
caused by individuals’ inexperience and lack of knowledge.  In other words, self-help 
might be viewed as simply an attempt to ensure that the administration of the legal 
system runs relatively smoothly.   
 
                                                
112 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Maybe a Solicitor Needs to Know that Sort of Thing but I Don’t”, 
supra note 60. 
113 Again, in the Canadian context, it is reminded that Legal Aid Ontario in Ontario has recently witnessed 
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Viewed through a neo-liberal lens, there are questions about whether self-help 
programs represent the effect of steps taken to dismantle social welfare programs.  This 
positions self-reliance as a cover for inadequate safety nets for the citizens.114  Critical of 
a neo-liberal focus on privatization and the corresponding dismantling of social welfare 
programs, Henry Giroux stated,  
 
[t]he incessant call for self-reliance that now dominate public discourse 
betray a hollowed-out and refigured state that neither provides for adequate 
safety nets for its populace, especially those who are young, poor or 
marginalized, nor gives any indication that it will serve the interests of its 
citizens in spite of constitutional guarantees.115   
 
Given this critique, one of the specific questions that arises in the context of self-help 
assistance is whether the current focus on the shared concepts of individualism, self-
reliance and limited state involvement in individuals’ lives (all of which form part of a 
neo-liberal political philosophy) underlies the motivation for the development of self-help 
programs in which it is assumed that the individual will take responsibility for his or her 
own legal matter with minimum state assistance. 
 
As a political paradigm, neo-liberalism gained significant standing in the 
1980’s.116  From an ideological perspective, the concept represents an economic doctrine 
that puts the “production and exchange of material goods at the heart of the human 
experience” and envisions a “consumerist, free-market world.” 117   Underlying this 
ideology is a strong adherence to the twin concepts of individual freedom and reduction 
in state functions that support and assist the individual.  Steger and Roy maintain that a 
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neo-liberal ideology includes an unwavering commitment to the free-market and the 
accompanying belief that the free-market (with little or no interference from government) 
will inevitably lead to a better and more productive society for all individuals.  These 
ideological principles, in turn, influence the modes of governance.  Specifically, a neo-
liberal approach to governance is shaped by entrepreneurialism, competitiveness, self-
interest, and the devolution of central state power.118  Active democracy is pushed to the 
political margins and confined to market participation. 
 
The neo-liberal approach of governance is articulated in government policies that 
promote the privatization of government enterprises, de-regulation, and reductions in 
government funding.  This is particularly so for social services and welfare programs.119  
In this regard, governments view their role as being responsible to the free market and 
actors in “slimmed down state enterprises.”120   
 
In his discussion of the role of Community Legal Centres in promoting legal 
citizenship in Australia, Mark Rix suggests that the contracting out and outsourcing by 
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 140 
government of its responsibilities to its citizens has transformed both the state and its 
citizenry.  In this regard, he states that,  
 
[t]he contracting out of public services does not simply mark a change in the 
way that governments deliver services to citizens, as important as this is.  In 
drastically transforming the relationship between governments and citizens, 
contracting out has also brought about the emergence of a new mode of 
citizenship…[the] contract state has divested itself of many of the roles and 
functions that were once regarded as core responsibilities of the welfare 
state, so has ‘citizenship’ been similarly hollowed out.  In other words, 
citizenship has come to denote a much narrower range of far more limited 
citizen rights then the term denoted during the era of the welfare state.  The 
term ‘consumer citizenship’ refers to this narrowing and hollowing out of 
the meaning and significance of citizenship.121   
 
The reduction of support for social welfare programs results in the relinquishment 
by government of its responsibility for citizens’ well-being122 and a corresponding 
transference of that responsibility to the individuals themselves; as Rix notes this creates 
a ‘consumer citizenship.’  At a minimum, from a democratic standpoint, the recasting of 
citizens as consumers and the market as a framework for engagement and participation 
means, “people begin to think of themselves as consumers in all they do, even when they 
are not in an overtly economic situation.  While people are economic consumers some of 
the time, they are political citizens all of the time.”123  Moreover, as ‘consumer citizens,’ 
individuals are left to self-mobilize in order to obtain the services that they require in 
their daily lives.  Citizens are “compelled to pay for or ‘earn’ the benefits and services 
that are supplied by private or community sector organizations contracted to government, 
and in attempting to seek redress for any shortcomings or problems in service delivery, 
they essentially play the role of active and responsible consumers.”124  Individuals 
become responsible for achieving their own well-being.  As a result, the recasting of 
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citizens as consumers results in the narrowing of rights that individuals are afforded and 
otherwise make use of as citizens of a welfare state.  This recasting also has the effect of 
isolating citizens as individual consumers with the net result being “an atomized society 
of disengaged individuals who feel demoralized and socially powerless.”125  All this has a 
detrimental effect on the democratic impulse.  
 
This “atomized society of disengaged individuals” is further consistent with 
concepts of social exclusion that contemplate certain individuals being geographically 
resident in a society, but unable to participate in the “normal activities of citizens in 
society.”126  Key components of the activities from which individuals are excluded 
include the ability to exercise decision-making power and the ability to be part of a larger 
community from which the individual draws support and a sense of connectedness. 
Individuals who are socially excluded suffer from economic disadvantage and are less 
likely to secure social rights that include employment, housing, health care and 
education.127  In this sense, there are economic as well as social aspects of the deprivation 
that give rise to social exclusion.128  Thus, in recognizing and addressing social exclusion, 
it is important to identify and remedy the various mechanisms by which individuals are 
disengaged from the mainstream society.  From a political perspective, Bhalla and 
LaPeyre have noted that, “[t]he political dimension of exclusion involves the notion that 
the State, which grants basic rights and civil liberties, is not a neutral agency but a vehicle 
of the dominant classes in a society.  It may, therefore, discriminate between insiders and 
outsiders and may exclude some social groups and include others.”129  This is relevant to 
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the democratic thesis.  Individuals who are socially excluded remain unable to participate 
in or impact the decision-making that takes place in a variety of legal institutions and 
processes.  This lack of an access to justice results in individuals being unable to realize 
certain social rights and thus, remaining marginalized in society.  In his discussion of the 
barriers that prevent individuals from accessing justice, McDonald further notes that, “a 
lack of access to justice results not just from factors tied to the subjective perceptions of 
those who are excluded.  It also flows from social marginalization visited upon them by 
the societal mainstream.”130 
The individualistic nature of a ‘consumer citizenship’ and the corresponding 
requirement that all citizens, regardless of ability or resources, effectively take 
responsibility for fulfilling their own needs results in the potential for social exclusion of 
certain members of society.  This is not ameliorated by the provision of choice in the 
types and terms of services if individuals are unable to access or make use of the services 
offered.  From a critical neo-liberal perspective, these ‘responsibilized’ citizens are not 
empowered by the opportunity to control their own lives and well-being.  Instead, the 
individuals end up isolated, vulnerable to exploitation, socially powerless to make 
substantive changes in their lives and, thus, ultimately disengaged.  This is largely 
because such an individualistic approach does not take account of the social, economic 
and political inequality prevalent in society.  Together these inequalities work to prevent 
segments of the population from engaging in society in a meaningful manner.  Robert W 
McChesney suggests that the consequence is that “the social inequality generated by 
neoliberal policies undermines any effort to realize the legal equality necessary to make 
democracy credible.”131  
 
In the context of self-help legal services, this neo-liberal critique challenges the 
legitimacy of the underlying theoretical motivations of this initiative—that self-help 
represents a form of individual empowerment that ultimately encourages greater 
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131 Forward by Robert W McChesney in Chomsky, Profit over People, supra note 125 at 10. 
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participation and engagement.  Rather, by placing the onus on the individual to seek out 
self-help in order to address their own legal matter in a legal system that is unfamiliar and 
unwelcoming, self-help represents an abdication of the state’s responsibility to provide 
the resources to ensure that members of society are in a position to engage as active 
political citizens.  The consequence is that individuals are unable to engage in a 
meaningful manner and are left isolated and disenfranchised. 
 
Given this critique, it is important to examine critically the motivations as well as 
the efficacy of self-help in terms of facilitating a broader conceptualization of access to 
justice that is seeks to expand citizens’ meaningful participation.  In undertaking this 
critical examination, self-represented litigants’ experiences with self-help and their views 
on participation in the civil justice system offer important insight into whether self-help 
might promote meaningful participation.  Alternatively, it might lead to isolation and 
disengagement and thereby fall victim to this particular critique of neo-liberalism.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to examine the particular circumstances of an expanding self-
represented litigant population in the civil justice system.  This included a discussion of 
some of the barriers facing self-represented litigants as they attempt to engage in the civil 
justice system.  As a means of addressing the problems faced by the growing number of 
self-represented litigants who are navigating the legal system without procedural or 
substantive legal advice, various jurisdictions have developed self-help legal services.  
Self-help centres provide advice and information to self-represented litigants on a 
volunteer basis.  From a democratic perspective, self-help services offer the potential for 
assistance and support that empower and enable individuals to participate in a more 
meaningful and direct manner.  However, this initiative is vulnerable to certain criticisms 
about the motivations behind the development of self-help services and whether it is 
limited in terms of the legal issues at stake and the particular vulnerability of certain 
individuals or groups.  The latter concern is that certain individuals may not be in a 
position to benefit from the assistance offered.  Notwithstanding the validity of the 
criticisms that are raised in respect of this initiative, I maintain that self-help remains a 
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useful site at which to examine self-represented litigants’ experiences and perceptions 
about participating in the civil justice system, as well as access more generally.  As such, 
a self-help legal centre in downtown Toronto was utilized as the basis for the empirical 
research conducted in this project.  The following chapter will examine the rationale for 
the particular methodological approach adopted and the specific methodologies employed 
in conducting the research at the Toronto self-help legal centre.  
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CHAPTER FIVE   
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
RESEARCH 
 
 
As noted at the outset, access to justice remains one of the most debated issues on 
the law-and-society agenda.  Of late, attention has turned to efforts to measure the impact 
and efficacy of different initiatives aimed at improving individuals’ access to justice.1  
Along with a broader turn toward empirical studies in law, there have been renewed 
efforts within the access to justice field to develop a more compelling and convincing 
methodology by which to assess and evaluate these different initiatives.  A tension has 
arisen between quantitative and qualitative approaches; this is typically framed within the 
context of how initiatives are evaluated for the purposes of research.  However, beneath 
that seemingly technical project, there is a deeper and more basic policy debate about the 
overall ambitions for access to justice – namely whether access to justice policy and 
initiatives ought to be informed by a continued commitment to the practical thesis or 
whether a new approach to access as articulated in the democratic thesis should be 
adopted?2 
 
One specific area in which these debates arise is that of civil law self-help centres.  
The efforts to gauge the success of this initiative have encompassed both empirical and 
                                                
1 In their article on empirical studies on access to justice, Catharine R Albiston and Rebecca Sandefur note 
that a “new crop of evaluation studies have joined a broader body of contemporary research investigating 
the delivery of legal services.”  This new crop of studies has tended to focus on the implications of legal 
representation and legal services.  However, Albiston and Sandefur have called for an expanded research 
agenda that “steps back from lawyers and legal institutions to explore not only whether existing policies are 
effective, but also how current definitions and understandings of access to justice may blind policy makers 
to more radical, but potentially more effective, solutions.”  See, for example, Catharine R Albiston & 
Rebecca L Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice” (2013) Wis L Rev 101 at 103 
[Albiston & Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice”]. 
2 In her article entitled “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice (For Ordinary People)”, Laura 
Nader questions whether the gap caused by much legal advice and assistance to the few and too little for 
the many undermines the legitimacy of the institutions of democratic self-government.  See Laura Nader, 
“Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice (For Ordinary People)” (1990) 10 Windsor YB Access 
Just 496 at 508 [Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access”]. 
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conceptual analysis.3  As such, the work devoted to assessing the validity and viability of 
self-help law centres provides an important site at which to discuss access to justice 
theory and objectives.  Moreover, there are significant policy implications to be drawn 
and considered from such work. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to canvass certain recent empirical quantitative 
work and relate it to the broader challenges and ambitions of the practical and democratic 
theses in terms of a policy agenda for access to justice.  In so doing, I hope to outline the 
tension between quantitative and qualitative research methodologies and the challenges 
associated with these different methodologies as a foundation for discussing the 
methodology adopted in this project.  Next, I will introduce the two research streams that 
have arisen in access to justice research namely, (1) the qualitative and related 
observational work; and (2) the more recent quantitative studies that seek to use 
randomized methods in an attempt to measure outcomes.  In the following section, I will 
discuss critically and in more depth some of the concerns associated with a focus on legal 
outcomes and corresponding adoption of a randomized quantitative methodology.  I will 
concentrate on the practical, theoretical and ethical issues raised by these studies.   
 
As part of laying the groundwork for my methodological choices, I will advocate 
for more in-depth qualitative research that examines the experiences, views and 
perceptions of individuals engaged with the civil justice system.  This is based on the 
belief that qualitative research, which takes account of the individual’s experiences 
attempting to access justice, creates a space in which to think and debate meaningful 
participation.  Indeed, I contend that this form of qualitative research is consistent with an 
expanded concept of access to justice that contemplates policies and initiatives that 
encourage democratic participation and citizen engagement.  In so doing, my hope is not 
only to expand discussion of the broader objectives respecting access to justice, but also 
to learn from some of the criticisms that have been leveled against earlier qualitative and 
                                                
3  Michael Millemann, Nathalie Gilfich & Richard Granat, “Rethinking the Full-Service Legal 
Representation Model: A Maryland Experiment” (1997) Clearinghouse 1178 [Millemann, Gilfich & 
Granat, “Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representation Model”]; Gary Blasi, “How Much Access? 
How Much Justice?” (2004) 73 Fordham L Rev 865. 
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observational studies in access to justice.  Accordingly, throughout the first part of this 
chapter, my critical ambition is to relate the empirical debate back to the more 
fundamental discussion over the tension between the practical and democratic theses as a 
basis for access to justice theory and policy.  
 
The Democratic Thesis and Qualitative Research 
Working within a theoretical framework that contemplates more direct participation by 
individuals in the legal and political processes that impact their lives, qualitative research 
seeks to examine how self-represented litigants’ views and perceptions are formed by 
their particular interactions with the legal system.4  In this regard, qualitative research, 
including in-depth interviews, case studies and observation, can be used to gather data 
regarding individuals’ “lived experience” with law.  It also offers an opportunity to elicit 
the meaning that they assign to these experiences and the implications for their further 
engagement with law.   
 
In a litigation context, individuals’ ability to tell their stories, as well as present 
evidence to the adjudicator, are both important criteria by which the litigants assess the 
fairness of the legal proceeding in which they are involved.  The significance of these 
criteria is supported by research that has been conducted in field of procedural justice.  
More specifically, it looks to the importance of process-versus-outcomes to a litigant 
when assessing the overall fairness of a legal process.5   In seeking out the self-
                                                
4 Ellen Berrey, Steve G Hoffman & Laura B Nielsen, “Situated Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness 
and Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation” (2012) 46:1 Law & Soc’y Rev 1 at 6 [Berrey, 
Hoffman & Nielsen, “Situated Justice”]. 
5 Specifically, the social psychology research that has been conducted in the field of procedural justice 
examines how individuals weigh the quality of the procedures afforded them in different legal contexts and 
ultimately assess the fairness of a given process.  See Martin Gramatikov, Maurits Barendecht & Jin Ho 
Verdenschot, “Measuring the Costs and Quality of Paths to Justice: Contours of a Methodology” (2011) 3 
Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 349 at 361.  In the context of procedural fairness, the values associated 
with evaluating the procedural fairness of a process are informed by principles of natural justice such as a 
right to be heard, the right to be judged impartially, and the making of a determination on the ‘evidence’ 
presented.  See Grant Huscroft, “From Natural Justice to Fairness: Thresholds, Content and the Role of 
Judicial Review” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd ed (Toronto, 
Canada: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013) at 148-151 [Flood & Sossin, Administrative Law in 
Context] and Laverne Jacobs, “Caught Between Judicial Paradigms and the Administrative State’s 
Pastiche: ‘Tribunal’ Independence, Impartiality, and Bias” in Flood & Sossin, Administrative Law in 
Context, ibid at 233-235. 
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represented litigants’ experiences, it is also important to take account of some of the 
themes raised in the research on legal consciousness.  In particular, it examines how a 
litigants’ legal consciousness both informs and is altered by their particular legal 
experiences.6 
 
Previous research in access to justice has examined in what circumstances 
individuals consider law as a viable option to resolve their problems and when they in 
fact ‘turn’ to law. 7  Having ‘turned to law’ to resolve their problems (with assistance of a 
service such as self-help), there is a further need to examine whether they believe they are 
subsequently better able to engage with legal processes and institutions in the future.  In 
other words, having participated directly in a legal process, it is important to understand 
how individuals’ experiences in the civil justice system and resulting perceptions about 
their ability to participate might impact their views about future participation more 
generally.  Underlying this approach to access to justice research is the democratic thesis: 
this thesis values enhanced and meaningful participation by all citizens within a variety 
of legal and political forums. 
 
An approach to research that is focused on individuals’ experiences, perceptions 
and potential for engagement can be contrasted with the more recent quantitative, 
randomized and results-based approach.  This methodology seeks to generate data by 
attempting to measure the impact of legal representation and/or other comparable legal 
services within a particular legal context using measurable legal outcomes in individual 
                                                
6 Laura Beth Nielsen, “Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens 
about Law and Street Harassment” (2000) 34:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 1056 at 1059 [Nielsen, “Situating Legal 
Consciousness”]. 
7 See for example, research conducted by researchers such as Austin Sarat, Lucie White, Susan Silbey, 
Patricia Ewing, Laura Beth Nielson and Sally Engle Merry (and most recently Michael Trebilcock, 
Anthony Duggan and Lorne Sossin in the Canadian context).  See Patricia Ewick & Susan B Silbey, The 
Common Place of Law (Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1998) [Ewick & Silbey, The 
Common Place of Law]; Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness 
Among Working Class Americans, (Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) [Merry, Getting 
Justice and Getting Even]; Lucie E White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: 
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G” (1990) 38:1 Buff L Rev 1; Austin Sarat & William LF Felstiner, Divorce 
Lawyers and Their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process (New York, USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Nielsen, “Situating Legal Consciousness”, ibid. 
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cases.  In terms of access to justice initiatives, research that measures the impact of a 
specific legal service on the legal outcome achieved arguably helps to define when full 
legal representation is needed to achieve a particular outcome and when something less 
than full legal representation can be provided to self-represented litigants.8  In this regard, 
quantitative data may be used to rationalize budgetary cutbacks of initiatives that are not 
‘proven’ to generate certain outcomes or that offer a basis for suggesting that a lesser 
service has a certain statistical probability of achieving the same results.  However, 
caution must be exercised: research should not be driven by questions that fit “policy-
makers’ definition of a problem and their policy goals for addressing that problem.”9    
 
In light of this focus on quantitative data, the call for ‘hard data’ as a basis for 
developing and maintaining access to justice initiatives becomes louder.  This has worked 
to effect a corresponding downgrading of the value of qualitative research.  Specifically, 
the focus on self-represented litigants’ experiences and perceptions about their 
engagement with the civil justice system is relegated to the status of ‘customer 
satisfaction surveys’; “there are no counterfactuals” to the individual’s belief that the 
service provided a benefit.10  While this research project does not negate the need for full 
legal representation in certain situations and the associated need for research that assists 
in delineating those situations, there are practical, theoretical and ethical concerns that 
arise in shifting the focus from qualitative research to randomized outcome-based 
quantitative research.  Accordingly, I will argue that qualitative research that concentrates 
on the self-represented litigants’ experiences, views and perceptions must be an integral 
part of a broader conceptualization of access to justice that seeks to promote the 
democratic virtues of participation and engagement and is further consistent with giving 
‘voice’ in a democratic context.   
 
                                                
8 Subsequently to conducting research on self-help services, Michael Millemann and others discussed the 
benefits associated with adopting a spectrum of legal services.  Millemann, Gilfich & Granat, “Rethinking 
the Full-Service Legal Representation Model”, supra note 3. 
9 Albiston & Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice”, supra note 1 at 104.  
10 Pascoe Pleasance, “Trials and Tribulations: Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-Legal 
Setting” (2008) JL & Soc’y 8 at 9 [Pleasance, “Trials and Tribulations”]. 
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Empirical Research on Access to Justice  
A significant portion of the recent research conducted in the field of access to justice has 
focused on the impact of legal representation (or lack thereof) on case outcomes.11  This 
is consistent with the practical thesis and a corresponding focus on traditional legal 
representation as a means of improving access to justice.  Within this research stream, 
outcomes have generally been defined as a positive result in the particular case type (e.g., 
a greater monetary award or the avoidance of an eviction) or other defined ‘win’ in a 
purely legal context.  More recently, this approach to research has expanded to other 
forms of legal services that run a spectrum from legal clinics and duty counsel programs 
to initiatives that distribute legal pamphlets or provide online assistance.  Historically, 
research in this area involved observational studies that purported to study the impact of 
legal services in a variety of different settings.12  Typically, these projects included a 
combination of observations about various adversarial processes, interviews with 
stakeholders (including lawyers, judges, court clerks and self-represented litigants), 
surveys, case studies, reviews of court records, and a meta-analysis of other outcome-
based studies.13   
                                                
11 Herbert M Kritzer, “To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is that the Question?” (2008) 5:4 J Empirical Legal 
Stud 875 [Kritzer, “To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer”]. 
12 D James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance:  What 
Difference does Representation Make (Offer and Actual Use) Make?”  (2011) at 49-56.  Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13papers.cfm?abstract_id=1708664.  This article was subsequently published as 
“Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual 
Use) Make?” (2012) 121:8 Yale LJ 2032 [Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal 
Assistance”].  In the article, the authors provide an exhaustive review of the various studies that have been 
conducted to date. 
13 For an example of meta-analysis, see Rebecca L Sandefur, “The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of 
Empirical Evidence” (2010) 9:1 Seattle Journal for Social Justice 51 as well as research by researcher such 
as Jessica Steinberg, Michael Milleman and Jeff Gidding regarding examples of other methods of inquiry.  
See Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, “‘Lay People, For God’s Sake!  Surely I Should Be Dealing with 
Lawyers?’  Toward an assessment of Self-Help Legal Services in Australia” (2002) 11:2 Griffith LR 436; 
Milleman, Gilfrich & Granat, “Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Representation Model”, supra note 3; 
Jessica K Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services” 
(2010-2011) 18 Geo J on Poverty L & Pol’y 453 [Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”]; Julie MacFarlane, 
“Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”, Final Report of the National Self-
Represented Litigants Project (May 2013) at 86. Available online at www.lsuc.onca/ uploadedfiles/ 
For_The_Public?About_The_Law_Society/_Decisions/2014/Self_Represented_Project.pdf [MacFarlane, 
Final Report of the National Self-Represented Litigant Project]; Trevor CW Farrow, Diana Lowe QC, 
Bradley Albrecht, Heather Manweiller & Martha E Simmons, “Addressing the Needs of Self-Represented 
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For the purposes of this discussion, research regarding outcomes can be divided 
into two broad categories: (1) research that examines the outcomes achieved by self-
represented litigants who do not have counsel compared with those individuals who have 
counsel; and (2) research that examines a spectrum of legal services whereby individuals 
receive some legal assistance that falls short of full representation, such as unbundled 
legal services.  Further examples of legal services that fall into the second category 
include self-help centres, duty counsel, hotlines and legal education programs.  Both of 
these broad categories reflect a focus on evaluating the instrumental impact of legal 
services and the efficacy of a particular access to justice initiative in affecting positive 
legal outcomes for the clients.  In certain respects, both categories are aimed at assessing 
the effectiveness of a service in a particular legal setting.  Importantly, the ‘effectiveness’ 
of a program is measured in terms of the objective legal outcome achieved in the case. 
 
In contrast to this approach, there are legal researchers working in the field of 
access to justice who have adopted more qualitative methods (including ethnographic 
methods).  These are borrowed from the social sciences as a means of examining 
individuals’ experiences within the civil justice system, their legal consciousness, and 
their perceptions about law more generally.14  Typically, the objective in this type of 
research is to collect narratives and/or information from individuals in order to “discover 
the different ways in which people use and think about law” and what that means for 
access to justice going forward.15  This work seeks to examine the way in which 
individuals characterize, address and respond to civil justice problems without traditional 
legal representation and what impact this has on the individual.  One of the validating 
                                                                                                                                            
Litigants in the Canadian Justice System”, A White Paper prepared for the Association of Canadian Court 
Administrators (March 27, 2012).  Available online at www.cfcj.fcjc.org [Farrow et al., “Addressing the 
Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”]. 
14 See for example, Hazel Genn, The Paths to Justice – What People Do and Think about Going to Law 
(Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 1999); Merry, Getting to Justice and Getting Even, supra note 7; Patricia 
Ewing & Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law, supra note 7; William O’Barr & John M Conley, 
“Litigant Satisfaction versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claim Court Narratives” (1985) 19 Law & Soc’y 
Rev 661; and Ingrid Eagly, “Community Education: Creating a New Version of Legal Services Practice” 
(1997-98) 4 Clinical L Rev 433 [Eagly, “Community Education”]. 
15 Ewick & Silbey, The Common Place of Law, ibid at xi. 
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bases for conducting research in this manner is to engage in a broader discussion about 
not only what role law plays in citizens’ lives, but also what role it should play.  In this 
regard, an in-depth analysis of individuals’ particular experiences provides an 
opportunity to engage in a much broader theoretical discussion.16  In keeping with the 
democratic thesis, this approach also seeks to directly engage individuals in a discussion 
about how they participate in legal processes and legal institutions. 
 
The research that engages the views and perceptions of self-represented litigants 
through methods such as observation and in-depth interviews has recently come under 
attack.  The main thrust of the attack is that the solicitation of clients’ viewpoints does 
not provide evidence of the efficacy of a particular legal service; it fails to correlate the 
service provided with the self-represented litigant’s ability to affect a particular result.  
Furthermore, it is argued that this methodological approach does not address whether the 
client is in a position to make use of the assistance provided in order to obtain a 
successful outcome.  In this regard, it is further argued that, although surveys and 
interviews reflect the client’s level of ‘customer satisfaction’ with a particular service, 
they offer only limited insight into the effectiveness of an initiative in relation to 
specified goals.17  This critique is bolstered when the legal service being studied is 
something less than full legal representation.  In these particular circumstances, there is 
an added concern that surveying clients who might otherwise not receive any legal 
assistance provides a distorted picture of the efficacy of the particular initiative: the 
interviewees are likely to be disproportionately positive about any assistance that they 
receive.  This criticism applies notwithstanding the actual outcome obtained or the 
objective quality of the service provided.  Finally, there is a concern that the self-
represented litigant (as a layperson with little or no experience with lawyers, legal 
processes or legal institutions) is not in the best position to assess critically the services 
provided.   
                                                
16  Lucio Baccaro & Konstantinos Papadakis, “The Downside of Participatory-Deliberative Public 
Administration” (2009) 7 Socio-Economic Review 245 at 256. 
17 Laura K Abel, “Evidence-Based Access to Justice” (2009-2010) 13 U Pa J L & Soc Change 295 at 297-
303 [Abel, “Evidence-Based Access to Justice”]. 
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What is important to note about these criticisms is their underlying insistence that 
a focus on case outcomes (i.e., the legal result reached in a particular case) is necessary to 
establish an accurate measure of the quality and/or efficacy of a particular access to 
justice initiative.  In this regard, some scholars further contend that research on access to 
justice should attempt to provide “definitive evidence” and/or a “quantification of the 
benefit of advice or representation” about a particular access to justice initiative.18   
 
However, the resulting focus on case outcomes as a measure of the effectiveness 
of an access to justice initiative raises deeper challenges.  These include questions about 
what the broader objectives of access to justice theory are and how such objectives 
should be articulated in access to justice policy and initiatives.  Moreover, broader 
theoretical considerations about what access to justice seeks to provide access to, as well 
as practical and ethical issues concerning case outcome research (as a means of obtaining 
the ‘quantification of benefits’) suggest that there are valid reasons for guarding against a 
shift that is too heavily focused on case outcome research.  Instead, it is important to 
continue to incorporate a variety of methodologies that, at a minimum, encourage 
ongoing discussion about how access to justice should be conceptualized so that they are 
optimally consistent with and support a broad conceptualization of access to justice goals, 
particularly as it pertains to advancing democratic values and interests.  
 
Outcome-Based Studies 
It is important to critically examine outcome-based research in regard to a dialogue about 
methodologies.  Specifically, this examination should take account of certain issues that 
are raised about outcome-based research in a socio-legal setting; this includes how 
outcomes are conceptualized and delineated, as well the potential problems with doing 
so.  Following this critical discussion, it is necessary to look at some of the problems that 
are more specifically generated in the context of randomized outcome-based research.  
Generally speaking, an outcome-based approach to research raises several important 
                                                
18 Abel, “Evidence-Based Access to Justice”, ibid at 303, Pascoe Pleasance, “Trial and Tribulations: 
Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-Legal Setting”, supra note 10 at 11. 
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normative questions about the nature of access to justice and about what is being sought 
as the end-goal—whether this should be access to law as opposed to access to justice; and 
whether ‘justice’ may be characterized as something different from a successful outcome 
in a particular legal context.  Related to these difficult normative inquiries is the primary 
question of how successful outcomes are or should be defined for the purposes of 
empirical research.  However, even more fundamentally, it must be asked, given the 
challenges associated with measuring outcomes, whether a focus on outcomes should be 
the main driver of decisions about the overall direction of access to justice or whether it 
should be a piece of a larger puzzle.  This question ties in directly with the tension 
between the practical and democratic theses. 
 
Outcome-based research is used because it can assist researchers in evaluating the 
efficacy of a particular legal service, assuming that outcomes are conceptualized in a 
particular way (which, in itself raises difficult questions).19  Moreover, policy-makers 
will likely use the data resulting from this type of research when they are called upon to 
make difficult decisions regarding resource allocation and the development of programs 
that seek to improve individuals’ access to justice.  With respect to forms of assistance 
that offer something less than full legal representation, there is also an argument that it is 
important, from the user’s perspective, that individuals seeking assistance are able to 
make use of the assistance in a meaningful way.  In this regard, research regarding the 
link between the effectiveness of a program and the outcome achieved is important to the 
individuals making use of the assistance.   
 
However, there are a couple of problems associated with such an emphasis on the 
measurement of legal outcomes.  First, in some legal contexts, it may be important to 
distinguish between successful representation and successful outcomes.  The former 
raises difficult questions about the quality of the services provided; this is something that 
                                                
19 Abel, “Evidence-Based Access to Justice”, supra note 10; Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation 
of Legal Assistance”, supra note 12. 
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the legal profession is often reluctant to consider.20   For example, in the limited 
representation or self-help setting, the legal services provided to the self-represented 
litigants are typically pro bono and, as a result, vary greatly between the individual’s 
interactions with different lawyers.  As such, it would be difficult to account for 
differences in the quality of the legal service provided and the impact this might have on 
self-represented litigants’ ability to achieve a successful outcome.  From a professional,  
as well as research perspective, there is a problematic assumption that, to the extent that a 
self-represented litigant has failed to obtain a positive result, it is the fault of the self-
represented litigant or the program design (among other factors), but is not related to the 
quality of the advice or information provided by the legal professional.   
 
Second, defining what constitutes a ‘successful outcome’ may be less than 
straightforward.  For example, providing legal advice that an individual not proceed with 
a particular claim (i.e., it has no basis in law) may result in a successful outcome if the 
individual follows the advice and decides not to pursue the legal issue.  Moreover, from a 
legal standpoint, if the client was provided with good advice or information and was in a 
position to act on the advice provided in accordance with both procedural and substantive 
rules but still obtained a negative judgment, it may not be an ‘unsuccessful outcome.’21  
With respect to judicial outcomes in an adversarial system, there are invariably ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’: these do not necessarily correlate with the nature of the assistance provided 
to the litigants.  A final dimension relates to the use of settlements and how a settlement 
might constitute a successful outcome.  This is particularly relevant given the number of 
cases that settle prior to formal adjudication.  In this case, should the measure of the 
                                                
20 In their article entitled “Peer Review in Canada: Results from a Promising Experiment”, Fred Zemans 
and James Stribopoulos call for an increased research focus on the quality of legal services provided in the 
context of improving access to justice in order to ensure that those in need of access to representation 
receive quality representation.  Fred Zemans & James Stribopoulos, “Peer Review in Canada: Results from 
a Promising Experiment” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall LJ 697 at 698-699.  Interestingly, in this research 
project, several of the self-represented litigants interviewed made reference to the fact that in meeting with 
different volunteer lawyers at LHO, they received different advice that they attributed in part to the 
seniority and experience of the particular volunteer lawyer.   
21 Lucie E White, “Specially Tailored Legal Services for Low-Income Persons in the Age of Wealth 
Inequality: Pragmatism or Capitulation” (1998-1999) 67 Fordham L Rev 2560 at 2561 [White, “Specially 
Tailored Legal Services for Low-Income Persons”]. 
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success depend on an objective analysis of the terms of the settlement when it is 
conceivable that none of the parties may characterize the settlement as a success?   
 
In defining the parameters of a successful outcome, researchers may canvass legal 
professionals who practice within the particular field.  However, this may be easier to do 
in certain legal contexts where there is a discernible solution to the legal matter.  For 
example, in a study conducted on the impact of counsel in refugee determination hearings 
at the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, the researcher undertook to study the 
effect of counsel on outcomes achieved in refugee determination hearings.22  In this 
particular legal context, it may be slightly easier to define a successful outcome, namely 
whether the Immigration and Refugee Board granted the individual refugee status.  
However, it is interesting to note that, even within this study, it was acknowledged that 
one of the challenges associated with conducting the research was the difficulty in 
accounting for the multiple variables (other than presence of counsel) that may impact the 
granting of refugee status.23  Moreover, there is an added consideration that all successful 
claims are ‘good decisions’ in the sense of being deserving and winnable.   
 
The delineation of a successful outcome for the purpose of measuring the impact 
of a particular variable becomes even more problematic when there is more than one 
possible solution and/or it is less clear what constitutes the best solution in the particular 
circumstances.  A good example of this is family law where competing interests and non-
legal considerations may make it difficult to define a successful outcome for research 
purposes.  Added to this uncertainty are some of the additional problems pertaining to 
research in poverty law where establishing what constitutes ‘success’ when dealing with 
members of a seriously disadvantaged population is further complicated.  For instance, 
unlike other members of society, disadvantaged groups tend not to suffer ‘discrete’ legal 
problems, which, once resolved, allow them to continue with their everyday life.24  In 
                                                
22 Sean Rehaag, “The Role of Counsel in Canada’s Refugee Determination System: An Empirical 
Analysis” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 71 at 82.  
23 Ibid at 84. 
24 Stephen Wexler, “Practicing Law for Poor People” (1970) 79 Yale LJ 1049. 
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these circumstances, the legal issue may be bound up with other socio-economic 
problems that require redress if the individual is to derive some meaningful benefit from 
the legal assistance. 25  Finally, research on laypersons’ experiences in court suggest that 
individuals may often have “hidden agendas” – these include the “unappreciated factors 
that cause people to resort to the legal system and the undisclosed objectives that they 
pursue within the system.”26  While a hidden agenda may remain undisclosed by the 
individual (a party that seeks the court’s “official” recognition of the seriousness of their 
problem), a hidden agenda may indirectly impact the outcome that is ultimately achieved 
and/or the individual’s reaction to that outcome.  Moreover, in certain cases, a more 
successful outcome may entail redress of socio-economic conditions rather than a legal 
‘win’.27  In all of these instances, if the measurement of a ‘successful’ outcome is to be 
meaningful and reflective of an actual improvement in the individual’s life rather than a 
legal construct, the question becomes how are these other factors accounted for in the 
research?  
 
In most studies, the definition of a successful outcome typically involves a 
consideration of the legal results achievable in a particular case.  However, this analysis 
also fails to take account of the broader historical, political and social factors that may 
provide advantage to certain parties (i.e., the “haves”) and result in disadvantage to other 
parties (i.e., the “have-nots”) in terms of resources, the application of legal rules and the 
structure of the various legal institutions.28  The result of these varying advantages and 
disadvantages (many of which may not easily be accounted for in quantitative research 
design) is potentially different outcomes achieved within a particular type of case. 
 
                                                
25 Ab Currie, “A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low and Moderate Income Canadians: 
Incidences and Patterns” (April 2005) Available online at http://cfcj-fcjc.org/docs/2006 currie.en.pdf. 
26 John M Conley & William O M Barr, “Hearing the Hidden Agenda: The Ethnographic Investigation of 
Procedure” (1988) 51:4 Law & Contemp Probs 181 at 182. 
27 This relates to the critique regarding the effectiveness of addressing issues of inequality, marginalization 
and disempowerment through the legal process.  A more detailed discussion of this is contained in chapter 
three. 
28 Marc Galanter, “Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change” 
(1974-75) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev 95 at 97. 
 158 
In addition to defining the parameters of a successful outcome across various 
legal fields and contexts, there are further challenging questions about how outcomes 
should be conceptualized.  For example, in measuring the legal outcome achieved in a 
particular case, certain broader goals associated with political, social and economic 
concepts of justice may also be overlooked.29  In this regard, empirical studies have 
historically shied away from the study of ‘justice’ due to its contested normative and 
political nature.30  For instance, Laura Nader’s review of a privately-funded community 
lawyer project in small town Connecticut demonstrated that the benefits derived from 
legal assistance provided by a community-based lawyer to citizens wishing to raise issues 
affecting the entire community included a collective improvement in civic education 
among citizens and greater participation by those same citizens in political and 
administrative decisions made by the local government.31  Both of these ongoing and 
long-term democratic benefits would likely be overlooked in studies that focus 
exclusively on measuring the specific outcome achieved by an individual party with the 
assistance of the community lawyer. 
 
The failure to take account of broader forms of social and political justice when 
evaluating outcomes is also further complicated when examining access to justice 
initiatives that do not involve direct representation by counsel.  In studying the impact of 
a community legal education program in Chicago, it was concluded that, unlike analyzing 
certain zero-sum litigation, it is more challenging to evaluate the results of an initiative 
such as a legal education program.  This was particularly true in light of the fact that 
community legal education programs (like the one studied in that research project) tend 
to reach populations not otherwise served by traditional legal services.  As a result, the 
benefits may be diffused among the community.  However, by gathering the stories of 
those individuals involved with the education initiative, qualitative research was able to 
                                                
29 Laura Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access”, supra note 2 at 506-508; Eagly, “Community 
Education”, supra note 14. 
30 Austin Sarat, Mariane Constable, David Engel, Valerie Hans & Susan Lawrence, Crossing Boundaries: 
Traditions and Transformations in Law & Society Research (Evanston, USA: Northwestern Press, 1998). 
31 Nader, “Processes of Constructing (No) Access to Justice”, supra note 2 at 505-509.  See also the 
discussion in chapter three. 
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ascertain the impact of the program on the individuals that participated and the 
corresponding benefits derived from the program. 32   Specifically, through the 
dissemination of certain legal knowledge, the program provided information about legal 
procedures and processes that subsequently enabled individuals to participate in strategic 
decisions about their own case, to develop problem-solving skills, and to improve 
leadership skills and consciousness-raising among community members about their rights 
and responsibilities. 33   All of these benefits represent important access to justice 
objectives consistent with a democratic thesis that may be overlooked or underestimated 
in a conceptualization that focuses on the particular legal outcome that an individual was 
able to achieve.   
 
By contrast, empirical research that focuses on the specific legal outcomes 
achievable in a particular legal context may fail to take account of some of the broader 
political and social benefits to be gained by members of a community.  With respect to 
these broader political and social benefits, it is also likely that outcome-based randomized 
studies would struggle to measure the long-term impact of providing certain legal 
services to a particular group over time.  Even if such quantitative research were 
practically feasible, the prospect of conducting this type of longitudinal quantitative 
research would be extremely challenging.  Moreover, the effort to gather the sample 
populations large enough to perform this kind of analysis would be logistically 
challenging, if not impossible, without the expenditure of significant financial and human 
resources.  Both of these are not typically available in access to justice research.   
 
From a practical perspective, measuring the impact of a particular legal service on 
the outcome in a legal case can also be difficult given the number of variables (i.e., the 
disposition of a particular adjudicator, the approach of opposing counsel, and the 
individual abilities/resources of the self-represented litigant and the merit of the case) that 
potentially affect the outcome in even the most straightforward of circumstances.  
                                                
32 Eagly, “Community Education”, supra note 14 at 472. 
33 Eagly, “Community Education”, supra note 14 at 474 & 479. 
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Interestingly, even within randomized research settings, it is not always possible to 
isolate the requisite variables in the control and treated groups or hold constant the socio-
legal setting in which the research is being conducted.  Indeed, it is worth noting that, in 
Greiner and Pattanyak’s study at Harvard, some members of the control group found 
legal assistance through other sources and some members of the treated group declined 
the offer of assistance from the clinic. The ability to isolate the appropriate variable 
becomes even more difficult when examining legal services other than full 
representation, such as ‘unbundled’ services.  As a result of this difficulty, some of the 
research conducted on programs that offer limited forms of legal assistance or unbundled 
legal services has failed to demonstrate discernible benefits to the client and/or has 
demonstrated mixed results.34  These contradictory findings have also driven concerns 
about the appropriateness of using outcome measurement as a means of evaluating an 
access to justice initiative without randomizing the study.  This is, in part, because it is 
difficult to isolate or control for the particular variable being measured in certain 
adjudicatory contexts. 
 
One example in which the research on limited legal services produced mixed 
results was a study by Jessica Steinberg.  It was conducted in California on the unbundled 
legal services offered to individuals in housing eviction cases.35  The study was designed 
to examine the impact of discrete legal services offered to poor litigants facing eviction in 
county court proceedings.36  The study was observational and, while not randomized, a 
percentage of the litigants observed received assistance drafting court documents and a 
                                                
34 Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, supra note 13; W Vaughan Stapleton & Lee E Teitelbaum, “In 
Defence of Youth:  A Study of the Role of Counsel in American Juvenile Courts” (1972); Carroll Seron, 
Gregg Van Ryzin & Martin Frankel, “The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New 
York City’s Housing Court:  Results of a Randomized Experiment” (2001) 35:2 Law & Soc’y Rev 419 
[Carroll, Van Ryzin & Frankel, “The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants”]. 
35 Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, supra note 13; Ross Dolloff, “Let’s Talk about Values, not Systems” 
(2003) Mgmt Info. Exch J; Robert Bickel “Limited Legal Services: Is it Worth it?”(2006) 39 Colum J L & 
Soc Probs 331; Empirical Research Group, UCLA School of Law, Evaluation of Van Nuys Legal Self-Help 
Centre (Final Report) (August 30, 2001). 
36 Interestingly, the author of the study suggests that the study suffered from “methodological limitations as 
it was unable to measure the impact of unbundled legal services independent of the merit of the cases or the 
personal attributes of the clients who sought assistance.”  Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, supra note 13 
at 458. 
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further percentage of those litigants observed also received assistance at pre-trial 
conferences.  These cases were compared against a group of litigants who had full 
representation and against those without any assistance.  In examining both the 
procedural and substantive outcomes achieved in each case, the research concluded that, 
while the self-represented litigants who received unbundled legal services were 
successful from a procedural justice standpoint, the impact on substantive outcomes was 
limited.  It was noted, “recipients of unbundled aid fared no better than their unassisted 
counterparts on either possession or monetary outcomes…nor did outcomes improve with 
increased unbundled legal aid.”37  The study noted that, in terms of the procedural justice 
benefits, the litigants who received unbundled services were better equipped than the 
litigants who received no assistance to avoid default judgment and to raise valid and 
legally cognizable defences. 38   However, notwithstanding the potential benefits 
associated with providing individuals with unbundled assistance that allows them to 
defend against default judgment on a procedural basis, it was concluded that the 
provision of unbundled legal services in default proceedings did not ensure better overall 
substantive outcomes.  This is true even if the litigant was successful in avoiding default 
judgment.39   
 
In light of the findings and notwithstanding that there was no generalizable 
correlation between the provision of unbundled legal services and better substantive 
outcomes, Steinberg did highlight certain other benefits associated with the provision of 
unbundled legal services.  Regardless of the actual outcomes achieved, the data suggested 
that the self-represented litigants who received unbundled services were better informed 
about their rights and potentially better able to address matters in the future.40  This may 
be particularly relevant in light of the specific legal context and the group of individuals 
involved, namely low-income individuals dealing with housing evictions.  In this 
instance, the dissemination of pertinent legal information represented an important 
                                                
37 Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, supra note 13 at 482. 
38 Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, ibid at 491. 
39 Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, ibid at 494. 
40 Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, ibid at 494. 
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practical result that should not be overlooked when developing and implementing access 
to justice initiatives.  The self-represented litigants who received unbundled legal services 
gained knowledge about their legal rights and responsibilities and were, in theory, in a 
better position to use that information in the future, as well as potentially distribute the 
information gained to other individuals within their community.  
 
Randomized Outcome-Based Research 
While randomized testing has typically not been the standard practice in legal 
representation research, it is closely linked to a focus on legal outcomes.  Historically, 
many studies have sought evidence about the efficacy of a particular service through 
methods such as observation, surveys, interviews with various stakeholders and case-file 
reviews.  However, these methods have not generally involved randomization.  The 
underlying motivation in much of this research has been to understand better the impact 
that legal representation (and/or some form of legal services) has on an individual’s 
case.41  Yet, due to the number of factors that potentially influence any given outcome, 
there are challenges involved in making generalizations about the impact of a particular 
access to justice initiative on outcomes achieved.  Moreover, it is suggested that many of 
the studies that compare the outcomes of cases in which there was legal representation 
with outcomes where there was no representation are fatally flawed from a 
methodological perspective.42  Flowing from this critique, it is maintained that, “the use 
of comparisons and control groups are the best empirical method for isolating the 
effectiveness of a particular intervention while excluding other explanations for the 
intervention’s claimed effects.”43  Together with a focus on evaluations that examine the 
“sort of difference a service makes,”44 these critical observations have led to a shift in 
methodological alignment in access to justice research.  This is supported by a belief that 
                                                
41 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance”, supra note 12 at 2139. 
42 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance”, ibid at 2126. 
43 Abel, “Evidence-Based Access to Justice”, supra note 17 at 299. 
44 Liz Curran, “A Literature Review: Examining the literature on how to measure the ‘successful 
outcomes’: quality, effectiveness and efficiency of Legal Assistance Services” (February 2012) at 12.  See 
www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/Legalaidprograms/Documents/literature/20review20of/20legal/20assistance/2
0by/20Dr/20Liz/20Curran.pdf [Curran, “A Literature Review: Examining the Literature on How to 
Measure Successful Outcomes”]. 
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‘hard data’ can assist in making difficult policy decisions about access to justice 
initiatives and that ‘hard data’ is obtained through randomized studies.  That said, while 
containing useful cautions, these criticisms regarding the absence of hard data should not 
have the effect of excluding or marginalizing other forms of research.   
 
In the context of assessing access to justice, randomized studies create two similar 
groups (a treated group and a control group).  The claim is that it is possible to compare 
the impact of legal services on outcomes achieved when the service is offered or provided 
to a treated group and not offered and/or provided to a control group of clients.  By 
managing for a collection of variables that may potentially impact the outcome of the 
case in both treated and control groups, researchers making use of randomized studies 
insist that it is possible to measure the impact that a particular legal service has on the 
outcome achieved in a specific legal setting.   
 
While there are a small number of studies that have pursued randomized research, 
I will concentrate on one recent and prominent example from Harvard Law School: it can 
serve as a focal point for a critical discussion about research methodologies in access to 
justice research.45  In conducting this study, one of Greiner and Pattanyak’s arguments 
was that earlier observational studies “suffer from methodological problems so severe as 
to render their conclusions untrustworthy.”46  They suggest that these earlier studies may 
provide “rich descriptive” information about self-represented litigants, but that it is not 
possible to “draw inferences on causation regarding the effects of offers or actual use of 
representation” from the descriptive information collected due to various methodological 
shortcomings in the structure of the various studies.47  Greiner and Pattanyak contend that 
there are three main methodological problems in the earlier observational studies: a 
failure to define the intervention that is being examined; a failure to account for selection 
                                                
45 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance”, supra note 12. 
46 Ibid at 2126. 
47 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance”, ibid at 2126-27. 
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effects; and a failure to adhere to standard principles of statistics that account for 
uncertainties within the study.48 
 
These criticisms of earlier access to justice research projects arose in the context 
of a research project that Greiner and Pattanyak undertook at Harvard Law School.  They 
conducted a randomized study in the field of access to justice.49  In their study, the 
researchers sought to measure the impact of an offer of representation from law students 
working at the Harvard Law Aid Bureau (HLAB): this is a student-run, faculty-
supervised legal clinic connected with the clinical law program at Harvard Law School.  
Potential clients consisted of claimants who were seeking to appeal a denial of certain 
unemployment insurance benefits.  Upon contacting the clinic for assistance, the 
claimants were subjected to the usual intake interview respecting their case and their 
consent to participate in the evaluation was obtained. 50  Following this process and 
assuming that the individual qualified for assistance at the clinic, the individual’s 
information was sent to the researchers; they randomized the case and instructed HLAB 
whether to offer the individual assistance.  Within the treated and control groups, the 
researchers attempted to account for gender, education, race, as well as the length of time 
the legal matter had been continuing.  The treated group was offered assistance from the 
clinic, but the control group was not offered assistance.  However, it is important to note 
that the relevant variable that the research sought to isolate was the impact of an offer of 
representation from the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau.  The research did not randomize the 
participants on the basis of actual representation provided or withheld.    
 
                                                
48 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance”, ibid at 2184. 
49 In focusing on the studies conducted at Harvard Law School, I am starting from the position that the 
methodology and results achieved are statistically valid.  It seems appropriate here to caution that I do not 
have any formal or sustained background in statistics and, therefore, do not purport to pass judgment on the 
technical or scientific aspects of their methodology. 
50 Upon attending at the clinic, the potential clients were verbally advised that HLAB was conducting an 
evaluation of the service and were also read a script about the study before being asked to confirm whether 
they verbally consented to participate in the study.  See Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation in 
Legal Assistance”, ibid at 2143-2144. 
 165 
Accordingly, the study did not purport to evaluate the quality of the legal services 
provided.  In fact, the researchers expressly made certain assumptions about the quality 
of the legal services.  Instead, the research project was limited to examining whether an 
offer of legal assistance (and subsequent use of representation) had a positive impact on 
the ultimate outcome obtained by the claimant; this was measured by the value of the 
pecuniary award made to the claimant.51  The researchers reasoned that offers of 
representation are “what a service provider actually does to attempt to improve a 
potential client’s situation” and, as such, it is worthwhile to measure its effects.52  The 
measurement of an offer of legal assistance also allows the researchers to focus on the 
service provider’s delivery system and operation.  Finally, the researchers concluded that 
they could not randomize actual use of representation from an ethical standpoint.   
 
Once subjects were divided into treated or control groups, the official records 
about the outcome achieved in the individual cases included in the study were 
scrutinized.  It was theorized that the claimants who had been offered legal assistance in 
the form of legal representation (and ultimately accepted the offer of assistance) would 
achieve better results (i.e., greater monetary awards) than those individuals not offered 
assistance.  Ultimately, the results from the randomized study suggested that an offer of 
assistance from the HLAB had “no statistically significant effect on the probability that a 
claimant would prevail.” 53   The researchers also concluded that the offer of 
representation delayed the adjudicatory process.  
 
One of the noteworthy aspects of this research is that Greiner and Pattanyak’s 
conclusions appear to run contrary to many of the earlier observational studies: these 
studies suggested that legal representation (as opposed to not having representation) 
                                                
51 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation of Legal Assistance”, supra note -12 at 2127-2129. 
52 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation of Legal Assistance”, ibid at 2127-2129. 
53 Greiner & Pattanayak, “Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance”, ibid at 2124; there are other 
studies that reflect a similar conclusion regarding unbundled legal services and limited representation.  See 
Jessica Steinberg, “In Pursuit of Justice”, supra note 13. 
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typically has a positive impact on case outcomes.54  The discrepancy between the data 
collected in their randomized study and the data derived from the earlier studies caused 
Greiner and Pattanayak to re-examine the earlier studies.  In so doing, they made some 
observations regarding the ‘rigour’ of the methodologies employed in the earlier studies.  
Based on their review, they concluded that the “only way to produce credible quantitative 
results on the effect of legal representation is with randomized trials.”55   
 
In addition to reviewing earlier studies on the impact of representation on legal 
outcomes, the Harvard researchers engaged in an analysis of how the particular 
circumstances of their study might explain the lack of a statistically significant result.  
These explanations sought to contextualize the specific legal setting in which the research 
was conducted so as to provide insight into possible explanations for the data results 
recorded.  The explanations took account of the particular nature of the legal issue in 
dispute (i.e., unemployment benefits) as well as the type of procedure and process faced 
by the claimants in the study (specifically, face-tracked processes in which the 
adjudicators were accustomed to hearing from self-represented parties).  
 
A Discussion of Randomized Outcome-Based Research   
From a policy perspective, it is argued that determining which individuals, issues and/or 
legal settings necessitate the assistance of counsel (or some other equally appropriate 
form of legal service) is important when distributing limited legal resources to individuals 
                                                
54 This also appears contrary to an earlier study conducted in respect of the New York City Housing Court.  
See Seron, Van Ryzin & Frankel, “The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants”, supra 
note 34.    
55 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation of Legal Assistance”, supra note 12 at 2144; a similar 
conclusion was reached by Jessica Steinberg following her non-randomized analysis of unbundled legal 
services offered to poor litigants involved in eviction cases in California.  Jessica K Steinberg, “In Pursuit 
of Justice”, supra note 13.  Interestingly, a recent research project that Greiner and other researchers have 
undertaken includes the use of questionnaires to “obtain qualitative information about the study 
participants” in a study about different initiatives aimed at assisting consumers in financial crisis.  In 
conducting long term surveys of consumers who had been in significant debt, the authors of the study state  
“[t]he surveys will assess elements of overall well-being that might conceivably be affected by counseling 
and representational interventions, such as self-reported stress levels, perceptions of the court system, and 
likelihood of compliance with any court-imposed remedies.”  See Dalie Jimenez, D James Greiner, Lois R 
Lupica and Rebecca L Sandefur, “Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a 
Randomized Control Trial: A Research and Clinical Approach” (2013) 20:3 Geo J on Poverty L & Pol’y 
449 [Jimenez, Greiner, Lupica & Sandefur, “Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress”]. 
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who would otherwise proceed without counsel. 56   Moreover, to the extent that 
assumptions are made about the perceived benefits of initiatives such as self-help or 
unbundled legal services and that these assumptions form the basis of a justification for 
reduced funding for full representation, research data could be useful in challenging these 
assumptions.  However, it is also equally important that the search for ‘scientific’ or 
‘hard’ data that drives randomized outcome-based research and contributes to the 
justification of certain policy initiatives does not occupy the whole field and, perhaps 
more importantly, does not presuppose the answers sought.  The utility of quantitative 
work need not diminish the corresponding need for qualitative research that incorporates 
a deeper contextualized understanding of the experiences of those engaged with the 
justice system; this understanding extends beyond the specific outcome achieved. 
 
Interestingly, in a more recent research project involving debt collection, Greiner 
indicated that the research project designed was innovative in the sense that it utilizes “a 
combination of subjective and objective metrics to measure the financial well-being of 
consumers.”  The newer research project in question includes both an analysis of the 
outcomes achieved in debt collection court cases and also seeks qualitative information 
about the study participants.  In this regard, the researchers seek to adopt a “holistic 
approach to research that takes account of the users’ perspective.” 57   This more 
contextualized understanding of individuals’ experiences is entirely consistent with a 
broader theory of access to justice that seeks to engage individuals in a conversation 
about justice, participation and their corresponding ability to affect justice.  Moreover, 
this approach is less an either/or issue and more about how quantitative and qualitative 
methods can complement each other. 
 
                                                
56 See the Boston Bar Association Task Force on Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel in Massachusetts in 
which it is acknowledged that different civil proceedings will require different levels of intervention by 
counsel and that, where appropriate, lesser forms of assistance may be provided.  See “Gideon’s New 
Trumpet: Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel in Massachusetts”, Boston Bar Association Task Force on 
Expanding the Civil Right to Trial, (September 2008).  Available online at: http://www.bostonbar.org/ 
prs/nr_0809/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf. 
57  Jimenez, Greiner, Lupica & Sandefur, “Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress”, supra 
note 55. 
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While proponents of randomized studies maintain that randomization is better 
suited to the task of drawing causal connections between the outcome and the type of 
representation being studied, there is still debate as to how this can best be achieved.  
Moreover, within randomized studies, it can be very difficult to isolate the variable being 
studied (i.e., the legal service) from some of the other aspects of the legal matter that may 
influence the resolution of the matter.  As is the case with other social science research 
that involves participants and fieldwork, it is not possible to replicate a purely 
experimental setting in which the researcher can isolate and causally measure the impact 
of a particular variable. 58  Again, this is particularly complicated when examining non-
traditional legal services used by low-income clients and/or disadvantaged or vulnerable 
individuals.  The unpredictability and often demanding nature of addressing the needs of 
disadvantaged groups raises unique challenges when attempting to isolate the cause and 
effect of a legal service on the outcome achieved.  Finally, Pascoe Pleasance noted a 
practical consideration in his discussion of the length of randomized control trials 
generally.  He noted that the “relatively long duration of control trials does not fit easily 
into the political context in which many trials may run.”59  
 
In addition to various practical challenges associated with outcome-based 
research, there are important ethical challenges respecting the withholding of legal 
services to otherwise deserving clients.  In the Harvard study, Greiner and Pattanayak 
distinguished the treated and control group by offering legal representation to the treated 
group and not offering assistance to the control group.  Thus, the variable that was 
controlled for was the offer of legal assistance rather than the withholding of actual legal 
services.  The decision to proceed in this manner was defended, in part, on the basis that 
the clinic was not in a position to offer assistance to all those seeking it.60  As such, offers 
                                                
58 For example, in her review of access to justice research and methodologies, Liz Curran insists that 
randomized studies are problematic when attempting to evaluate legal services due to the “complex and 
diverse nature of the legal assistance service, the clients they serve and the setting they are.”  Curran, “A 
Literature Review: Examining the literature on how to measure successful outcomes”, supra note 44 at 15. 
59 Pascoe Pleasance, “Trials and Tribulations”, supra note 10 at 13. 
60 Greiner & Pattanyak, “Randomized Evaluation of Legal Assistance”, supra note 12.  In the poverty law 
context, Paul R Tremblay makes note of the ‘scarcity’ of legal services that inevitably forces poverty 
lawyers to confront the reality that there are more poor clients then resources, time or money to serve these 
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of assistance to certain clients (but not all clients) would happen in any event.  Thus, a 
certain percentage of individuals otherwise entitled to assistance would be turned away 
from HLAB.  While this is likely true, it raises difficult questions about whether there is a 
difference between allowing the legal clinic’s capacity to dictate who will receive its 
services (and/or adhering to an established policy regarding how this issue will be 
addressed when there are limited resources available 61 ) and randomly assigning 
assistance to anonymous clients in order to ‘test’ the impact of assistance on the outcome 
achieved by the client.62   
 
This rationalization about randomizing offers of assistance can be contrasted with 
the discussion about the ethical challenges associated with triage in legal clinics.  While it 
is acknowledged that frontline lawyers in legal clinics will need to make difficult 
decisions about who they can and cannot assist, the factors that will impact these 
decisions must be carefully considered and be consistent with the overall goals and 
objectives of the clinic, the needs of the individuals seeking assistance, and the broader 
socio-political setting in which the legal clinic is operated.63  In fact, randomized 
decisions about assistance are contrary to articulated triage policies (as well as the policy 
objectives pursued by legal aid more generally); these contemplate the weighing of 
                                                                                                                                            
clients.  However, he proceeds to suggest that the rationale for decisions about who to assist must be clearly 
articulated rather than a matter of happenstance.  See Paul R Tremblay, “Acting ‘A Very Moral Type of 
God’: Triage among Poor Clients” (1999) 67 Fordham L Rev 2475 [Tremblay, “Acting ‘A Very Moral 
Type of God’”]. 
61 Tremblay, “Acting ‘A Very Moral Type of God’”, ibid. 
62 Although practically speaking many clinics are quite resourceful at finding ways to assist individuals 
even when beyond capacity.  Interestingly, in the medical context, when testing the impact of a new drug, it 
is not acceptable to withhold existing treatments that address the medical condition in question in order to 
isolate and measure the impact of the new drug.  Moreover, in the medical field where randomized 
controlled studies are prevalent, there are still continuing ethical debates about the implications of 
randomization.  These debates are rooted in the conflict between a physician’s obligation to the patient they 
are examining – namely that there not be any arbitrariness in the care they provide and the clinical research 
setting where randomization does include arbitrary delivery of treatment; necessary to measure the efficacy 
of a potentially life-saving treatment.  While the medical situation is not identical to the legal context 
(particularly the civil law context), randomization raises important ethical questions respecting the 
‘withholding’ of services to those in need that are not easily addressed.  See David Wendler “The Ethics of 
Clinical Research” in Edward N Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012).  Available 
online at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall 2012/entries/clinical-research/ [Wendler, “The Ethics of 
Clinical Research”]. 
63 Tremblay, “Acting ‘A Very Moral Type of God’”, supra note 60 at 2477. 
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certain factors such as the significance/impact of the case, the nature of the client’s needs 
and the availability of resources to address the particular legal issue.   
 
Randomized research also raises additional ethical challenges in the specific 
context of poverty law because the research (where the supply of services is controlled by 
a researcher) is conducted in a setting in which individuals are particularly vulnerable and 
most in need of assistance.64  Coupled with this is the concern that the research is driven 
by a focus on the expenditure of limited resources rather than a determination of what 
certain groups need and what will directly improve their particular ability to affect 
justice. 65  Moreover, recent statistics suggest that there is a growing lack of access to 
justice and legal processes among middle-income individuals.66  In certain respects, the 
legal challenges faced by middle-income individuals will be different from low-income 
individuals and/or disadvantaged groups.  This shift in demographics raises further 
questions about the validity of importing the research data gained from a poverty context 
into other social contexts.    
 
These reservations about a focus on outcomes and randomized research as a 
means of measuring outcomes suggest the need for a more comprehensive agenda on the 
appropriate focus of access to justice research.  In particular, these reservations raise 
larger and more compelling questions around how a particular methodological approach 
supports and informs a theory of access to justice going forward.  The dialogue about 
methodologies in access to justice research also reflects a wider contestation about the 
practical and democratic theses of access to justice.  The practical thesis limits its focus to 
ways in which to improve self-represented parties’ chances of obtaining a positive 
                                                
64 Again, in the medical context, randomized clinical research raises ethical concerns about exploitation – 
specifically whether the research exposes subjects to risks in order to collect data for potential benefit of 
future subjects; see Wendler “The Ethics of Clinical Research”, supra note 62.  In a poverty law context, 
the question that arises is whether researchers are further exploiting a group of individuals that are already 
marginalized.   
65 Albiston & Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice”, supra note 1. 
66  Jamie Baxter, Michael Trebilcock & Albert Yoon, “The Ontario Civil Legal Needs Project: A 
Comparative Analysis of 2009 Survey Data” in Michael Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & Lorne Sossin, eds, 
Middle-Income Access to Justice (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2012) at 55.   
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outcome in their legal matters.  On the other hand, the democratic thesis incorporates a 
broader approach to access to justice that seeks to enhance citizens’ empowerment and 
participation in the broader legal processes and political decisions that impact their lives 
and, in so doing, expand concepts of ‘justice.’67  In this regard, the objectives of the 
democratic thesis of access to justice extend beyond outcomes in a particular case.  Given 
this wider contestation about the appropriate thesis going forward, the question is 
whether the provision of legal services should be the end goal of access to justice or 
whether there are broader principles and goals that should frame both research and the 
development of policy initiatives in access to justice?  I now turn to addressing some of 
these questions.  I will offer some tentative answers before outlining the specific research 
methodology implemented in this project. 
 
The Importance of Qualitative Research  
The present focus on outcome-based research draws upon an access to justice theory that 
is concerned with improving access to justice by providing individuals with various kinds 
of legal services such that they may address and resolve their legal issues.  While 
outcome-based studies maintain that ‘hard data’ will allow policy-makers and 
professionals to improve access by providing for the better and more efficient delivery of 
legal services, there remains a deeper question about whether this should be the ultimate 
or even dominant goal.  I contend that the research that supports a traditional route to 
access through expanded legal services and simplified court processes does not go far 
enough in terms of a theoretical framework.68   As Rebecca Sandefur concluded,   
 
the typical ways of conceptualizing people’s experiences with civil justice 
problems focus too narrowly on law...[;] Stepping back to look at the whole 
canvas of public experience with civil justice problems reveals that we need 
not merely provide additional access to law, but also more creativity in 
thinking about access to justice.69   
 
                                                
67Roderick A MacDonald, “Access to Justice and Law Reform #2”, (2001) 19 Windsor YB Access Just 
317 at 319. 
68 Sandefur, “The Impact of Counsel”, supra note 13 at 52. 
69 Ibid at 52. 
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Consequently, within a comprehensive theory of access to justice, it will be 
important to focus on enhancing the ways by which individuals can give meaning to the 
concepts of law and justice in their lives and in the life of their communities.  In order to 
do so, it is important that individuals are provided with direct access to a variety of 
forums in which they can engage in discussions about law and how law might foster a 
discourse on justice.  This should include access to traditional legal institutions as well as 
non-legal institutions and processes.  In order to achieve a comprehensive approach to 
access, it is essential that researchers engage with those individuals attempting to access 
the various legal processes and institutions.  The goal in this regard is to ensure that the 
approaches to access that are adopted reflect the needs and expectations of those 
individuals that are being encouraged to participate.  Research that seeks to understand 
citizens’ experiences, perspectives and perceptions is also consistent with the democratic 
principle that individuals should have a voice in the development and administration of 
the institutions that affect them.  In this sense, this approach to research is consistent with 
the democratic thesis discussed earlier and the underlying commitment to participatory 
democracy.   
 
Previous research has demonstrated that only a small percentage of individuals’ 
civil legal needs are understood by them to be legal problems and addressed in formal 
legal settings.70  Furthermore, the practical reality is that neither the state nor the legal 
profession is in a position to provide and/or fund the level of legal representation needed 
to address every individual’s legal issues.  This is true from both a financial and practical 
standpoint. 71   Notwithstanding that providing legal services to all who need it is 
impracticable, there is also a segment of the population who do not want to relinquish 
their legal problem to a legal professional.  One example of this was demonstrated by 
Barclay’s research in which appellants chose to represent themselves at the appellate 
                                                
70 For example, see Hazel Genn, The Paths to Justice – What People Think about Going to Law (Oxford, 
UK: Hart Publishing Inc., 1999) [Genn, The Paths to Justice]. 
71 In the American context, Gillian Hadfield has indicated that it would cost approximately 50 billion 
dollars annually to secure one hour of legal help (at small firm/sole practitioner rates) for all American 
households that have an unmet dispute-related need; see USC News, available online at 
http://news.usc.edu/57034/usc-professor-reflects-on-the-high-costs-of -law.   
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level because self-representation allowed them to have more control over the legal 
process in which they are participating regardless of the increased potential for a negative 
outcome. 72  In representing themselves, the appellants felt they could ensure that the 
issues are presented in the order and style that they chose.73  All of these considerations 
need to be attended to when theorizing about what access to justice should hope to 
achieve and when conducting research on access to justice.   
 
These practical realities pose challenging questions for the development of a 
comprehensive access to justice theory.  Most importantly, they ask whether access to 
justice would be better served by moving away from a focus on the provision of an 
‘equal’ but ‘elite’ level of legal services for all citizens.74   In the Canadian context, an 
‘equal’ but ‘elite’ level of legal services contemplates a continued commitment to 
providing a lawyer to as many individuals who would like a private lawyer.  This focus 
on ‘equal but elite’ legal services has had a twofold effect: (1) it has prioritized programs 
that are directed at providing legal services to those who cannot otherwise afford the 
services; and (2) it has driven the outcome-based research that is aimed at measuring the 
effectiveness of those programs, as well as the corresponding allocation of resources 
necessary to support those services.75  However, with respect to the effect that this policy 
has on designing and conducting research, Albiston and Sandefur emphasize the need to 
resist the “pull of the policy audience.” 76  This contemplates research questions and 
resulting projects being designed to fit policy-makers’ definition of a problem and the 
goals thought necessary to address the problem.  This is to be contrasted with research 
projects that attempt to understand the problem from the perspective of those impacted.  
In this regard, access to justice theory should, 
                                                
72 Scott Barclay, “Decision to Self-Represent” (1996) 77 Social Science Quarterly 912 [Barclay, “Decision 
to Self-Represent”]. 
73 Barclay, “Decision to Self-Represent”, ibid. 
74 Lucie E White, “Specifically Tailored Legal Services for Low-Income Persons in the Age of Wealth 
Inequality:  Pragmatism or Capitulation?” (1998-1999) 67 Fordham L Rev 2573 at 2578 [White, “Specially 
Tailored Legal Services”]. 
75 Ibid at 2578. 
76 Albiston & Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice”, supra note 1 at 104. 
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in the context of the present levels of wealth inequality…endorse the idea 
that the social needs of disenfranchised groups should be addressed sui 
generis, in ways that reflect their own experiences of need, their embedded 
historical and cultural realities, the societal power landscapes from their 
perspectives, their capacities, and their normative aspirations.77   
 
A shift in the objectives of access to justice theory away from a focus on lawyers 
requires a corresponding shift in access to justice research objectives: the research data 
collected should reflect the experiences and perspectives of the individuals and groups 
currently attempting to access to justice.  This approach to research would seek to 
identify the actual needs and expectations of those individuals.78   
 
A useful analogy is to a similar debate in the field of health care delivery where a 
‘universal standard of health services’ is challenged as a bad idea from both a short-term 
and long-term perspective.79  From a short-term perspective, a ‘universal standard of 
care’ does not allow for a contextualized approach that takes account of different groups’ 
different needs at different times.  From a long-term perspective, the focus on 
standardized services that are framed around elite practices and institutions actually 
perpetuates the separation of institutional practices that maintain social stratification 
rather than move society toward a goal of institutional equality.80  In the context of legal 
service delivery, prioritizing the value of an adversarial legal system that contemplates an 
ideal of equality of legal services becomes problematic when the result is a failure to 
deliver an elite and uniform quality and level of services to all citizens.  This is made 
more problematic in the context of an adversarial system that contains certain 
assumptions and expectations about the expertise and experience of the various 
                                                
77 White, “Specifically Tailored Legal Services”, supra note 74 at 2578. 
78 See recent research conducted on self-help programs in Australia by Merran Lawler, Jeff Gidding and 
Michael Robertson in which the researchers, through interviews, observation and case studies sought to 
gain insight into the “particular experiences and perspectives of self-help themselves instead of focusing on 
explorations of the potential impact of legal self-help on the smooth administration of justice.”  See Merran 
Lawler, Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help 
Legal Resources to Citizens in Need” (2012) 30 Windsor YB Access Just 185 at 187 [Lawler, Giddings & 
Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal Resources”]. 
79 White, “Specially Tailored Legal Services”, supra note 74 at 2578-2579. 
80 White, “Specially Tailored Legal Services”, ibid at 2578-2579. 
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participants.81  In this regard, there is a disconnect between expectations about how the 
system operates and the ability of certain participants to navigate through the system.   
 
In the legal context, the more traditional route travelled (i.e., providing access to 
legal services) can be contrasted with the broader concept of access to justice that I have 
been advocating.82  In the context of a broader conceptualization, it is worth re-iterating 
Roderick MacDonald’s comments regarding a broader approach to the conceptualization 
of access to justice that suggest that,  
 
[i]n a liberal democracy, true access to justice requires that all people should 
have an equal right to participate in every institution where law is debated, 
created, found, organized, administered, interpreted and 
applied…..Improving access to legal education, to the judiciary, to the 
public service and the police, to Parliament and to various law societies is 
now seen as the best way of changing the system to overcome the 
disempowerment, disrespect and disengagement felt by many citizens.83    
 
This broader conceptualization seeks to promote direct citizen participation in both law-
making and law-administering institutions and processes.84  In this regard, the goal in 
encouraging participation is not to assume individuals will assume control of all of the 
political processes occurring in a large-scale democratic society.  Nor is the goal to affect 
radical court reform.  Rather, the goals are more modest, but more immediate and 
relevant to individual citizens’ lives – to foster direct and meaningful participation when 
and where individuals so choose.  This approach seeks to encourage engagement on local 
as well as national levels and in a variety of forms and forums.   
                                                
81 White, “Specially Tailored Legal Services”, ibid at 2579. 
82 A broader conceptualization of access to justice is discussed in chapters two and three of this thesis. 
83 Roderick MacDonald, “Access to Justice in Canada Today:  Scope, Scale and Ambitions” in Julia Bass, 
WA Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – The Way Forward, 
(Toronto, Canada: The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 19 at 23 [MacDonald, “Access to Justice in 
Canada Today”]. 
84 Janice Gross Stein & Adam Cook, “Speaking the Language of Justice: A New Legal Vernacular” in 
Julia Bass, W A Bogart & Frederick H Zemans, eds, Access to Justice for a New Century – The Way 
Forward (Toronto, Canada: The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2005) 163 [Gross Stein & Cook, 
“Speaking the Language of Justice”]. 
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In order to advance a democratic approach to access, it is necessary to undertake 
research that seeks out the perspectives and views of the individuals seeking to 
participate.  Thus, the research undertaken in conjunction with this theoretical approach 
should ensure that the individuals ultimately impacted by the adoption of a democratic 
approach are provided an opportunity to provide their input.  In other words, if the 
underlying theoretical approach to access is driven by democratic principles and goals, 
then it is important that the research undertaken in conjunction with that theoretical 
approach should also be based on those same democratic principles.  This ensures that the 
initiatives developed to promote meaningful participation are reflective of individuals’ 
actual needs and expectations.  Therefore, before it is possible to choose between 
potential solutions aimed at enhancing access, it is vital that the “people bearing the 
greatest weight of the current failure of our institutions…(the public)…be consulted 
about what they want when they face civil justice problems.”85  While this sentiment was 
originally expressed in the context of outcome-based research, it is pertinent in terms of 
any research that seeks to improve individuals’ access to justice.  
 
Research on Legal Consciousness  
Adopting a qualitative approach to access to justice research that collects data about 
individuals’ experiences is useful in highlighting “how people’s sense of fairness is 
formed through their particular experiences within the legal system and in relation to the 
litigants’ embeddedness in the institutional context.” 86   One of the assumptions 
underlying legal consciousness is that individuals manoeuver through legal structures 
based on their legal consciousness.  However, individuals’ legal consciousness may, in 
                                                
85 Sandefur, “The Impact of Counsel”, supra note 13 at 85; See also Lawler, Gidding & Robertson, 
“Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal Resources”, supra note 78 in which it 
was noted that the lack of data on the particular experiences and perspectives of self-helpers in Australia 
necessitated the need for qualitative research that sought to understand the role of self-help from the users’ 
perspective.  It was further noted that much of the earlier research had focused on how self-help as an 
initiative impacted the larger system of justice. 
86 Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, “Situated Justice”, supra note 4 at 6 suggests that a qualitative approach 
that take account of how individuals evaluate the fairness of their experience can also take account of 
certain structural constraints (i.e., the role of professionals, the types of opportunities that law provides, and 
the social and financial resources available).   
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turn, be shaped by the legal structures and processes that they encounter.87  As such, in 
seeking to understand self-represented litigants’ experiences in the civil justice system 
and how those experiences both shape and are shaped by their engagement in the judicial 
system, it is helpful to draw specifically on the work of a group of scholars, including 
Patricia Ewick, Susan B Silbey, Austin Sarat, LB Nielsen and Lucie E White.88  To 
varying degrees, they seek to understand individuals’ experiences with law from the 
individuals’ perspective as well as how those same individuals construct meaning about 
law and the legal processes they experienced.89  
 
Susan Silbey suggests that, “legal consciousness as a theoretical concept and topic 
of empirical research developed within law and society in the 1980’s and 1990’s to 
address issues of legal hegemony, particularly how the law sustains its institutional power 
despite a persistent gap between the law on the books and the law in action.”90 While 
subject to different iterations, the study of legal consciousness explores the ways in which 
knowledge about and/or experience with law (and legal institutions) affects one’s 
understanding of law and the meaning one gives to law.91  It reflects the continual 
                                                
87 Ibid at 6. 
88 Ewick & Silbey, The Common Place of Law, supra note 7; Laura Beth Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary 
Citizens about Law and Street Harassment” (2000) 43:4 Law & Soc’y Rev 1056 [Nielsen, “Attitudes of 
Ordinary Citizens about Law”]; Austin Sarat, “…‘The Law is All Over’: Power, Resistance and the Legal 
Consciousness of the Welfare Poor” (1990) 2 Yale JL & Human 343 [Sarat, “…‘The Law is Over’”]; Lucie 
E White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:  Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.”  
(1990) 38(1) Buff L Rev 1 [White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes”]. 
89 Bryant G Garth & Austin Sarat, eds, How Does Law Matter? Fundamental Issues in Law & Society 
Research (Evanston, USA: Northwestern University Press, 1998) [Garth & Sarat, How Does Law Matter?]. 
90 Susan S Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness” (2005) 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 323 at 
323 (Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness”].  Silbey suggests that legal consciousness was originally driven 
by the question that if “law failed to meet its public aspirations, how did it retain support among the people 
and how did it continue to achieve the sense of consistency, accessibility, fairness and legitimacy?”  This 
required understand not only who used law and how they used law but also who did not use law and why.  
These questions led to research by individuals such as Sally Merry who sought to understand “the ways that 
law is used and understood by ordinary citizens”.  Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness”, supra note 90 at 
326 quoting Sally Merry “Concepts of Law and Justice among Working Class Americans” (1985) 9 Legal 
Studies Forum 59. 
91 Ewick & Silbey, “Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness” 
(1992) 26 New Eng L Rev 731 at 734 [Ewick & Silbey, “Conformity, Contestation and Resistance”]; 
Nielsen, Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law, supra note 88 at 1059. 
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interplay of law, everyday life and individual experiences.92   Legal consciousness 
research examines the role law plays in constructing meaning, affecting actions and 
shaping the various aspects of individuals’ social lives. 93   Thus, central to 
conceptualizations of legal consciousness is the individual’s specific understanding of 
law.94   
 
However, legal consciousness research also seeks to examine how the meaning 
one gives to the concept of law or justice further “translates into actions and decisions.”95  
In this regard, legal consciousness is not merely a ‘state of mind,’ but is also procedural 
in the sense that it seeks to reveal what people do as well as what they say.96  Thus, in 
order to better understand the meaning that individuals prescribe to law and how their 
actions might subsequently be shaped by this meaning requires that researchers engage 
with those who are the ‘recipients of law’ rather than those who produce law.97  In this 
regard, examining individuals’ own accounts of their participation (or non-participation) 
in legal processes or institutions, how they interpret and give meaning to this 
participation, and how this participation subsequently affects their understanding of law 
become important elements of legal consciousness research.   
 
Ewick and Silbey defined legal consciousness in terms of how individuals make 
sense of law and legal institutions and also how they, “give meaning to their law-related 
experiences and actions such that consciousness is understood to be formed within and 
changed by social actions.”98  In this regard, self-represented litigants’ understanding of 
                                                
92 David M Engel & Frank W Munger, “Rights, Remembrance and the Reconciliation of Difference” 
(1996) 30 Law & Soc’y Rev 7 at 14. 
93 Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law”, supra note 88 at 1059. 
94 Ewick & Silbey, “Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance”, supra note 91 at 734. 
95 Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law”, supra note 88 at 1059. 
96 Garth & Sarat, How Does Law Matter?, supra note 89. 
97 Austin Sarat, “…‘The Law is All Over’”, supra note 88 at 375 citing David M Trubek, “Where the 
Action is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism” (1984) 36:1 Stan L Rev 575. 
98 Elizabeth A Hoffman, “Legal Consciousness and Dispute Resolution: Different Disputing Behaviour at 
Two Similar Taxicab Companies” (2003) Law & Soc Inquiry 691 at 732 [Hoffman, “Legal Consciousness 
and Dispute Resolution”].  
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law and views about their ability to participate in legal institutions may be constituted and 
sometimes re-constituted by their experiences within those particular institutional settings 
or processes.  Arguably, this, in turn, influences the meaning that they give law and their 
relationship to law going forward.  Moreover, individuals’ actual experiences and the 
meaning they attribute to them are juxtaposed with conventional norms and pre-existing 
assumptions about the role of law in society.   
 
For example, Lucie E White’s account of a client’s attempt to reverse an 
administrative tribunal’s decision reducing her welfare benefits and the barriers that she 
faced in attempting to do so provided a context in which to examine such a juxtaposition.  
In that research project, the individual’s actual ‘lived experience’ was contrasted with 
concepts of procedural justice that contemplated “meaningful participation by all citizens 
in the governmental decisions that affect their lives.”99  In telling the woman’s story, 
White sought to present the case as a means to examine the ‘disjuncture’ between the 
ideal of procedural justice and the stratified conditions in society in which certain 
marginalized individuals attempt to make use of those procedural rituals. 100  In the 
particular facts of that case, White argued that, as a result of substantive inequality, there 
are serious social, economic and operational barriers that work to prevent women, like 
Mrs. G, from engaging in the decision-making process in a meaningful manner.  While 
these barriers overwhelmingly discourage meaningful participation by certain 
marginalized groups, White maintains that Mrs. G was, at certain points during the 
administrative process, able to assert an “equal power to take part in the making of 
language, the making of shared categories, norms, and institutions, as she spoke through 
that language about her needs about Sunday shoes.”101  By speaking about something that 
was important to her life, namely the shoes needed for church on Sunday, Mrs. G asserted 
herself into the process on her terms.  However, White ultimately concludes that, 
 
                                                
99 White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes”, supra note 7 at 3. 
100 White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes”, ibid at 3-4. 
101 White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes”, ibid at 50. 
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Mrs. G’s unruly participation at her hearing was itself political action.  Yet 
it was an act that did little to change the harsh landscape which constricts 
Mrs. G. from more sustained and more effective political participation. 
Substantial change in that landscape will come only as such fragile 
moments of dignity are supported and validated by the law.102   
 
This process requires an examination of individuals’ actual ‘lived experiences’ in various 
legal processes.  This examination provides an important context in which to explore 
ideas of empowerment and participation within the existing adversarial system.  In so 
doing, attempts can then be made to elucidate a better account of theory and practice. 
 
The development of legal consciousness as a line of inquiry into the meaning 
attributed by actors to the role of law in constructing and communicating certain social 
transactions led researchers to draw on anthropology and qualitative sociology.103  A 
qualitative methodology aims to “describe accurately another’s experience so as to elicit 
what the research participant believes or understands, and to provide quotes as evidence, 
rather than to judge through one’s own lens what that person must think or feel.”104  
Thus, through the use of methods such as in-depth qualitative interviews in which the 
participants are able to recount their story, researchers are provided an opportunity to 
gain an understanding of both the individuals’ experiences and the meaning that 
individuals prescribe to those experiences as it pertains to certain concepts.   
 
Critiques of Legal Consciousness Research 
In light of the fact that different researchers have adopted different working definitions of 
legal consciousness, research respecting individuals’ legal consciousness is open to the 
critique that it is too interpretive and too subjective to be of value; it is has the hallmarks 
of art, not science.  Additionally, there is an argument that “legal consciousness is 
contingent, and may change according to the area of social life about which the 
                                                
102 White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes”, ibid at 52. 
103 Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness”, supra note 90 at 327. 
104 Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research” in Peter Cane & Herbert M 
Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2010) at 926 at 931 [Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research”]. 
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researcher asks, with reference to the social location of the subject, and the subject’s 
knowledge about the law and legal norms.”105  Moreover, given the subjectivity of the 
research, the findings are not generalizable; every individual’s perception is uniquely 
their own and, therefore, any person’s particular legal consciousness is likely to be very 
different across gender, race, and socio-economic groups.  Again, Lucie White’s case 
study involving Mrs. G. provides a useful example of the way in which certain 
characteristics or status in society may affect an individual’s conceptualization of law and 
their interaction with it.  Finally, there is a criticism that the researcher’s own definition 
and understanding of law may ultimately influence how the researcher hears and/or 
interprets an interviewee’s experience of law.  While these are legitimate concerns about 
legal consciousness research, they must be balanced against the importance associated 
with ensuring that the experiences, perceptions and views of those who are attempting to 
access to justice are included in discussions about enhancing access. 
 
Taking account of the views of those attempting to access justice is, in part, in 
response to the historical fact that the perspectives of the legal profession both informed 
and framed the discussion of the issues respecting access.  However, there are serious 
questions whether the profession’s approach to these issues coincides with the self-
represented litigants’ actual experiences in the civil justice system.  More recently, 
reports by both the CBA and the Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and 
Family Matters have stressed the importance of including justice system users in the 
discussion about reform.  The Australian research that examined whether legal service 
providers develop self-help resources from an “entirely law-centric perspective” and, 
therefore, maintain the legal profession’s position as gatekeepers of the legal system 
lends weight to this concern.106  Given the existence of this type of research data, it is 
important that account be taken of potential differences between the objectives of those 
                                                
105 Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law”, supra note 88. 
106 Ibid at 186. 
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developing access to justice initiatives and the experiences of individuals making use of 
those same initiatives.107  
 
The research project undertaken as part of this thesis is interested in examining 
elements of the participants’ legal consciousness, particularly in terms of how their views 
on access, justice and engagement were affected by their experience as a self-represented 
litigant.  However, the purpose of the research is not to map the legal consciousness of 
self-represented litigants.  Instead, the research seeks to describe the participants’ 
experience with certain legal processes and institutions and in so doing, draw out the 
meaning that the participants attribute to notions of access, justice and empowerment 
based on those experiences.  This research project draws on earlier research on legal 
consciousness in order to develop a methodological approach that assists the research in 
better understanding individuals’ experiences interacting with the civil justice system and 
the meaning individuals’ prescribe to those experiences.  The theoretical gambit is that 
both the experience and the meaning attributed to the particular experience will influence 
the individual’s future engagement with law and legal processes and their general 
willingness to participate in decision-making processes.   
 
Research on Procedural Fairness 
Research in the field of procedural fairness has concentrated on the subjective 
experiences of litigants as a means of understanding how individuals evaluate the fairness 
of a legal process and legal institution.  This research approach is set against the 
randomized outcome-based research, which focuses on evaluating the objective outcomes 
achieved.  By contrast, procedural fairness research has demonstrated that individuals in 
adversarial settings distinguish process from outcome when evaluating the ‘fairness’ of 
both: they are more likely to accept an unfavourable outcome if they believe that the 
process used to arrive at the outcome was fundamentally fair.108  In this regard, as briefly 
                                                
107 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, supra note 78. 
108 Hazel Genn, “Tribunals and Informal Justice” (1993) 56 Mod L Rev 393 at 14; EA Lind & T Tyler, The 
Social Psychology of Procedural Justice, (New York, USA: Plenum Press, 1988); EA Lind, R Lissak & D 
Conlon, “Decision Control and Process Control: Effects on Procedural Fairness Judgments” (1983) 13:4 
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discussed earlier, issues of procedure and the individuals’ ability to engage in the process 
play a central role in how they react to their experiences in court.109  For example, 
individuals’ ability to tell their story as well as present evidence to the adjudicator both 
become important criteria against which individuals assess the fairness of the particular 
proceeding.110  This does not mean that the outcome is irrelevant, but only that there are 
other elements of the adjudicatory process that significantly affect an individual’s overall 
perception of fairness and their willingness to accept the legitimacy of that process and 
the outcome achieved.   
 
Thibault and Walker were some of the first researchers to conduct research in the 
field of procedural justice in 1975.111  They hypothesized that “litigants’ satisfaction with 
dispute resolution decisions would be independently influenced by their judgment about 
the fairness of the dispute resolution process.”112  They sought to examine individuals’ 
perceptions about the justness of court procedures by recording individuals’ reactions to 
different legal processes.  Based on the results obtained, Thibault and Walker ultimately 
concluded that, “the just procedure for resolving the types of conflict that result in 
litigation is a procedure that entrusts much control over the process to the disputants 
                                                                                                                                            
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 338; R Lissak & B Sheppard, “Beyond Fairness: The Criterion 
Problem in Research on Dispute Intervention” (1983) 13:2 Journal of Applied Social Psychology 45. 
109  Nourit Zimmerman & Tom R Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A 
Psychological Perspective” (2010) 37 Fordham Urb LJ 473 at 483-485 [Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between 
Access to Counsel and Access to Justice”]. 
110 In their discussion about legal consciousness, Ewick and Silbey link the ideal of an “attitudinal” concept 
of legal consciousness with concepts of fairness and due process, such that attitudes about law are directly 
related to one’s assessment of the fairness of a process.  In this regard, the authors suggest that there is a 
“deep, broad-based normative consensus” that individuals may be skeptical about the fairness of a 
particular legal process or institution but at the same time, maintain a commitment to the creation of an 
ideal that assumes equal and fair treatment.  This idea is discussed further in chapter 6 in the context of the 
participants’ views on participation within the civil justice system.  See Ewick and Silbey, The Common 
Place of Law, supra note 7 at 36. 
111 J Thibault & L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (New York, USA: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1975) (Thibault & Walker, Procedural Justice).  The authors note that prior to the 1970’s there was a 
limited amount of procedural justice research, which tended to focus on particular aspects of the legal 
process.  As a result, the consensus was that there was little social science research on the topic of 
procedure. 
112 Tom R Tyler, “What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures” (1988) 22:1 Law & Soc’y 103 at 103. 
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themselves and relatively little control to the decision-maker.”113  This conclusion is 
particularly relevant to self-represented litigants in light of the fact that their participation 
is not mediated by legal representation.  In this regard, two specific questions arise: how 
the provision of services (such as those offered to self-represented litigants at self-help 
centres) influences the self-represented litigants’ ability to engage with those adjudicatory 
processes; and what the ramifications of that engagement are for the individual’s 
evaluation of their experience. 
 
In recent years, this field of study has been extended to encompass the relative 
importance of different fairness criteria used by individuals when assessing the ‘justness’ 
of an experience; recent research has also examined the inter-relationship between the 
different criteria in various legal settings.  One of the conclusions drawn from more 
recent research involves the importance that litigants place on their opportunity to be 
heard in the litigation process.114  Research has demonstrated that ‘having a voice’ in the 
process is considered “central to people’s subjective reactions to that experience”115 
because it allows them to tell ‘their side of the story.’  It also reassures the litigants that 
the decision-makers are listening to and considering their stories when making 
decisions.116  Flowing from this conclusion is the question of whether litigants, in valuing 
direct interaction with the decision-maker, will demand more direct participation in their 
own legal process.  Again, this question has important ramifications for the particular 
context of self-represented litigants attempting to access justice.   
 
Overall, the procedural fairness research conducted has sought to identify those 
aspects of adjudicatory processes that affect individual litigants’ experience in litigation 
processes as well as their perceptions about their experience.  Drawing on some of the 
criteria that individuals use in assessing the fairness of a particular process can assist in 
                                                
113 Thibault & Walker, Procedural Justice, supra note 111 at 2. 
114 The use of the term “to be represented” is not in this particular context, restricted to representation by 
legal counsel. 
115 Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice”, supra note 109 at 503-504. 
116 Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice”, supra note 109 at 503. 
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evaluating individuals’ overall experience and the meaning they attribute to that 
experience.  Specifically, criteria such as whether individuals were able to tell their side 
of the story and whether they believe that the resulting decision was based on the facts 
presented can be helpful in attempting to understand self-represented litigants 
experiences with the litigation process. 
 
Critique of Procedural Fairness Research 
Procedural fairness research has not been without its critical commentary.  One aspect of 
this has been directed primarily at the early studies that attempted to identify and rank the 
importance of certain procedural criteria within clinical settings that did not represent the 
real life experiences of individuals in adversarial litigation processes.117  An early 
example of this is Folger’s study regarding the importance of voice, particularly as it 
relates to an individual’s ability to alter experienced inequity.  The research in question 
was conducted using male students in grade six in a simulated work setting.118  While the 
clinical setting of this research, as well as other similar research, does raise concerns 
about the validity of generalizing the findings to the civil justice system, it is important to 
note that there is more recent research that has substantiated the process criteria in 
adversarial settings.119 More particularly, this encompasses the small claims court setting 
where individuals experience participation in the process and place value on their 
experiences.120  
 
 In a recent critical discussion of the evolution of both procedural justice research 
and legal consciousness research, Susan Silbey questioned certain of the conclusions 
drawn in various procedural justice research projects.121  She stated that, “it turns out that 
                                                
117 Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, “Situated Justice”, supra note 4 at 6. 
118 Robert Folger, “Distributive and Procedural Justice:  Combined Impact of ‘Voice’ and Improvement on 
Experienced Inequity” (1977) 35:2 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 108 
119 William O’Barr & John M Conley, “Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court 
Narratives” (1985) 19 Law & Soc’y Rev 661 [O’Barr & Conley, “Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal 
Adequacy”]. 
120 O’Barr & Conley, “Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy”, ibid. 
121 Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness”, supra note 90 at 337. 
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these studies often begin with a model of fairness as it is defined by existing legal 
processes and doctrine (i.e., the opportunity to be heard, to have professional 
representation, and to have access to appeal and review).  These studies then measure 
popular agreement or disagreement with those norms.  Commitments to alternative 
conceptions of fairness, such as loyalty, compensatory treatment or substantive equality 
are not measured.”122  Instead, procedural justice research projects are premised on a 
particular model of fairness defined in terms of the existing adversarial model of legal 
process and framed by values of legal liberalism.  The result is a failure to engage in a 
discussion with the participants about the possibility of alternative models and a further 
failure to examine questions of underlying inequality and power distribution that 
ultimately influence individuals interaction with legal processes and the law more 
generally.   
 
Taking account of the potential limitations that an exclusive focus on either 
procedural fairness and/or legal consciousness research might have, these themes can be 
used to inform a broad qualitative approach to research in access to justice that seeks to 
include both contextual and diverse perspectives.  Such an approach would focus on an 
in-depth analysis of a limited number of cases rather than search for a causal explanation 
of the link between certain variables.  In this sense, qualitative research methods “reveal 
particularity and diversity and are good at enabling greater sense to be made of a situation 
that might not be evident with a more superficial study.”123   
 
In light of this, it is prudent to recommend that a combination of different 
methodologies would assist qualitative research on access to justice.  For example, 
qualitative research methods might likely include, along with in-depth interviews, 
observations of self-represented litigants who have received different forms of assistance 
and proceeded to represent themselves.  Sally Merry’s research regarding legal 
                                                
122 Silbey, “After Legal Consciousness”, supra note 90 at 337. 
123  Curran, “A Literature Review: Examining the Literature on How to Measure Successful Outcomes”, 
supra note 44 at 15. 
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consciousness provides an example of this type of research.124  In speaking to subjects, 
listening to them talk in mediation and in different court settings and observing how they 
handled their particular legal matter, she was able to gain a varied and fuller perspective 
from her subjects.  In eliciting this fuller and more enriched perspective from the 
participants, she was able to draw certain inferences about the construction of 
individuals’ legal consciousness. The triangulation of research methods such as in-depth 
interviews and observational techniques allows for a richer and more nuanced account of 
the individuals’ experience.   
 
Critiques of Qualitative Research Methods 
However, in choosing to adopt qualitative methods, it is important to take account of 
some of the criticisms that have been leveled against earlier qualitative-focused studies 
more generally.125  One of the most significant criticisms leveled at the qualitative and 
observational access to justice research is that it purports to draw causal connections that 
are not justified by the qualitative methods employed.  Based on this criticism, therefore, 
it is important that the objectives of qualitative research are clearly and modestly 
outlined; they must be consistent with the type of data that will be collected.   
 
Furthermore, the sample selection process, as well as sample size, adopted in 
qualitative research cannot be assumed to be representational of a group or a 
phenomenon.  Thus, in conducting qualitative studies, it will be important to 
acknowledge that the data gathered from such studies may be representative only “in the 
sense of capturing a range or variation in a phenomenon,” and not in the sense of 
“allowing for the estimation of the distribution of the phenomenon in the population as a 
whole.” 126  The collection of qualitative data should contribute to a conversation about 
what access to justice means to those directly affected by attempts to improve access.  In 
                                                
124 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, supra note 7. 
125 For instance, David Fetterman suggest that a “rigourous effort” contributes to the knowledge base in a 
particular field while a poorly designed or executed study only adds “noise to the system.”  See David M 
Fetterman, Ethnography – Step by Step, 3rd ed (California, USA: Sage Publications Inc., 2010) at 145 
[Fetterman, Ethnography]. 
126 Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Studies”, supra note 104 at 943. 
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this context, in-depth knowledge about an individual’s particular experience and the 
meaning they attribute to that experience can provide more assistance than fleeting and 
impersonal knowledge from a larger sample.127  
 
The Basis for Research regarding Self-Help and Participation 
In light of the foregoing discussions about the importance of qualitative research and 
participatory democracy, my research project sought to examine how self-represented 
litigants experienced the legal process in which they were directly involved and the 
meanings they attributed to that experience.  The goal of the research project was to 
gather accounts from self-represented litigants who made use of the resources offered at a 
civil law self-help centre and proceeded to manage their own legal matter.  In so doing, 
they attempted to participate in the civil justice system without the assistance of legal 
representation.   
 
Situating this qualitative research about self-represented litigants’ experiences 
within the context of a self-help legal centre provided an opportunity to explore access to 
justice from a broader participatory perspective.  The participants’ experiences in 
attempting to participate in the litigation process provided the context for a discussion 
about the potential relationship between access to justice and meaningful participation.  
Engaging in this discussion would, in turn, provide an opportunity to deepen the 
discourse on access to justice to include the possibility of meaningful participation as 
both an objective of and strategy for improving access going forward.  This discussion 
would be in keeping with the democratic thesis of this project.  This is contrasted with the 
historic focus in access theory and policy that has concentrated on the provision of 
lawyers and legal services (the practical thesis).  
 
Thus, without proceeding with a fully formed theory of access to justice to be 
tested, this research sought to examine the relationship between the self-represented 
litigants’ experiences (as relayed by the self-represented litigants themselves) and their 
                                                
127 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) at 4-5. 
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views and perceptions about being able to participate in the civil justice system.  The 
objective in proceeding this way was to examine how a theory in progress—the 
democratic thesis—might be further grounded in the participants’ experiences and might 
also be modified by those same experiences.  Drawing on some of the themes explored in 
the earlier research on procedural fairness and legal consciousness, this research sought 
to explore how the individual’s perceptions about his or her ability to participate and 
affect justice in their daily lives were shaped and/or re-shaped by their experiences with 
self-help legal assistance and their engagement in the civil justice system.  Specifically, 
through observation and open-ended in-depth interviews with the participants, this 
project sought to gain insight into the participants’ perspectives and examine how these 
individuals’ “lived experiences” influenced their views on participation and about their 
ability to access justice.128  
 
In addition to conducting interviews with self-represented litigants, I also 
conducted interviews with lawyers who regularly volunteer at the self-help legal centre.  
The aim in conducting these interviews was to survey the nature of the legal assistance 
that these volunteer lawyers offered clients.  Moreover, it was historically taken for 
granted that the legal profession’s views on access both informed the discussion about the 
objectives of access to justice and directed the resulting initiatives.  However, the project 
showed that there are serious questions about whether these views are reflective of self-
represented litigants’ experiences and/or their views about what access to justice should 
entail.  Research in Australia highlighted the discrepancy between what self-help 
providers believed was needed in terms of resources and what self-represented parties 
actually wanted when trying to resolve their legal matter.129  Taking account of these 
earlier research findings, the objective in conducting interviews with volunteer lawyers at 
the self-help legal centre was to gain an ‘insider’s perspective’ on access to justice: this 
would then be compared and contrasted with the self-help user’s actual ‘lived 
                                                
128 Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research”, supra note 104 at 931.   
129 Lawler, Giddings & Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal 
Resources”, supra note 78 at 210. 
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experiences.’130  The purpose in proceeding in this manner was not to critique the nature 
or efficacy of the legal services provided at the self-help legal centre.  Rather, it was to 
explore how differing perspectives and expectations about accessing justice might be 
reconciled within a broader conceptualization of access to justice.   
 
As a means of defining the scope of this research, it is helpful to outline what the 
research did not aim to do.  This research project did not seek to suggest that the data 
collected is representative of all self-represented litigants’ experiences with self-help.  
Nor did it purport to make generalizations about the effectiveness of self-help legal 
services (as discussed in the context of Greiner’s research at Harvard).  Moreover, it did 
not purport to test a fully formed theory of access to justice against data collected at the 
self-help legal centre nor measure the presence or absence of certain variables.  Rather, 
this project was exploratory and open-ended in the sense that the self-represented 
litigants’ narratives ultimately informed the discussion about a new theoretical 
conceptualization of access, albeit one that contemplates enhanced and meaningful 
engagement by citizens in the “decisions that affect their lives.”131  The goal in this 
regard was to examine the possibility of a shift away from a strict reliance on legal 
professionals and a move toward more direct participation by citizens.132  Thus, this 
project’s ambition was to both contextualize (through narratives of self-represented 
litigants who have attempted to access justice), as well as deepen, the conversation about 
the possibility of a broad conceptualization of access. 
 
This thesis has maintained that the adherence to a particular and traditional 
paradigm about what access should entail and how access might be promoted has shaped 
the response to the access to justice crisis.  According to this paradigm, access to legal 
representation will assist individuals in obtaining a better outcome or securing a legal 
                                                
130 For a fuller discussion of this rationale for interviewing the volunteer lawyers, please see the discussion 
in chapter six of this thesis. 
131 White “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes”, supra note 7 at 3-4. 
132 Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law”, supra note 88 at 1058.   
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victory that better represents justice.133  To the extent that this research project sought to 
take account of how self-represented litigants were impacted by their experiences 
participating in the civil justice system, it is acknowledged that the project sought to 
examine the potential benefits as well as harms that result from individuals’ direct 
participation in the civil justice system.  In this respect, it is noted that such an 
examination contemplates the exploration of outcomes in the sense of skill development 
and the acquisition of knowledge that results from individuals having received assistance 
from self-help services and from their direct participation in civil justice forums. 
However, it is important to note that this research project approached the examination of 
these broader ideas of outcomes in an exploratory and non-randomized manner such that 
the discovery of any such benefits and/or harms would be derived from the insights 
provided by the individuals.  
 
Consequently, one of the questions raised in this research was whether self-help 
legal advice serves as a temporary and/or fragmented measure that provides an 
opportunity for limited engagement or whether self-help can and/or should encourage 
meaningful participation consistent with the democratic thesis.  From an ethnographic 
viewpoint, direct individual engagement in the civil justice system with the assistance of 
self-help legal services provides an institutional standpoint that “organizes the direction 
of the sociological gaze and provides a framework of relevance.”134  In this context, the 
‘guiding perspective’ was that of the self-represented litigant who makes use of self-help 
and how their experiences might inform a critical discussion about the role of self-help 
legal assistance within a broader and more democratic conceptualization of access.  
Through the collection of self-help users’ narratives, I sought to explore the participants’ 
thoughts about both the positive, as well as negative, aspects of their attempts to 
participate in the civil justice system, the goals they achieved (or did not achieve), and 
                                                
133 Sally Engle Merry & Susan Silbey, “What do Plaintiffs Want? Re-examining the Concept of Dispute” 
(1984) 9:2 Justice System Journal 151. 
134 Dorothy E Smith, Institutional Ethnography – A Sociology for People (Oxford, UK: AltaMira Press, 
2005) at 32. 
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how their experiences might impact their willingness to participate further in the civil 
justice system or other legal and political forums.  
 
This focus on self-represented litigants’ particular experiences is linked to the 
belief that individuals’ experiences will shape their perceptions or views about a 
particular topic.  Underlying this belief is the claim that individuals act on their 
perceptions and those actions have real-world consequences.  As such, the subjective 
reality experienced by an individual is no less real than the putative objectively-grounded 
and measured reality offered by quantitative researchers.135  This viewpoint is further 
supported by the conclusion that individuals evaluate their legal experiences (and, in so 
doing, form attitudes about law and legal institutions) more in terms of process and form 
of interaction than outcomes achieved.136  Thus, the process in which individuals are 
engaged can be as important as the outcome in shaping their views and perceptions.  
 
In the particular context of the civil justice system, the concept of how an 
individual evaluates the ‘fairness of a legal process’ (which has unique implications for 
self-represented parties) is not neutral or universal in nature.  Rather, it is directly linked 
to the individual’s particular experience.137  One of the major factors that an individual 
uses in assessing the fairness of a legal process is the individual’s actual ability to 
participate in the process.138  And as it was noted earlier, ‘having a voice’ and ‘being 
heard’ in the process are considered to be “central to people’s subjective reactions to that 
experience” because both aspects allow them to tell their side of the story.139  It also 
reassures the litigant that the decision-makers are listening to and considering their stories 
when making decisions.  This reassurance that they were heard is consistent with 
principles of procedural justice, which serve to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
                                                
135 Fetterman, Ethnography, supra note 125 at 5. 
136 Ewick & Silbey, “Conformity, Contestation and Resistance”, supra note 91 at 735. 
137 Berrey, Hoffman & Nielsen, “Situated Justice”, supra note 4 at 6. 
138 Tyler, “What is Procedural Justice?”, supra note 109; White, “Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills 
and Sunday Shoes”, supra note 7 at 4. 
139 Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice”, supra note 109 at 503-504. 
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institutional process and, ultimately, the Rule of Law.  Thus, in the context of this 
research, interviews with the self-represented litigants sought to determine whether the 
participants felt that they were heard and listened to as part of their general engagement 
with the litigation process.  
 
Flowing from these research findings is the further question that is relevant to this 
project - whether litigants, in placing value on direct interaction with the decision-maker, 
will seek more direct participation.  In this regard, self-help seeks to provide individuals 
with the tools, skills and information necessary to be heard directly in the civil justice 
system.  Thus, given the focus on direct participation in the context of the democratic 
thesis, self-represented litigants’ self-evaluation of whether they were heard also assists 
in understanding the impact of self-help on the self-represented litigants’ attempts to 
participate and their views on such attempts.  Moreover, to the extent that individuals’ 
ability to participate is linked to their ultimate perceptions about the fairness of the 
particular legal process, it may also be assumed that this could affect their views about 
further participation in other legal or political contexts.  Thus, again drawing on data and 
methodologies used in the fields of procedural justice and legal consciousness, qualitative 
research becomes an important tool by which to examine how individuals’ experiences 
with certain legal institutions and processes shape their ability and/or willingness to 
participate in law and/or other political processes.140  This also has implications for the 
development and implementation of the policy and initiatives that promote a broader 
conceptualization of access to justice.   
 
                                                
140 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, supra note 7 at 5 & 9; Eagly, “Community Education”, supra 
note 14.  Sally Merry’s research respecting self-represented litigants’ court experiences in Boston provides 
a good example of this type of qualitative research in access to justice.  Her research examined patterns of 
court use by working class individuals who ‘went to court’ (and/or meditation) to resolve their problems.  
Part of the scope of the research examined the individuals’ legal consciousness, which Merry defined as 
“the way people understand and use law”.  Merry maintained that consciousness is formed and re-formed 
through individuals’ experiences including their experiences within certain social/legal structures.  Merry 
observed that individuals’ legal consciousness changed as they went through court processes and that as a 
result, there were contradictions between what they expected beforehand and what happened to them in 
court.   
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In her book entitled Getting Justice and Getting Even, one of the questions that 
Sally Merry Engle sought to examine was why individuals would continue to return to 
court processes “to seek redress despite the efforts of court personnel to persuade them 
that their problems do not belong in court.”141  In seeking an answer to this question, she 
examined the individuals’ particular experiences with court processes and how those 
experiences shaped their views about what the court could offer them (even if in a 
symbolic sense).  Drawing on this type of inquiry, my research project sought to ask how 
individuals’ experiences as self-represented parties impacted their perceptions about their 
ability to bring about justice in their lives and further participate in decisions that impact 
their lives.  As a corollary, I also sought to examine the role self-help played in shaping 
these perceptions. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, if access to justice research and policy-making is to make important 
headway, it will require further and better attention to its underlying conceptual and 
methodological foundations.  While being critical of the quantitative turn in recent 
empirical research, it does not mean that such work has no role to play in access to justice 
research.  On the contrary, a more catholic and less narrow approach to empirical work is 
demanded if access to justice research is to fulfill its potential.  This is one that will value 
both quantitative and qualitative research.  The work of Greiner and others has much to 
offer and recommend, but it must be part of a more encompassing research agenda that 
takes account of an equally encompassing theoretical framework.  Such a program will 
examine not only the impact of various legal and policy initiatives on outcomes achieved 
in individual cases, but also the effect of such interventions on people’s capacity to 
participate more fully in a variety of legal and political process.  It is only by aligning and 
reconciling the continued importance of qualitative research within a broader 
conceptualization of access that it will be possible to advance the practical efficacy of the 
legal process as well as its democratic legitimacy.  Based on the discussion in this 
                                                
141 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, supra note 7 at 170. 
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chapter, the particular methodologies adopted in this research project are discussed in the 
following chapter.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO RESEARCH  
IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 
Having examined critically an exclusively quantitative and outcome-based 
approach to research in access to justice and in so doing, made an argument for the 
continued importance and potential value of qualitative research, this chapter will include 
a discussion of the particular methods used in this research project.  More specifically, 
this will include a discussion of certain ethnographic methods.  My research project 
incorporates observations at the self-help legal centre in downtown Toronto and 
qualitative interviews with self-represented litigants and volunteer lawyers who attend at 
the self-help centre.  Consequently, this chapter will begin with a broader discussion of 
the objectives and underlying ambition for the research project, namely to examine self-
represented litigants’ experiences navigating the civil justice system.  Following this 
broader discussion, I intend to outline the mechanics of the research project, including the 
methods used, the rationale for adopting these methods, and the process involved in 
conducting this type of research.  Finally, I will conclude this chapter with a discussion of 
some methodological and ethical considerations that flow from the adoption of these 
research methods, particularly as it relates to the in-depth interviews with self-represented 
litigants. 
 
An Ethnographic Approach 
This study is grounded in an ethnographic methodology.1  The ethnographical research 
project is interested in obtaining the insider’s perspective through fieldwork.  This 
typically engages various social science methods such as participant observation and in-
                                                
1 While the approach may be grounded in an ethnographic approach, it is not held to be traditional 
fieldwork in the sense that the researcher is immersed in a social setting for extended periods of time.  
Rather, the goal is to draw on aspects of an ethnographic approach, namely gathering detailed information 
about how interviewees interpret an aspect of their social world as opposed to quantitative data that seeks to 
measure the occurrence or frequency of an event.  Michael Agar, The Professional Stranger, 2nd ed (San 
Diego, USA: Academic Press, 1996) at 129 [Agar, The Professional Stranger]. 
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depth interviews.2  In this regard, ethnography seeks to understand social and cultural 
phenomenon through interaction with individuals who experience a phenomenon directly.  
In the particular context of socio-legal research, methods such as observation and 
interviews are useful tools when attempting to understand the “complex ways in which 
law, decision-making, and legal regulation are embedded in wider social processes.”3  
From an ethnographic perspective, the focus of this research was (through both 
observation and interviews) to gather a description of the self-represented litigants’ 
experiences that reflected the “richness, depth and variety” of these experiences as told 
by the individual.4  In this regard “qualitative data, with its emphasis on people’s lived 
experiences, is fundamentally well-suited for locating the meanings people place on the 
events, processes and structures of their lives and for connecting these meanings to the 
social world around them.”5  
  
Engaging in in-depth interviews with participants allows the researcher to not 
only view a social phenomenon from the participants’ own perspective, but also to 
explore the meaning attributed to the phenomenon by the individuals involved.6  As a 
result, ethnographic studies typically do not stem from a fully articulated theory (that the 
researcher seeks to either prove or disprove) but rather draw upon different theoretical 
approaches that guide the research framework and assist in defining the nature of the 
information sought.7  In describing institutional ethnography, the sociologist Dorothy E 
Smith suggested that the individual’s experience can define the ethnographer’s further 
                                                
2 David M Fetterman, Ethnography Step by Step, 3rd ed (California, USA: Sage Publications Inc., 2010) at 3 
& 5 [Fetterman, Ethnography]. 
3 June Star & Mark Goodale, eds, Practicing Ethnography in Law (New York, USA: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2002) at 2 [Star & Goodale, Practicing Ethnography in Law]. 
4 Agar, The Professional Stranger, supra note 1 at 63. 
5 Matthew B Miles, A Michael Huberman & Johnny Salanda, eds, Qualitative Data Analysis, 3rd ed 
(California, USA:  Sage Publications Inc., 2014) at 11.    
6 Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research” in Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, 
eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 
926, 934 [Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research”]. 
7 Fetterman, Ethnography, supra note 2 at 7. 
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research steps.  In this regard, both the experiences and the perspective of the individual 
organize the direction of the ethnographer’s investigation.8   
 
In the present study, I drew on different aspects of certain socio-legal fields of 
study including procedural fairness and legal consciousness.  This helped to build a 
conceptual framework in which it would then be possible to gather data about the self-
represented litigants’ experiences and the meaning they attributed to those experiences.  
However, rather than attempting to construct a new theory of access to justice that was 
based on the stories collected from self-represented litigants, this research sought to 
contextualize and deepen the discussion about meaningful participation in accordance 
with the democratic thesis.  Presenting the participants’ experiences in a qualitative and 
narrative form provided an opportunity to reflect on and analyze the experiences from the 
viewpoint of this broader conceptualization of access.   
 
When analyzing the participants’ experiences in accordance with the democratic 
thesis, it was important to remain aware of the benefits and challenges associated with 
meaningful participation.  Specifically, the relevant benefits included educative 
enhancement, improved confidence, and the ability and/or willingness to participate in 
other forums and contexts.  This analysis also required being aware of the potential 
challenges or pitfalls associated with cosmetic participation, particularly as it relates to 
participation in contexts where the distribution of power inhibits meaningful engagement 
in the decision-making process.   
 
In this regard, the theoretical development of the democratic thesis was influenced 
by the narrative data collected in this project.  The collection of data was, in turn, 
influenced by a method, which “collect[s] and analyze[s] data in such a way so as to 
generate theory from data sources using a constant comparative method.”9  In proceeding 
in this manner, it was important to examine and re-examine the data collected in terms of 
                                                
8 Dorothy E Smith, Institutional Ethnography – A Sociology for People (Oxford, UK: AltaMira Press, 
2005) at 31. 
9 Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research”, supra note 6 at 931. 
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the theoretical underpinnings of the research project.  This meant that the sample 
selection and data collection were done together and in accordance with the development 
of emerging theoretical considerations derived from the original conceptualization.10  
While this approach to research draws on certain aspects of a grounded theory method 
(i.e., an open-ended and concurrent approach to data collection and analysis), 11 the 
method used in this project went beyond grounded theory and also drew on aspects of 
other qualitative methods.  
  
Specifically, the methods employed in this study involved participant observation 
whereby I attended at the self-help centre.  I observed the operation of the centre, as well 
as the interaction between various self-represented litigants, staff and lawyers who 
volunteer legal services at the centre.  This period of observation both overlapped with 
and was followed by qualitative interviews with self-represented litigants who attended at 
the self-help centre to seek legal assistance with a legal issue.  By observing the processes 
at the self-help centre, as well as the litigants’ interactions at the centre, and then 
subsequently interviewing the clients about their experiences, I sought to gain a more 
expansive understanding of the self-represented litigants’ experience with self-help and 
with their attempts to negotiate the resolution of their legal matter.  One of the goals in 
proceeding by way of both passive observation of interactions between individuals and 
lawyers and in-depth interviews with self-represented litigants was to obtain nuanced and 
detailed accounts of individuals using self-help to attempt to access justice.  
 
Notwithstanding the two methods employed, the main thrust of the research 
focused on in-depth qualitative interviews with both a limited number of self-represented 
litigants who had made use of the services at the self-help centre and the lawyers who 
                                                
10 Benjamin F Crabtree & William L Miller, eds, Doing Qualitative Research, 2nd ed (California, USA: 
Sage Publications Inc., 1999) at 41 [Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research]. 
11 In her discussion of the core aspects of grounded theory, Kathy Charmaz states “[f]undamental tenets of 
the grounded theory method include: (1) minimizing preconceived ideas about the research problem and 
the data, (2) using simultaneous data collection and analysis to inform each other, (3) remaining open to 
varied explanations and/ or understandings of the data, and (4) focusing data analysis to construct middle-
range theories.  See Kathy Charmatz, “Grounded Theory as an Emergent Method” in SN Hesse Bilber & P 
Leavy, eds, Handbook of Emergent Methods (New York, USA: Guildford Press, 2008) 155.   
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volunteered there.12  The intention was that the interview process would be “intensive, 
fine-grained, qualitative, and unapologetically interpretive.” 13   The objective in 
proceeding in this manner was to collect a “thick description” of the individuals’ 
experiences rather than data that proves or disproves a pre-determined hypothesis or 
represents fleeting knowledge about a large number of examples”.14  In this regard, the 
ethnographic approach adopted focused on “intensive discussions with a very few 
people”, not on the collection of survey data that reflects the presence or absence of ….a 
few predefined variables in a large population.”15 
 
The particular form of the interview was narrative.  But it was interspersed with 
broadly constructed prompts that assisted in ensuring that the interview covered certain 
broad topics.16  As it pertains to narrative interviews, “it is in the telling and hearing of 
stories that people disclose, arrange, and make sense of their own experience as well as 
that of others.”17  Thus, the collection and examination of the self-represented litigants’ 
narratives sought to explore the meaning that self-represented litigants gave to their 
participation in the civil justice system.  Furthermore, undertaking interviews in this 
manner also allowed for the possibility that individuals would not only offer their own 
account of their experiences, but also provide insight into the views that they generated as 
a result of these experiences including how those views might impact future actions.  
  
                                                
12  A copy of the guides that I used during the interviews with the self-represented litigants and the 
volunteer lawyers interviewed are attached as appendix A to this thesis.  In keeping with a flexible 
approach to the interviews, the guides were used as a form of prompts during the course of the interview in 
order to ensure that certain broad topics were discussed rather than as a form of survey. 
13 Draft paper by Cynthia Williams entitled “The Social Reform of Banking” (November 2013) at 7 
[Williams, “The Social Reform of Banking”]; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture (New York, 
USA: Basic Books, 1973) at 23 [Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture].  
14 Williams, “The Social Reform of Banking”, ibid at 7; Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, ibid; John 
Gerring, Case Study Research  - Principles and Practice (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 
2007 [Gerring, Case Study Research]. 
15 Gerring, Case Study Research, ibid at 134. 
16 In this case, it was possible to draw on some of the factors studied in the field of procedural fairness 
research to prompt participants to discuss the nature of their participation and in reflecting on their 
participation in certain legal processes, how they evaluated that participation. 
17 Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 221. 
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As an example, in an examination of homelessness and bureaucratic decision-
making on housing needs in England, the researchers theorized about the “interaction 
perspective”; namely how the homeless participants’ legal consciousness was situated 
within the interaction between the individual seeking housing and the welfare bureaucrat, 
both preceding and culminating in the refusal of help from the bureaucrat.18  The 
decisions made regarding the homeless participants’ entitlement to housing and the 
manner in which the decisions were communicated to the individuals by the bureaucrats 
were thought to influence and inform the recipients’ ideas about the nature of the legal 
process and the value associated with deciding to challenge the decision.19  It is this 
dimension of the ethnographic methodology that draws upon theories of legal 
consciousness and more specifically, in the context of this research how individuals’ 
perceptions about engagement may be formed or re-formed by their particular 
experiences in the legal system and how this formation and/or reformation proceeds their  
future actions. 
 
The Use of Multi-Methods in this Research Project 
In qualitative research projects, data is typically collected through three broad categories 
of methods that can be used separately or in combination; these are observation, 
interviews and document analysis.20  Most notably, in the law and society tradition, 
empirical socio-legal research often engages a variety of methods to study law in a larger 
social context because it provides a more “nuanced understanding of law, legal 
institutions, and legal processes than can be provided by any one methodology alone due 
to the complex nature of the social world in which they operate.”21  Thus, combining 
different methods in accordance with a triangulation process provides an opportunity to 
                                                
18 Dave Cowan, “Legal Consciousness: Some Observations” (2004) 67:6 MLR 928 [Cowan, “Legal 
Consciousness”] 
19 Cowan, “Legal Consciousness”, ibid at 939. 
20 Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research”, supra note 6 at 928; Herbert M 
Kritzer, “Stories from the Field:  Collecting Data Outside Over There” in Starr & Goodale, Practicing 
Ethnography in Law, supra note 3 at 143 [Kritzer, Stories from the Field”]. 
21 Laura Beth Nielsen, “The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical Legal Research” in Peter 
Cane & Herbert M Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (United Kingdom: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 955 [Nielsen, “The Need for Multi-Method Approaches”]. 
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secure a more detailed and descriptive account of an individual’s experience that might 
not otherwise be possible if only one method were employed.  Moreover, the use of 
multiple methods is consistent with a holistic approach to ethnographic research that 
seeks to examine a social group or phenomenon from a variety of angles, with the 
understanding being that this will ultimately contribute to a more complete picture of the 
subject matter being studied.22   
 
For example, it is suggested that in-depth qualitative interviews can “provide 
insight into processes and subjectivities, but often at the expense of representativeness,23 
bias or social desirability”24 whereas observation alone does not allow for the expression 
of the inner views, thoughts or perceptions of the interviewed.25  In this context, the inner 
views, thoughts and perceptions of the participants are important when examining the 
meaning participants give to a particular experience: observation alone would not be 
sufficient.  Combining the observational and interview methods allows the researcher to 
address some of the weaknesses of both methods, thereby ensuring more comprehensive 
data collection.   
 
In conducting observational research at the outset of the study, the researcher can, 
by engaging in a more passive role, gather data, which is then complemented by an 
interview process that imposes added structure on the data collection process but allows 
for the deeper probing of a particular issue with a participant.26  In an ethnographic 
context, the data collected during the initial observation period can inform the interview 
process based on what was actually observed rather than what might be expected by the 
interviewer or recounted by a participant: each of the methods can inform and guide the 
development of the other.  In this research project, observation and in-depth qualitative 
interviews were both used to collect detailed data about self-represented litigants’ 
                                                
22 Fetterman, Ethnography, supra note 2 at 19. 
23 Nielsen, “The Need for Multi-Method Approaches”, supra note 21 at 953. 
24 Kritzer, “Stories from the Field”, supra note 20 at 154.    
25 Kritzer, “Stories from the Field”, ibid at 155. 
26 Kritzer, Stories from the Field”, ibid at 154-155.   
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experiences with self-help legal services and their participation in the civil justice system.  
With respect to the organization of this project, it was anticipated that the different 
methods would overlap during certain points in the project such that one stage of the 
research project may not be complete prior to the commencement of the next stage of 
research.  
 
Following a period of observation, in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted 
with self-represented individuals who sought legal assistance from the self-help law 
centre.  The main focus of the interview was to have individuals describe, in their own 
words, the nature of their legal matter, the steps they took in addressing their legal issue 
(including the types of assistance provided at the self-help centre) and their experiences 
in court and/or dealing with opposing parties and/or lawyers.  A portion of these 
qualitative interviews also focused on the collection of demographical data about the self-
represented litigant.  This data include gender, employment status, educational 
background and age.  One of the objectives in collecting demographic data was to situate 
the individuals’ narrative within a particular social context and at the same time, attempt 
to ensure that there was a diverse collection of perspectives represented in the data.27   
 
Interviews were also conducted with pro bono lawyers who volunteer at the same 
self-help centre.  Generally speaking, most but not all of the lawyers interviewed had 
been observed engaging with clients during the earlier observation stage of the research 
project.  Proceeding in this manner helped to situate their views about access, self-
represented litigants and self-help within a particular setting and take account of those 
views in the context of their specific interaction with self-represented litigants.  
Conducting interviews with the lawyers who volunteer at the clinic also provided an 
opportunity to compare and contrast the legal profession’s ‘insider’ views on access and 
the ability to maneuver through the civil justice system with the views of those 
individuals who have direct experiences of attempting to access justice as self-
                                                
27  The author acknowledges that it was not be possible to include participants from every 
cultural/racial/religious/socio-economic background within a limited interview process but does wish to 
highlight the fact that one of the goals in approaching the research in this manner was to interview 
individuals from a variety of different background in order to collect diverse narratives. 
 204 
represented litigants.28  In a system that was designed by and for lawyers and judges, it is 
not surprising that the legal profession’s perspective has been very influential in this 
discussion: the layperson’s (including self-represented litigants) perspective has only 
recently been included in the discussion.29   
 
LawHelp Ontario as a Site of Research 
LawHelp Ontario (LHO) opened its doors in 2007.  Drawing on self-help models 
developed in other jurisdictions – notably the United States, England and Australia – 
LHO sought to offer a variety of legal services to self-represented litigants engaged in a 
variety of civil law matters (excluding family law).  These services included assistance 
with the preparation of legal documents, provision of summary advice about the 
procedural as well as substantive issues of law, assistance with preparation for court 
appearances, examinations and medications, and a limited duty counsel role in certain 
circumstances.  In accordance with other self-help service models, it was assumed that, 
while clients did not retain the volunteer lawyer assisting them, they could re-attend as 
often as necessary to obtain further advice and information about their legal matter.  In 
many instances, where an individual has a case that involves various legal steps, the 
individual may re-attend at LHO several times to obtain assistance at different stages of 
the litigation.  In even more particular instances, individuals may attend on certain days 
or times in order to try and ensure that they speak to the same volunteer lawyer.30  
                                                
28 Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Bryant G Garth, “Civil Procedure and Courts” in Peter Cane  & Herbert M 
Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2010) at 700 [Menkel-Meadow & Garth, “Civil Procedure and Courts”].  In her critique of recent access to 
justice research, Carrie Menkel-Meadows suggests that it is important that we question who is doing access 
to justice research as well as the purposes for which the research is used.  Specifically, she questions the 
move away from research that tests theories that originate in social science disciplines such as research on 
‘voice’ and democratic participation in favour of a move toward research that seeks to address “the 
problems that respond to the needs of the courts.”  This shift suggests a focus on efficiency from the 
perspective of the lawyers and judges rather than a focus on what individuals need in terms of accessing 
justice.  See Menkel-Meadow & Garth, “Civil Procedure and Courts” at 700. 
29 One of the motivations for including the perspectives of the laypersons has been the call for this 
perspective from scholars such as Rebecca Sandefur.  Catherine R Albiston & Rebecca L Sandefur, 
“Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice” (2013) Wis L Rev 101 [Albiston & Sandefur, 
“Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice”]. 
30  During my time at LHO observing the working of the centre, attending client-lawyer meetings and/or 
meeting with interview participants, it was apparent that several ‘repeat’ clients would attend on a specific 
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Otherwise, individuals may meet with a different lawyer each time they re-attend at the 
centre. 
 
The volunteer lawyers who participate in the program come from a variety of 
legal settings that range from large corporate firms to sole practitioners.  On average, a 
lawyer will volunteer at the centre one half or full day a month and, in the course of the 
day, meet with approximately 4-7 individuals.  Typically, the lawyer will meet with the 
client for approximately 45 minutes.  However, prior to the volunteer lawyer meeting 
with the self-represented individual, a member of LHO’s staff31 and/or one of the 
volunteer law students will attempt to ascertain the nature of the clients’ matter and the 
scope of their questions for the lawyer. 32  This is, in part, to ensure that the clients’ issues 
falls within the scope of the assistance that LHO provides.  The assessment of the clients’ 
needs is undertaken through a triage process that begins when the individual first arrives 
at LHO.  Upon arrival, individuals are asked to complete an intake form about the nature 
of their legal problem.  LHO operates as a walk-in centre and, therefore, individuals 
receive assistance on a first-come, first-served basis.  Once one of the volunteer students 
and/or staff members has confirmed that the individual’s legal issue falls within the 
centre’s remit the individual will wait to speak with one of the two volunteer lawyers 
who are available to meet with clients on any given day.  While there are limits to the 
amount of time that a volunteer lawyer can spend with any one client, clients may wait a 
significant amount of time to speak to a lawyer if the centre is particularly busy.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
day of the week in the hopes of meeting with one particular lawyer who volunteered at the same time each 
week.   
31 It is important to note that several of the senior staff are trained as paralegals and/or foreign lawyers and 
thus, competent to engage in a legal discussion with the clients about the nature of their issue as well as the 
nature of the information that the lawyer will likely wish to review in order to provide advice and 
information.   
32 LHO has an agreement with the University of Toronto Law School whereby students from the law school 
can volunteer at LHO once a week.  The scope of the student’s responsibilities include client assistance 
when the client is working on the computers, assistance in ascertaining the general nature of the client’s 
needs and assuring that the client has all of the requisite documentation that they may require prior to 
speaking with a volunteer lawyer. 
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In addition to meeting with a lawyer to discuss a legal issue, clients can also 
attend at LHO to do work their own case on computers at the centre.  Typically, clients 
may use the computers to prepare various court documents that are accessible online in a 
template format that includes prompts that allow the individual to input specific 
information about their case.  In these instances, one of the volunteer law students will 
often provide technical assistance to the client regarding the formatting of the document.  
However, any substantive advice about the nature of the contents of the document must 
be reviewed by one of the volunteer lawyers.  The objective in furnishing this workspace 
is to provide self-represented litigants, who might not otherwise have access to 
computers, with the resources they need to prepare legal materials.  In so doing, they can 
draw on support from the staff and volunteer lawyers as needed.   
 
While LHO maintains financial eligibility criteria that sets maximum income 
levels above which the individual is not eligible for assistance, 33  demographic 
information on the education levels of individuals seeking assistance indicates that 
approximately 30% have a university degree and at least 44% have a high school 
education as well some university or college-level courses. 34   This shift from 
predominantly poverty clients to include low-income and middle-income individuals 
reflects the changing demographic of self-represented individuals.35  In terms of the age, 
the majority of the individuals attending the centre were between the ages of 35 and 64 
(70%).   
                                                
33 In the case of a single person, the income limit is $36,000.00 and this rises to $73,992.00 for four people.  
However, individuals on social assistance are automatically accepted at LHO. 
34 LawHelp Ontario Pilot Year Project Year One Report (2009) at 13-14.  Available upon request as it is no 
longer available online but on file with the author. 
35 The demographic information collected in respect of the small sample group used in this research project 
is consistent with these more general statistics reported in LawHelp Ontario’s Pilot Year Report.  While 
being sensitive to issues arising in respect of sample bias more generally, it was found that the majority of 
the individuals interviewed in this project had completed high school and had some post-secondary 
training. 
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Noting Engler’s concerns about the efficacy of self-help resources,36 a significant 
portion of the earlier research on self-help initiatives was concerned with how and who 
self-help might assist, particularly as it relates to vulnerable groups in society.  The shift 
in the make-up of self-represented litigant populations at LHO suggests that these 
concerns must now be examined within the context of this shift.  As the self-represented 
population expands to include a broader range of individuals, it will be helpful to 
examine these individuals’ perceptions about being self-represented litigants, how they 
view self-help in the context of access to justice, and how they make use of self-help.  
Recent self-help research conducted in Australia touched on the implications of this shift 
in demographics when researchers examined the factors that were likely to affect how 
individuals handled their own legal issue.37  That research explored whether there were 
certain personal characteristics that were likely to influence the way in which self-
represented individuals handled their legal problem.  Data collected from qualitative 
interviews with self-represented individuals highlighted three broad categories of factors, 
including certain personal attributes that were likely to contribute to the individuals’ 
effectiveness and potential success in addressing their legal matter.  The researchers 
determined “[t]he results of this study also tend to confirm our original hypothesis, which 
is that legal self-help presents both opportunities as well as limitations and challenges for 
users - all within a complex mix of both positive and negative variables, represented in 
the three main sets of factors that have aided this study: environmental factors, legal 
complexity and the personal characteristics of the users themselves.”38  In an effort to 
situate the self-help initiative within a broader conceptualization of access to justice that 
seeks to promote engagement and participation as part of the democratic thesis, it is 
important to take account of who is making use of this initiative, their objectives in doing 
                                                
36 Russell Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal about 
When Counsel is Most Needed” (2010) 37:37 Fordham Urb LJ 2 [Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation 
to Civil Gideon”]. 
37 Michael Robertson & Jeff Giddings, “Self-Advocates in Civil Legal Disputes: How Personal and Other 
Factors Influence the Handling of their Cases” (2014) 38 Melbourne UL Rev 119 at 124.  In their research, 
Robertson and Giddings note that the majority of the interviewees in their study were between the ages of 
18-50 years of age and had completed mid-level to late level secondary education [Robertson & Giddings, 
“Self-Advocates in Civil Legal Disputes”].  It is worth noting that this research project analyzed interviews 
of 17 individuals who had made use of self-help services.   
38 Robertson & Giddings, “Self-Advocates in Civil Legal Disputes”, ibid at 150. 
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so and what these accounts mean for self-help and access to justice policy more 
generally. 
 
Observation at LawHelp Ontario 
During the observation stage of the research, I attended LHO in Toronto and passively 
participated (with the prior consent of both the client and the volunteer lawyer) in client 
meetings between self-represented litigants and the volunteer lawyers.  I also spent time 
at the self-help centre generally observing the interaction among staff and clients.  My 
focus included both the process by which clients attended at the centre and applied for 
assistance as well as the resulting triage process undertaken by the centre’s staff and 
volunteers in assessing the clients’ needs and priorities. 
   
During the course of the observation phase, I visited LHO approximately 15 times 
over an 8-month period.  During a typical visit, I would stay for the day.39  I observed the 
staff’s interaction with clients, I spoke directly to clients about their willingness to 
participate in an interview process and, on occasion, I discussed their experience on an 
informal basis as they waited to meet with a lawyer, and I attended meetings between 
lawyers and clients.  I tried to attend on different days of the week due to the fact that 
certain times and days of the week could be busier than others.  The details of my 
observations along with the impressions and thoughts that arose as a result of the 
observation were recorded during the course of each daily visit in notebooks that I kept 
with me throughout the day.  Each visit constituted a separate entry in my notebook.  I 
discuss and analyze those observations in the next chapter.  
   
Observing the setting and the processes at the self-help centre provided an 
opportunity to engage in an open-ended process of inquiry that was not restricted to 
specific research goals or expectations that the research may hold.40  During research 
                                                
39 On average, I would arrive at LHO as it was opening at 9:30 and stay for the day.  The centre closed at 
4:30.  The centre was also closed between 12:00 and 1:00 each day and during lunch, the staff, volunteer 
lawyers (on occasion) as well law students conducting volunteer work would gather for lunch together.   
40 Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 48.  
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conducted on the practice habits of family law lawyers, Herbert Kritzer determined that 
the observation period (in which he followed lawyers through a typical day in practice), 
provided more “nuanced images” of the realities of their practice than the more 
straightforward data resulting from interviews with lawyers about their practice.41  He 
concluded that, during the observation period, he was confronted with events that differed 
from his initial expectations about how lawyers conduct themselves in practice.42  As a 
passive observer, Kritzer proceeded to record these events as he witnessed them.  Based 
on the variations in the data collected through observation and interviews, Kritzer 
ultimately concluded that there were contradictions between what the researcher observed 
the lawyer doing on a daily basis when addressing clients’ needs and how these activities 
were characterized by the lawyer during the interview process based on the questions 
posed by the researcher.  
 
In light of these types of findings, the purposes of the observational period in this 
project were multifold.  First, it was important to get an understanding of how the staff 
and clients interact at the centre, as well as the processes employed by the self-help 
centre’s staff to assist self-represented parties who seek legal advice and information.  
One of the more specific goals in this regard was to become more familiar with the 
procedures in place at the self-help centre and with the nature and scope of legal matters 
raised by self-represented parties at the self-help centre.  The observations made during 
this period include a description of the routine operations at the centre.  This helped to 
contextualize the research setting in which the interviewees were selected and the 
interviews were conducted.43  It also provided an opportunity to gain insight into the 
nature of self-represented litigants’ engagement with the centre; this begins when they 
first enter the centre and ask to speak to a lawyer.   
 
                                                
41 Kritzer, “Stories from the Field”, supra note 20 at 153. 
42 Kritzer, “Stories from the Field”, ibid at 153. 
43 Chava Frankfort-Nachmias & David Nachmias, eds, Research Methods in the Social Sciences, 7th ed 
(New York, USA: Worth Publishers, 2008) at 257 [Nachmias & Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social 
Sciences] 
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Again, this type of viewpoint was useful in contextualizing the interviewees’ 
experiences and perceptions about the centre; some aspects of this were subsequently 
discussed by the participants during their interviews.44  For example, the physical 
location, including the size and often overcrowded nature of the reception area, was an 
aspect of the individuals’ experiences that was highlighted by several interview 
participants.  In another example, during the observation period, it was apparent from 
several of the self-represented individuals’ first interaction with the centre’s staff that 
there was often a difference between the language used by the self-represented litigants to 
describe their problem and the language used by the staff and volunteer law students to 
define the nature of the self-represented litigants’ legal issue.  As a result, the self-
represented litigants’ first interaction typically required both the centre’s staff and the 
individual to engage in a form of mutual translation whereby the client attempted to 
describe the nature of the issue and the staff member attempted to determine whether it 
was a legal problem that the volunteer lawyers might be able to address.   
 
The observational period also provided an opportunity to meet with and establish 
a level of comfort with certain of the self-represented litigants; some subsequently 
participated in the interviews.45  Specifically, during this period of observation, I had 
various opportunities to make contact with self-represented litigants while they waited to 
speak with a lawyer.  This initial contact was often done with the assistance of staff from 
the self-help centre who were familiar with many of the returning clients.  Often, I would 
introduce myself (and clarify my relationship to the centre), explain the nature of my 
research project, discuss the prior consent that they would need to provide for me to 
observe a meeting or contact them for a potential interview, and collect contact 
information from individuals who were amenable to being interviewed at a later date.  
 
                                                
44 Nachmias & Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences, ibid at 191; Crabtree & Miller, Doing 
Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 48. 
45 It is important to note that during the observational stage of the research, repeated efforts were 
undertaken to assure potential interviewees that their willingness to participate in either the observation or 
interview stage of the research project did not impact the legal services that they were entitled to receive 
from the self-help centre.   
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The Use of In-Depth Qualitative Interviews 
The number of in-depth face-to-face qualitative interviews conducted with self-
represented litigants was limited to 12.46  Because it was not the intention of this research 
to make findings that were generalizable to the entire population of self-represented 
litigants or draw analytical truths from the qualitative work conducted, the sample is not a 
statistically representative group nor does it contain a significant number of 
participants.47  I use the experiences of this particular group of self-represented litigants 
(as framed and expressed by them directly) to identify common experiences within a 
diverse group of participants; they are not offered or utilized as a rock-solid foundation 
on which to base my constructive suggestions or proposals.  I simply claim that an in-
depth snapshot of the experiences and views of some self-represented litigants can offer 
useful, authentic and rebuttable insights into the process and practice of civil litigation.  
With this objective in mind, the goal was to collect rich and varied sources of information 
from the participants about their experiences as self-represented litigants within the more 
broadly construed institutional setting of the civil justice system.48  From this perspective, 
the sampling method was purposeful.  One of the main criteria shared by all interviewees 
was that they had all sought assistance from the self-help centre in the course of 
representing themselves in a civil law matter and were proceeding to act without 
                                                
46 In their discussion of sampling size, Crabtree and Miller suggest while there is not “hard and fast rules” 
regarding sampling to the point of redundancy or theoretical saturation, their experience has 5-8 data 
sources suffice for a homogeneous sample and 12-20 or more are commonly needed when looking for 
disconfirming evidence or trying to achieve maximum variation.  Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative 
Research, supra note 10 at 42.   
47 It is noted that while the research does not aim to generalize about self-represented litigants or the 
effectiveness of self-help centres, the author Lisa Webley notes that qualitative in-depth interviews can be 
representative in the sense that the research does seek to capture a “range or variation in a phenomenon.”  
The difference is that in identifying a phenomenon, the research does not purport to estimate how such a 
phenomenon is distributed in the population as a whole.  See Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to 
Empirical Legal Research”, supra note 6 at 943.  Moreover, in defending against the critique that 
qualitative ethnographic research methods are limited in their application, Dorothy Smith contends that the 
critique ignores “the contemporary realities of how the local is penetrated with the extra-or translocal 
relations that are generalized across particular settings.”  Smith continues to suggest that institutional 
ethnography “addresses explicitly the character of institutions in contemporary society: that they are 
themselves forms of social organization that generalize and universalize across multiple local settings.  
While they may and do articulate differently in the particularities of local settings, their generalized and 
generalizing character is going to appear in any ethnography  -indeed, it has to be there and should be there 
explicitly, even in an investigation that begins with the experience of one individual.”  See Dorothy E 
Smith, Institutional Ethnography-A Sociology for People (Oxford, UK: AltaMira Press, 2005) at 42.  
48 Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, ibid at 934. 
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traditional legal representation.  Given the practical realities involved in contacting 
interviewees outside the self-help centre and scheduling interviews, it was assumed that 
the interviewees’ legal matters would be at various stages of resolution.  The range of 
these stages extended from initial service of an originating process through discovery to 
the implementation of costs, settlement documentation and potential routes of appeal.   
 
The intention was to gather a sample that generated data about a range of different 
experiences.  It was presumed that this would provide for a fuller discussion about how 
these individuals’ experiences might inform the conceptualization of a broader theory of 
access to justice.  For this reason, it was important to select as diverse group of self-
represented litigants as possible in an effort to obtain a broad range of perspectives.  
Thus, drawing on a purposive snowball approach to research sampling, this study 
engaged in a process of sampling that sought to ensure a broad spectrum of narratives.49  
In order to do so, the sampling of participants evolved as I spent time at the self-help 
centre, observed the interactions between staff, clients and lawyers, met with self-
represented litigants, and carried on interviews with self-represented litigants.  Moreover, 
throughout the interview process, there was a rolling review of the data collected in the 
interviews.50  For example, when it became apparent that there had been more women 
interviewed then men, a conscious effort was made to engage male clients in the 
interview process.  The same was true of age groups; the experiences of younger clients 
were solicited when earlier interviews involved individuals between the age of 45 and 65.  
While this attempt to gather diverse perspectives was not always successful, there were 
some opportunities to engage different perspectives and broaden the discussion of 
experiences.  The ethnographer Michael Agar has characterized this approach to 
ethnographic sampling as theoretical sampling.  In theoretical sampling, “the 
ethnographer chooses in a self-conscious way the next people to interview to obtain data 
                                                
49 Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 40-41. 
50 During the interview process, I sought to ensure that a variety of perspectives were included.  In some 
instances, this presented particular challenges.  For example, I wanted to ensure that there were both 
plaintiff and defendants represented equally however in certain cases, it was necessary to sacrifice this 
balance in order to account for a diverse group of individuals.   
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for comparison with the group she has already talked with.”51  One of the benefits of 
proceeding in this fashion is that the researcher can determine whether they begin to hear 
similar accounts or experiences.”52  While it is assumed that, with in-depth interviews in 
which the participant is recounting their personal experiences, the interviewer is likely to 
hear different narratives, it is possible that certain themes may begin to take shape.  In 
these instances, the researcher may decide to complete the interview process or seek out a 
new sampling group in order to explore the themes as they arise or seek out entirely new 
themes.   
The majority of the participants were recruited through collaboration with the 
self-help centre’s staff who would identify potential research participants from the intake 
form that the individuals completed upon arrival at the centre or was based on the staff’s 
knowledge of the participants and their cases from previous visits.  It was at this point 
that the staff member would assure the individual that the research being undertaken was 
independent of the centre’s services.  As such, their decision about whether to participate 
in the study would have no impact on the services they could access at the centre.  While 
there are some potential challenges associated with this approach in terms of sampling 
bias,53 this approach was more likely to provide a varied sample of individuals.  More 
importantly, this approach sought to ensure that certain vulnerable individuals did not 
feel exploited or pressured into participating in the research.  This was based on the fact 
that members of the staff were familiar with the particular individual either through 
previous visits or through the intake process; they were able to assess whether a particular 
individual would be amenable to being approached.  On other occasions, I would first 
participate as an observer in a participant’s meeting with the volunteer lawyer and, 
                                                
51 Agar, The Professional Stranger, supra note 1 at 172. 
52 Agar, The Professional Stranger, ibid at 172. 
53 While there were practical reasons for proceeding in this manner, it is important to acknowledge the 
potential challenges when selecting participants in this way, namely that the self-help centre staff may have 
their own potential biases and/or reasons for suggesting certain clients.  In order to address this concern, 
prior to commencing the research I met with staff and volunteers to discuss the nature of my research.  
Moreover, throughout the course of the research project, I was actively engaged in asking questions about 
potential participants before they were approached by staff.  This included a brief discussion of their past 
involvement with the centre. 
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subsequent to the meeting, inquire whether the individual would be prepared to meet with 
me for an interview.   
 
In addition, I was also able to make initial contact with potential interviewees 
while they were in the self-help centre reception waiting to speak with a volunteer 
lawyer.  In these cases, I would introduce myself, describe the nature of my research and 
then ask whether they would be interested in being interviewed for the study.  If these 
individuals were amenable to being interviewed, I would obtain their contact information 
so that I could set up a time to meet.  Typically, this contact was made through email, 
although on occasion I was also able to contact individuals by phone. 
The aim during the interview stage was to conduct in-depth interviews that 
‘generated narratives’ which focused on a specific experience, namely the self-
represented litigants’ participation in the civil justice system.54  Open-ended questions 
and prompts (drawn in part from the literature on procedural justice research) were used 
to help elicit a detailed description of the litigants’ experience representing themselves.  It 
was hoped that this discussion would also draw out the participant’s views on certain 
topics including their ability and willingness to participate in this as well as other legal or 
political processes.  The content of the questions and prompts sought to encourage the 
individuals to talk about the participatory aspects of their experience.  Specifically, the 
participants were encouraged to talk about engaging in court processes, completing steps 
in the legal process, and interacting with lawyers and judges.  The individuals were also 
asked about how they felt about those experiences, whether they would characterize the 
various experiences as positive and negative, and why.  The goal was to see how having 
participated directly, the individuals characterized their experience and what about that 
experience led them to characterize it in that particular manner.   
The interviews proceeded as more of a conversation in which the participants 
were encouraged to not only relate the details of their legal case and the steps they had or 
would undertake, but also their views about subjects such as participation, justice and 
                                                
54 Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 93. 
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access generally.  During the course of the conversation, the participants were also asked 
about the self-help resources that they used, what they found helpful and/or unhelpful 
about the services, and what skills or tools they may have developed as a result of 
accessing this resource.  Again, the purpose in asking these types of broad questions was 
not to evaluate the efficacy of the self-help resource, but rather to explore how the self-
represented litigants felt about participating directly and what skills or tools may have 
impacted their experience or been obtained as a result of their experience.  The purpose in 
using open-ended questions was to also try and encourage the interviewees to reflect on 
their experience in their own voice.  Toward the end of the interview, there were also a 
series of survey-type questions that followed the more open-ended questions and 
prompts.  The survey questions were aimed at obtaining certain demographic information 
about the participants including age, educational background, socio-economic status as 
well as information about what, if any, legal services the participants used in addition to 
self-help.  This information helped to situate the interviewees within a myriad of 
contexts. 
On a practical level, there were certain challenges associated with scheduling 
interviews once the participants left the centre.  These challenges were related to the fact 
that a significant portion of the interviewees fell within certain lower income levels, 
existed on subsidized income, travelled great distances to attend at the centre and/or 
worked jobs that did not provide much flexibility.55  Moreover, several of the individuals 
did not have a fixed address, changed addresses often, and/or had limited access to phone 
or email; this made it difficult to contact them outside of the centre.  As a result, it was 
necessary that the sampling methods remained flexible.  In terms of physically 
scheduling the interviews, individuals were interviewed in neighbourhood coffee shops, 
public libraries or even public parks.  Other participants were interviewed at LHO either 
prior to their meeting with a volunteer lawyer or directly following the meeting.   
 
 
                                                
55 In order to qualify for assistance from the self-help centre, the self-represented litigants must not have an 
income of more than $36,000.00 for a single person.  See also http://www.cfcj.org/a2jblog/access-to-
justice-to clients-methodological-challenges-in-civil-justice-research/. 
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Methodological Considerations  
The examination of the self-represented litigants’ experiences and the relationship 
between those experiences and the litigants’ legal consciousness raised several 
methodological issues.  First and foremost, it was important that, in establishing the self-
represented litigants’ views on access to justice and participation, I did not impute views 
to the participant that would potentially bias the responses and/or distort the views of the 
participant.56  Moreover, it was important to be aware of potential selection biases 
associated with soliciting interviews from individuals who were making use of the self-
help services.  Keeping in mind the research regarding justiciable issues conducted by 
individuals such as Ab Currie and Hazel Genn and the inclination of many individuals to 
‘lump’ their legal problem, the concern in this regard was that those who attend at the 
self-help centre to seek assistance already have or are disposed to have, certain views and 
attitudes about engagement and access to justice that would likely be reinforced by the 
assistance they receive at the centre.  Drawing on examples from an earlier research 
project—in studying the legal consciousness of employees from two separate taxi cab 
companies that had different grievance cultures—steps were taken to approach potential 
interviewees rather than post a notice seeking participants.  The reason being that there 
was a concern about the potential for self-selection and the bias that might be associated 
with self-selection.  In the context of legal consciousness research, this was relevant 
because the assertiveness or extroversion of the volunteer interviewees might skew the 
discussion about legal consciousness, which included a discussion of how the individual 
addressed problems at work. 57  
  
In my research project, there was also a concern that, because the centre’s staff 
would on occasion first approach potential participants regarding their willingness to 
participate in an interview, the staff would be inclined to select certain interviewees on 
the basis that the participants were likely to be positive about self-help and the services 
                                                
56 Laura Beth Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment” (2000) 43:4 Law 
& Soc’y Rev 1056 at 1061 [Nielsen, “Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens about Law”]. 
57 Elizabeth A Hoffman, “Legal Consciousness & Dispute Resolution: Different Behaviour at Two Similar 
Taxi Cab Companies” (2008) 28:3 Law & Soc Inquiry 691 at 700 [Hoffman, “Legal Consciousness & 
Dispute Resolution”]. 
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received at LHO.  While this is a different kind of self-selection bias, the potential for 
selective sampling by the centre’s staff raised concerns about the ability to obtain a 
diverse range of perspectives and required that I engage in an ongoing discussion with 
staff about potential interviewees.58  Taking account of these concerns in my discussions 
with staff, it was important to stress that this research sought a group of participants 
whose experiences as self-represented litigants were likely to expand and deepen existing 
understandings rather than disprove a pre-constructed theory generalizable to the larger 
self-represented populations.59  It was also important to stress that the purpose of this 
research project was not to complete a quality assessment of the self-help services 
provided at LHO, thereby hopefully alleviating certain of the staff’s concerns. 
 
In addition to conducting interviews with self-represented litigants who sought 
assistance from the self-help centre, the study included interviews with six volunteer 
lawyers who provide legal services at the self-help centre on a pro bono basis.  The 
questions posed of the lawyers were less about constructing a narrative of their 
experiences and more about exploring an ‘insider’s’ perspective’ on access, justice and 
engagement.  For example, some of the questions focused on the lawyers’ views about 
the role of self-help, what they thought that it provides individuals, what they thought 
might further assist self-represented litigants, and their views on self-representation more 
generally.  During this segment of the research project, I also sought to understand why 
the lawyers volunteered at the self-help centre and what they thought they were 
contributing in terms of promoting access to justice.  The purpose of conducting these 
interviews was to compare some of the lawyers’ views on what they thought they were 
providing and the associated benefits of these services with the self-represented litigants’ 
actual experiences.  The assumption was that these potentially divergent views would 
ultimately highlight how different stakeholders might frame the objectives differently and 
                                                
58 In an attempt to address the concern regarding staff selection, prior to conducting the research I met with 
LHO’s staff and provided them with a broad outline of the nature of my research and in the course of so 
doing, stressed that this research project was not focused on examining the efficacy of the self-help services 
provided at LHO nor was it focused on conducting a quality assessment of the services offered but rather 
was focused on the individuals’ engagement with the civil justice system; a component of which included 
self-help legal services.   
59 Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 35. 
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what this meant for a more comprehensive access to justice theory.  A discussion of the 
data collected from all of these interviews is also discussed in the context of the research 
findings in the next chapter.  
 
All of the interviews except one were recorded.60  Once the interviews were 
completed, the contents of the interviews were transcribed, reviewed and summarized in 
table form.  Due to the small sample of interviews conducted and the narrative nature of 
the interviews, it was not necessary to code the data collected.  Instead, it was felt that the 
information could be managed through the use of summaries as well as tables that 
condensed key elements of the data from each interview and highlighted various themes 
that arose across different interviews.61  In this regard, the decision was made to present 
the data respecting the individuals’ views and perceptions “interpretatively and 
qualitatively, as instances and opportunities for analysis and reflection” in terms of the 
broader concepts discussed in this thesis.62  Conducting fieldwork and then processing 
the field notes made during in-depth interviews can be a process that is “inevitably 
framed by our implicit concepts.”63  Therefore, in examining the resulting text of 
summaries and tables, which by nature include an element of subjectivity, it was again 
important to guard against imposing my own meanings to the data.  In order to do so, it 
was important to review periodically the original transcripts of the recorded interviews in 
order to ensure that the themes being developed were consistent with the actual accounts 
provided by the participants.  This rolling review of the transcripts was also undertaken 
during the course of writing the discussion of the results that is contained in chapter 
seven.  Because the interviews also represent an interpretation of what was experienced, 
                                                
60 One of the earlier interviews was unscheduled and therefore took place in a cafeteria at the courthouse as 
soon as the individual had finished his meeting at LHO.  It became apparent early in the interview that the 
noise in the cafeteria was interfering with the audio recording.  As a result, I took detailed notes of the 
interview instead, including specific quotes from the participant. 
61 Miles, Huberman & Saldana, Qualitative Data Analysis, supra note 5; Merran Lawler, Jeff Giddings, & 
M Robertson, “Opportunities and Limitations in the Provision of Self-Help Legal Resources to Citizens in 
Need” (2012) 30 Windsor YB Access Just 185 at 192.   
62 Jonathan Yovel, “Language and Power in a Place of Contingencies: Law and the Polyphony of Self-
Representation” (2013) 5	  Studies in Language and Society 27 at 39. 
63 Miles, Huberman & Saldana, Qualitative Data Analysis, supra note 5 at 11. 
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it remained important to be aware of this issue when transcribing and interpreting the 
information provided: this would ensure that the narrative remained in the participants’ 
voices.  As such, to the extent that the certain data was discussed, it was important that 
reference to certain ideas or themes remain in the actual voice of the participants; direct 
quotes were used wherever possible. 
 
Ethical Considerations  
Prior to sitting in on client-lawyer meetings at the centre and conducting interviews with 
clients of the centre, it was necessary to acquire the written consent of the participants to 
engage in both the observational stage as well as interview stage of the project.  At the 
observation stage, it was also important that the individuals (and the lawyer) consent 
separately to having a third party (researcher) attend the meeting.  As part of the informed 
consent process and before deciding whether to participate in either stage of the research, 
the potential participants were advised of the nature of the research and its objectives; 
details were given about the methods that would be used to collect the data.   
 
As previously noted, there was a particular ethical concern that potential 
participants, who were seeking assistance from the self-help centre, would feel pressure 
to consent to participate in the study in order to receive or continue to receive assistance 
from the centre.  In light of this concern, the individuals were assured (both verbally and 
in writing) that their willingness to participate in either the observation or the interview 
stage of the study was in no way tied to the legal services that they would be entitled to 
receive from the centre.  Copies of the relevant consent forms are attached as appendix B 
to this thesis. 
 
In addition, given the sensitive nature of the information that the participants were 
being asked to discuss in their interview or were observed discussing with the volunteer 
lawyer, the participants were advised of the continuing confidentiality associated with 
their participation in the study.  It was felt that this was particularly important in light of 
the fact that the participants were discussing legal matters for which they had sought legal 
advice from the self-help centre.  Specifically, the participants were assured that while 
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the researcher was not acting in a legal capacity, their meetings and interviews would 
remain confidential.  Moreover, in an effort to protect the privacy of the participants and 
in light of the fact that actual names were not necessary for the purposes of analyzing and 
reporting on the data collected, it was decided that the names of the individuals and 
details about their legal problem including court files or dates of court proceedings would 
be removed from the main data file.  Alternatively, pseudonyms would be used and 
access to the data file would be limited to the researcher conducting the interviews.64  It 
was believed that removing identifiers such as names, addresses or reference to specific 
legal proceedings (ie. titles of proceedings/court file numbers or names of parties) would 
assist in protecting the confidentiality and privacy of the participant. 
 
Aside from the ethical issues associated with conducting interviews in a legal 
context, this group of interviewees raised additional ethical concerns.  Earlier access to 
justice research established that the majority of self-represented litigants are either low or 
moderate-income individuals for whom the cost of legal services is out of reach.65  Many 
of the individuals seeking legal advice from the self-help centre do so because they 
cannot afford to retain a lawyer.  Furthermore, a significant percentage of self-
represented litigants who seek pro bono legal assistance may also face additional socio-
economic challenges associated with poverty, disempowerment and social exclusion.66  
As a result, it was important to respect the fact that many of these individuals may feel 
                                                
64 In the recent decision of Parent c R, 2014 QCCS 132, the Quebec Superior Court examined the issue of 
researcher-participant privilege.  While the court ultimately determined that this privilege must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis, it did make certain important statements about the importance of academic social 
science research and the corresponding importance to protect the confidentiality of participants who 
participate in research projects where they are asked to divulge sensitive and personal information.  Of 
particular importance to the court in establishing a privilege over confidential interviews, was the reliance 
placed by the interviewee on the promised confidentiality and the steps taken by the interviewer to protect 
the confidentiality during and after the research project.  See also Nachmias & Nachmias, Research 
Methods in the Social Sciences, supra note 43 at 79-80. 
65 Research in this area has been conducted by researchers such as Tom R Tyler, Jona Goldschmidt, Ab 
Currie and Rebecca Sandefur. However, it is important to note that recent research undertaken in Ontario 
has also suggested the self-represented demographic is expanding to include members of the middle class 
who cannot afford the cost of private legal services.  See Sande L Buhai, “Access to Justice for 
Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective” (2009) 42 Loy LA L Rev 979 at 983. 
66 Ab Currie, “A National Survey of the Civil Justice Problems of Low and Moderate Income Canadians: 
Incidence and Patterns” (April 2005) at 2.  Available online at http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/ sites/default/files/ 
docs/2006/currie-en.pdf. 
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vulnerable in a variety of different ways.  This awareness requires that the research 
protocols utilized be sensitive to these potential vulnerabilities.  Also, the methods 
employed may affect not only the nature of the data collected, but also the participants 
themselves.67  This required adopting a diligent and reflective approach during the course 
of the research project.  This specifically included examining regularly how the research 
process might be affecting a particular interviewee during the course of their interview 
and allowing the interviewee to direct the flow of the conversation as much as possible 
by, for example, respecting the interviewees’ direction to move away from a topic when 
they so indicated.  By so doing, I endeavored to ensure that the research process was not 
“exploitative or oppressive for the participants.”68  
 
There are also are ethical questions that arise in the context of gathering and 
analyzing interview data that results from unstructured qualitative interviews.  One 
qualitative researcher has characterized the ethical concern that arises in this context as 
questions of “what will be left in and what will be left out of the ‘findings’”, as well as 
“who will interpret and disseminate the findings.”69  Unlike methods of data collection 
such as surveys whereby both the question and the potential range of answers are limited, 
narrative interviews raise concerns about interpretation given the breadth of the 
discussion that occurs between the interviewee and interviewer.  Narrative interviews are 
characterized as involving a conversation between the interviewer and the participant 
narrator.  Thus, the story takes shape based on the interaction between the interviewer 
and the participant: this is typically in the form of broad questions and prompts and the 
responses that result from these prompts.  As such, the process is a “reciprocally 
interpretive process” through which the interviewer and participant develop the meaning 
                                                
67 In his book on ethnography, David Fetterman has also suggested that experienced interviewers will begin 
sensitive interviews with non-threatening questions embedded in a conversation before proceeding to more 
personal and sensitive questions.  In proceeding in this manner, the interviewer is sensitive to timing and 
the participant’s level of comfort with the progression of the interview.  Fetterman, Ethnography, supra 
note 2 at 41. 
68 Ibid at 126. 
69 Carl F Auerbach & Louise B Silverstein, Qualitative Data (New York, USA: New York University 
Press, 2003) at 130. 
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of the story together.70  In light of this process, the concern is that the researcher’s own 
perspectives, cultural biases and pre-existing assumptions may influence not only the 
interviewee’s response, but also the scope and discussion of the narratives ultimately 
constructed.  
 
In addressing the ethical concerns that arise in the context of narrative interviews, 
it was incumbent upon me, when conducting the research, to remain aware of my own 
perspective and how this perspective might influence the course of the discussion or the 
interpretation of the interviewees’ responses.  In so doing, I sought to remain alert to the 
possibility that my own experiences would be inserted into the interview process and 
subsequently responded to or reinterpreted by the participant.  In this particular study, it 
was important to take account of how my perspective on the process of litigation or 
previous experience participating in the civil justice system or volunteering at LHO might 
overshadow or run up against the self-represented litigant’s experience in the same civil 
justice system.   
 
In undertaking this research, it was important to acknowledge that, prior to 
conducting this research, I had been a civil litigation lawyer who previously provided 
volunteer legal services at the self-help centre on a regular basis.  While I had not 
volunteered at the centre in the three years prior to conducting this research, it was 
important that I identify the cultural norms, beliefs and views that might potentially 
influence the interview process as well as the collection and interpretation of the data.  As 
such, it was important in understanding the individual’s particular legal experience and 
their reflections on their experience that I remain aware throughout of my own ‘insider’ 
status.  In this regard, I sought to remain focused on an attempt to understand their 
experience through their own eyes untainted by my perspective.  This resulted in different 
challenges at different stages of the project.  For example, during the observation stage 
between the lawyer and client, I did not place myself in the position of the volunteer 
lawyer providing advice and/or attempting to solicit information from the client regarding 
                                                
70 Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research, supra note 10 at 225. 
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their specific legal matter.  During the interview stage, I tried not to engage in a legal 
vernacular that the participants would expect of lawyers or those trained in the law.  
Rather, I sought to allow the participants’ description of their legal issues and experiences 
to be articulated in the participants’ own language and reflective of their understanding of 
that process.  These challenges remained throughout the course of the research project: I 
addressed them through efforts to reflect on the language I adopted as well as the nature 
of the questions and prompts used during the interview process.  
 
Conclusion 
In keeping with a broader conceptualization of access, the research design for this 
particular project incorporated ethnographic and qualitative methodologies as a means of 
obtaining insight in to self-represented litigants’ experiences with the assistance of self-
help legal services.  The data collected from these interviews and from my time 
observing the operation of the self-help centre are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 
The narrative form is a powerful research tool for accessing and assessing 
individuals’ experiences in the world.  In contrast to other intellectual and statistical 
approaches, it can capture and portray aspects of human lives that more measured 
approaches to academic inquiry ignore or marginalize: it can add dimensions of depth 
and detail that elude other traditional forms of investigation.  Furthermore, narratives can 
work on both a macro and micro level.  Although some narratives may be particularistic 
in that they represent individuals’ distinct stories, they can also reflect broader and more 
shared messages about the reality of those individuals’ lives in the greater social 
environment.1  Consequently, in a project that claims to incorporate and value the 
experiences of laypersons, the narratives of self-represented litigants can offer insight 
into a qualitative dimension of behaviour that is often missing from quantitative studies.  
The narratives generated in this research project and analyzed in this chapter may not be 
entirely illustrative of the experience of all self-represented litigants.  However, they can 
reflect and bring to light certain generalized messages about the reality of what it means 
to represent oneself in the civil justice system.   
 
In this chapter, I will begin by introducing the participants in this research project 
and contextualize the setting for the research through a brief discussion of some of the 
observations made at Law Help Ontario (“LHO”).  Following this, I will frame the two 
overarching themes derived from the participants’ interviews; the contrasting themes of 
empowerment and disempowerment are situated in the previously discussed literature on 
the objectives and benefits derived from a participatory approach to democracy and 
citizen engagement.  Next, I will discuss each of these themes in greater depth and in so 
doing, draw on those aspects of the participants’ interviews which reflect these 
contrasting themes.  Finally, I will canvass the impact that these contrasting themes have 
                                                
1 Benjamin F Crabtree & William L Miller, eds, Doing Qualitative Research, 2nd ed (California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc., 1999) at 224 [Crabtree & Miller, Doing Qualitative Research].   
 225 
had on the participants’ conceptualization of access to justice and engagement, more 
generally.  Throughout, the discussion in this chapter I hope to speak in the participants’ 
voice whenever possible and in keeping with the democratic thesis.   
 
Findings based on Interviews with Self-Represented Litigants 
I conducted 12 in-depth interviews with self-represented litigants who sought assistance 
from the self-help legal centre.  All of the participants interviewed had visited LHO on 
more than one occasion and were in the process of managing their own legal case in the 
civil justice system.  The majority of the individuals had visited the self-help centre 
between three and seven separate times.2  I interviewed six men and six women.  The 
participants ranged in age from 20 to 71 with the majority of the participants falling 
between the ages of 30 and 50.  In terms of level of education, one of the interviewees 
had a grade nine education and one had recently completed high school.  The remainder 
had graduated from high school.  Those who had graduated from high school had also 
completed post-secondary level courses or degrees in the fields of accountancy, 
journalism, political science, education, chemistry, computer programming, nursing and 
the fine arts as well.  There was also one individual with master’s level courses in 
occupational health.  Several of the participants had been involved in previous legal 
matters in which the individuals had both represented themselves or been represented by 
legal counsel.   
 
The interview lasted approximately 60-90 minutes on average: the longest 
interview lasted just over two hours.  The chart below outlines certain demographic data 
about each self-represented litigant.   
 
                                                
2 As noted in in the methodology chapter, one of the challenges in securing interviews was gathering a 
sample of individuals who attended at LHO more than once and were in the process of handling their legal 
problems with assistance from the centre.  In many instances, individuals may attend the centre once, 
obtain information but not return for a second visit.  As a result, it is not possible to determine whether they 
are handling their legal issue without counsel, have retained counsel or may be ‘lumping’ the problem 
having determined it is not something that they can address.   
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Name3  Interview 
Date  
Interview 
Location  
Gender  Age  Education/Employment 
QC 11/13/14 LHO  M 71 Chartered Accountant 
BS 11/25/14 LHO M 60-
70 
Chemical engineering 
Degree 
EP 12/15/14 LHO F 50 Unemployed 
SE 12/23/14 LHO F 44 BA in political 
science/Degree in 
journalism/self-employed 
KC 04/28/15 Coffee 
shop 
F 50 Fine Arts Degree/ 
Registered Nurse/ Self-
employed 
BN 04/30/15 Toronto 
Reference 
Library 
M 30-
40 
Unemployed /recipient of 
ODSP 
LM 05/21/15 LHO M 48 4/6 years of Certified 
General 
Account/unemployed 
SX 05/25/15 LHO F 21 High School 
Diploma/unemployed 
QH 06/03/17 Public park M 30 BA in Political Science 
KU 06/12/15 Public 
Library 
F 44 Degree in Political 
Science & Education 
MD 07/16/15 Coffee 
shop 
F 60 Grade 9/ Previous small 
business owner/ 
Unemployed 
XE 07/27/15 LHO M 50-
60 
Trained in Computer 
IT/recipient of ODSP 
                                                
3 The names of all of the interview participants have been changed in order to protect their privacy and 
confidentiality.  All other demographic information about the participants remains unaltered. 
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I also conducted six interviews with lawyers who volunteered their legal services 
at the centre.  Of the six lawyers, I was able to observe three of these individuals in 
meetings with clients.  In one instance, I was also able to interview the self-represented 
individual who had received assistance during an observed meeting.  These participants 
included three partners and three associates with different levels of experience.  The most 
junior associate had been called to the bar in 2013 and the most senior partner had been 
called to the bar in 2004.  There were both male and female partners.  The lawyers 
worked for different types of firms; these included a partnership of two lawyers, a small 
boutique family law firm, a mid-size corporate commercial firm and three large Bay 
Street firms.  On average, the lawyers volunteered between 2-5 times a year with one 
exception; one lawyer who volunteered a half a day once a week had been doing so for 
several years.  This particular volunteer had developed a following of clients who would 
regularly attend when he volunteered to speak about their file and seek advice.  Several of 
the self-represented litigants interviewed made reference to his assistance in the course of 
their interviews.  The chart below outlines certain demographic data about the volunteer 
lawyers interviewed. 
 
Name Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Location 
Year of 
Call/Gender 
Type of 
Practice 
Type of  
Firm 
EN 03/03/15 LHO 2005/M Commercial 
litigation 
Partnership 
of 2 
DA 04/01/15 Law Firm 2013/F Commercial 
litigation 
Medium size 
full service 
firm 
DE 04/03/2015 Law Firm 2012/F Family Law Boutique 
family law 
firm 
ST 04/29/15 Law Firm 2006/M Insurance 
Defence 
Bay street 
firm 
SB 07/09/15 Law Firm 2004/M Commercial 
Litigation 
Bay Street 
Firm 
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NQ 07/21/15 Law Firm 2005/F Commercial 
Litigation 
Bay Street 
Firm 
 
My research was focused on the experiences and views of the individuals who 
were representing themselves.  As such, this discussion will concentrate on those 
interviews.  Having said that, the interviews conducted with volunteer lawyers will be 
incorporated in the discussion in so far as the data collected from those interviews 
informs and, in some cases, contrasts with the self-represented litigants’ narratives.  The 
objective in proceeding in this manner is to highlight the different perspectives on access 
to justice that exist between the self-represented litigants as ‘users’ of the civil justice 
system and the lawyers as ‘insiders’.  Also, I intend to utilize these different perspectives 
to challenge further existing assumptions about access to justice in theory and practice.   
 
Observations at LawHelp Ontario  
Over the course of 10 months (between October 2014 and July 2015), I observed day-to-
day operations at the self-help centre as well as specific meetings between volunteer 
lawyers and clients: some of these clients and lawyers I interviewed about their 
experiences.  During this period, I observed the interaction between the staff and the 
clients upon the client’s arrival at the centre, the interaction between many of the clients 
while waiting in the reception area, and the staff’s (both volunteer and paid) internal 
operations as they sought to manage the flow of clients arriving daily at the centre.4  In 
many instances, the staff was familiar with returning clients and, thus attuned to the stage 
of the individual’s legal matter and the nature of the assistance they required at that 
specific time.  In the case of new clients, the staff presented the first opportunity for the 
client to explain their issue and outline what type of advice or information they required.  
Aside from completing intake forms, the process by which the staff assisted clients in 
                                                
4  The self-help legal centre, LHO is described in greater detail in chapters four and six.  The centre 
maintains a paid staff as well as a rotating roster of volunteer lawyers who provide procedural as well 
substantive legal advice and information to clients in 40 minutes meetings.  The centre has financial 
eligibility requirements that are vetted by the staff when clients first attend at the centre.  The clients are 
welcome to re-attend as often as necessary however their ability to speak with a volunteer lawyer is on a 
first-come-first-served basis.   
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articulating their legal issue and the assistance they require is informal and ad hoc.  
Typically, this involves discussions with the client, clarification of facts, review of 
documents, and importantly, an assessment of the immediacy of the legal issue.  In some 
instances, the staff might ultimately conclude that the centre is unable to assist them with 
their particular problem as it is beyond the purview of the services provided at the centre.  
On many occasions, it appeared that the staff struggled with making this determination 
and with advising the client, as it meant that the client was turned away from the centre.  
On occasion, the client might express anger and frustration at being turned away and, 
more significantly, at not knowing where to turn next. 
 
On many days, there were more clients than time available with the volunteering 
lawyers.  This meant that a certain number of individuals would sit in the small reception 
area for an extended period waiting to speak to a lawyer; some would not have the 
opportunity to meet with a lawyer and, therefore, needed to return to the centre on a 
different day.  One interviewee, who was a mother of two young children, commented, 
“if you arrive at 10:00 and there’s already 5 people ahead of you, you won’t get to be 
seen in the morning.  So then you have to wait and have lunch and then come back in the 
afternoon.  So that can be tough, because I’m always trying to juggle my schedule as a 
mom.”5  Many of the clients were observed sitting quietly.  However, several of the 
interviewees commented on these long waits and the conversation that takes place 
between clients in the reception area: information and experiences about their respective 
cases was shared.  One of the interviewees, MD, in describing her time waiting, said, 
“you get to know also by talking to each other, you get to know what other people are 
going through.”6  In another example, the same interviewee described a conversation she 
had with a fellow client while waiting to meet with a lawyer; his advice to her was to 
proceed with her motion because “its not the lawyer’s motion, it’s your motion.”7   
 
                                                
5 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 7. 
6 Interview of MD dated July 16, 2015 at 9. 
7 Interview of MD dated July 16, 2015 at 9. 
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 During the period between October and December 2014, I also participated in 
meetings between clients and volunteer lawyers at LHO.  During the course of the 
meeting, I took notes as appropriate and generally observed the interaction between the 
self-represented litigant and the volunteer lawyers.  In many instances, the volunteer 
lawyer and the client would spend a good portion of the allotted time (approximately 30-
40 minutes) bringing the lawyer up to speed on the status of the client’s matter, the stage 
of the proceeding, and how the lawyer might assist the client.  The clients were often 
seeking to understand what steps were required or permitted and what was likely to be 
the outcome of those steps in the litigation.  The challenge for the lawyer was to explain 
the process in practical terms and in non-legal language.  In certain instances, it appeared 
as though the lawyer was struggling to explain a particular procedure in non-legal 
terminology or to provide the underlying rationale for a particular procedure.  In one 
example, a client was told that they would need to prepare both a notice of motion and an 
affidavit in respect of a motion they wished to bring.  The lawyer explained that the 
notice of motion advises the court of the basis for the motion and grounds on which it is 
brought.  The lawyer then proceeded to explain that the affidavit provides the court with 
the moving party’s story that forms the basis for the motion.  From the client’s 
perspective, these two documents appeared to be performing the same function.  As such, 
he was unclear as to why both were required.  The lawyer ultimately responded – “that is 
just how we do it.”   
 
 In other regards, the volunteer lawyer often provided a sympathetic ear to clients 
who were struggling with their file.  During the course of my observations at LHO, one 
of the lawyers made specific reference to this aspect of her role at the centre.  She 
indicated that she would allow clients to spend a considerable amount of time providing 
the background of their case; this included the various non-legal aspects of how the case 
had affected them.  The lawyer believed it was important that someone was listening to 
them.  Interestingly, several of the participants interviewed also made reference to the 
emotional support they received from both the staff and the volunteer lawyers at LHO.8  
                                                
8 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 13. 
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In certain instances, the particular volunteer lawyer would take an almost brusque 
approach, cutting the client off and posing questions about the immediate issue to be 
resolved.  The latter approach was observed with one lawyer in particular who had been 
volunteering at LHO for a long period of time.  He justified this approach on the basis of 
time management – namely, that there were always more clients than could be served.  It 
is also worth noting that the lawyer in question was very popular among the clients, some 
of whom would specifically show up on the day he volunteered in order to speak with 
him.   
 
Self-Represented Litigants, Empowerment and Disempowerment 
With respect to the construction of an individual’s legal consciousness, Ewick and Silbey 
have suggested that,  
 
to the extent that consciousness is forged in and around situated events and 
interactions, (a dispute with a neighbour, a criminal case, a plumber who 
seemed to work few hours but charged for many), a person may express 
through words or actions, a multifaceted and possibly contradictory 
consciousness.9   
 
While Ewick and Silbey’s characterization of legal consciousness included three broad 
categories of consciousness that were relevant to their study about the different ways in 
which ordinary individuals use and think about law, the idea that individuals may 
construct a multi-faceted and contradictory sense of legal consciousness resonates with 
the data collected in this research project.  In fact, the interviews with self-represented 
litigants (bolstered by the observations of the volunteer lawyers) highlighted certain 
themes that, at first glance, appear antithetical.  However, on further examination, these 
themes support the development of a participatory approach to access and, at the same 
time, serve to highlight the challenges associated with doing so within the traditional 
adversarial model.    
 
                                                
9 Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law (Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998) at 50 [Ewick & Silbey, The Common Place of Law]. 
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In her examination of individuals’ court experiences and corresponding legal 
consciousness, Sally Merry noted that, “consciousness develops through individual 
experience.  But this experience takes place inside structures, which define people’s lives.  
Further, it changes with contradictory experience…[t]he legal consciousness I observed 
changed as plaintiffs went to court and observed contradictions between what happened 
to them and what they expected.”10  In the course of each research interview, the 
individuals discussed a variety of different issues, concerns and viewpoints about the 
nature of their legal issue, their attempts at self-representation in the civil justice system, 
as well as their experience dealing with opposing counsel, judges and even the volunteer 
lawyers at the self-help centre.  While each interviewee had a very different (and in many 
respects personal) story to tell, when reviewed together, the totality of the interviews 
reflected two overarching and conflicting themes.  This discussion seeks to animate these 
conflicting themes through the particular views and perspectives as expressed by the 
participant interviewees in their own voices.  
 
For the purposes of a discussion about the development of access to justice both 
in terms of a theoretical framework and a policy initiative, these overarching themes are 
broadly categorized as empowerment and disempowerment.  Individual empowerment is 
both a necessary precondition to meaningful participation and constituted by meaningful 
participation.11  In this sense, the meaningfulness of the individual’s engagement will be 
judged in part by the effect that the individual perceives to have on the decision-making 
process, including their ability to ‘have a say’ and ‘be heard.’  An essential requirement 
of both ‘having a say’ and ‘being heard’ is educative in the sense of developing the skills 
necessary to engage in the dialogue and being informed about the issues at stake.  
Roderick MacDonald maintained that, in order for education to be empowering, it must 
                                                
10 Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even – Legal Consciousness among Working Class 
Americans (Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1990) at 5 [Merry, Getting Justice and 
Getting Even]. 
11 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between individual empowerment and meaningful 
participation, see the discussion in chapter three of this thesis. 
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be broad in scope and comprehensive rather than instructional.12  By contrast, the 
“inability to communicate is itself a manifestation of social exclusion as well as a 
cause.”13  This was one of the findings made by researchers in the course of their 
interviews with members of disadvantaged communities in England.14  Members of 
tenant advocacy groups operating in disadvantaged neighbourhoods were asked about 
their thoughts on the concept of social exclusion; this included what it meant to them, 
how it affected them, and what caused certain individuals to be socially excluded.  As 
part of their responses, several of the participants in that study listed, 
communication skills and ability to learn as a key activity in its own right.  
These skills link to people’s ability or opportunity to participate across all 
four dimensions, e.g. by engaging politically, interacting socially, working, 
caring or volunteering, and consuming.  For the residents [interviewed], 
communication skills are a generic set of skills that is a determining factor 
in opportunities to participate across a range of dimensions.15   
In the democratic context, disempowerment results from both the continued exclusion of 
certain individuals and groups from the dialogue, deliberation and decision-making 
processes and a corresponding entrenchment of the belief that only certain individuals are 
worthy of being heard.16   
Consistent with the benefits derived from greater citizen participation, many of 
the interviewees expressed feelings of personal empowerment relating to certain aspects 
of their experience as self-represented litigants.  However, these feelings of 
empowerment were often juxtaposed or overshadowed by corresponding feelings of 
disempowerment that manifest in the individuals’ engagement in different aspects of the 
civil justice process.  These aspects are broadly defined as engagement with adjudicators, 
                                                
12 Roderick MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice” (1992) 7:2 CJLS 23 at 44 [MacDonald, “Theses on 
Access to Justice”]. 
13 Liz Richardson & Julian LeGrand, “‘Outsiders’ and ‘Insiders’ Expertise: The Response of Residents of 
Deprived Neighbourhoods to an Academic Definition of Social Exclusion” (2002) 36:5 Social Policy and 
Administration 496 at 506 [Richardson & LeGrand, “‘Outsiders’ and ‘Insiders’ Experiences”]. 
14 Richardson & LeGrand, “‘Outsiders’ and ‘Insiders’ Experiences”, ibid. 
15 Richardson & LeGrand, “‘Outsiders’ and ‘Insiders’ Experiences”, ibid at 505. 
16 See the discussion of participatory democracy in chapter three of this thesis. 
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interactions with opposing counsel, and understanding and implementing legal 
procedures.  Interestingly, the volunteer lawyers interviewed in this project tended to 
corroborate the self-represented litigants’ experiences, particularly as it related to themes 
of disempowerment.   
 
In one particularly stark example, several of the interviewees expressed concern 
about being taken advantage of (or even tricked) by opposing counsel.17  In several cases, 
this anxiety resulted in the individuals’ unwillingness to discuss legal issues with the 
opposing lawyer either in person or on the phone.  Instead, they choose to communicate 
only in writing.  The participants’ concern in this regard was corroborated by several of 
the volunteer lawyers who recounted experiences in which they believed that opposing 
counsel improperly withheld consent to reasonable requests made by self-represented 
litigants and/or responded to self-represented litigants in an overly aggressive or 
patronizing fashion.   
 
Self-Representation as an Empowering Experience 
The benefits associated with meaningful participation include the potential for increased 
self-confidence, a broader understanding of legal and political processes and institutions 
and the corresponding possibility of ever greater engagement on the individual’s own 
behalf as well as others.18  More specifically, the development of certain skills, the 
formation of political consciousness, and even the ability to cope with frustrations are 
reflective of empowerment.  These qualities broaden individuals’ social understanding, 
connect them to others in the same situation, and give them faith in social change as well 
as a desire to affect change.19  All of the skills associated with empowerment further 
foster an ability to participate in political processes and local decision-making.20  In the 
                                                
17 This discussion is examined below in greater detail of this chapter. 
18 See chapter three of this thesis regarding a discussion of engagement and the benefits associated with 
participatory democracy. 
19 Elisheva Sadan, Empowerment and Community Planning: Theory and Practice of People-Focused Social 
Solutions (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers, 1997) at 80 [Sadan, Empowerment and Community 
Planning]. 
20 Sadan, Empowerment and Community Planning, ibid at 77. 
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case of the self-represented litigants interviewed, several of the participants demonstrated 
varying aspects of empowerment.  These included an increased sense of self-confidence, 
a corresponding recognition that they could affect results and respond to challenges in the 
future, and a sense of empathy and concern for other individuals in similar circumstances. 
 
Specifically, several of the participants in this study acknowledged that they were 
more self-confident in their abilities as a result of preparing for and participating in 
various legal processes.  Several of the participants characterized this self-confidence in 
terms of their ability to accomplish certain legal tasks that would have been viewed 
previously as formidable.  Enhanced self-confidence was also characterized in terms of 
personal growth and a corresponding recognition that individuals could represent 
themselves when faced with new and/or different challenges in the future.  Moreover, an 
important aspect of this development was individuals’ recognition that when placed in 
these challenging circumstances, they could learn new skills and processes and respond 
accordingly.  For many of the participants interviewed, this was contrasted with a 
corresponding acknowledgement that there would be a wide variety of individuals who 
would not be in a position to represent themselves; the challenges facing certain 
individuals would be too daunting.21   
 
For EP, who was involved in litigation over a failed real estate transaction and, at 
the time of the interview, was preparing for the presentation of her case in court, the 
process of representing herself made her realize that it is possible to go in to court and tell 
your story without the experience or education of a lawyer.22  In terms of the impact of 
this process on her personally, EP suggested that it has had a “good effect in the sense 
that it is ‘empowering’.  You feel like you can do things.  You can defend yourself, you 
can go through the procedure, you can learn and make an attempt to defend yourself 
                                                
21  The later discussion in this chapter includes a more detailed discussion of the challenges facing certain 
self-represented litigants.  See also Russell Engler, “Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon:  What 
Existing Data Reveal about when Counsel is Most Needed” (2010) 37:37 Fordham Urb LJ 2 [Engler, 
“Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon”] in which Engler makes reference to certain groups of 
individuals who may, for different reasons, not be in a position to effectively represent themselves. 
22 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014. 
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without legal representation.”23  Having received assistance from volunteer lawyers at 
LHO, EP also indicated that,  
 
coming here [LHO] for help, they explained the process, it’s less 
intimidating and there’s some things you probably can do yourself, really.  
And I mean this is pretty straightforward so I don’t feel terribly lacking in 
confidence because I know he’s lying, basically.  So I just hope the judge 
sees that.  So they help a lot there.24   
 
EP’s assertion of confidence is contrasted with a later conversation in which she 
describes her previous encounters with a legal professional.  In the past, EP had been 
unable to stand up for herself and was fearful.  Due to various personal challenges in her 
life, she was also deferential to the lawyer from whom she sought advice.  As a result, she 
believed she allowed decisions to be made for her.  This included decisions with which 
she did not agree.  In particular, she disagreed with her lawyer’s decision that certain 
personal facts would not be raised with the court in order to protect her from potential 
embarrassment, notwithstanding the possibility that the inclusion of the information 
would better explain EP’s actions.  In this regard, she said, “I was too meek.  If someone 
said ‘no’ I just shrugged it off, and I will not do that now.”25  In this regard, she believed 
that the experience of representing herself had changed how she would approach similar 
challenges in the future.  This was due in part to a realization that “you have to fight for 
yourself, even with the lawyer you have to explain and say ‘listen, at least we can try’.” 
 
In hindsight, EP believed that these facts were relevant, important to her position, 
and, ultimately, not embarrassing for her.  An important aspect of having taken over 
responsibility for her own case was the acknowledgement that, in the past, she had not 
advocated on her own behalf vis-à-vis her legal counsel.  Going forward, she had learned 
the importance of speaking up and engaging with the decisions being made that affected 
her representation and impacted her life.  For EP, this meant that she would be prepared 
tell a lawyer what steps they might take and ask more questions about events that might 
                                                
23 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 8. 
24 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 2. 
25 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 12. 
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affect her life.  In this regard, direct engagement resulted in EP learning to assert her own 
interests and challenge the assertions of those experts who might advise her to proceed 
differently.   
 
A similar sentiment was expressed by XE.  A former IT specialist, he had been 
served with a subrogated insurance claim in respect of a fire in his home that allegedly 
caused damage to the adjoining residence.  At the time of his interview, he had prepared 
and served a statement of defence.  When questioned about how the process of 
representing himself might impact him, he commented that,  
 
part of why I’m doing it is to gain some experience in self-litigation, 
because I never know when a situation like this might come up.  And again 
my circumstances might be different.  Maybe I’ve moved on, my health has 
improved and I have a job and I can afford a lawyer.  But I think at least I 
will be able to say to that lawyer, ‘can we handle it this way?’  Participate in 
my defence.26   
 
As with EP and XE, the self-represented litigant’s increased self-confidence was 
reflected in how the individual believed that they would deal with similar problems in the 
future.  KU is a 44 year old mother of two who was involved in a dispute with a former 
commercial landlord.  KU’s case involves a lease as well as claims of defamation on 
behalf of KU and her black husband.  The case has been continuing for some time.  
Originally, KU had retained a lawyer to pursue their claim, but this legal relationship had 
ended.  She said “we had a good lawyer who was very competent and did his best but I 
think he just felt okay I’m losing steam, I am not going to get anything out of this and this 
is going to be a long battle.  For many reasons, he kind of gave up on us and decided to 
walk the other way.  So we had nobody to represent us, so it was a long lengthy 
process.”27  It was at this point that KU began to represent herself.   
 
At the time of the interview, KU had been involved in a variety of legal procedures, 
including the preparation and arguing of motions as well as participation in the discovery 
                                                
26 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 11. 
27 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 1-2. 
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process.  In the interview, KU felt very strongly about her case and the principles 
involved, namely that her former landlord had been racist in his handling of her own and 
her husband’s commercial lease.  KU was confident about her case and about her ability 
to speak in court.  With respect to her court appearances in particular, she indicated that, 
“I was fine with it because I felt quite fiery, in most situations I felt like I’m ready to go.  
I want to get this over with it but at the same time, yes I have something to say.”28  In 
learning about the legal system and participating in various legal processes, she felt less 
intimated and more emboldened in the sense that she believes, “[p]ersonally, I’ve learned 
so much.  The growth has been tremendous I can’t summarize it just with our time 
together, and it’s changed me completely.  I cannot go back to being the naïve person I 
was before.”29  With respect to the impact of self-help on her experience, KU stated,  
 
[o]kay so very empowering for sure.  I felt like we had a chance to be a 
voice for our own corporation.  And more definitely all the legal 
terminology, I feel a little more comfortable with now, so comfort level is 
up there.  And I don’t feel intimidated anymore being before the Master – 
the first time I had to go in the whole building I thought I was, yes I would 
lose it because it just felt so intimidating.  So now it’s like that’s not an issue 
at all.  Anything else happens in the future, friends mention a legal issue I’ll 
say it’s not a problem.  Go to Law Help, get some information – so just 
feeling empowered that you can get access to information and not feeling 
isolated.  That’s very important.30   
 
It is worth noting that the term ‘empowering’ was initially raised by the participant 
and not referenced in interviewing KU.  Even more significantly, when asked if she 
would represent herself again, KU indicated that she would.  This was despite the recent 
loss of a motion and a very stressful discovery experience in which she felt that the 
emotional side of the legal issues overwhelmed her and her husband’s performance in 
that process.  This sentiment was reinforced by one of the volunteer lawyers (EN) when 
he suggested that the assistance provided to self-represented litigants,  
 
                                                
28 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 5. 
29 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 9. 
30 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 6. 
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besides just the instrumental assistance where they learn something and they 
can do their case a little better, it really provides almost all of them 
invariably with a huge reduction in their own stress.  They know that there’s 
somewhere they can go, they can talk about their case and they suddenly 
feel a little bit more empowered with the case.  It doesn’t feel as 
overwhelming.31 
 
This opinion was also reflected by MD who was engaged in a claim against a 
trustee under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.  MD alleged that the trustee acted 
improperly in providing her with negligent advice and was moving to initiate a claim 
against the trustee.  In discussing the assistance provided by LHO, MD contended that 
had she previously known about the services provided at the centre, she would have taken 
steps against a former employer over allegations of harassment and she would have been 
prepared to proceed on her own without counsel.  For MD, there was a strong sense that 
with the right information (like the type provided at LHO) individuals could win their 
own cases.  In discussing the nature of the assistance provided at LHO, MD said “I feel 
very positive, I’m very happy, I wish I’d known about it years ago because I had an issue 
with my company and the union and I wish I’d known because I would have sued my 
company then”.32 
 
QH, a university student with severe social anxiety, indicated that he was proud of 
his ability to prepare court documents in a very short time frame and to make arguments 
in court.  This was particularly so in light of the fact that the opposing counsel was a very 
senior lawyer.  In this regard, QH stated, 
 
I did take some positives from the experience as well.  I felt more confident 
in my own ability to stand up for myself and take on social and socially 
based professional challenges.  Despite the fact that on the social aspects of 
it I wasn’t able to prevail, in terms of actually compiling my case I was 
actually quite proud of myself.  Anyway it needs to be kept in mind that this 
boutique penthouse litigator [opposing counsel] took about nine months or 
whatever to get her case together and I was scrambling, didn’t know what I 
was doing and I think I put together something pretty reasonable 
                                                
31 Interview of EN dated March 3, 2015 at 2. 
32 Interview of MD dated July 16, 2015 at 10. 
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considering.  So I guess it provided some – not that I necessarily needed a 
major boost, like I’m so good in my writing - but it was nice to look at it as 
a final thing and be like that wasn’t bad.  It wasn’t the greatest, looking at it 
I was like oh I could have worded that better…But ultimately looking at it I 
was like for what it was it was pretty good.33   
 
QH had been involved in a dispute with a family member over the division of a 
real estate property that was jointly owned.  With the assistance of LHO, QH prepared 
responding application materials and appeared before two judges on two separate 
occasions to make substantive legal arguments about the application in issue.  While 
ultimately not successful in his own application, QH felt that, as a result of the experience 
representing himself, he was less likely to “get pushed around in the future” and more 
able to assert himself.  This was particularly meaningful for QH whose struggle with 
severe social anxieties had often affected his life in significant and negative ways.  In his 
interview, QH acknowledged that “in terms of problem solving and actually having to 
express it orally and/or in person, that is something that I got better with.”34  Thus, the 
ability to stand in front of a courtroom full of lawyers and clients and make submissions 
on behalf of his application had important implications for his self-confidence.  This was 
so much so that, when asked in the interview whether he would represent himself again, 
he indicated that, depending on the complexity of the matter and his financial means, he 
would consider doing so.35   
 
Certain of the interviewees also expressed confidence based on the skills they 
developed.  This resulted from learning about the various steps relevant to their legal 
process, understanding how the steps fit together, and completing those steps by 
themselves.  For one participant, BN, developing the skills to defend himself was a 
challenging, but important process.  In describing the confidence that he derived from the 
experience, BN said,  
 
                                                
33 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 13. 
34 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 15. 
35 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015. 
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[s]o about the experience, I went in not empowered and I feel, I don't want 
to say 100% but I feel more empowered.  The fact that I know how to do 
this stuff and I’m learning a process.  Like I kind of look at it that way so I 
don't just see the negative.  I’m listen – these are skills that are not really 
pleasant but there are skills you are learning, you’re learning how to 
represent yourself.  As difficult and challenging as it is it’s like this is stuff 
that you wouldn't have looked into.36   
 
BN was involved in a complicated employment case that originated as a human 
rights complaint and subsequently involved allegations of breach of contract by the 
employer.  Initially, BN received assistance from a lawyer in resolving the human rights 
complaint.  However, he was left to his own devices regarding the employment litigation 
with his former employer.  At the time of his interview, BN was preparing to bring a 
motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the opposing lawyer.  A previous and 
unrelated legal experience had left him feeling rushed, overwhelmed and panicked when 
representing himself.  However, as a result of learning about the legal process and 
developing certain skills to represent himself better, BN indicated that he now felt that he 
had rights, could prepare a response and defend himself.37  In contrast to his previous 
experience, BN believed that with the information he received from LHO, he is,  
 
a little bit more chilled out I would say because I know that – like when I 
receive a document I know I have rights.  I can prepare a response.  I can 
defend myself.  The other time I felt panicked because I didn’t really know 
what to do.  Now I know that ok he sent this but I’m going to send 
something back.  It’s not like he is going to get me.  Before it was like he’s 
going to get me.38   
 
This assertion of confidence was manifested in a belief that he would be able to address 
new issues as they arose.  It was reinforced by BN’s acknowledgement that, like the 
volunteer lawyers at LHO who typically reach for their copy of the rules of procedure 
when faced with a procedural question, BN could use the same book to search the rules 
                                                
36 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 5. 
37 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015. 
38 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 6. 
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for the appropriate procedural answer.  In seeking advice from the volunteer lawyers at 
LHO, BN observed,  
 
I think the one thing that I would like to see is every time I am in this 
situation [seeking advice at LHO], the lawyer just opens up a book and pulls 
out the rules.  Fair enough.  And I’m like I could do that, but what book is 
this?  Can I do this at home?  Not fully but can I help out the process by 
knowing what I should be looking up and also the steps of procedure.39 
 
In a related manner, XE expressed satisfaction in being able to research and 
ultimately prepare his statement of defence on his own.  While he clarified that preparing 
his defence was not “enjoyable”, he also acknowledged, “there was some satisfaction in 
the end product, just in the way I was able to find sample statements of defence and pull 
out certain key phrases that helped me in my own defence.  And this is something – I 
guess that’s all part of being a self-helper.”40 
 
Accordingly, an important component of empowerment is education.  This is not 
only about individuals being educated through the process of participation, but also about 
education being a pre-requisite for empowerment and meaningful participation.  If 
individuals are to deliberate on and participate in decision-making processes, they must 
receive adequate information about the interests at stake, the issues, the processes, and 
the relevant policies.  Moreover, ensuring that individuals are educated so that they are 
able to engage in a meaningful manner furthers a sense of empowerment in those 
individuals.  To the extent that education about legal processes and institutions facilitates 
participation and direct engagement, it can also contribute to the ‘democratization of 
law.’41  This democratization of law involves a shift in power from the elite professionals 
who exhibit control over the meaning and administration of law to individuals who, in 
learning about various legal processes, are able to begin to participate in the design and 
operation of those same processes.  In so doing, individuals have the opportunity to 
develop and incorporate their own concepts of justice into the laws and institutions that 
                                                
39 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 7. 
40 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 7. 
41 See chapter three regarding a discussion of the democratization of law. 
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affect them.  In the context of this research project, information provided to the self-
represented litigants at LHO assisted the individuals in better understanding the relevant 
processes, reducing the intimidation and resulting anxiety surrounding legal proceedings, 
and providing an opportunity for individuals to make informed decisions about the 
pursuing their case.   
 
In reflecting on the effect of education through self-help, EP indicated that, by 
understanding the step-by-step process involved in furthering her legal position, she was 
able to,  
 
talk about legal documents, I’m more knowledgeable and I feel more 
comfortable so that makes the procedure go better.  And sometimes I even 
know already before I get here I have to do this and this.  So it’s an 
education.  My writing skills I think are stronger.  And I think it’s basically 
just being more familiar with the legal system.  That is tremendously 
helpful.42 
 
BS, who was addressing credit issues resulting from an unresolved mortgage that 
was discharged, visited LHO because he,  
 
wanted them to first of all introduce him to the legal system because I have 
no background in it.  I am a university graduate – a Canadian university 
graduate but in science.  I have no idea of the legal system.  So being the 
good educated person I am I wanted to do some basic homework and find 
out about how I could go about helping myself to access; to support myself 
or to represent myself within the legal system.43   
 
Notwithstanding that there was an acknowledgement that learning about the legal 
process and institutions made the system less intimidating and assisted the self-
represented litigants in preparing for and participating in their legal case, several of the 
interviewees were also mindful of the inherent value associated with having a better 
understanding of the legal system and how it works.  When KU first approached a lawyer 
about pursuing a claim on behalf of herself and her husband, she acknowledged that she 
                                                
42 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 7. 
43 Interview of BS dated November 25, 2014 at 2. 
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had little information or knowledge about the legal system.  When asked in the interview 
about what skills that she might have acquired as a result of her experience, she stated,  
 
I would just say that a general overall knowledge of the legal system and the 
steps before trial, I had no idea, really, it’s ridiculous.  I had a lack of 
knowledge when we first approached the lawyers…but when it actually 
happens to you I guess the personal reflection of knowing there’s many 
steps to seeking justice I didn’t know, so that’s really been an education for 
me.44 
 
 For QC, a retired chartered accountant who was involved in litigation with former 
employees over issues of payroll and intellectual property, it was evident that he believed 
that he has “learned about the importance of form.”  He said he now grasped the 
importance of not simply anticipating what the court requires, but also appreciating why 
and how one might go about providing the appropriate evidence.  At the time of his 
interview, QC was preparing appeal proceedings and looking forward to the challenge of 
presenting his case at the appellate level.  Notwithstanding a previous appearance before 
the Federal Court of Appeal in which the court ruled against him, QC characterized his 
experience in court (particularly at the appellate level) as a “superb education.”45   
 
 Understanding the process to which their cases were subjected was a recurring 
theme that arose in the discussions with the self-represented litigants.  One of the 
participants described the legal procedures involved in resolving her civil action as 
“stepping stones, a building process…its like you’re in a building process to get from one 
point to another to achieve your end goal.  So it’s about what’s your end goal.”46  For 
some of the self-represented litigants, this understanding of process encompassed not 
only the need to decipher the formal steps that the individuals were required to take, but 
also the significance of those steps in the litigation process.  When the process was 
                                                
44 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 8. 
45 Interview of QC dated November 13, 2014. 
46 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 20. 
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understood better, it had the potential to legitimize the process.  EP suggested that “once 
you kind of learn some of the procedures, you kind of gain a respect for it.”47   
 
In his interview, BN was very clear regarding the legal information and advice 
provided to him – “I would like the instructions and I’d like to know why.”48  For BN, 
this reflected his need to not only understand what might be requested by the opposite 
side, but also how he might begin to make decisions about how to respond as new issues 
and challenges arose in the context of his case.  MD also expressed a similar viewpoint.  
She highlighted the importance of not simply understanding the technical steps, but 
grasping how the steps fit together and why certain steps were necessary.  In the context 
of understanding a cross-examination process and the action that proceeded the cross-
examination, MD stated that, “I just feel going back to Law Ontario, when I asked her 
one question it’s just not one question, it’s got to be the whole.”49   
 
For XE, the quest to learn the procedural steps involved in his legal matter had a 
slightly different iteration.  After having served his statement of defence, XE wanted to 
understand how, in practice, his matter might proceed and what his role was to be as a 
defendant.  XE was confident in the sense that he had “a little bit of an aptitude for this 
type of work and I have the time, but I don’t know the procedure.”50  XE wanted to 
understand not only the technical requirements, but also “who really is now responsible 
to push the matter along?  Is it entirely their responsibility that is the plaintiffs?  Because 
basically I’ve been shown the flow chart for a simplified procedure and this is the 
challenge for me to understand what the procedure is.” 51   For XE, this meant 
understanding how the litigation process progressed and what his role was within that 
process.   
 
                                                
47 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 10. 
48 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 7. 
49 Interview of MD dated June 16, 2015 at 11. 
50 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 3. 
51 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 3.  
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However, there is a second educational component that is evident in the steps 
undertaken by the individual self-represented litigants to educate themselves about the 
legal system and their particular legal issues apart from the information and advice 
provided at LHO.  One participant had been engaged in litigation with a bank over their 
cheque-cashing policy that he claimed ran contrary to the Bills of Exchange Act.  In the 
course of his legal case, he had been to Small Claims Court, Superior Court, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal, and the Divisional Court.  Having educated himself about the 
substantive aspects of his case, he was also well versed in the procedures relevant to his 
case, the organization of the courts, as well as the contents of the Bills of Exchange Act 
and the relevant interpretive case law.  In the course of our discussion regarding his 
extensive knowledge of both the procedural and substantive law relevant to his case, LM 
indicated that,  
 
when this all started I think I read something like 2,000 Can LII cases, every 
case with the word cheque in it.  So at that point that was 2005, Can LII was 
still fairly new at it.  I think there’s 15,000 cases with the word cheque in it.  
So I read the first 2,000 back in 2005, so that gave me my basis for the legal 
determinations and decisions going back 300 years.  That’s where some of 
these laws come from, like Canada’s Bills of Exchange Act is actually a 
word for word copy of Ireland’s Bills of Exchange Act from 1800 
something or other.”52   
 
For another self-represented litigant who was trained as a journalist, SE, managing 
her own employment case and attempting to determine whether she could bring a motion 
for summary judgment necessitated her finding the relevant information on her own.  She 
indicated that, in attempting to find an answer, “I read the Rules of Civil Procedure, I’ve 
read them all.”53  In these examples, the self-represented litigants exhibited both a 
willingness and a determination to inform themselves about the nature of their case from 
both a procedural and a substantive law perspective.  In fact, the self-represented 
litigants’ endeavours to understand and engage with the different elements of their 
                                                
52 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 7. 
53 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 6. 
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particular case underscored one of the volunteer lawyer’s impressions of the individuals 
that he encountered at LHO.  In this regard, he stated,  
 
now I actually leave there [LHO] feeling quite impressed by the clients that 
I see and their ability to maneuver their way through the system with the 
help of us.  Because I’ve been doing it for 9 years now and I still half the 
time don't have a clue what I’m doing.  So to imagine someone trying to 
manoeuver their way through that system without any legal education and 
without any resources like I’ve had to rely on, except for the volunteers they 
see 3 or 4 times at the project, it’s laudable.  I think it’s amazing frankly that 
they’re able to do as good a job as they do.  Some of the affidavits they 
come in with, some of the pleadings they come in with, I’m just blown 
away.  Really, really good.54 
 
(i)  Self-Represented Litigants and Judges 
Throughout the course of their legal proceedings, several of the self-represented litigants 
had appeared before Masters and/or Judges.  As a result of appearing in a variety of court 
settings, the participants were in a position to reflect on the different roles and attitudes 
adopted by the various adjudicators: they were able to provide their views on how these 
particular experiences influenced their perceptions of the adjudicator, his or her role 
within the civil justice system, and their own beliefs about their ability to engage with the 
adjudicatory process and affect justice in their case.   
 
Based on their various court appearances, the self-represented litigants had a 
myriad of different experiences when participating in court proceedings.  A review of the 
narrative data collected reflects both the participants’ positive and negative experiences 
in court.  For certain of the self-represented litigants interviewed, their experience 
appearing before an adjudicator (whether it be a Master or a Judge) was positive in the 
sense that they felt that they were provided with an opportunity to engage with the court.  
In those instances, it was useful for the interviewee to reflect in greater detail on those 
aspects of the experience that were positive.  
 
                                                
54 Interview of ST dated April 20, 2015. 
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KU had recently lost a motion on the production of documents previously agreed 
to during an examination for discovery.  During the motion, she had made submissions 
on behalf of herself and her husband and had taken the position that certain documents 
need not be disclosed due to a lack of relevancy.  The Master hearing the motion ruled 
against her.  However, when speaking about the hearing, KU said, “It was fair.  We lost 
very well”.  In referring to the Master, KU further suggested that they (her and her 
husband) “were lucky to have somebody who was fair and he was kind of guiding us in 
the sense of what questions you want to ask next.”55  For KU, being a fair adjudicator 
meant that he was,  
 
a very empathetic listener.  Maybe being older as well he didn’t speed 
through things.  He made sure that we were one of the last people, we didn’t 
have an audience to listen to us.  I thought maybe that’s just coincidence or 
maybe he was thinking of our situation knowing that we didn’t have 
representation.  I felt he was an empathetic listener.  He was just curious 
about the case itself.56   
 
KU felt that the adjudicator did not dismiss her nor did he make her feel that she was 
unprepared.  In all, KU felt that the Master has given her time to speak. 
 
 Despite an earlier experience that left EP “scared because I don’t want anyone to 
yell at me”, she also had a more encouraging exchange with a judge in the context of the 
current case.  EP described this adjudicator as “very nice and when she wrote her short 
form, she explained it to me so I’d understand because I am not a lawyer, and she was 
wonderful.  Very nice.”57  In elaborating on what made this particular judge ‘fair,’ EP 
suggested that,  
 
she wasn’t condescending, and she wasn’t dismissive and rolling her eyes 
like’ oh my gosh we’re going to have to slow down the procedure and she’s 
not going to know what she’s doing.’  She was very open-minded.  It looked 
to me, the way she spoke to me was respectful and she wanted me to 
understand everything that we were doing, all the steps, so that I would 
                                                
55 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 4. 
56 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 4. 
57 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 4. 
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understand what was happening and to present my case.  So I was very 
appreciative of that.  And it was encouraging…And it strengthened my 
resolve and helped me.58   
 
 In the course of her case, KC had participated in several court appearances 
including two summary judgment motions as well as a motion to amend the pleadings.  
While she ultimately lost a motion for summary judgment, she had felt confident about 
her earlier interactions with the bench.  With respect to one appearance in particular, KC 
said “Now Master *** was special, she said ‘I have read absolutely everything.’ I loved 
it.  She’s good.  She’s very decent.  She made that very clear.  And I had this much [KC 
uses her hand to describe the depth of her motion materials] and they had less than half 
an inch thick [opposing counsel’s motion materials] and she actually said to the bank 
lawyer, ‘is this all you have?’”59  In referring to the same adjudicator, KC acknowledged 
that, while sympathetic, the Master’s “hands were tied.”60  
 
Notwithstanding how the Master might have been restricted in reaching her 
decision, KC remained positive about the manner in which the Master prepared her 
endorsement.  In this regard, KC noted that she (the Master) had “worded her 
endorsement to move everything from the counterclaim up into the amended statement of 
claim of defence.  So when costs awards would be rendered it may buffer the final result.  
So she actually was very helpful to me, I feel, in that way.  That’s all she could do.  So 
that’s how her endorsement went.” 61   Interestingly, for KC, her assessment of a 
subsequent judge was also based, in part, on how he handled the delivery of his 
endorsement.  With respect to this subsequent judge, KC stated,  
 
Judge *** heard me, because he wrote a six-part endorsement.  And he 
stepped up to the plate and read aloud my statements in court…[Interviewer: 
How did you feel about that when he did that?]…I thought it was awesome 
                                                
58 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 15. 
59 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 23. 
60 Interestingly, several of the participants interviewed made reference to the fact that the adjudicator’s 
hands ‘were tied.’  Thus, despite being either sympathetic or amenable to the self-represented litigants’ 
position, the adjudicator was unable to find in the self-represented litigants’ favour.   
61 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 8. 
 250 
that he would be so openly supportive.  He clearly saw there was a concern.  
But again his hands were tied.  There’s a lawsuit on the table but he very, 
very carefully worded that endorsement.  And I honestly and sincerely went 
in to mediation with an open heart hoping we could do something.  But the 
resistance has been no compromise from the other side.62   
 
 MD’s experience in court before a Master was also a positive experience.  In 
describing her first court appearance, MD said of the Master,  
 
she was really great.  It was quite an experience.  And I actually went in to 
court a couple of times before my date so I could see how it worked.  That’s 
something very suggestive to people that they should go in and see what 
court is like…[Interviewer: When you say she was great what about her was 
great?]…If I didn’t know something or if I repeated something she said ‘I 
understand’, ‘I’ve already read it’ and she was very nice.  She wasn’t like 
some of those on TV.  There was one on TV that calls people stupid.  I’m 
like really, they’re not stupid, they’re just not informed properly and you 
shouldn't be calling them stupid.63  
 
(ii)  Self-Represented Litigants and Future Engagement  
Finally, an important consequence of meaningful participation within the context of 
participatory democracy focuses on the ‘spill-over’ effect from one area of life to another.  
The cumulative effect being that individuals become willing to participate in other 
forums and contexts.  In the course of the interviews, several of the self-represented 
litigants made a connection between their participation in the immediate legal context in 
which they were involved and a willingness to engage in other contexts in the future.  
More specifically, in two instances, this was reflected in the participants’ 
acknowledgement that there could be a role for them in speaking on behalf of those who 
cannot.  For BN this meant,  
 
maybe I become an advocate, maybe I help other people.  Because one thing 
I’ve learned is that, it was a really difficult time for me, the past 3 years…I 
was able to pull myself together but there’s lots of people – like I figure I’m a 
pretty tenacious type of person and I really work hard.  But there’s lots of 
people that I know that there’s no way they could have pulled this off.  So it 
                                                
62 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 12. 
63 Interview of MD dated July 16, 2015 at 5. 
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makes me worry about the people - like I can do this but there’s people that 
can't do this.  And if they’re left with the same options that worries me.64   
 
Perhaps more significantly, in reflecting on whether his experience has led to him being 
otherwise politically engaged, LM acknowledged that subsequent to commencing his 
action,  
 
it’s led to the – because of this and as a result of the Sammy [Yatim] 
shooting on the street car - that led to me being down here for a protest of 
that and it ended out in front of the Police Headquarters on the day they 
were having their board meeting.  So I’ve been to all the board meetings 
since and have made presentations.65   
 
For KU this had a slightly different meaning in the sense that her claim against 
the landlord and her experience litigating the claim over several years reinforced in her a 
commitment to furthering justice and standing up for herself as well as others facing 
injustice.  In this respect, when reflecting on the concept of injustice in the context of her 
own litigation experience, she noted,  
 
my point in all of this was that I’ve always been an advocate for justice 
whatever form it’s in so it just reinforced personally for me that wherever 
there’s an injustice I will be there…so I guess injustice in the sense that 
there are some things that are clearly and blatantly people being exploited or 
things being done that shouldn't be.  So whenever personally if I can get 
involved to most of my capacity I would like to continue to be that kind of 
person.  So in this case it touches us very personally but there are many 
other issues and many other people fighting for their land and their rights 
and whether it’s here in Canada or elsewhere.  So injustice is for me, I’d say 
summarizing it is checking on the champion of the underdog who doesn't 
have a voice.  And it maybe sounds a bit clichéd but that really is the case 
unless you’ve been in those shoes.  It’s a horrible feeling because you really 
don’t know, you really realized there’s so much bigger massive forces that 
you feel you can’t fight against.  And this individual [the defendant in JT’s 
action] who is one representative of this company who is masked behind the 
company, he owns so much property that it means nothing to him.  He could 
easily have, in my case, walked away and it just became a whole personal 
vendetta, ridiculous, which is not worth getting into now.  But I really hope 
                                                
64 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 5. 
65 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 16. 
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in this case that I’ve shook him up and wakened him and at least have to pay 
all these legal fees which can be very, very high.  He’s paying for it, he’s 
losing something. And whenever I get the opportunity, when people ask me 
I say well yes we’re still in court.  What?  It’s still going on.  I can’t believe 
it.  Yes and we’re not done with this.66   
 
The potential for positive spill-over was also emphasized by one of the volunteer 
lawyers who described the long-term impact of self-help as being,  
 
like learning how to ride a bike.  Every court or tribunal or whatever it is has 
a fairly similar process, very specific rules here and there, the rules of ethics 
might change here and there.  But for the most part, it’s the same process.  
One side presents their case, the other side presents their case and there’s a 
lead up to that in terms of the exchange of information and all that.  So I see 
this self-help process as someone learning how to ride a bike.  And once 
you’ve learned how to ride the bike you can get on a different bike and you 
have to adjust maybe the handle bars or the seat or it’s a little higher off the 
ground so it take a little bit of getting used to.  But you still know how to 
ride a bike.  And I think that it does have the power to give self-represented 
individuals information, knowledge and skills that they can take into their 
lives into the future, to future disputes and navigate their way through those 
disputes more efficiently and effectively.67 
 
Self-Representation as a Disempowering Experience 
Ewick and Silbey’s conceptualization of legal consciousness included three different 
characterizations of individuals’ relationships with law; standing before the law, 
engaging with the law, and struggling against the law.68  Of the three characterizations, 
the description of individuals’ relationship ‘before the law’ had particular resonance with 
this research project: self-represented litigants are essentially before the law in the sense 
that they are compelled to engage directly with the formal dispute resolution structures of 
the civil justice system.  In describing individuals’ experiences before the law, Ewick and 
Silbey depict law as a “formally ordered, rational, and hierarchical system of known rules 
and procedures” which is often regarded as “somewhere else, a place very different from 
everyday life;” an individual takes certain problems “somewhere else” that is elevated in 
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67 Interview of ST dated April 29, 2015 at 8. 
68 Ewick & Silbey, The Common Place of Law, supra note 9 at 47. 
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terms of significance.69  When viewed in this way, individuals who come ‘before the law’ 
expect that their everyday problems will be transformed and resolved in a manner that is 
consistent with their conception of an objective and impartial legal system of rules and 
procedures.  Merry suggested that the “promises of equal treatment in court, for example, 
are contradicted by the experience of the court’s unequal attention to interpersonal 
problems.”70   
 
The reality is that this is not always the case.  In this regard, individuals may 
“believe in the appropriateness and justness provided through formal legal procedures, 
although not always in the fairness of the outcomes.  Sometimes, however, finding 
themselves before the law, people express frustration, even anger, about what they 
perceive as their own powerlessness.”71  Thus, disempowerment is reflected in ‘cosmetic’ 
experiences of engagement in which individuals become aware of the fact that their 
participation is not bringing about the desired result or even affecting the course of the 
process. 
 
For the self-represented litigants interviewed, the sense of empowerment that they 
gained as a result of handling their own legal problem was often juxtaposed with feelings 
of powerlessness.  This ensued from their engagement with the formal civil justice 
structures and with the actors working within the civil justice system, namely the lawyers 
and judges.  In her interview, EP aptly characterized her concern as “I worry more about 
the Master or the Judge, I have to be honest.  Because you don’t know what decision 
they’re going to make and they’re all powerful.  You get that feeling and they could go 
either way, so that worries me.”72  This sense of powerlessness was also expressed in the 
self-represented litigants’ attempts to both understand and implement a legal process that 
was overly complex and often operated differently than prescribed in the rule book.  For 
the self-represented litigants interviewed, appearing ‘before the law’ caused a bifurcation 
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of what they expected to have happen in terms of the fair resolution of their legal problem 
and how they were actually treated within the legal system.   
 
This division was manifest in how the self-represented litigants approached the 
concept of access to justice, often in contrast to what they experienced in court.  When 
asked about what access to justice would look like in the context of their individual cases, 
very few of them characterized access to justice as being about winning their case.  
Instead, the focus was on presenting the facts and having a decision based on those facts.  
For KC, justice included, “open, full transparency.  No judgment should be made unless 
all evidence is in front of a judge.  And if there’s any evidence missing a judgment 
shouldn’t be allowed.  It’s not okay, that’s how I define it.”73  EP suggested that justice 
means that they look at all the evidence regardless of whether it’s a lawyer presenting the 
evidence and questioning witnesses.  The bottom line should be the evidence presented, 
“regardless of the fact that maybe you don't have the experience of the lawyer but you’re 
still presenting the facts, what happened…If you don't have an opportunity to present 
your evidence then you won’t feel that justice has been served.”74   
 
XE articulated a similar view when asked about justice in the context of his case.  
He stated, 
 
I think what I’ve been told several times in this office is that the judge will 
always be interested in the facts and I think that’s what justice is.  It’s 
getting down to the facts and what really happened and was there 
negligence or wasn’t there negligence and determining what the costs are.  
It’s all about the facts, I think that’s what justice is.75   
 
LM expressed a similar view regarding the objective of pursuing a matter in the 
civil justice system.  He suggested that,  
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for me, this is all about, let me get before a judge and argue the case on its 
merit.  Now that happened with Justice --- where we spent 2 hours or an 
hour and 45 minutes of arguing this stuff which is probably more than all 
the other hearings combined, give or take, or it’s certainly 2 or 3 times 
longer than any other hearing and 10 times longer than some.  So having 
that proper hearing is what it all comes down to and everything else before 
that or leading to that is just something that distracts you and it’s a road 
block or step to getting where you want to be.  It’s all about having a 
hearing of your case and having somebody who has the authority to judge 
matters – saying you’re crazy or yes you have some rights or yes your rights 
were violated…That’s all anybody is really looking for and everything else 
tends to be about roadblocks to preventing that, and I can understand why 
those roadblocks are there.76     
 
Whether articulated as ‘facts’ or ‘evidence’, it would appear that ‘telling the judge 
one’s story’ was a significant objective for the participants, which was grounded in their 
particular conceptualizations of both access and justice.  From the participants’ accounts, 
it seems that, while the procedure may be understood and, in some instances, legitimized 
by the self-represented litigants, it is also the formality of the procedures that ultimately 
interfered with individuals’ ability to tell their story before the adjudicator.   
 
For the self-represented litigants interviewed, their conceptualizations of what 
being ‘before the law’ should entail was often contrasted with their actual experience 
when navigating the civil justice system.  While the self-represented litigants interviewed 
took steps (with the assistance of self-help legal services) to engage in the resolution of 
their own legal problems, they often ran up against ‘insiders’ within the adversarial 
system that resulted in negative experiences for them.  These insiders were unprepared or 
unwilling to engage with them; the civil justice system is ill-equipped to facilitate their 
direct engagement.  The consequence was a sense of disempowerment.  For one 
participant in particular, this sense of powerlessness ultimately influenced her perception 
of the justice system as a whole.  When asked about her views on the civil justice system, 
SE expressed a loss of faith that was premised on her,  
 
                                                
76 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 13. 
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experience with Masters and the Judges, with the exception of Master ---, 
who don’t seem to give a [shit].  I don’t care.  It’s like they’re all playing 
croquet together or something.  It’s like the lawyers are corrupt, they’re 
playing the system, the Judges and the Masters know it, but they don’t 
stop it.  Why?  I don’t know.  Because they are afraid of being overturned 
on appeal?77   
 
For SE in particular, the disconnect between her view of the justice system before 
engaging as a self-represented litigant and her view of the system subsequent to 
representing herself was attributable, in part, to the perception of her own powerlessness 
vis-a-vis the actors who inhabit the system (i.e., the lawyers, judges and court staff).   
 
This sense of powerlessness was reflected in the participants’ belief that the legal 
processes involved a different language that the self-represented litigants did not 
understand and could not speak.  This inability left the self-represented litigants unable to 
communicate and, as a result, feeling excluded from the process.78  The nature of this 
disadvantage was typified by QC, who described his frustration with the opposing 
counsel and judge’s repeated use of the term ‘nunc’ during a court proceeding; this term 
held no meaning for QC at the time of hearing, although it was later explained to him that 
nunc was the abbreviated form of  ‘nunc pro tunc’.79  For BS, the need to speak like a 
lawyer had direct implications for the resolution of his case.  He reported that if “one is 
not aware of it - [the legal vernacular] - you are lost.  You will be treated as such.”80   
 
SE described the impact of not knowing the language in a more profound way 
when she stated that this “whole legal system is like I’ve fallen through some rabbit hole.  
I don't know this world.  I don't even understand much of the language.  I’ve been living 
here for three years so now I know some of the language.  It’s kind of like moving to a 
                                                
77 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 18. 
78 Richardson & LeGrand, “Outsiders and Insiders’ Expertise”, supra note 13 at 505-506. 
79 The legal term ‘nunc pro tunc’ means ‘now for then’.  Generally speaking, a court ruling ‘nunc pro tunc’ 
will apply retroactively to correct an earlier ruling.  At https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nunc_pro_tunc. 
80 Interview of BS dated November 25, 2014 at 6. 
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new place.”81  For SE, attempting to manage her own file and navigate the civil justice 
system as a lay person was akin to landing in a foreign country where you do not speak 
the language, are unfamiliar with the food, and do not know where to find clothing or 
lodging.82   
 
(i)  Self-Represented Litigants and Judges 
Several of the participants had positive experiences with adjudicators, as discussed 
earlier.  However, other participants characterized their court appearance as negative.  
The discussion of these experiences also provided an opportunity for participants to 
reflect on the critical aspects of their experience and what this meant for them as self-
represented litigants.  In examining the self-represented litigants’ experiences in court, it 
is possible to contrast what the individuals may expect or value in a court proceeding 
with the deleterious effects that a negative experience may have on those expectations 
and their corresponding sense of empowerment/disempowerment.  This also affected the 
participants’ perceptions about the legitimacy of the justice system.    
 
Certain of the participants interviewed described discomfiting interactions with 
adjudicators that often left them feeling embarrassed and ineffectual in representing 
themselves.  The self-represented litigants’ anxiety respecting these encounters tended to 
focus on the fact that, as non-lawyers, they did not know the process and procedures.  
Yet, in many instances, they are expected to engage in a fashion similar to legal 
professionals who attend regularly in these courts.  As a result, they felt that they made 
mistakes, worried about making mistakes or felt dismissed by the adjudicator.  When 
appearing before a judge in civil court, QC recounted an incident in which the judge 
advised him that, “we will make no exceptions for you because you are a self-represented 
litigant.”83  This blunt articulation of the court’s attitude toward self-represented litigants 
underscores the apprehension that they feel as ‘outsiders’ in the civil justice system. 
 
                                                
81 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 7. 
82 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014. 
83 Interview of QC dated November 13, 2014. 
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While EP has appeared in several different courts without representation, an 
earlier procedural appearance in a matter unrelated to her current case left her nervous 
about appearing without a lawyer.  In that matter, she had raised an issue with the court 
that had been overlooked and, as a result, was subject to a reprimand by the Master.  In 
re-telling her account of the appearance, EP stated,  
 
I told the other lawyer, the defendant’s lawyer there’s one more thing-I can’t 
remember what it is now, it’s over a year.  But one thing we had to bring up 
to the Master and he forgot to tell, and she was really trying to get the little 
cases, little matters out of the way to clear her docket.  And he didn’t tell 
her, and then she screamed at me when I brought it up…[Interviewer:  What 
did she say?]…She was furious.  She said ‘I told you I want – this was 
supposed to be just do one thing’, and it wasn't my fault because I told him.  
And the whole room froze and looked.  It was horrible, horrible.  It was 
really bad.  And then he [the defendant’s lawyer] told me, he said, I think I 
forgot.  He’s a nasty little lawyer anyway, he’s not really nice, he’s very 
aggressive, very pit-bull like, and he apologized.  But when we went back in 
he apologized [to the court], she didn't apologize to me so I didn’t think that 
was right, because she just screamed at me and it wasn’t right.84  
 
 In his interview, QH recounted two separate court appearances related to his real 
estate litigation.  His experiences in respect of these two appearances were very different.  
In reflecting back on these appearances, QH highlighted some of the particular challenges 
he thought he faced as a self-represented individual in court.  In this regard, he said,  
 
as a self-rep it’s kind of you’re really on the hot seat.  Aside from that, 
again the procedural things, knowing when to speak, what to call who, 
how to refer to what, what to be careful of, what sort of rights you have, 
when you should speak, when you shouldn’t speak.  I guess another point 
that was kind of an issue was just in terms of the vestments.  The attorney 
of course has their robes as does the justice.  So dressing as a civilian, 
even if you’re not wrong, it kind of feels like you’re being prosecuted in a 
way.  Do you know what I mean?...We’re the only one not wearing a 
robe.85   
 
                                                
84 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 4. 
85 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 8. 
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QH’s views of court were significantly impacted by one court appearance in 
particular.  Regarding this hearing, QH said his adjudicator “reminded him of Judge Judy 
in a way.  She was very like I’m going to hurt you and put you down.”  In describing her 
approach to him in court, QH further elaborated,  
 
[s]he wouldn’t let me speak, she would constantly cut me off, tell me that 
she didn’t want to hear it.  She apparently had come to her decision 
generally prior, it would appear to me.  Like when I got there she seemed 
like she was furious with me, like she wanted to hurt me...Anyway it was 
one of those things – how do I put it?  I guess during the second hearing I 
was concerned about being held in contempt because again she didn’t want 
to hear about, ‘I don’t want to hear the merits’.  Okay so I didn’t want to 
speak out of turn and because of that I didn’t really think that I was given 
an opportunity to really defend myself.  I think if I’d been an experienced 
attorney I would have simply known how much to push back, or to feel 
like your honour, my client is entitled to this…where as for me, that’s her 
courtroom, she’s kind of running the show and she just seems to be on a 
bit of a, I was like I don’t understand why you’re doing that.  So it was 
confusing.86  
 
 LM had appeared in a variety of judicial settings and had experienced a range of 
adjudicators.  In one particular experience in small claims court, LM felt that the deputy 
judge dismissed his case without any significant input from him.  In describing the 
hearing, LM said,  
 
in that case, for whatever reason I guess the Attorney General’s office 
didn't file the right paperwork in order to have the hearing actually on the 
docket.  So it ended up being an add-on to the full day’s docket.  The 
judge said at the beginning of the hearing – ‘I haven’t read any of the 
materials’ but he asked the Crown if they wanted to proceed anyway.  And 
then asked me to explain the entire case in one sentence and then made his 
ruling that  - ‘I wouldn't have a problem paying the $5.00 to the bank so 
neither should you’.  Case dismissed.  That was it.87   
 
In the course of his interview, LM returned to this appearance when discussing the 
challenges faced by individuals who go to court to defend themselves and are judged by 
                                                
86 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 9. 
87 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 6. 
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individuals who are disconnected from the realities of the litigants’ lives.  Specifically, he 
stated,  
 
I guess it comes down to the people aren’t being judged by their peers, 
they’re being judged by, as with Deputy Judge *** where he said ‘well I 
wouldn’t have a problem paying $5.00 to them’.  And my thought in 
response is ‘well yeah a guy that makes $300,000 a year on a government 
salary doesn't care about $5 and the guys he hangs out with at the country 
club are going to be the guys that receive that $5 and buy him a beer.’88   
 
This view was echoed by another participant who worried that the socio-
economic gap between judges and self-represented litigants made it difficult for judges to 
appreciate the perspective of the self-represented litigants.  This made it difficult for self-
represented litigants to advance their case.  In other words, the judges, accustomed to 
having a particularized conversation with the lawyers that appear before them, were not 
in a position to engage with non-lawyers.  While partially attributing the judges’ mindset 
to human nature, SE said, “If you’re a judge and your friends are all judges and you’re 
hanging out with lawyers, you go to the National Club…Yeah, so I think they know 
intellectually that there’s a world outside but do they really feel it?  Do they feel the pain 
of people who really cannot?”89  
 
 The frustration exhibited by the self-represented litigants regarding their 
experiences with judges also resonated with the volunteer lawyers interviewed.  In 
discussing the importance to self-represented litigants of being ‘heard’ by the adjudicator, 
the volunteer lawyer, SB stated,  
 
[s]o I understand that it’s frustrating to hear the guy mutter and move his 
papers and talk about irrelevant stuff.  But I think the value of moving it to 
the bottom of the list, saying ‘okay listen I’m going to hear you out.’  I 
know that is frustrating, but ‘I’m going to hear you out.’…You have an 
hour, you booked an hour, you tell me everything you want to tell me for the 
next hour and I’m going to write my notes.  And I also think judges could be 
just a little more sympathetic.  I don't know why there isn’t a little more 
                                                
88 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 14. 
89 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 20-21. 
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empathy.  Like ‘I’m really sorry for the problems that you have encountered 
but unfortunately you have no cause of action, you’re outside the limitation 
period, I’m going to strike your claim.’  I think that would go a long way to 
reducing the frustration.90   
 
This view is consistent with some of the findings from Tom Tyler’s and other 
researchers’ examining individuals’ views on procedural fairness.  More specifically, it 
points to the link between being heard and a legitimate legal process.91  For the self-
represented litigants, the ability not only to present evidence, but also to receive an 
indication from the adjudicator that their story was heard significantly affected the 
individuals’ sense of whether they were treated fairly.  More importantly, it influenced 
whether they believed that they would be willing or able to engage in the legal process in 
a meaningful manner.    
   
 To the extent that the self-represented litigants felt that they were listened to and 
taken seriously by the adjudicator, they had positive experiences in court.  These positive 
experiences were, in several instances, unconnected to the ultimate outcome in the 
hearing.  In fact, in suggesting that the adjudicator’s ‘hands were tied,’ it would appear 
that the self-represented litigants were prepared to accept the decision of the adjudicator 
when the adjudicator took the time to listen to the self-represented litigants’ position, 
explained the process, and elucidated the basis of their judgment.  Moreover, in 
acknowledging receipt and review of both the written materials and oral submissions of 
the self-represented litigants, the adjudicator also appeared to legitimize the efforts made 
by the self-represented litigants to engage in the process.  In this sense, the self-
represented litigant was not treated as an ‘outsider’ but rather an active participant in the 
process.  By contrast, a negative experience with a judge had the effect of reinforcing the 
self-represented litigant’s self-perception of an ‘outsider’.   The formal procedures 
followed in court, as well as the informal practices known only to the participating 
                                                
90 Interview of SB dated July 9, 2015 at 7-8. 
91 Tom R Tyler, “What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures” (1988) 22 Law 7 Soc’y Rev 103; J Thibault & L Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological 
Analysis (New York, USA: John Wiley & Sons, 1975); E Allan Lind, Robin I Lisak & Donald E Conlon, 
“Decision Control and Process Control Effects on Procedural Fairness Judgments (1983) 13:2 Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology. 
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counsel—the language used by lawyers and judges, and even the robes worn by the 
lawyers and judges—all serve to highlight the perceived gulf between ‘insiders’ (judges 
and lawyers) and ‘outsiders’ (self-represented litigants).   
 
The perception of this gap is further reinforced by the self-represented litigants’ 
view that lawyers and judges are part of the same elite profession and inhabit a similar 
socio-economic sphere; many of the self-represented litigants are not part of that sphere.  
Given these views, the attitudes and approaches adopted by certain adjudicators toward 
self-represented litigants often served to widen this perceived gap.  In these instances, the 
adjudicators did not provide an opportunity for the individual to speak, did not appear to 
take account of what the individual was saying, and/or scolded the individual for 
speaking out of turn or making a mistake.  The result was a sense of powerlessness and a 
corresponding belief that only certain voices are likely to be heard within the civil justice 
system.  Both of these factors contribute to an overall sense of disempowerment, which is 
inconsistent with the principles underlying a democratic approach to access to justice. 
  
(ii)  Self-Represented Litigants and Opposing Counsel 
One of the recurring themes that arose in the context of the interviews with self-
represented litigants involved the participants’ experiences with and attitudes toward 
opposing counsel.  Not all of the self-represented litigants interviewed had a negative 
experience interacting with opposing lawyers; some of the participants characterized the 
lawyers’ actions as ‘just doing his job’.  However, many of the self-represented litigants 
expressed concerns about feeling tricked by lawyers and/or that the lawyers were 
unwilling to cooperate with the self-represented litigants in ways that they might not 
otherwise do if dealing with a lawyer.  The result was that the self-represented litigants 
felt intimidated and often powerless when dealing with opposing counsel.   
 
Moreover, it was felt that this behaviour was perpetuated or, at a minimum, 
overlooked by Masters, Judges and even the Law Society of Upper Canada.  By virtue of 
the organization of the adversarial system or through the maintenance of an elite legal 
profession to which both lawyers and judges belong, it was believed that the profession 
 263 
ultimately protected its own.  In the course of her case, SE made a complaint to the Law 
Society of Upper Canada about the opposing lawyer’s behaviour.  The Law Society told 
her that there was no basis for her complaint and that, if she wished to pursue the matter, 
she did have recourse through the courts; this suggestion seemed absurd to the self-
represented litigant.  Indeed, it caused SE to call into question whether lawyers should be 
judged by an impartial person and, “[n]ot someone that you golf with but maybe someone 
whose a bit more impartial…They all go to the same country clubs.”92  As it pertains to 
self-represented litigants who are up against trained lawyers, SE challenged the notion 
that self-regulation is meant to “protect us from government tyranny.  I think the 
government needs to protect us from lawyer tyranny.”93   
 
SE’s comments regarding her belief that the Law Society is effectively 
unreceptive to self-represented individuals is also reflective of the broader concern that 
judges and lawyers are ‘insiders’ and self-represented litigants remain ‘outsiders’ within 
the civil justice system.  This division between insiders and outsiders is also manifest in 
self-represented litigants’ observations of the interaction between lawyers and judges in 
courtroom settings.  While the participants expressed concerns about not being provided 
with an opportunity to articulate their position, there was also a corresponding anxiety 
about the ease with which lawyers and judges conversed to the exclusion of the self-
represented litigant.  For LM, lawyers were characterized as ‘insiders’ who knew how the 
legal system operated and were comfortable functioning within it.  This position creates a 
significant advantage for lawyers in the sense that,   
 
it’s still a case of a system by and for lawyers and where lawyers get 
preferential treatment by the nature of them providing the information to the 
decision-maker in a nice easy format, that’s what they’re looking for that 
you just get a natural advantage by serving the people [judges] what they 
like and what they’re wanting.94   
                                                
92 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2104 at 17; while it is not contended that this perception reflects all 
members of the legal profession, it does speak to the concern about ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the legal 
system and how such a distinction serves to undermine the legitimacy of the civil justice system. 
93 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 17. 
94 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 13. 
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In the course of discussions with the self-represented litigants, this was, again, often 
characterized as a problem with legal language.  The stylized conversation between 
lawyers and judges in court has a significant impact on self-represented litigants 
participation in the proceeding.  From their perspective, it would appear that the lawyers 
and the judges are engaged in a conversation to which the self-represented litigants are 
not privy (e.g., QC’s frustrating example of the use of the legal term ‘nunc’).  However, 
this also raises more significant issues about whether self-represented litigants are able to 
contribute to the conversation in a meaningful manner or will be able to respond 
effectively to submissions made by an opposing lawyer.   
 
BN typified this concern when, talking about an upcoming court proceeding, he 
said that the opposing lawyer could,  
 
say certain things to the judge and just have something, and I don’t know 
how to argue it.  I have no idea how to argue anything on Monday.  I’m 
going to be like okay.  There’s certain things that will be said and he [the 
opposing lawyer] could say something that could basically shut me down, 
and I have no idea, that’s kind of frightening…I’m sure that the judge would  
- I’m talking about as far as lingo that might be over my head and him 
possibly being able to assert something that I don’t even notice to argue.  
But hopefully the adjudicator would explain.95  
 
In describing her experience dealing with opposing counsel, KC described a 
feeling of intimidation based on the fear of,  
 
being up against experts in the law who are very crafty.  How to work and 
manipulate the law to the benefit of the case they may be dealing with.  I 
think crafty is a fair word to use, it’s what I’ve been dealing with.  And it’s 
always like trying to be one step ahead of them or figure out where they’re 
at, or where they’re going.  It’s been troubling.  To me in a fair and just 
system there should be no craftiness.96   
 
                                                
95 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 8-9. 
96 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 23. 
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This concern is further complicated by the discrepancy between the rules as read by the 
self-represented litigants and the application and interpretation of those same rules by 
lawyers.  In some instances, the self-represented litigants expressed an additional fear that 
lawyers may purposefully manipulate the rules in order to mislead self-represented 
litigants.  SE articulated this concern when she said that, “the rules are there for a reason 
so that people don’t abuse the system which is the ultimate irony because people are 
using it [the rules] to abuse the system.  You know what I mean?”97  
 
Similarly, BN’s concern was that the opposing counsel would assert positions or 
make demands of BN that he could not defend as valid or legitimate.  In the context of 
opposing counsel’s demands for a cross-examination in advance of a motion, BN stated,  
 
I would like to have those navigational instructions [the rules of procedure], 
even if it’s just in writing them down, just to be able to reference them over 
the weekend so I might know, because I didn't know whether he could just 
say he wants to cross-examine.  I could go ‘I didn’t get the email.’  He’s 
been doing that with me with the examination [judgment-debtor 
examination].  I tried to say I’m going to be setting aside a motion and he’s 
like – he didn’t respond, so I showed up at that anyway [judgment-debtor 
examination].  So it’s like just little things like that.  I don't know when 
people are playing tricks.  That's the one thing that I don't have that 
knowledge base.98   
 
When asked further about his distinction between someone acting within the purview of 
the rules and someone who is playing tricks, BN responded,  
 
before when I was getting the Notice of Examination and I look at some of 
the documents, my gut feeling tells me that probably the process was not 
100% on the up and up as far as what they did.  That’s my gut feeling from 
reading it.  Like I’d see judgments with different dates on them and crossed 
out.  But I don't know for sure.99   
 
                                                
97 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 13. 
98 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 7. 
99 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 8. 
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SE’s concern was that once she filed a motion, she would be inundated with emails and 
faxes from the opposing counsel who was going to,  
 
try to baffle me with bull*&#@, and I’ll be ‘is it true?’  Can I do this, can I 
not do this? Is what’s he’s saying true?  So I’ll have to come here [LHO] 
and say ‘is it true?’, can he do that?...And then when I get these ridiculous 
emails from the other side threatening and saying ‘I’m going to do this and 
I’m going to do that’, I’m going to come in and say ‘can he do this? Is what 
he’s saying true or is it just more scare tactics.100 
 
In BS’s interview, this manifested in a concern that the opposing lawyers would 
take steps against him that he was unversed in and unable to address.  In this regard, he 
stated “the speed at which I can go is not the speed at which the law firm would like me 
to go and they may get frustrated with me and throw the book at me but I do not know 
what is in the book.”101  The concern, as articulated by KC, BN, SE and BS, is that they 
may be overwhelmed or manipulated by opposing lawyers who have all the legal 
knowledge.  More significantly, the participants felt that the lawyers are prepared to use it 
against the self-represented litigants.  These feelings of intimidation based on a disparity 
in levels of legal knowledge were compounded by an anxiety that lawyers would use 
loopholes or tricks to confuse and trip-up self-represented litigants in ways that they may 
not against other lawyers.   
 
 For SE, the problem was further complicated by the fact that, when lawyers adopt 
overly aggressive positions with self-represented litigants, there was little or no recourse 
available to the self-represented litigants because,  
 
this is just someone whose playing the system, like he knows all the 
loopholes, he knows the games he can play, he knows that he will do 
whatever he wants and not be held to account because I can’t afford to hold 
him to account.  This is the thing I think I said when I met you a few weeks 
ago.  I made an analogy to a hockey game.  When there’s a hockey game 
there’s a ref, and there seems to be no ref here.  So it’s like he can do 
                                                
100 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 23-24. 
101 Interview of BS on November 25, 2014 reflects BS’ reluctance to speak to opposing counsel on the 
phone and concern that he could not communicate with the lawyer until he was confident of the law and 
how he would articulate his position. 
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whatever he wants, slashing, hooking, smash me into the boards face first 
and then I can go to the ref but that’s the court…[Interviewer: “Its two 
weeks after the game is over”]…It’s not just that, it could be months after 
the game’s over and guess what, I’ll end up having to pay.102 
 
 QH’s distrust of opposing counsel manifested in what he felt was the adoption of 
unreasonable positions that were only resolved once a lawyer from LHO became 
involved on QH’s behalf.  Specifically, after the opposing counsel refused to consent to a 
first adjournment of the matter in order to allow QH time to prepare responding 
materials, QH reported that “DE [the volunteer lawyer at LHO who was assisting QH] 
was able to apparently get her [the opposing lawyer] to be a bit more reasonable, whereas 
it was difficult for me to get her to just give anything…when DE called she was just like 
‘you and I both know how this will go, so don't push anymore.  He’s going to get his 
adjournment and you’re well aware of it.’”103  Interestingly, I observed this particular 
exchange: the volunteer lawyer (DE) made several attempts to call and was ultimately 
successful in reaching the opposing lawyer to secure a reasonable adjournment for QH.   
 
In her interview, KC also referenced a refusal by opposing counsel to cooperate 
with her as a self-represented litigant.  Early in the proceeding, she requested a change of 
venue from the opposing lawyers based on the fact that the action against her had been 
initiated outside the downtown.  She said that,  “distance driving is painful for me.  I have 
right leg injuries and back and neck injuries.  And I also have an old car.  So I sent a 
letter, when I eventually got onboard with Pro Bono asking them to transfer it to Toronto 
and there was a refusal and resistance.” 104  This was despite the fact that KC lived 
downtown, the bank branch at issue was located downtown, and the opposing firm 
maintained offices downtown near KC.  
 
                                                
102 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 8-9. 
103 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 4. 
104 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 4. 
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The concerns regarding opposing counsels’ approach to self-represented litigants 
were bolstered by certain of the volunteer lawyers’ experiences at LHO.  In describing 
her role at LHO, the volunteer lawyer DE said,  
 
a lot of time it’s calling the opposing lawyer because the bank has a lawyer 
and the condo corporation has a lawyer, and just saying we need an 
adjournment.  Because they won’t give it to the self-rep but they’ll give it to 
someone who says they’re a lawyer.  I have experienced that a lot…I’ve 
done that a lot, called the other lawyer and just said, ‘are you going to be 
reasonable?’ 105   
 
The apprehension expressed by both the self-represented litigants and the volunteer 
lawyers was also reflected in the advice that the volunteer lawyers would provide the 
self-represented clients about their interaction with opposing lawyers.  Specifically, in 
one meeting that I observed in October 2014, the advice provided to the self-represented 
litigant by the volunteer lawyer, DE, was “speak to the other side’s lawyer in writing or 
email – not on the phone.”106   
 
The volunteer lawyer, ST, recounted similar experiences at LHO whereby on 
behalf of a self-represented litigant, he would typically “pick up the phone and talk to a 
lawyer and say ‘what are you doing here?  This person is self-representing here at the 
project, you’re treating them like – I don't want to say – a lack of civility but it 
approaches that at times.  And realistically this is what is going to happen so why don't 
you give them the extra two weeks or whatever is it that they need and stop being so 
difficult.’” 107   In elaborating further on the difficulties faced by self-represented 
individuals when dealing with opposing counsel, ST continued,  
 
I think the biggest problem, and I see it in my files all the time, is I defend 
cases that self-reps bring, and I see a lot of lawyers spending a lot of time 
using procedural strategy to try and defeat a claim…And I think that’s a bit 
                                                
105 Interview of DE dated April 3, 2015 at 2-3. 
106 I observed meetings between the volunteer lawyer, DE and QH and between DE and another client on 
the afternoon of October 14, 2014 in which both clients were advised to communicate with the opposing 
counsel in writing to avoid being bullied or potentially out-maneuvered by the opposing lawyer. 
107 Interview of ST dated April 29, 2015 at 3. 
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unfair, because I know that a motion to strike a claim that you receive from 
a self-rep is a great procedural strategy to see if they’ll go away and to get a 
costs award etc, etc, etc.  But I know that’s not going to make the claim go 
away.  So unless it's a very clear case and I really have no idea what I’m 
pleading to, a motion to strike isn’t something that I tend to recommend to 
my clients.  Whereas co-defendants on the same case are scheduling 
motions to strike.108  And I’m going to sit back and let that process happen 
because I know that in the end it might just scare them into amending their 
claim and continue.  So I would say that one of the biggest challenges for 
them is lawyers and high paid law firms who are simply trying to put 
procedural blocks in front of them.  Once they actually get their case before 
the court and have their case heard, I think for the most part the court will 
do its best to see justice.  But there’s a lot of cases that I’ve seen where that 
isn’t getting there.  And I don't for a minute want to suggest that I’m not 
guilty of the same things.  I have done them.109   
 
Like certain of the self-represented litigants’ experiences with adjudicators, the 
issues raised about their experiences with opposing counsel are characterized by their 
self-perception as ‘outsiders’ and lawyers as ‘insiders’.  In this regard, lawyers are 
insiders in terms of the knowledge they hold and the way in which they are able to use 
that knowledge in an adversarial setting against the self-represented individual.  
Moreover, the anxiety experienced by the self-represented litigants when they were 
compelled to interact with opposing lawyers was exacerbated in situations where lawyers 
adopted overly aggressive or difficult positions toward the self-represented party and/or 
they took positions that they would not likely have taken with trained lawyers.  The 
resulting imbalance of power between the self-represented litigant and the lawyer serves 
to undermine the individuals’ belief in their ability to engage meaningfully.  This also 
heightens the self-represented litigants’ sense of distrust regarding actions taken by the 
lawyer.  Taken together, these further undermine the legitimacy of the legal process that 
from the self-represented litigant’s perspective, is subject to manipulation by lawyers. 
 
 
                                                
108 It is important to consider ST’s characterization of the use of summary judgment motions by lawyers in 
the context of the recent SCC decision, Hryniak v Maudlin, which advocated the use of such motions early 
in the proceedings as a means of improving access to justice.  See chapters three and four of this thesis. 
109 Interview of ST dated April 29, 2015 at 5-6. 
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(iii)  Self-Represented Litigants and Legal Process 
It is arguable that open, transparent and fair procedures help to legitimize the legal 
processes and the outcomes achieved in those processes.  However, for the participants in 
this project, the legal rules and procedures presented certain challenges that ultimately 
affected their perceptions of both their ability to proceed without legal representation and 
the equal applicability of the law.110  Roderick MacDonald suggested that substantive, 
linguistic, structural and procedural complexities produce a second effect on individuals 
by generating additional barriers through the feelings they engender in individuals.111  
While the self-represented litigants sought out information and advice from LHO and 
often made further attempts on their own to understand both the substantive and 
procedural aspects of their particular case, many discussed their struggle to comply with 
and apply the various procedural requirements.  Specifically, fulfilling the formal written 
requirements of certain court documents proved to be quite challenging for the self-
represented parties.  Finally, the time-consuming and drawn out nature of litigation, as 
well as the emotional aspects of managing one’s own case, contributed to the participants 
feelings of disempowerment.   
 
While there may be various challenges associated with understanding the relevant 
rules of procedure, a recurring theme that arose in the context of the interviews involved 
the self-represented litigants’ efforts to understand when and how the rules of procedure 
are applied.  The Rules of Civil Procedure set out timeframes for the completion of 
certain steps in litigation and provide a framework for what is to happen when those 
timeframes are not met.  However, a further complication arises when other informal 
customs are adopted by the insiders.  A volunteer lawyer, EN, reiterated this sentiment in 
a slightly more innocuous fashion when, describing his role at LHO, he said there is a 
“big difference between the rules as written and the rules in practice, and helping them 
                                                
110 Martha Minow and Robert Post, “Trust in the Legal System must be Regained” (December 9, 2014), 
The Boston Globe.  Available online at https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/12/09/after-michael-
brown-eric-garner-trust-legal-system-must-regained/ySfGQ3UrhSuWFi1hVH0z2K/story.html. 
111 Roderick MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”, supra note 12 at 34. 
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[the self-represented litigants] to understand that difference so as to be as efficient as 
possible with their claims.  That’s number one.” 112  SB expanded on the volunteer 
lawyer’s role in demystifying the rules when he said:  
 
the rules are drafted in such a manner that I can see why the self-reps come 
in….like this guy in Court recently.  It says here if he doesn't deliver an 
affidavit of documents I can move to strike his claim.  And I’m like ‘yeah 
that’s what the rule says.’  Why wouldn't you as a community of people, 
never mind like a first year lawyer probably does that, just assume that if the 
rules say that then that is the rule.  And I think the rules are drafted in a 
manner that have so much discretion, and again now much better, but it 
leads self-reps to the point where they don't have the annotated rules, they 
don't know what to read about the case law.  Even the annotated rules don't 
give you much help.  And the rules are read in such a manner that you think 
you have all these rights and then they – I think get frustrated when the 
court says ‘well no, I’m never going to dismiss the claim.’  That’s not 
reasonable and they don't understand.  So I think there is a real disconnect 
between their image of the legal system and how it operates and what the 
rules of the game are, and then actually how the rules are applied.113  
 
 While XE ultimately concluded that learning about the legal process and 
undertaking steps on his own was a positive aspect of his self-representation, he also 
underscored the difficulty faced by a non-lawyer in understanding the practical 
application of the rules.  Notwithstanding having reviewed a flow chart outlining the 
procedural steps, XE questioned the applicability of the rules in light of the fact that the 
flow chart indicated an affidavit of documents was required within 10 days.  He 
complained that, “nobody called me about any exchange of documents.  So have I 
basically missed that deadline?  Another date coming up on that flow chart is you have 60 
days to discuss a settlement with the other party.  So again I don't know who calls who.  
And if I don't get a call have I missed that date?”114  Thus, while non-lawyers may be in a 
position to find the requisite rule (typically online via the Ministry of the Attorney 
General’s website or the CanLii website) and interpret the application of the rule in the 
context of their particular case, ultimately the rule is often applied differently in practice 
                                                
112 Interview of EN dated March 3, 2014 at 2. 
113 Interview of SB dated July 9, 2015 at 4. 
114 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 3. 
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among lawyers.  During the course of SE’s interview, she exemplified the challenge 
facing self-represented litigants when they attempt to exercise judgment and make 
strategic decisions about the progression of their case in accordance with the prescribed 
rules.  SE indicated that,  
 
I served my defence on Friday and filed it on Friday.  So I’m going to move 
for summary judgment.  I know I’m allowed – like according to my research 
I can move for summary judgment right after I file my defence, but then I’m 
like ‘well the pleadings are still open so I don't know if I’m going to hear 
from them again, if they’re going to change their claim against me.’  So 
that’s what I have to ask these guys.  Do I have to wait or can I file a 
summary motion.115 
 
 This discrepancy between what the technical legal rule might require or prohibit 
and what the ‘practice’ of law might be among lawyers was a source of significant 
frustration for self-represented litigants.  Interestingly, during the observation stage of 
this research project, volunteer lawyers were often heard to be advising clients that the 
step they were seeking to take was not typically undertaken in practice in the manner that 
they were proposing.  For example, several clients were advised against noting an 
opposing party in default immediately following the expiration of the time limit for filing 
a statement of defence because it was not the practice among most lawyers to do so and 
any default judgment obtained would likely be set aside by a judge.   
 
For other participants, a key theme underlining the discussion of their case and 
their resolve to move their case forward was a concern that they would be ‘tripped up’ by 
the ‘technicalities’ of law.  XE underscored the stress involved in this regard when he 
said that, “If my objective is to win the case, which it is, then that is very stressful, to 
think that a technicality like that would invalidate my claim.  That would be stressful 
because I’ve come that far.”116  MD also highlighted a concern about technicalities 
associated with the application of procedural rules when she expressed the view, “[w]e 
don't want to be kicked out of court because of a technicality.  That’s the thing right here.  
                                                
115 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 2. 
116 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015. 
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I don't know the technicalities.  If I don't get all those files [documents requested in a 
cross-examination] is there going to be trouble.”117  In terms of understanding the 
procedural requirements, MD further described,  
 
the stress of not knowing where the next step is, and no one explaining even 
if I do ask, they’re still like you’ve got to do this and this and then they 
leave one thing out.  That’s very stressful.  This has been a very stressful 
three years, and just because I don't have a doctor’s note stating that I’ve 
gone through a psychiatrist, you’ve got to understand that it is stressful 
because you don’t know.  It’s like taking an exam…because I think just 
knowing that – ‘hey, if I don't do this I’m going to get thrown out of court or 
I’m going to have to do an appeal.’  I think that’s my anxiety, because I 
even asked one of the lawyers and she said ‘this is a mess but I know there 
is going to be this, this and this.’118   
 
In addition to struggling to decipher how the procedural rules might be applied in 
a particular case, the participants highlighted another challenge specific to non-lawyers 
when completing steps in litigation.  This involved the preparation of written materials 
for court, such as statements of claim, statements of defence and affidavits.  The 
participants were sensitive to the fact that adjudicators and lawyers prepared court 
materials in a particular language and format and that, if the self-represented litigants 
were to engage with the process, they would need to prepare their materials in a similar 
style.  
 
LM acknowledged that there was a certain logic in having the parties lay out their 
evidence in advance of the hearing.  However, the preparation of a formal affidavit was a 
particularly intimidating event for him.  In this regard, he stated,  
 
[b]ut at the same time there’s too much information as you can imagine with 
this.  If I try and put it all in writing and then provide all the background and 
all the details I end up with 100 pages or something like that.  As it is, I’ve 
got a 7 or 8 page affidavit that he’s telling me that’s way too much 
information, so I try and summarize this for my motion.  So for a layman to 
                                                
117 Interview of MD dated July 16, 2015 at 10. 
118 Interview of MD dated July 16, 2015 at 16. 
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try and provide all the information while simultaneously not providing too 
much information is pretty much impossible.119   
 
LM further elaborated that while the process might be understandable in terms of the 
rules of procedure, those same rules do not assist in the preparation of court materials.  
Specifically, he suggested that “the documents in terms of how to prepare whether it’s a 
plaintiff’s claim or an affidavit or anything like that, there really isn’t anything to tell you 
how to do it and what it should look like.”120   
 
QH experienced a similar difficulty when attempting to prepare his responding 
materials.  He said,  
 
I had to get 8 years of memories written down in a few – well what was 
actually considered a few pages for me, but again I can tend to go on a 
little.  So again, that was another challenge for me was ensuring that it was 
to the point.  Again LHO was helpful in providing I guess resources for 
‘this is what it needs to look like, you have to have this page first, then this 
page needs to come after, this needs to be filed here, these are their hours.  
It needs to have a Table of Contents that looks like this’…Yeah and also in 
terms of the affidavit.  It’s not entirely clear what you have to write.  There 
are a number of issues of that nature that I faced that were – again, if I had 
formal legal training or experience I would have simply known how to do 
that or what to do, and again it takes a lot more I guess – it’s actually 
really time-consuming.121 
 
For KC, there was a concern that “I don't know how to minimize it.  That’s one of 
the deficits of a self-rep  - is what do you leave out and still be heard?  You can be too 
complete but at the end of the day if it’s all there and they dismiss it you can say but I put 
it all in there.”  KC’s anxiety over whether she had provided sufficient information to the 
court was corroborated by comments made to her by a judge.  In a motion regarding her 
pleadings, KC was required to delete certain phrases that she had included in an amended 
statement of defence,  
 
                                                
119 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 7. 
120 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 11-12. 
121 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 5-6. 
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through Pro Bono I was told the five step process of how you present 
misconduct and I put together a 17 page report and the judge said I didn't 
plead it properly.  Which I find as a self-represented person, like you’re 
talking about access to justice, why should anyone whose self-represented 
have to plead anything, let alone properly.  We don't know how, we’re not 
lawyers.  So that troubled me because I don't know what pleading properly 
is.122 
 
In striving to tell their stories within the structured format of an affidavit or a 
pleading, several of the participants acknowledged that part of this struggle related to the 
fact that, for the self-represented litigant, a legal proceeding can be a highly emotional 
experience.  While a lawyer may feel vested in the case that she is advocating, there is 
still a distance between the subject matter of the litigation and the lawyer’s personal 
life.123  However, for the self-represented litigants, the subject matter of the litigation 
involves the personal aspects of their life.  KU became acutely of aware of this challenge 
in the course of an examination for discovery in which,  
 
sitting in front of somebody whose done you so much harm and caused your 
family so much grief, we thought we’d be cool as cucumbers but it wasn’t 
the case.  It was more for my husband to keep it together.  He wasn't crying 
or anything like that, there were no outward really display of emotion but 
you could tell he was off balance and couldn't respond as quickly and in the 
right manner…Self-representing, I wish we would have done a better job, I 
felt like we were ill-equipped for the discoveries, especially my husband 
because he had to face the property manager who he was buddies with, so 
when you have an emotional relationship, we didn't answer those questions 
as well as we could have and I think we gave away too much information.124   
 
QH articulated a similar sentiment when he said that, “when you’re representing 
yourself, it’s something that’s really personal.  It’s not something that you can kind of 
deal with at arm’s length.  And of course, it’s very emotional.  And if the issue is 
                                                
122 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 7. 
123 In defining the attributes of the “dominant model” of legal professionalism, Trevor Farrow suggests that 
key elements of this model require that the lawyer remain “personally neutral vis-à-vis the result of the 
client’s cause; and to leave the ultimate ethical, personal, economic and social bases for the decision to 
proceed in the hands of the client.”  See Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46 
Osgoode Hall LJ 51 at 63.  
124 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 5. 
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complex, which our issue was, you actually have a lot more of the information than your 
lawyer would have.”125   
 
The fact that the self-represented litigant is not only attempting to argue a 
particular position, but also experiencing the legal issue in the course of his or her daily 
life means that the adherence to neutral and detached advocacy is neither possible nor 
realistic.  In this sense, there is a disconnect between the ways in which trained lawyers 
might choose to present a case and how the judiciary expects to see a case presented and 
the way in which self-represented litigants might present their case.  This disconnect 
becomes apparent to the self-represented litigant upon their engagement with the civil 
court process.  While acknowledging the emotional side of litigation, QH also recognized 
that, “its [the court] kind of an environment where it’s best not to be emotional.”126  In 
watching court proceedings and preparing to present her own case, EP observed that, “I 
want to go in there really organized, calm and rational rather than emotional, because I’m 
a really emotional person anyway.”127   
 
The difficulties that resulted from the emotional aspects of representing oneself 
were further compounded by the time-consuming nature of preparing your own case.  
Most experienced litigators would acknowledge that the litigation process can take a 
significant amount of time as a legal matter moves through the judicial system. However, 
for self-represented litigants, the process of litigation can consume an exponential amount 
of time by comparison.  Unlike the professional lawyer retained on behalf of a client to 
handle their case for them, many self-represented litigants must manage their legal case 
while otherwise employed and/or meeting a variety of personal responsibilities.  QH 
recognized early in his litigation that self-represented litigants require significant amounts 
of time to research how to take certain steps; this fact worked to the opposing counsel’s 
advantage.  KC acknowledged that “for the size of the matter I’m dealing with I feel that 
amount of time I’ve consumed at Pro Bono is disproportionate….for self-reps there’s a 
                                                
125 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 4. 
126 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 4. 
127 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 8. 
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disproportionate amount of time required for maybe things that could be dealt with faster 
in another way.”128  SE suggested that one of the reasons that she would not represent 
herself in the future was because, “[a]ll things being equal because it's a time suck.  Like 
right now I am on a deadline to get a manuscript in for my book and I’m spending hours 
and hours dealing with the lawsuit.  So it’s sucking up my time.”129  KU highlighted the 
time-consuming nature of litigation for self-represented litigants both in terms of the time 
spent at LHO waiting to speak to someone, as well as the drawn-out nature of litigation 
generally.  Respecting the latter, she said,  
 
I think so much time is spent with the paperwork and I think people can lose 
steam.  Really if we weren’t a strong couple a lot of people said ‘I think you 
guys would be divorced by now or crack up because the strain on your 
marriage and your finances is tremendous.’  So luckily we have a strong 
base and we’ve made it through.  But I would say if there’s a way to speed 
things up quicker for people who are self-representing in particular that 
would help.  Because if they don’t have a support network, emotional 
support network or financial, you just give up.  You just say it’s too hard, 
it’s too difficult.130   
 
Self-Represented Litigants and Access to Justice  
Having examined different aspects of the corresponding themes of empowerment and 
disempowerment, the question that remains is how these apparently conflicting 
experiences ultimately influence the participants’ beliefs about access to justice.  More 
significantly, it is important to show how these experiences affect the perception of their 
ability to bring about justice in their lives.  Mindful that the self-represented litigants 
interviewed had been engaged with the civil justice system first hand, it is worth noting 
that all but three of the self-represented litigants indicated that, if they were to be 
involved in another legal matter, they would likely prefer to retain a lawyer.  This 
assertion is, in turn, contrasted with these litigants’ conceptualization of access to justice 
that tended to focus on whether one was able to present one’s case and be heard by those 
with the authority to make a decision.  Arguably, the apparent discrepancy between the 
                                                
128 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 20. 
129 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 13. 
130 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2014 at 8. 
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participants’ admission that they would likely hire a lawyer in the future (notwithstanding 
what they had learned or gained personally from the present experience) and their 
characterization of access to justice may be reconciled and resolved in terms of how 
lawyers interact with their clients and the extent to which clients are engaged in the 
decision-making processes on their cases.  Alternatively, this discrepancy may also be 
explained in terms of how their beliefs about what the civil justice system should do does 
not correspond with how it actually operates for them.  While this does not mean that the 
entire civil justice system is unworkable from the perspective of the self-represented 
litigants, it does require that policy-makers, the judiciary and the legal profession 
evaluate critically how the system is operationalized by ‘insiders’ and how those 
‘insiders’ must begin to disabuse themselves of the control that this status has afforded 
them.  Such an ambition is consistent with a democratic approach to access.131   
 
While the participants believed that the services provided at LHO generally 
assisted them in accessing the civil justice system, one participant, BN, distinguished 
between access to services and access to justice.  In this regard, he stated,  
 
I don’t think I have access to justice because I’m going to Law Help Ontario 
because I don't know whether I will get justice.  So access to legal support 
but I don't know if I have access to justice.  Time will tell…Yeah.  Access 
to Justice, I know it’s a catch phrase, but for the way I see it, I don't feel like 
having these services is really access to justice.  I think that it’s just access 
to – you’re doing it yourself you’re just getting training.  I don't know, am I 
wrong?...[interviewer: so some people define it [access] as getting lawyers 
and that will get me justice.  Some people say it’s about being able to just be 
heard, and, if I get heard, then I’ve got access]…BN: I was actually going to 
say that—to be heard.132   
 
As noted, when EP was questioned about what she thought justice would look like in her 
case and what that term meant to her more generally, she responded,  
 
                                                
131 This critical evaluation is developed further in the final chapter of this thesis that examines certain 
recommendations that are based on the insights provided by the participants interviewed in this research 
project. 
132 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2105 at 11. 
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What it should mean is they look at all the evidence regardless of whether 
it's a lawyer presenting the evidence and questioning witnesses.  The bottom 
line should be the evidence presented…Regardless of it and regardless of 
the fact that maybe you don't have the experience of the lawyer but you’re 
still presenting the facts, what happened…[Interviewer: So is the justice 
piece being heard by the court or is the justice piece the decision that comes 
out of that, for you?]…EP:  I think it’s both.  If you don’t have an 
opportunity to present your evidence then you don’t feel that justice has 
been served, and if you don’t have a good outcome you probably think 
would it have made a difference if I hired a lawyer, did I not do the work, 
did I not present properly?  Was there a bias because I wasn't represented?  
There are a lot of questions that’ll come up.  I haven’t got there yet.133   
 
LM felt strongly that access to justice should mean, “[h]aving somebody with the 
authority to do something about a situation, hear the facts and render a decision.  That I’d 
say is the…That’s the whole point of the system and that’s what the system is all about 
denying from happening.”134  
 
However, LM’s positive experience with one particular judge with whom he was 
provided an opportunity to discuss the details of his case still left him skeptical about 
whether he would be in a position to affect justice.  For him, access was about being 
heard.  This was evident in his previously noted comments about the interaction he had 
with one judge in particular.  In this regard, he said,  
 
[y]ou at least feel like you had a proper hearing which makes it a little easier 
to stomach not having gotten justice…But that’s where even having an 
opportunity to argue something before somebody that is actually listening, 
which is a challenge to begin with, where even having that opportunity it 
can still end up not giving you the justice you’re seeking because you didn't 
get that ability to give a full argument because of personal limitations of any 
person.135   
 
Thus, a key component of achieving justice included the prerequisite that individuals are 
heard in a meaningful manner.  However, there remain significant barriers, both 
                                                
133 Interview of EP dated December 15, 2014 at 14-15. 
134 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 17-18. 
135 Ibid at 18. 
 280 
personally and structurally, that prevent individuals from being heard.  From LM’s 
perspective, the challenges faced by non-lawyers who must engage with members of the 
bench in a highly stressful setting in a civil courtroom meant that self-represented 
litigants were unlikely to access justice.  As well, the difficulty of completing the often 
multi-staged procedural requirements of civil litigation added to the stress.  
 
For XE, the concept of justice and access to it was about “getting down to the 
facts, and what really happened and was there negligence or wasn't there negligence and 
determining what the costs are.  It’s all about the facts, I think that’s what justice is.”136  
This view was shared by KC and MD.  For KC, justice involves “[o]pen, full 
transparency.  No judgment should be made unless all evidence is in front of a judge.  
And if there’s any evidence missing a judgment shouldn't be allowed.  It’s not okay.  
That’s how I define it.”137  For MD, being able to go into court the same as a lawyer and 
feel comfortable making an argument was an important aspect of access to justice.  In the 
context of her particular case, she believed that, with the assistance of LHO, she was 
“positive” that she would be able to get justice in her case.   
 
Law as a Level Playing Field 
The research that Trevor Farrow conducted on individuals’ understanding of their ability 
to access justice highlighted “[a] strong and troubling theme…that money and class are 
key factors when it comes to meaningful accessibility of justice” and that “justice 
appears, at least to many, as only available to the rich.”138  Several of the participants in 
this study echoed this concern.  Specifically, there was reference made to the need for 
access to justice, as an initiative, to ‘level the playing field’ for non-lawyers.  In so doing, 
this ensures that individuals, regardless of means, are able to engage in the legal system.  
BS suggested that, without services such as LHO, the average citizen is not on a level 
playing field in the legal system.  He stated,  
                                                
136 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 16. 
137 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 16. 
138 Trevor C W Farrow, “What is Access to Justice?” (2014) 51:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 957 at 972-973. 
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it is definitely for the average person like myself and I consider myself an 
average citizen, there is a lot of anxiety because you realize that you are in a 
playing field and you do not have access to it and you are kind of at the 
mercy of the system and you need to have the proper access…a service like 
LHO to level the playing field for all citizens.139   
 
QH likened the provision of services that assist individuals access justice to the 
provision of health care services, in the sense that,  
 
it is an extremely important thing for a democratic society to have.  Because 
in a sense again from a political perspective, it is one of our three branches 
of power, it’s our third branch of government.  And it can pose a bit of a 
democratic issues in terms of if certain people have greater access to 
government, it kind of has the same argument as ‘is it fair that lobbyist can 
have greater access whereas normal people can’t have a say in the executive 
or parliament.’  So there’s an access issue.140 
 
SE held a much stronger position in this regard.  She maintained that,  
 
there is no justice in the justice system unless you can pay for it.  That’s the 
bottom line.  If you can’t afford to pay a lawyer $400-$600 an hour, and 
let’s face it, who can?...I just mean you have to afford to represent yourself, 
you have to have good representation, you have to pay and it’s prohibitively 
expensive.  So if you can’t afford that you have no access to justice.141 
 
Conclusion 
The self-represented litigants interviewed in this research project raised important and 
distinctive issues about their experience in the civil justice system.  It might be said that, 
by seeking assistance from self-help legal services at LHO, they were already prepared to 
engage in the legal system on their own behalf.  Their subsequent experiences highlighted 
a variety of challenges as well as successes.  From a confidence and educational 
standpoint, there was an overall sense of encouragement about their individual ability to 
learn, engage and grow.  However, in some instances, this was undermined by their 
interaction with those who inhabit the civil justice system, namely the lawyers and 
                                                
139 Interview of BS dated November 25, 2014 at 12. 
140 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 17. 
141 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 19. 
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judges.  Often, participants exhibited a sense of powerlessness when dealing with the 
system’s insiders that left them disenchanted not only about the operationalization of the 
legal system, but also about their own ability to affect a result in their case and the ability 
of like individuals to do the same.  
 
The central question that follows from a review of these themes is how the self-
represented litigants’ particular challenges and successes might inform a theoretical 
conceptualization of access to justice and the policy initiatives derived therefrom.  As 
part of this undertaking, it is important to take account of both the empowering and 
educative aspects of the participants’ experiences and their disempowering aspects.  In 
doing so, it is hoped that an approach to access that seeks to enhance the positive benefits 
associated with direct engagement by self-presented litigants can also address the 
challenges that cause self-represented litigants to lose confidence in the civil justice 
system and ultimately disengage.  Developing such an approach would be consistent with 
the democratic thesis that seeks to encourage citizens’ wide and frequent participation in 
the legal and political decisions that affect them.  A key component of this analysis must 
include a critical examination of how the existing adversarial system is operating in light 
of the presence of self-represented individuals and how those who currently participate in 
and administer the adversarial system might better address self-represented litigants’ 
concerns.  Consequently, the final chapter in this thesis will examine some of the ways in 
which access to justice theory and the corresponding access policy and programs might 
be approached in order to advance the practical efficacy of the legal process as well as its 
democratic legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT  
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Access to justice policy and approaches have had various iterations.  However, 
much of the debate about conceptualizations of access to justice, as well as the resulting 
policies, have been influenced by a central focus—legal representation.  This 
predominant view has influenced much of the theory of access to justice, as well as a 
myriad of the initiatives developed to improve access.  However, the purpose of this 
thesis has been to offer an alternative conceptualization of access that shifts away from a 
reliance on legal representation as the predominant approach to promoting access.  This 
alternative conceptualization seeks to deepen the way access to justice is conceptualized 
and operationalized. 1   This conceptualization is informed by the principles of 
participatory democracy and is justified on the basis of law’s critical role in a democratic 
society.  A participatory approach to access attempts to ensure that individuals are able to 
engage meaningfully in the legal and political processes that impact their lives.  Through 
engagement in these political and legal processes, individuals will also be in a position to 
affect the achievement of justice in their lives.  Moreover, encouraging meaningful 
participation has important consequences for the administration of justice, the continued 
legitimacy of the justice system and the laws created and administered within that justice 
system.  
  
A conceptualization of access to justice that encourages meaningful participation 
is consistent with the realities of self-represented litigants in the civil justice system.  
More significantly, this conceptualization is supported by the self-represented litigants’ 
narratives in this study.  While there were many reasons for them to feel disempowered 
about their experience, the self-represented litigants also experienced and revealed 
important moments of empowerment, which is relevant to the development of meaningful 
                                                
1 In the case of access to justice, there may be a general acceptance of the idea that enhancing access to 
justice is a worthwhile goal but little agreement regarding how that goal is defined or how it is to be 
achieved.  
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participation.  In the context of this research study, this sense of empowerment was often 
associated with an increased sense of self-confidence, enhanced knowledge of legal 
processes and institutions, and, in certain instances, a willingness to engage further in 
other forums and capacities.  Thus, to the extent that empowerment is valued with a view 
to fostering meaningful participation by citizens in a myriad of capacities and forums, the 
democratic thesis represents a potentially transformative endeavor. 
 
Consistent with the democratic thesis, a participatory approach to access to justice 
offers different roads to change than those associated with the predominant model of 
access as defined by the practical thesis.2  This is not to say that these two theoretical 
approaches are mutually exclusive, such that adoption of one approach negates the 
implementation of initiatives that are grounded in the alternative approach.  Rather, that it 
is necessary to ensure that the choice of a particular initiative is guided by the broader 
objectives of access to justice theory.  In this way, the initiative will contribute to the 
overall goal; the promotion of opportunities for individual empowerment and 
participation.   
 
In light of the participants’ stories in this research project, particularly relating to 
their disempowering experiences, it is apparent that there are significant changes required 
within the litigation process.  Some of these changes are immediate and practical in the 
sense that the participants, specifically lawyers and judges, be more inclusive of self-
represented litigants.  Moreover, the process should be made more accessible through 
better support for individuals attempting to represent themselves.  However, there are 
other changes that require a deeper examination of the structure and operationalization of 
                                                
2 In his article entitled “Theses on Access to Justice”, MacDonald was critical of ‘reforms’ undertaken to 
ameliorate the lack of access as “the very notion of “re”-form induces the presentation of ideas in a form 
prefigured for implementation within the system, but thereafter out of the interpretive control of those who 
propose them.  The appointment of task forces, working groups and commissions of inquiry composed of 
those who have a commitment to official structures and institutions is a guarantee of recommendations 
written in the official discourse…The Policy Audience demands output which can be evaluated within 
existing structures.”  Keeping this critique in mind, it is not only important how we think about access to 
justice initiatives but also how we frame proposed changes to ensure that those changes are not caught 
within an official discourse that fails to take account of those who we wish to include in the discourse and 
who might previously have been excluded.  See Roderick A MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice” 
(1992) 7:2 CJLS 23 at 32 [MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”]. 
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the litigation process so that self-represented litigants are viewed not as a problem to be 
addressed, but rather become an important and integral part of the legal process in a 
democratic society.  
 
Thus, while this crucial insight does not mean that the entire civil justice system is 
unworkable from the perspective of the self-represented litigant, it does require that 
scholars, policy-makers, the judiciary and legal professionals critically evaluate how the 
system is currently operationalized.  This necessarily entails a re-appraisal of the role of 
the ‘insiders’ who act within the adversarial system, as well as the process implemented 
by those same ‘insiders’.  The failure to take account of these critical components and 
make the requisite changes will likely result in continued cosmetic participation 
experienced by many self-represented litigants and a corresponding mystification of the 
legal system.3  By contrast, undertaking comprehensive change in terms of both practice 
and the underlying assumptions about the litigation process signals a transformation of 
the existing adversarial system consistent with the democratic thesis of access to justice. 
 
In this chapter, therefore, I intend to discuss two important aspects of the shift 
from the practical thesis to the democratic thesis of access to justice.  In the first part, I 
will suggest that the adoption of the democratic thesis is sustained and encouraged by the 
self-represented litigants’ experiences in this research project.  As part of this discussion, 
I propose that what is needed from an access to justice perspective is a commitment to 
enhancing more meaningful participation by individuals, as opposed to a predominant 
focus on representation by lawyers and a corresponding continued reliance on 
professionals.  In so doing, I will briefly canvass several aspects of the participants’ 
empowering experiences as a basis for adopting a participatory approach.  However, 
assuming that individuals wish to participate, but struggle to do so, it will be necessary to 
make significant changes to the way the litigation process is conceptualized and 
                                                
3 In his critique of the Task Force on Access to Justice (a task force that he chaired), MacDonald suggested 
that ultimately the recommendations reflected the fact that “all destabilizing proposals gradually became 
transformed from queries about the legitimacy of the existing institutional order to tacit re-endorsements of 
that order: over two years, ADR, case management, legal aid, preparing legal insurance, public legal 
information, and legal education in the law faculties, for example, each came to be discussed only terms of 
the dominant model.  See MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”, supra note 2 at 44. 
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operationalized.  This includes broader systemic changes, as well as more immediate and 
practical changes that will encourage and support self-represented litigants.  Therefore, 
the second part of this concluding chapter will address certain changes that might begin 
to transform the self-represented litigants’ disempowering experiences.  These changes 
are aimed at enhancing greater participation by self-represented litigants.  This, in turn, 
signifies a broader paradigm shift in the litigation model and one that is both necessary 
and urgent if we are to live up to our democratic ideals.  In the course of this chapter, I 
intend to unite the theoretical and the empirical research in a series of policy initiatives.   
 
A New Approach to Access to Justice 
The democratic thesis of access to justice contemplates that individuals are provided with 
opportunities to participate in law-making and law-administering processes.  This 
encourages citizens’ discourse on concepts of law and justice.  This discourse contributes 
to the development of a new legal vernacular that is relevant to and reflective of 
individuals’ lives.  In this sense, individuals have an opportunity to reclaim official law.  
The benefit of facilitating meaningful participation more generally is that it also assists 
individuals to develop the confidence, skills, and tools that enable them to participate 
further.  In this regard, Pateman maintained that the social training of citizens in the ways 
of democracy ensures that citizens are able to maximize their participation within a 
democracy.  The associated benefit in proceeding in this manner is that individuals begin 
to engage in a wide variety of decision-making processes and the resulting decisions are 
legitimized.  Moreover, the promotion of meaningful participation, if taken seriously, 
necessarily encourages wider and more frequent engagement by individuals and/or 
groups that have historically been disengaged or excluded from legal and political 
institutions.  Within the context of the democratic thesis of access to justice, the means by 
which individuals are able to participate will incorporate both self-representation and 
assistance from lawyers who are focused on encouraging individuals to share in the 
decision-making processes that affect their lives.4  
                                                
4 In terms of a comprehensive approach to access to justice, the provision of legal representation is not 
characterized as an either/or but rather forms part of an overall approach that contemplates assisting 
individuals seek justice in their lives and participate directly where possible.  Thus, the underlying premise 
is that access initiatives would facilitate direct participation in a variety of different fashions. 
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While individuals may be frustrated by their attempts to participate, it does not 
mean that they do not want to or are not interested in having a voice and a role in the 
policies, rules and decisions that affect their daily lives and those of their communities.  
Experience suggests that, to the extent that participation begets further and expanded 
participation, individuals want more participation and meaningful engagement, not less.  
Thus, the frustration expressed by the participants in this research may have more to do 
with the reality of their participatory experiences within a complex and professionalized 
legal system than with a disinterest in being part of the process or any particular outcome.   
 
This state of affairs is borne out by the procedural fairness research discussed in 
chapter five and further reflected in the discussions with self-represented litigants in this 
research project.  Also, research in the field of procedural fairness has indicated that, 
“people want voice in legal proceedings and react to the extent that they do or do not 
receive it.”5  In this sense, ‘voice’ is defined as “having some form of participation in 
decision-making by expressing one’s own opinion.” 6   There are positive benefits 
associated with individuals’ belief that they had a ‘voice’ in the particular proceeding; 
these include being more likely to trust the decision-maker, feeling that they were treated 
with respect, increased self-esteem, and an enhanced belief about what they may be 
entitled to as a worthwhile person.7  All of these are important elements of empowerment 
and participation.   
 
In the specific context of this research project, the participants’ views about their 
court experiences were significantly influenced by whether they believed that the 
                                                
5 Nourit Zimmerman & Tom R Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological 
Perspective” (2010) 37 Fordham Urb LJ 473 at 486 [Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel 
and Access to Justice”]. 
6 Robert Folger, “Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of ‘Voice’ and Improvements on 
Experienced Inequality” (1977) 35 J Personality & Social Psychology 108 at 109 [Folger, “Distributive and 
Procedural Justice”]. 
7 Folger, “Distributive and Procedural Justice”, ibid at 117. 
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adjudicator provided them with an opportunity to speak and be heard.8  In fact, in several 
instances, the adjudicators’ reaction to the self-represented litigants’ attempts to 
participate in the proceeding significantly affected the individuals’ general perception of 
the fairness of the process.  For instance, QH’s perceptions about the fairness of the legal 
process were impacted greatly by his interaction with a judge who he said,  
 
wouldn’t let me speak, she would constantly cut me off, tell me that she 
didn’t want to hear it.  She had apparently come to her decision generally 
prior, it would appear to me.  Like when I got there she seemed like she was 
furious with me, like she wanted to hurt me.  And it was kind of confusing.9   
 
For QH, the judge’s dismissal of his attempts to engage in the conversation resulted in 
him concluding that the judge had already made her decision and there was nothing for 
him to contribute.  Rather than encouraging participation, this type of exchange is more 
likely to reinforce certain negative perceptions about who is able or allowed to speak and 
who is not.  Unlike lawyers who regularly attend in court and who may appreciate that a 
particular judge does not need to hear from them because she either understands or does 
not dispute their submissions, self-represented litigants have no such contextual 
reference.  Therefore, they are likely to assume that their voice is not relevant or 
worthwhile.  Not surprisingly, such an experience has the potential to reinforce feelings 
of disempowerment and disengagement.    
 
In this research, the implications of being provided with an opportunity to be 
heard and thereby participate in a meaningful manner extended beyond the participants’ 
evaluation of the fairness of the specific proceeding.  For the individuals interviewed, 
being heard and being able to participate in the decision-making process further affected 
their perceptions about access generally and, more specifically, their ability to access 
justice.  For EP, achieving justice was about an adjudicator listening to the evidence 
regardless of who was presenting it.  For BN, access to justice was not about access to 
                                                
8 See the discussion in chapter seven of this thesis regarding the self-represented litigants’ experiences 
interacting with adjudicators.   
9 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 9. 
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legal services or assistance such as the type provided at LHO, but rather about using the 
tools and skills provided at LHO in order to be heard.   
 
Implicit in these descriptions of access is the emphasis placed on direct 
engagement and the opportunity to both speak and be heard.  Moreover, while it may be 
that many of the interviewees were obligated to proceed by virtue of being defendants in 
a civil action, it is also worth noting that all of the self-represented litigants had made 
repeated visits to LHO in order to obtain additional legal information and advice about 
how best to proceed.  This readiness to engage was reflected in the self-represented 
litigants’ efforts to learn more about the legal rules, processes and institutions relevant to 
their case; this, in itself, suggests a commitment to participate.  While almost all of the 
participants also indicated that, if given a choice, they would prefer to hire a lawyer, this 
assertion was often qualified in a variety of ways.  For example, certain of the self-
represented litigants acknowledged that, even if they did hire a lawyer in the future, they 
would want to participate in the decisions made within the solicitor-client relationship 
rather than allow the lawyer to unilaterally manage their case.  As XE indicated, this 
meant that, in the future, “at least I will be able to say to that lawyer, can we handle it this 
way?  Participate in my defence.”10  The admission that self-represented litigants would 
likely hire a lawyer was also a reflection of their acknowledgement that the litigation 
process presented a variety of challenges that were both disproportionately time-
consuming and financially taxing; lawyers were better equipped to handle the situation.   
 
Benefits Associated with Meaningful Participation 
As a result of handling their own case, there were important consequences for the 
participants.11  Specifically, several of the participants expressed increased confidence as 
a result of addressing their legal problem without a lawyer (KU and MD), standing up 
and making submissions in court (LM, EP and QH), and preparing complicated court 
documents such as affidavits and various pleadings (QH and XE).  This increased 
                                                
10 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015 at 11. 
11 This was discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. 
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confidence extended beyond the particular task at hand.  It encompassed a more general 
sense of confidence associated with recognition of an ability to address problems as they 
arose in the future and stand up for oneself as well as others.  Increased personal 
confidence is an important component of empowerment, which is necessary, for 
meaningful participation.12   
 
While meaningful participation both includes and requires an educative 
prerequisite, there is also an educative benefit to be gained through engagement. 13  In 
order to engage in decision-making processes in a meaningful manner, individuals must 
be educated in a range and use of democratic as well as legal tools and skills.  It is also 
necessary that individuals be provided with the relevant information required for 
participation.  This includes obtaining both the skills necessary to engage and be effective 
in that engagement, as well as information about the relevant rules, policies and issues, 
that form the subject matter of the decision-making process.  One modest site at which 
this may begin to occur is self-help legal services where individuals are provided with 
technical information, as well as training in skills that assist them to participate more 
effectively.  However, by participating in decision-making and problem-solving, 
individuals acquire educative benefits; they learn in an experiential manner that leads to 
changes in behaviour, confidence and leadership.  Moreover, individuals gain knowledge 
about those processes that potentially carries over to other decision-making processes.  
For certain of the participants in this research project, there was a definite recognition 
that they had learned important skills and/or obtained knowledge that was not only 
necessary for their participation in the civil justice system, but was also likely to carry 
over to other aspects of their lives.  The volunteer lawyer, ST, had compared the 
development of these skills to learning to ride a bicycle in the sense that once you learn to 
                                                
12 See discussion regarding the link between increased confidence and empowerment in chapter three of 
this thesis. 
13 Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 
[Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory].  Pateman’s discussion of participation is discussed in 
greater detail in chapter three of this thesis.   
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do so, you can ride a variety of different types of bikes with minor adjustments.14  As 
noted, BN articulated this when suggesting,  
 
I went in not empowered and I feel, I don't want to say 100% but I feel more 
empowered.  The fact that I now know how to do this stuff and I’m learning 
a process.  Like I kind of look at it that way so I don't just see the negative.  
I’m listen – these are skills that are not really pleasant but there are skills 
you are learning, you’re learning how to represent yourself.  As difficult and 
challenging as it is it’s like this is stuff that you wouldn't have looked into.15   
 
For other self-represented litigant participants in this study, such as KU, 
developing a different knowledge base about the structure and operation of the legal 
system was an important benefit of attending at LHO and proceeding without a lawyer.  
More importantly, this was knowledge that she did not have prior to representing herself, 
but which she subsequently placed a significant value on when she noted, 
 
I would just say a general overall knowledge about the legal system and the 
steps before trial, I had no idea, it’s ridiculous.  I had a lack of knowledge 
when we first approached the lawyer…Yeah again, I’d really like to 
reinforce that I’ve grown as a person but it expanded my knowledge.  So 
yes maybe when I read an article or I hear about something I would be more 
engaged and be more interested, ‘okay what’s the legal side of it.’16  
 
Given the scope and impact that a wide variety of legal decisions are likely to have on the 
daily lives of individuals, the development of a better understanding of how these 
decisions are made is important.  Individuals may understand and begin to think critically 
about the process by which the decisions are made.  This is arguably a worthwhile and 
promising means by which individuals may participate.     
 
In the context of this research project, a crucial aspect of the interviewees’ 
education and training involved the role played by LHO in providing information, advice, 
as well as support, to the self-represented litigants.  All of the self-represented litigants 
                                                
14 Interview of ST dated April 29, 2015. 
15 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 5. 
16 Interview of KU dated June 12, 2015 at 8-9. 
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interviewed had made use of the self-help legal services at LHO on more than one 
occasion.  Several of the interviewees had visited LHO between five and ten times.  
While the interviewees raised certain concerns about the services provided at LHO,17 the 
consensus was that the information and advice provided by the volunteer lawyers and the 
staff assisted them in representing themselves in a more effective manner.  In this regard, 
when asked about the role played by LHO, QH stated,  
 
[p]rocedural was something that was quite difficult, I suppose for a layman 
to just know right off the bat.  I guess reminding of deadlines.  They were 
quite helpful in terms of assisting in my initial I guess application for 
adjournment for the first hearing, which was ultimately successful.  Aside 
from that they were able to identify at least one hole in the case and it was 
something that I was able to pick up myself as well…Yeah actually I’m 
glad you brought that up, it’s a point that I wasn’t able to go over with my 
going back and forth here.  But I guess a large part of it was the emotional 
support…The only real support I actually had, aside from my aunt did lend 
me some money for costs, I had to pay her back after of course.  But from 
an emotional standpoint or from a who can I talk to about this, it was really 
kind of heartening that some people, even if they don’t even know you at 
all, that they care enough to do that.  So that was nice.18 
 
It was apparent from conversations with the interviewees that LHO provided them with 
more than technical information about legal rules.  It also provided explanations about 
how the various litigation steps fit together, why certain action was taken, and how the 
self-represented litigant may want to think about the next steps that would best help them 
achieve their particular goals.19  KC valued the discussions that she had with the 
                                                
17 The most common concern raised by the interviewees related to the fact that a self-represented litigant 
may meet several different lawyers at LHO and this resulted in both an inefficiency in service delivery 
which was particularly problematic in light of the fact that clients were limited to approximately 40 minute 
meetings with the volunteer lawyer and the potential for inconsistent advice; particularly as it related to 
litigation strategy.   
18 Interview of QH dated June 3, 2015 at 3 & 13. 
19 The participants interest in understanding the process in this research appears to contradict the findings of 
Gidding research regarding the objectives of self-help users in Australia as several of the participants in this 
research project expressed an interesting in not only receiving technical advice but also receiving more 
general information about the litigation process in order to better understand why certain steps were taken 
and anticipate future steps.  See Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, “‘Law People, For God’s Sake!, 
Surely I Should be Dealing with Lawyers?’ Toward an Assessment of Self-Help Legal Services in 
Australia” (2002) 11:2 Griffith LR 436 [Giddings & Robertson, “Toward an Assessment of Self-Help 
Legal Services”]. 
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volunteer lawyer at LHO.  This was not simply in terms of understanding the legal 
procedure, but also in terms of the advice she received regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses of her case and the corresponding strategy for dealing with them.  In this 
regard, speaking of meetings with a particular lawyer, she noted,  
 
[h]e’s (a volunteer lawyer at LHO also interviewed in this study) very good.  
We came to what I felt like was a bit of a conflict of interest because he was 
a bit harsh with me but I like that too.  You don't always want to hear 
everything that’s good.  And he said when you talk you sound like you’re a 
bit all over the place.  He said ‘you have to be focused or a judge gets upset 
with that.’  And that’s not bad advice….Of course, --- helped me in the 
sense that he played the devil’s advocate if you will.  And he gave me a few 
examples of how he had won in court, just keeping it simple.  Keep it 
simple, factual.20  
 
In terms of the benefits associated with participation, both empowerment and 
engagement are considered to contribute to a sense of community-building.  This is in 
part due to individuals moving from an exclusively private sphere to a public sphere.  In 
the process, they begin to take account of more than their own self-interest; they begin to 
consider the “welfare of the community as a whole.”21  In this context, community-
building contemplates a shift away from the ‘private’ toward the creation of public 
norms, as well as the positive spill-over associated with participation that begets further 
participation in other public spheres.   Modest illustrations of the shift from private 
interests to public concerns were observed in this research.  The overwhelming majority 
of the self-represented litigants interviewed in this research project were both cognizant 
of and sympathetic to the challenges that particular categories of individuals might face 
when attempting to access justice as a self-represented litigant.  Specifically, the 
interviewees noted that, notwithstanding the challenges that they faced in representing 
themselves, there were likely certain individuals (i.e., new immigrants, those who did not 
speak English, and/or individuals who suffered from mental health issues) who would be 
                                                
20 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2105 at 14 & 19. 
21 Jocelyne Bourgnon, “Responsive, Responsible and Respected Government: Towards a New Public 
Administration Theory” (2007) 73:1 International Review of Administrative Sciences 7 at 16. 
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disproportionately impeded when attempting to represent themselves.  From his 
experiences in various court settings, LM noted,  
 
[y]ou’ve got to figure from looking at the array of people that come in and 
out through here (LHO) and the upstairs and anywhere else in the 
courtrooms, certainly the majority of the people in the court are at the 
bottom end of the scale whether it’s monetarily or intelligence or resources 
or however you want to look at it.  So right from the start its either people 
that are almost disadvantaged in society as a whole, either trying to defend 
their rights or trying to defend themselves against being attacked by 
somebody else whose perhaps abusing the system or has abused them in 
some way and may now justify themselves.22   
 
In this regard, BN also noted a concern that, “there’s a lot of people that I know 
that there’s no way they could have pulled this off.  So it makes me worry about the 
people – like I can do this but there’s people who can’t do this.  And if they’re left with 
the same options, that worries me.”23  
 
What is also interesting about these illustrations was the corresponding 
acknowledgement by certain of the interviewees that what was needed, in addition to the 
service provided at LHO, were informal forums that self-represented litigants could join.  
There, self-represented litigants might share their experiences and provide practical 
advise and support to other self-represented litigants engaged in legal processes.  In 
particular, SE suggested that what would be beneficial as a self-represented litigant 
would be “to have a database of former self-represented litigants would could talk about 
their experiences.  And just say ‘hey just so you know what you’re in for, you might learn 
from experience.  I would do that.  When this is all said and done.”24  SE further 
elaborated on the rationale associated with such a forum for self-represented litigants 
when she suggested that, “it would be like an emotional support because I kind of feel 
like I’m out there on my own.  I feel like I’m in this jungle with a machete just hacking 
                                                
22 Interview of LM dated May 21, 2015 at 14. 
23 Interview of BN dated April 30, 2015 at 5. 
24 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 8. 
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my way through.  Am I heading in the right direction here, what’s going on.”25  In this 
sense, there was an acknowledgement that, having been through this experience, the 
individuals would be in a position to help, guide or, at least, support other self-
represented litigants.   
 
These examples of the empowering aspects of the interviewees’ experiences, 
together with the positive individual benefits associated with their engagement, support 
an argument for the promotion of meaningful participation as a basis for thinking about 
access to justice theory and policy.  At this point, some might suggest that the effort to 
advance democracy by way of civil litigation is misguided in the sense that the courts 
were not designed or are not best suited for making up the democratic deficit in society.  
While this stance might have some credence in an ideal democratic context, the present 
circumstances are far from ideal.  In other words, my proposal to think about civil 
ligation is not intended as a replacement for direct and meaningful participation in the 
political process; that would be and is an ideal situation.  Rather, litigation can act as a 
support to that broader ambition. 
 
There are two main reasons why my proposal is defensible and worthy of serious 
consideration.  First, the work and approach of courts are already located within a 
democratic framework.  The judicial development of constitutional law, administrative 
law, and even the common law generally are grounded in and justified in terms of 
democratic justice: judges shape the formal and substantive dimensions in line with 
demands and deficiencies of a democratic process of governance.26  Secondly, the rise in 
self-represented litigants presents both a crisis in and opening for the advancement of 
democratic participation.  As the experience and reflections of self-represented litigants 
themselves reveal, litigation is a means through which otherwise excluded persons can 
                                                
25 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 23. 
26 See discussion in Trevor Farrow’s book regarding the role and the work of the courts in a democratic 
society.  Specifically, Farrow quotes former Supreme Court Justice Lebel who aptly stated “courts play a 
key role in a democracy”.  Trevor CW Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy (Toronto, 
Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 18-30 [Farrow, Civil Justice, Privatization, and Democracy] 
citing Lebel J in Named Person v Vancouver Sun, [2007] 3 SCR 252 at para 85. 
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not only resolve particular disputes, but also have some say in the workings of 
government and the law.  By promoting access that contemplates individuals being heard 
in a meaningful fashion, the legal system and the democratic process more generally is 
legitimized.  Consequently, whatever the ideal role of courts, their contemporary status 
and raison d’etre is intimately tied to the democratic project and therefore it is imperative 
that more marginalized citizens be brought into an otherwise elite forum of decision-
making.  The pressing question becomes whether the existing litigation process could 
ultimately be designed to advance a more democratic approach to access to justice that 
takes account of meaningful and direct participation by self-represented litigants.  
 
A New Paradigm For Self-Represented Litigants 
In 1976, Abram Chayes charted a paradigm shift that was taking place in civil litigation.27  
Like him, I want to insist that another paradigm shift is (or should be) taking place today.  
Whereas Chayes focused on the role of the judge in civil litigation, I identify and analyze 
a similar transformation of size and significance that is beginning to occur in civil 
litigation when understood from the perspective of the self-represented litigants who now 
comprise a large portion of the litigants in the justice system.28  This shift gives rise to a 
corresponding imperative to develop a broader conceptualization of access to justice 
based on the democratic thesis.  As I have tried to show through exploring the 
experiences and perceptions of certain self-represented litigants as they grapple with and 
within the existing legal system, the signs of impending crisis and the resulting need to 
re-evaluate the existing adversarial model are evident.  The existence of self-represented 
litigants does not simply create difficult challenges within the legal process, but also 
presents a huge and subversive challenge to certain of the foundational assumptions about 
the legal process.   
                                                
27 Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harv L Rev 1281 [Chayes, 
“The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”].  
28 Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, ibid.  In his discussion of the need to re-define 
the role of the judge in cases involving self-represented litigants, Rollie Thompson stated that, “It’s time to 
admit that the traditional adversary system cannot accommodate more unrepresented litigants.  And it’s 
time to address this in a systematic way, by way of practice directions and rule changes.”  See Rollie 
Thompson, “The Judge as Counsel” (2005) 8 News and Views on Civil Justice Reform 3 at 5 [Thompson, 
“The Judge as Counsel”]. 
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 The fact alone that self-represented litigants are the overwhelming majority of 
litigants in some legal settings warrants a serious re-appraisal of the structure and 
dynamics of the adversarial context.  When this is combined with a sense of 
disempowerment and disengagement by those who do self-represent and/or those who do 
not litigate at all,29 the need for deep and systemic change in the system becomes 
apparent.  As such, I maintain that Chayes’ comments are as pertinent now as they were 
then: “we are witnessing the emergence of a new model of civil litigation and, I believe, 
our traditional conception of adjudication and the assumptions on which it is based 
provide an increasingly unhelpful, indeed misleading framework for assessing either the 
workability or the legitimacy of the roles of the judge and court within this model.”30   
 
 Accordingly, I want to recommend that this changing landscape presents 
important challenges to the legitimacy of the prevailing paradigm of civil litigation.  
While there is not yet any fixed or settled notion of what a new paradigm would look 
like, there are signs that one is needed.  What is clear is that there are indications that, as 
the traditional model and its underlying assumptions start to fray and unravel, a re-
appraisal of the litigation process and its operating assumptions are required.  Reform of 
the legal process and the role of those that operate within the civil justice system is 
required.  This should be in conjunction with a commitment to meaningful participation.  
How the legal process responds will be a good indication of whether there is a genuine 
desire to make substantial changes that best promote and advance a broader 
conceptualization of access to justice that encourage citizens’ direct participation.   
                                                
29 Due to the nature of the self-help centre and the fact that it offers assistance to a wide range of 
individuals addressing civil legal matters, one particular challenge faced by the staff and highlighted by 
several of the interviewees in this project was the difficulty in addressing the needs of individuals with 
mental health issues.  On a regular basis, there were often individuals waiting to speak to a volunteer 
lawyer who were suffering from apparent mental health issues as well as issues of homelessness and 
substance abuse.  In these instances, it appeared that the staff found it quite challenging when attempting to 
understand the nature of the individual’s legal problem and how LHO might be able to assist them. Thus, 
an important question raised in respect of this research is that while the fact is that there are lots of self-
represented litigants making use of self-help legal services to resolve their legal problems, this fact also 
begs the question of who is not accessing the self-help services and/or fall outside the scope of services 
offered by LHO and as such, unable to get assistance if at all.   
30 Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, supra note 27 at 1282. 
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Looked at from the perspective of access to justice and meaningful participation 
consistent with the democratic thesis, some of the defining features of the existing model 
of litigation include: 
 a complex legal system that necessitates individuals hiring lawyers in order to 
resolve their disputes in court; 
 a legal profession that maintains almost exclusive control over the creation and 
application of the procedural, as well as substantive, aspects of litigation;   
 an assumption that lawyers work with and against other lawyers that are, within 
certain parameters, evenly matched and generally have the same knowledge and 
skills;  
 an assumption that adjudicators remain neutral, largely passive umpires in the 
disputes between legal professionals; 31 and 
 an assumption that ultimately the parties are primarily responsible for how their 
case goes forward including how it will be presented by their lawyers for the 
adjudicator’s consideration.32 
Taken together, these features are foundational aspects of the adversarial system of 
litigation.  However, they are all, to a greater or lesser extent, no longer defensible 
features of a system in which a significant number of the individuals entering the legal 
system are not represented by legal professionals and do not themselves have the same 
legal training as the legal professionals already acting within the adversarial system.   
 
The Presence of Self-Represented Litigants  
As noted in chapter four, approximately 40% of litigants in the civil justice (non-family) 
system are unrepresented by lawyers: this percentage is significantly higher in family 
courts.  The very adversarial structure of the justice system and the assumptions that 
                                                
31 While in 1976, Chayes argued that there was a shift in paradigm regarding the litigation model from a 
traditional private law model (originating in the 19th century) to a newer public law model, I believe that 
many of those traditional assumptions about litigation and the role played by the various actors in the legal 
system remain deeply ingrained in the adversarial system.   
32 Neil Brooks, “The Judge and the Adversary System” in A Linden, ed, The Canadian Judiciary (Toronto, 
Canada: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976) 90 at 90. 
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underlie this structure - that each party has a trained legal representative who will 
advocate on the party’s behalf and from which a just result will be derived33 - starts to 
break down when only one party has an advocate who is familiar with the substantive law 
and legal procedures.  Moreover, the data from this project, as well as data collected in 
other research projects on self-represented litigants, suggests that many self-represented 
litigants are frustrated and dissatisfied with their experiences in the civil justice system.34  
The consequence is that individuals remain disengaged from the law-making processes 
that impact their lives.  This continued disengagement by a significant portion of 
individuals further diminishes the legitimacy of the justice system and is inconsistent 
with democratic principles.  However, before discussing those aspects of the adversarial 
system that might be changed in order to provide self-represented litigants with an 
opportunity to participate in a more meaningful manner, it is important to examine certain 
features of the existing system in light of some of the particular challenges generated and 
faced by self-represented litigants.  In doing so, it will then be possible to engage in a 
discussion about those features that require change.  While the proposed changes may 
appear piecemeal, it is in keeping with Chayes’ analysis that an accumulation of 
individual changes signals a transformation in the system that ultimately leads to a new 
model of litigation.   
 
                                                
33 In describing the failings of the English adversary system, Jack Jacob stated, “[f]or the proper 
functioning of the adversary system, a basic assumption is that the opposite parties command equal 
resources and can engage lawyers having equal skill, expertise and competence, but in practice this 
assumption is not fulfilled in a much larger volume and variety of cases than is generally imagined; and 
indeed, the adversary system accentuates the inequality in terms of resources and legal advice and 
representation between the parties….The true casualties are the litigants themselves, who are frustrated in 
their search for justice….Lastly, it may be said that, in the interplay between the court and the parties and 
their lawyers, the adversary system envelops the machinery of civil justice with a kind of mystique, even 
mysticism, which alienates people and inhibits them from resorting to the courts for the resolution or 
determination of their disputes.”  See Sir Jack I H Jacob, The Fabric of English Civil Justice (London, UK: 
Stevens, 1987) at 5-19. 
34 In addition to the discussion of the interviewees disempowering experiences in Chapter 7 of this thesis, 
please see Julie MacFarlane, “Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants”, Final 
Report of the National Self-Represented Litigants Project (May 2013) at 86. Available online at: 
www.lsuc.onca/uploadedfiles/For_The_Public?About_The_Law_Society/_Decisions/2014/Self_Represent
ed_Project.pdf [MacFarlane, Final Report of the National Self-Represented Litigant Project] and Action 
Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Law, “Access to Justice in Civil and Family Justice: A 
Roadmap to Change”, Final Report (October 2013).  Available online at www.cfcj.fcjc.org.   
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The evolving demographic of self-represented litigants suggests that poverty is 
not the sole indicator of self-representation.  Perhaps, more significantly, the increasing 
numbers of self-represented litigants give rise to some fundamental questions not only 
about the practical realities associated with the presence of self-represented litigants in 
the legal system, but also about the legitimacy of the current legal system as a means of 
resolving disputes and promoting justice.  In this regard, Sande Buhai noted that, “[t]he 
rise of pro se litigants has been seen as a ‘sign of system breakdown,’ the implication 
being that the system needs more or less expensive-lawyers. We should consider the 
possibility, however, that a system that only works when every party is represented by 
competent and equal counsel is not a system worth saving.”35  One of the consequences 
of the existing organization of the adversarial system is that, because the quality of legal 
services continues to have a significant impact on proceedings and legal services are 
distributed through a market to which only a few can gain entry, justice is effectively 
being bought and sold.  Russell Pearce argues that the result is unequal justice under the 
law.36  Thus, to the extent that there is an unequal application of justice, it is necessary to 
re-examine the efficacy of the existing adversarial system given the increased presence of 
self-represented litigants within the system.   
 
In my study, the majority of the self-represented litigants interviewed had varying 
levels of post-secondary education.37  They were employed, owned their own businesses 
or were the recipients of certain temporary government assistance programs. 38  As noted 
in chapter four, Scott Barclay’s research on litigants that pursue appeals without legal 
                                                
35 Sande L Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective” (2009) 42 
Loy LA L Rev 979 at 983-984 [Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”]. 
36 Russell Pearce, “Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never 
Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help” (2004) 73 Fordham L Rev 969 at 
970 [Pearce, “Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice”]; see also Lloyd L Weinreb, “The Adversary 
Process is Not an End in Itself” (2002) 2 The Journal of the Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics 59 at 62 
[Weinreb, “The Adversary Process is Not an End in Itself”]. 
37 All except two of the interviewees had post-secondary education and certain of the interviewees had 
more than one post-secondary degree. 
38 Two of the interviewees were retired but had been gainfully employed  - one has owned his own 
chartered accountant business and the other had been a project manager.  There was also one young adult 
who had recently completed her high school diploma and had been employed in transit.  Finally, two other 
individuals were on temporary disability insurance from their employment.   
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representation also suggests that, while many individuals may prefer to have a lawyer 
handle their case, there are also a portion of people who choose to represent themselves 
on appeal.39  The purpose in doing so may vary from individual to individual.  However, 
a loss of faith in lawyers or a desire to ensure that their case is presented as they see it are 
examples of the reasons provided by the self-represented appellate litigants.  There are 
also a number of self-represented litigants who may choose to represent themselves 
because they believe that the subject matter of the legal problem is small or discrete and, 
therefore, manageable.  Alternatively, they might wish to present their story to the court 
in their own words.  Ultimately, these reasons represent a new reality that affects the 
traditional dynamic of how litigation might unfold when the parties engaging in the legal 
process are not lawyers.  
 
(i)  The Role of Lawyers 
 One of the fundamental assumptions about the litigation process and the legal system 
more generally is that, due to the complexities of the legal system and the 
professionalization of law, individuals require lawyers in order to successfully navigate 
their way through the system.  The empirical research completed by Sandefur, Seron, 
Engler and others reinforces this basic assumption; individuals who are represented by 
lawyers tend to achieve better legal results.  Underlying this assumption is a further 
premise that, in accordance with the client’s wishes, the lawyer will take responsibility 
for individuals’ legal problems without further engaging or, at least, only minimally 
engaging the individual in the process.  However, the assumption that individuals rely on 
lawyers to navigate the legal system and resolve their legal problem is inconsistent with 
the new reality of self-represented litigants.40  The data suggests that not only is there an 
                                                
39 Scott Barclay, “The Decision to Self-Represent” (1996) 77 Social Science Quarterly 912 [Barclay, “The 
Decision to Self-Represent”]. 
40  See for example the various research undertaken by the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice and 
MacFarlane, Final Report of the National Self-Represented Litigants Project.  Available online respectively 
at www.cfcj-fcjc.org and www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/For_the_Public/About_the_Law_Society/ 
Convocation_Decisions/2014/Self_Represented_Project.pdf. 
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increasing number of self-represented litigants in the legal system, but also that this trend 
does not show signs of diminishing.41   
 
As part of the existing adversarial framework, it is further assumed that lawyers, 
as professionals, are exclusively skilled and knowledgeable about the process and 
substance of law (which they both develop and administer).  Thus, they claim to be 
entitled to maintain exclusive control over the litigation process.  In this regard, 
Zimmerman and Tyler note, “as lawyers develop a greater role in the system, the legal 
process becomes more professionalized and complex, and, when the procedural design 
assumes representation, the ability of individuals to actually proceed successfully without 
an attorney, or to directly participate when they do have a attorney, diminishes.”42  Given 
this professionalization of law and the corresponding complexity of the legal process, it is 
assumed that lawyers are the only individuals properly equipped to handle and resolve 
legal matters.  This is further perpetuated by the mystification of legal practice whereby 
both lawyers and non-lawyers assume that there is a way of engaging in the practice of 
law that is only known to and operationalized by lawyers, trained first in law schools and 
then in legal practice through work with other lawyers.43   
 
However, these assumptions must be balanced against certain other assumptions 
that underlie our legal system.  For instance, the by-laws of the Law Society Act 
contemplate non-lawyers representing a friend, neighbour or family member in court so 
long as certain conditions are met.  These conditions include not acting in more than three 
matters per year and not receiving compensation or benefit for representing the 
individual.44  There is also an assumption that individuals have the right to appear in 
court in person and the Rules of Civil Procedure presuppose that individuals are entitled 
                                                
41 Practically speaking, without a significant reduction in legal fees, the trend would suggest that more not 
less individuals are likely represent themselves. 
42 Zimmerman & Tyler, “Between Access to Counsel and Access to Justice”, supra note 5 at 477. 
43 Frederick Schauer, “Introduction: Is there Legal Reasoning?” in Frederick Shauer, Thinking like a 
Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 2009) at 1. 
44 Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, s 30(4) & (5), by-law 4. 
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to appear without representation.  More fundamentally, the recent Supreme Court of 
Canada decision regarding hearing fees acknowledged that ensuring individuals have 
access to courts is important for the development of law, as well as a means of holding 
the state to account – all of which is crucial to the preservation of the Rule of Law. 45  
Certain of these presumptions are also grounded in classic liberal concepts of personal 
autonomy and liberty.46  However, to the extent that a fundamental right to be heard 
appears to run contrary to other assumptions about how one might be heard effectively—
namely  the need to use lawyers—it will be important to reconcile this contradiction.  
This is particularly true given the practical realities that suggest that lawyers will not be 
available for all those who require assistance.   
 
Several of the interviewees in this study grappled with this mystification of law 
and legal practice when seeking to take procedural steps in their matter.  When they 
attended at LHO to obtain advice regarding how they might successfully complete a 
particular step in the litigation, it was not uncommon for a volunteer lawyer to tell them 
that, despite the wording of the particular procedural rule, it was not the generally 
accepted practice among lawyers to proceed in that fashion.47  In these instances, self-
represented litigants were often dissuaded from proceeding with the particular procedural 
step.  In the course of being dissuaded, they were left with the impression that engaging 
in the practice of law was something that is known exclusively to lawyers and, by 
extension, unknowable by non-lawyers.   
 
The specialized knowledge and training of lawyers which is supposed to make 
them uniquely positioned to engage in the practice of law also underlies another 
fundamental assumption about the current litigation model – namely, that lawyers work 
                                                
45 Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 59 at 
para 39-40. 
46 David M Trubek, “Critical Moments in Access to Justice Theory: The Quest for the Empowered Self” in 
Allan C Hutchinson, ed, Access to Civil Justice (Toronto, Canada: Carswell, 1990) at 107. 
47 During the observation period of this research project, I observed several instances where self-
represented litigants sought advice about taking a particular step  - such as noting a defendant in default due 
to the fact that they had not served a statement of defence and were told by the volunteer lawyer with 
whom they were speaking that lawyers did not typically note parties in default.   
 304 
with and against other lawyers who are equally trained and well-matched.  In accordance 
with the traditional dominant model of litigation, it is assumed that evenly-matched legal 
representatives will act as zealous advocates for their client. 48   This assumption 
underscores the functioning of the adversarial system as well as the validity of the 
outcomes reached in that system.  However, the validity of this assumption is called in to 
question by the fact that it assumes most lawyers are evenly matched49 or, even more 
fundamentally, that a zealous approach to advocacy results in the best or most just legal 
outcomes.50  As Sande Buhai has noted, “the adversarial system expects parties to be 
selfish in their arguments, creates incentives to hide evidence, and rewards parties whose 
attorneys are the most skilled and well-funded.”51  All of this seriously undermines the 
legitimacy of the results reached.   
 
Finally, the recent influx of self-represented litigants into the litigation process 
now more urgently calls this assumption into question.  Contrary to certain of the 
assumptions underpinning a zealous advocacy approach to litigation, one party is likely 
to have a distinct advantage over the other.  In fact, to the extent that trained lawyers are 
regularly appearing against self-represented litigants, the notion of zealous advocacy 
within the adversarial system (already suffering from questions of legitimacy) becomes 
distinctly problematic and potentially unfair when one side (the legally represented party) 
                                                
48 The adherence to a dominant model of legal professionalism that includes a continued commitment to 
zealous advocacy on behalf of a client is discussed by Trevor Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 
46 Osgoode Hall LJ 51 at 63-64 [Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism”]. 
49 Roger Cramton suggests that more often than note, lawyers “resources and abilities are not equally 
matched and equal justice under the law becomes an illusion.”  See Roger C Cramton, “Furthering Justice 
by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable” (2002) 70 Fordham L Rev 
1599 at 1608 [Cramton, “Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversarial System”]. 
50 See Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism”, supra note 48; Robert K Vischer, “Legal Advice as Moral 
Perspective” (2006) 19 Geo J Legal Ethics 1; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer as Problem-Solver and 
Third Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering” (1999) 72 Temp L Rev 785 [Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer as Problem-Solver”].  Moreover, in his discussion about the adversarial 
system Lloyd Weinreb argues that because the adversaries in trial (and other adjudicatory proceedings) are 
lawyers, “everything and everyone who might inhibit the contest between them is relegated to the 
sidelines” and thus, lawyers in a courtroom, are like gladiators that “roam about posturing in their fashion, 
attracting all the attention to themselves, winning or losing.”  This, in turn, raises difficult questions about 
the validity of the adversarial system as a means of both discovering the truth and resolving disputes.  See 
Weinreb, “The Adversary Process is Not an End in Itself”, supra note 36 at 61-62. 
51 Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”, supra note 35 at 982. 
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has a disproportionate advantage in experience, skills and knowledge of the applicable 
legal rules and procedures. 
 
(ii)  The Role of The Judge 
Finally, within the adversarial model, judges are thought to function as neutral umpires 
who generally ensure that evenly matched legal representatives work within certain 
parameters defined by principles of procedural justice.  As opposed to an inquisitorial 
legal system in which the judge actively manages the legal process by conducting 
investigations, determining issues and controlling the presentation of evidence, the 
adversarial model places these responsibilities squarely on the parties’ shoulders with 
respect to the presentation of evidence, issues and law.52  With the adversarial model, the 
assumption is that, by not taking an active role in the administration or presentation of the 
case in court, the adjudicator will remain unbiased, unpartisan and therefore impartial.53  
In defence of the adversarial system, many members of the legal profession maintain that 
judicial impartiality is a necessary precursor in order to be able to arrive at the truth or 
‘justice’.  Related to this assumption is the further belief that impartiality is demonstrated 
through the adoption of a passive and neutral stance.  In accordance with this assumption, 
judges do not undertake their own investigations or participate actively in the search for 
the truth in the cases presented before them.   
 
This view is subject to significant debate and, on occasion, may be challenged on 
the basis that, “empirical research has cast doubt on the premise that judges really are 
unbiased, suggesting that what is really at stake is only the appearance of impartiality.”54  
It has been noted that an impartial decision-maker is “one who is able to make judgments 
                                                
52 Pearce, “Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice”, supra note 36 at 972. 
53 While in the American context, Sande Buhai’s comments regarding the role of the judge in the 
adversarial system has significant implications for self-represented litigants.  She stated, “[p]erhaps because 
they are trained primarily as lawyers and not as judges, American judges tend to view their role as that of a 
neutral and impartial referee, consistent with the sporting theory of justice. They perceive their main job to 
be procedural-to ensure that the adversary system, quintessentially a contest between lawyers, operates 
efficiently and effectively.”  See Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”, supra note 35 at 
994-995. 
54 Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”, ibid at 982. 
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with an open mind – that is, one who comes to the decision-making table without his or 
her ‘mind already made up’ or without connections that improperly influence the 
decision-making process.”55  Within the inquisitorial model, judges may participate more 
actively in the presentation of the parties’ cases, but they are still expected to be impartial 
and unbiased: their decisions are supposed to be based on fact and law, not extraneous 
issues.56  The participant, SE, provided an interesting insight into a self-represented 
litigants’ perception of the judge’s role when she noted,  
 
I think that they’re beholding to the laws and the rules.  So even if they can 
see what this lawyer is doing, even if you have an ethical judge, a judge 
who is interested in justice, he can see what’s going on but he’s kind of 
shackled in a way because he can see the other lawyer is abusing the 
system, but he’s abusing it in a way that’s legal so to speak.57 
 
  One of the problems with the assumption that passivity is commensurate with 
impartiality is that it is based on a concept of the adversarial system that, in turn, makes 
certain assumptions about the players within the system.  It assumes that cases involve a 
contest between lawyers who are equally well-versed and equally well-resourced in the 
requisite procedural and substantive law and that they are equally prepared for the legal 
contest.58  These assumptions mean that, in an effort to remain passive (and thereby 
impartial) judges may fail to take account of self-represented litigants’ lack of legal 
knowledge and experience.  When “judges remain passive in the face of litigant 
confusion,”59 many litigants are left feeling like outsiders who are unable to participate 
because they are unfamiliar with the professional legal language spoken by lawyers and 
                                                
55 Laverne Jacobs, “Caught Between Judicial Paradigms and the Administrative State’s Pastiche: ‘Tribunal’ 
Independence, Impartiality, and Bias” in Colleen M Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in 
Context, 2nd ed (Toronto, Canada: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013) 233 at 234 [Jacobs, “Caught 
Between Judicial Paradigms”]. 
56 Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”, supra note 35 at 982. 
57 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2104 at 19. 
58 Michelle Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias:  Issues 
in Administrative Law” (2015) 38:1 Dalhousie LJ 119 at 124 [Flaherty, Self-Represented Litigants, “Active 
Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”]. 
59 Richard Zorza, “An Overview of Self-Represented Litigation, Innovation, its Impact, and an Approach 
for the Future: An Invitation to Dialogue” (2009) 43:3 Family LQ 519 at 524 [Zorza, “An Overview of 
Self-Represented Litigation”]. 
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judges; they are also equally unfamiliar with many of the procedures that take place in 
the courtroom.60  Given this disparity between lawyers and self-represented litigants in 
terms of training and experience, the validity and fairness of this judicial attitude is 
seriously called into question.  While these views are very problematic in their own right, 
there are even more significant issues raised about the fairness and justness of a legal 
system in which significant numbers of litigants do not understand the process, receive no 
assistance when attempting to engage with the system and, as such, are left unable or 
unwilling to express themselves.  Effectively, this is no participation at all.  
 
By contrast, in a recent example, Judge Posner undertook his own research 
relating to a case he was reviewing.  This was considered to call his role as a neutral 
decision-maker into question. 61  Specifically, Judge Posner had searched certain medical 
websites regarding information about a prescription drug that an unrepresented inmate 
claimed was being unfairly administered by the prison in which he was incarcerated.  The 
prison administration had counsel as well as expert witnesses.  Posner’s fellow judges, 
while concurring in the result, found that Posner, in conducting research online and 
outside the evidence presented by the parties, had turned the court into an advocate for 
one side.  However, Judge Posner queried whether “the unreliability of the unalloyed 
adversary process in a case of such dramatic inequality of resources and capabilities of 
the parties as this case is to be an unalterable bar to justice?”62  He felt that the inmate 
was ill-equipped to challenge the expert medical evidence presented by the 
administration.  As such, Judge Posner believed, “it is heartless to make a fetish of 
adversary procedure if by doing so feeble evidence is credited because the opponent has 
no practical access to offsetting evidence.”63   
 
                                                
60 MacFarlane, Final Report of The National Self-Represented Litigants Project, supra note 34 at 95. 
61 Debra Cassens Weiss, “Dissenter Blasts Posner’s Internet Research in Inmate’s Suit over Acid Reflux 
Treatment (August 20, 2015), ABA Journal, Available online at: 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/posners_internet_research_in_inmates_gerd_suit_leads_to_sparrin
g_in_7th_cir [Weiss, “Dissenter Blasts Posner’s Internet Research”]. 
62 Weiss, “Dissenter Blasts Posner’s Internet Research”, ibid. 
63 Weiss, “Dissenter Blasts Posner’s Internet Research”, ibid. 
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The criticisms directed at Judge Posner in respect of his positive step to ensure 
that the self-represented litigant’s case was properly presented is grounded in what 
Goldschmidt characterized as a “current reluctance of the judiciary to assist self-
represented litigants.”  This is rooted in assumptions about the traditionally passive role 
of the adversarial trial judge and reflected in American case law that generally refuses to 
recognize a duty of judicial assistance. 64   Notwithstanding these considerations, 
Goldschmidt suggests that the new reality respecting the significant numbers of self-
represented litigants in the civil justice system is forcing the judiciary to grapple with the 
question, “how far can a judge go in guiding and assisting a self-represented litigant in 
such a way as to avoid the possibly harsh or unjust consequences resulting form their lack 
of familiarity with the judicial process?”65   In the Canadian context, there is an 
acknowledgement of the need for adjudicators to provide judicial assistance in the course 
of a hearing.  This duty has been articulated in several decisions.66  In a decision of the 
Ontario Superior Court, MacDonald J dismissed a motion for a mistrial that was based on 
her having assisted a self-represented party to raise issues during the self-represented 
litigant’s examination and cross-examination.  In her reasons, the trial judge stated,  
 
[t]rial fairness requires ensuring that an unrepresented person is not denied a 
trial on the merits by her lack of knowledge of either the trial process or 
procedural or substantive law, or by the stress of appearing in court, or by a 
combination of those factors.  Litigants have the right to appear in court 
without counsel and the right to a fair hearing regardless of whether they are 
legally represented.  Since it is the trial judge who is required to give effect 
to those rights, doing so cannot amount to abandonment of the role of the 
trial judge and assumption of a counsel-like role.67   
 
MacDonald J’s concern about trial fairness caused her to acknowledge that while the 
adversarial system in “its purest form” provides a potential advantage to the represented 
                                                
64 Jona Goldschmidt, “Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian 
Context” (2006).  Available online at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/ 
resources/Judicial_Assitance.autocheckdam.pdf, at 2 [Goldschmidt, “Judicial Assistance to Self-
Represented Litigants”]. 
65 Goldschmidt, “Judicial Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants”, ibid at 2. 
66For example, see Barrett v Layton, [2003] OJ No 5572 (Sup Ct); Manitoba (Director of Child and Family 
Services) v A (J) 2004 MBCA 184 (CanLII). 
67 Barrett v Layton, [2003] OJ No 5572. 
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party who is opposing a self-represented party, such an advantage must be tempered by a 
commitment to fair trials; it must be deemed fair by “reasonable and informed observers 
of the trial process.”68  While tempered by a concern for impartiality and not assuming a 
‘counsel-like’ role, this approach to adjudication was upheld in a later decision of the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal.  In her discussion of active adjudication, Michelle Flaherty 
recognizes the importance of judicial impartiality as a “key component of procedural 
fairness.”69  However, she also challenges traditional notions of impartiality that require 
judicial passivity in light of the presence of self-represented litigants and the recognition 
that without judicial assistance, self-represented litigants are not likely to get a fair 
hearing.  In light of this concern, Flaherty advocates for the adoption of “substantive 
impartiality.”70  Substantive impartiality is contextual in the sense that adjudicators do 
not treat all litigants the same but rather treat litigants fairly, particularly as is needed to 
ensure that self-represented litigants are able to navigate their hearing in a meaningful 
manner.71  As such, the question that must be posed is how the judiciary can better 
facilitate self-represented litigants’ opportunities to be heard in a meaningful manner?  
The starting point for addressing this question must include a recognition that the 
opportunity to be heard cannot be interpreted in the traditional sense whereby two parties 
are deemed cognizant of the rules and relevant procedures, are legally represented, and 
appear before a neutral adjudicator.   
 
The fact that a great majority of civil courts suffer from long delays and civil 
cases can involve drawn out procedural steps raises further concerns about the 
appropriateness of the judiciary’s traditional passivity in civil law matters.  Taking 
account of these structural criticisms, it may be that the judge’s role as neutral umpire 
fails to ensure that litigants act in accordance with concepts of procedural fairness, both 
in and outside the courtroom.  In other words, in many instances, the concern is that 
                                                
68 Barrett v Layton, ibid.   
69 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, supra note 58 at 
137. 
70 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, ibid at 139. 
71 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, ibid at 139. 
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lawyers and litigants may act in certain ways outside of the court setting that are rarely 
captured and/or regulated by the judge.  This is due in part to the fact that certain 
procedural steps, such as motions, must be initiated by the parties based on their 
understanding of the procedural rights and responsibilities, these steps can take a long 
time to implement, and add additional costs to an already costly process.  Again, this 
situation disproportionately affects self-represented litigants who may be unfamiliar with 
the rules or their rights and are thereby disadvantaged when dealing with opposing 
counsel. 
 
This incongruity was highlighted by one of the participants in this research project 
when she drew an analogy between the role of the judge and a referee in a hockey game.  
As noted in chapter seven, SE challenged the efficacy of the judge’s ability to regulate 
the parties and their lawyer’s conduct given the role played by the adjudicator and the 
nature of the process by which a litigant is able to challenge an opposing party’s conduct.  
Specifically, she stated:  
 
[w]hen there’s a hockey game there’s a ref and there seems to be no ref 
here.  So its like he [opposing counsel] can do whatever he wants, slashing, 
hooking, smash me into the boards face first and then I can go to the ref but 
that’s the court…it could be months after the game’s over and guess what, 
I’ll end up having to pay.72   
 
Added to this is the further concern that judges, having trained as lawyers, “tend 
to reflect the entrenched attitudes, interests and constant influence of the organized 
bar.”73  To the extent that the bar maintains a commitment to zealous advocacy and the 
conduct that flows from an adherence to that approach, self-represented litigants are 
likely to remain disadvantaged. 
 
 
 
                                                
72 Interview of SE dated December 23, 2014 at 9. 
73 Cramton, “Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversarial System”, supra note 49 at 1605. 
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Proposed Areas of Change 
These foundational assumptions about the litigation process and the particular challenges 
faced by self-represented litigants demand a transformation in the prevailing approach to 
the model of litigation and the legal process more generally.  At a minimum, they 
necessitate a re-evaluation of the traditional model.  Some of the required changes are 
relatively practical and easy to incorporate, but there are others that require more 
fundamental shifts in how the litigation process is conceptualized.  In both cases, it is 
important to remember that the primary objective is the engagement of self-represented 
litigants in the civil justice system such that they are able to participate in a meaningful 
manner.  In the final section of this chapter, I will propose certain changes (and areas that 
require transformation) that are based, in part, on the research data collected in this 
project and informed by the democratic thesis of access to justice.  It is only if the 
litigation process generally and our thinking about how it might be transformed that real 
progress can be made in achieving a true measure of access to justice that is consistent 
with the democratic thesis. 
 
(i)  Access to Legal Advice and Information 
The participants in this research project all made repeated use of the self-help legal 
services at LHO in downtown Toronto.74  As their legal matters progressed, they returned 
to LHO to receive additional information and advice about preparing for the next step in 
the litigation as well as responding to action taken by opposing parties.  For KC, who had 
been to the centre several times during the course of her legal matter,  
 
It was very time-consuming but I’ve been lucky in that the calibre of 
lawyers who volunteer their time at Pro Bono is exceptional.  Some are 
more versed than others.  But my experience has been that they’re always 
been very generous with eliminating conflicts of interest and in one sense its 
consumed far too much time.  But on another sense if you believe in the 
greater good in the universe that things do take time.  Each time I’ve gone 
there’ve been people who’ve strategically helped me get to where I am now.  
Its been like a stepping stone. A building process, stepping stone.  Which is 
what any case is, is it not?75   
                                                
74 A description of LHO is contained in chapter six of this thesis. 
75 Interview of KC dated April 28, 2015 at 20. 
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This educative service provided the individuals with information, advice, skills 
and tools that assisted them in managing their own case.  The self-represented litigants 
were able to speak directly with volunteer lawyers who could advise them on substantive 
legal and procedural matters.  As well, the volunteer lawyers were able to assist them in 
making strategic decisions about the progress of their case.   
 
The critique that self-help legal services represents a shifting of responsibility to 
citizens to advocate on their own behalf within a complex and professionalized legal 
system raises legitimate concerns about the reliance on this initiative.  It is suggested that 
this initiative can engender a sense of disempowerment.76  This is particularly true if is 
assumed that the legal system in which individuals are compelled to participate remains 
inhospitable to them.  However, this critique must be weighed against two counter-
balancing factors: the practical realities of the existing legal system, (i.e., the growing 
number of self-represented litigants in need of legal advice and information); and the 
aspirational goals of the democratic thesis of access (i.e., promotion of meaningful 
participation and the demystification of law) that occurs when law is ‘taken back by 
ordinary citizens.’  Self-help can encourage non-lawyers to engage in conversations about 
law and legal process and do so in their own voices.  By so doing, they will begin to 
shape a new legal vernacular – a new language of law that is reflective of and constituted 
by the very citizens it is meant to govern.  Thus, taking account of these considerations 
and recognizing the ongoing limitations of the civil justice system as it relates to self-
represented litigants, I maintain that self-help legal services have an important role to 
play in the promotion of participation and the corresponding demystification of law.  The 
                                                
76 See discussion of the neoliberal critique of self-help contained in chapter four of this thesis.  In addition 
to the neo-liberal critique of self-help, there is a further consideration that requiring individuals to spend 
significant amounts of time addressing their legal problems is unrealistic when it is assumed that these 
individuals may already be fully occupied and perhaps overwhelmed within their day-to-day lives.  Erhard 
Berner and Benedict Phillips raise this critique in the context of self-help in poor communities when they 
state, “It would be a mistake to assume that those poor in income are rich in spare time: ‘[i]n many of the 
lowest-income households all men and women work such long hours that they are unable to commit 
themselves to projects that involve a lot of self-help.’”  See Erhard Berner & Benedict Phillips, “Left to 
Their Own Devices?  Community Self-Help Between Alternative Development and Neoliberalism”, Paper 
presented at N-Aerus Seminar: Beyond the Neoliberalism Consensus on Urban Development: Other Voices 
from Europe and the South (May 15-17, 2003). 
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question that arises in this regard is how both the practical realities facing self-
represented litigants and the goals of a democratic approach to access might shape the 
form and content of self-help legal services.77   
 
During my time observing meetings at the centre, I saw several lawyers 
explaining not only the process of litigation, but also the underlying reasons for a 
particular legal procedure in plain language.  This often facilitated a meaningful 
conversation between the lawyers and the self-represented litigants about their legal 
issues before ultimately making decisions about how to proceed.  In many instances, the 
volunteer lawyers also advised clients to speak in plain language when telling their 
stories to the court.  In this regard, the volunteer lawyers engaged in discussions with the 
self-represented individual in a way that a review of the particular rule or legal principle 
in a text book or online service could not. Thus, these services represent an essential 
component of a self-represented litigant’s attempt to participate and they are relevant to 
the legal profession’s responsibility to further access to justice.78   
 
The approach adopted by LHO and the lawyers who volunteer there (i.e., to 
provide substantive and technical advice as well as an underlying explanation for why 
certain steps are required) is an important element of self-help services.  It offers the 
opportunity to assist individuals in better understanding how the legal system operates 
and how they may participate in it.  Moreover, by offering assistance that improves 
individuals’ ability to articulate positions either in writing or orally in a court setting, 
                                                
77 For example. empirical research conducted in respect of sell-representation in Alberta recommended the 
establishment of self-help services  - but qualified the nature of the self-help services that should be 
offered.  Specifically, the report stated: “[a]n SHC must be easily accessible, welcoming and non-
intimidating, have hours that work for clients, provide outreach to those who cannot come to the centre, and 
be adequately resourced to meet client demand with quality service.”  See Mary Stratton, Alberta Self-
Represented Litigant Mapping Project Final Report (Edmonton, Canada: Canadian Forum for Civil Justice, 
2007) at 46-47.  Available online at www.cfcj.fjjc.org/docs/2007/mapping-en.pdf. See also Trevor CW 
Farrow, Diana Lowe, Bradley Albrecht and Martha E Simmons, “Addressing the Needs of Self-
Represented Litigants in the Canadian Justice System” A White Paper Prepared for the Association of 
Canadian Court Administrators (March 2012).  Available online at www.cfcj.fjcj.org.   
78 Moreover, in addition to being consistent with lawyer’s duties to promote the public interest, involving 
lawyers in local pro bono programs and clinics is beneficial because it “involves lawyers as long term 
partners in communities’ efforts to gain control of their destiny.”  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “In the Pursuit 
of the Public Good” (2001) 7 Wash U J of L & Pol’y 1 at 13. 
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self-help legal services can potentially serve to build self-confidence and the assist 
individuals develop the skills needed to participate more generally.  In this regard, unlike 
more limited self-help programs in the United States, the scope of self-help services 
should not be limited to legal information; it should be expanded to provide for the 
development of skills and education necessary to support and encourage participation.  
Finally, the example of the community lawyer project in Connecticut might also provide 
a basis for an expanded notion of self-help services whereby the self-help centres would 
include advice and information and training on topics that extended beyond litigation.79   
 
In light of the potential benefits associated with providing self-help, efforts should 
be made to ensure that the services are more widely available for self-represented 
litigants to avail themselves.  The existing self-help centres are located in civil 
courthouses in Ontario.  It would appear that the choice of these locations was made on 
the basis that the services are accessible to self-represented litigants who attend at that 
court or have matters in that court.  However, it was noted by both staff and self-help 
users at LHO that clients will often travel from other areas in the province in order to get 
assistance from LHO as there are currently only two such centres in Ontario.80  Locating 
the self-help centres in courthouses has worked to ensure that the judges and court staff 
working in those same courthouses are aware of the services and able individuals to 
direct litigants to the service for assistance.81  In light of the contribution that these 
services make in assisting and supporting self-represented litigants to participate in their 
own case, the scope and availability of self-help legal services should be expanded.  
There should be more centres like LHO, preferably in the every civil courthouse in 
Ontario.  Moreover, from a logistical standpoint, the centres should be open to the public 
                                                
79 For a more detailed discussion of the community lawyer project, see chapter three of this thesis. 
80 Currently, there is a self-help centre in downtown Toronto (University Avenue) and another located at 
the civil courthouse in downtown Ottawa (Elgin Street).  There is also a self-help centre at the Small 
Claims court in Toronto (Sheppard Avenue).  This does not suggest that every courthouse requires a fully 
staffed self-help centre but rather that there are sufficient resources to address the needs of litigants 
throughout the province. 
81 Staff reported that judges at the courthouse at 393 University Avenue will, on occasion, hold a matter 
down in order to allow a self-represented litigant to leave the courtroom, go downstairs and speak with a 
lawyer at LHO before proceeding. 
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beyond a regular nine-to-five schedule so that the centres may accommodate those 
individuals who work consistent with the shifting demographic of self-represented 
litigants.82 
 
(ii)  The Role of Lawyers  
While there are a significant number of self-represented litigants entering the civil justice 
system and managing their own files, the reality is that a great number of them are 
litigating against trained lawyers. 83   By virtue of their traditional role within the 
adversarial system and as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct in Ontario, a 
significant number of lawyers continue to be motivated by a commitment to zealous 
advocacy.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow has suggested that, “the lawyer’s ‘habitat’ remains 
primarily one of partisan protectionism, looking out for the client’s interests.”84  This 
continued commitment to zealous advocacy within the adversarial system is contrasted 
with the view held by members of the legal profession regarding the difficulty associated 
with advocating against self-represented litigants.85  Thus, in many cases, there is likely 
to be a serious imbalance of power whereby one party, represented by a legal 
professional, holds the relevant knowledge, skills and experience.  The self-represented 
litigants’ experiences suggest that they are aware of the fact that they do not have the 
same information or skills as the opposing lawyers.  As a result, they feel intimidated or 
bullied by opposing counsel and vulnerable to being taken advantage of by lawyers.  
Russell Engler has also noted that,  
attorney misconduct permeates the interaction between counsel and an 
                                                
82 This was a common complaint from the self-represented litigants interviewed, namely the difficulty in 
attending at LHO during work hours.  Interestingly, as there are more and more middle-class self-
represented litigants who are employed full-time, this may become a more immediate issue for self-help 
centres to address. 
83 Thompson and Engler have noted that, in the civil context, proceedings involving both represented 
parties and unrepresented parties present the greatest challenges in terms of developing court processes that 
are fair and take proper account of the unique needs of the self-represented litigant.  See Thompson, “The 
Judge as Counsel”, supra note 28 at 6. 
84 Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer as Problem-Solver”, supra note 50 at 790. 
85 For example, one lawyer recently commented “lawyers don't like dealing with angry self-represented 
litigants.  That is what articling students are for.”  See Linda Perlis, “The Death of a Divorce Lawyer” 
(December 2, 2015) The Globe and Mail, Globe Life and Arts, Facts and Arguments, L6. 
 316 
unrepresented adversary. Lawyers routinely engage in impermissible 
advice-giving, often including a misleading presentation of the law or facts, 
and over-reaching.  Lawyers present legal and factual issues in a 
strategically favorable light, selectively control the flow of information, and 
manipulate their un-represented adversary by misusing argument, appeals, 
threats, and promises.  Whatever assistance an unrepresented litigant has 
received may be undercut by the litigant's encounter with the opposing 
lawyer.86   
The resulting imbalance and the views that this fosters call into question the fairness and 
legitimacy of the adversarial process.  Roger Cramton has noted that the role lawyers 
play is further complicated by the fact that, even if lawyers attempt to express personal 
values that extend beyond the minimum requirements of their ethical codes or traditional 
adversarial role, “[e]veryday practice, however, pushes the conscientious lawyer to 
engage in conduct that is unfair and unjust.”87  Moreover, as officers of the court who are 
obligated to ensure that the administration of justice is not brought into disrepute, there is 
an argument that lawyers should not be permitted to act in ways that unfairly restrict or 
impede individuals from being heard; this is particularly so when similar action would 
not be taken against an opposing lawyer.88  As such, the question arises as to the extent to 
which lawyers can or should continue to act as zealous advocates (in the traditional sense 
of that notion) for their clients when acting against self-represented litigants?  
From an ethical standpoint, the application of general principles regarding the 
conduct of lawyers as advocates contained in the professional rules of conduct places 
little responsibility on lawyers when acting against self-represented litigants.89  For 
                                                
86 Russell Engler, “And Justice for All – Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Role of Judges, 
Mediators and Clerks” (1999) 67 Fordham L Rev 1987 at 1908 [Engler, “And Justice for All”]. 
87 Cramton, “Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversarial System”, supra note 49 at 1605. 
88 The commentary respecting Rule 5.1-1, the lawyer as advocate states “[t]he lawyer must discharge this 
duty by fair and honourable means, without illegality and in a manner that is consistent with the lawyer’s 
duty to treat the tribunal with candour, fairness, courtesy and respect and in a way that promotes the 
parties’ right to a fair hearing in which justice can be done.”  See The Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules 
of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1-1, commentary 1. 
89 For the purposes of this discussion, I have focused on the rules of conduct that govern lawyers in Ontario 
as these rules are directly relevant to the empirical research I undertook at LHO in downtown Toronto.  
While not directly referencing self-represented litigants, the commentary on Rule 5.1-1 does contemplate 
the responsibilities incumbent on a lawyer when opposing interests are not represented, either because it is 
related to a matter for which notice is not required or alternatively, involves a situation which the “full 
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example, Rule 5.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper 
Canada outlines the scope of the lawyer’s duties when representing a client.  The 
commentary on this Rule further colours the role of the lawyer in an adversarial 
context.90  Rule 7.2-9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct in Ontario deals expressly 
with a lawyer’s duties to unrepresented litigants and is quite limited in its scope; it 
comprises only two subsections with next to no commentary.  The main focus of the 
professional conduct rules addressing self-represented litigants is on the lawyer’s 
obligation to ensure that a self-represented litigant does not mistakenly believe that he or 
she can rely on any advice given by the lawyer or that the lawyer has taken account of her 
interests.91  There are no other positive duties imposed on lawyers in respect of self-
represented litigants.  Moreover, in reviewing the rules pertaining to lawyers’ 
responsibility to other parties, it is interesting to note that the scope of lawyers’ 
responsibility to represented parties as well as different corporate entities and 
governments is quite extensive, particularly when contrasted with the rules that outline 
lawyers’ duties to self-represented parties.   
 
Moreover, these limited provisions are overshadowed by a continued focus on and 
adherence to a principle of zealous advocacy that permeates lawyers’ professional 
                                                                                                                                            
proof and argument inherent in the adversarial system cannot be achieved.”  In these instances, the lawyer 
must take particular care to be accurate, candid, and comprehensive in presenting the client’s case so as to 
ensure that the tribunal is not misled.”  See The Law Society of Upper Canada, The Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 5.1-1, commentary 6. 
90 The first part of the commentary in Rule 5.1-1 characterizes the nature of the advocate’s role and duties 
in an adversarial system:    
[1] Role in Adversarial Proceedings – In adversarial proceedings, the lawyer has a duty to the 
client to raise fearlessly every issue, advance every argument and ask every question, however 
distasteful, that the lawyer thinks will help the client’s case and to endeavour to obtain for the 
client the benefit of every remedy and defence authorized by law.  The lawyer must discharge this 
duty by fair and honourable means, without illegality and in a manner that is consistent with the 
lawyer’s duty to treat the tribunal with candour, fairness, courtesy and respect and in a way that 
promotes the parties’ right to a fair hearing in which justice can be done. Maintaining dignity, 
decorum and courtesy in the courtroom is not an empty formality because, unless order is 
maintained, rights cannot be protected; and  
[3] The lawyer’s function as advocate is openly and necessarily partisan. Accordingly, the lawyer 
is not obliged (except as required by law or under these rules and subject to the duties of a 
prosecutor set out below) to assist an adversary or advance matters harmful to the client’s case.    
91 The Law Society of Upper Canada, The Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 7.2-9.  Available online at 
https://www.lsuc.on.ca/uploadedFiles/RulesofProfessionalConduct.pdf. 
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identity.  At a minimum, this is insufficient from an ethical standpoint as it signals a 
focus on how lawyers should act when interacting with other lawyers and/or represented 
parties while, at the same time, downplaying the need to identify distinct ethical concerns 
that may arise in the context of acting against unrepresented parties.  This state of affairs 
is compounded by the risk that particular conduct by a lawyer, (e.g., unreasonably 
withholding consent, misconstruing a position or the application of a relevant rule) is 
likely to be noted as “sharp practice” by opposing counsel who are familiar with the rules 
to which they are also subject, but not be appreciated by a self-represented litigant.  
Finally, the failure to articulate specific ethical obligations vis-à-vis self-represented 
litigants also sends an implicit message that this is not something with which lawyers 
(and the system at large) need to be concerned.   
 
Lawyers are subject to certain ethical requirements when acting as advocates for 
their clients.  In certain contexts, this can include competing requirements.  These 
become more problematic when the opposing party is a self-represented litigant.  For 
instance, the commentary contained in rule 5.1 acknowledges that lawyers are “openly 
and necessarily partisan” while representing a client: they are, therefore, under no 
obligation to assist an adversary.  However, this acknowledgement is contrasted with the 
lawyers’ duty not to take advantage of other’s party’s slips or mistakes (e.g., so-called 
sharp practices).  In an adversarial system where it is assumed that lawyers are relatively 
evenly matched, these conflicting interests may not cause significant issues or, if an issue 
arises, it is likely that the conduct may be caught by opposing counsel who is equally 
well-versed in the professional rules of conduct.  However, when the inexperience and 
lack of professional training of many self-represented litigants is taken into account, these 
types of contradictory duties have greater significance.  
 
The absence of more comprehensive ethical guidelines regarding self-represented 
litigants, as well as the contradictory nature of the existing rules, is in need of correction.  
Given the influx of self-represented litigants in the civil justice system, it may become 
necessary to address expressly the treatment of self-represented litigants by opposing 
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counsel within the rules of professional conduct framework.92  There is an assumption 
that lawyers act as ‘neutral mechanics’ that, without judging the morality of their clients’ 
actions, undertake to act on their behalf within the confines of the law.  However, this 
approach of neutral partisanship is often used to justify behaviour that is not necessary for 
the lawyer to do their job (i.e. adopting unreasonable positions that delay or obfuscate the 
process).  While lawyers have an unwavering duty to their clients and a duty that is 
partisan, there must be limits placed on the behaviour undertaken in the name of that 
duty.  Acknowledging the need for such limits, there is a further need for a critical 
evaluation of the lawyer’s role and the lawyer’s corresponding ethical duties when 
dealing with self-represented litigants.  This would provide lawyers with ethical 
guidelines and tools to resolve these issues in the context of self-represented litigants.  
The failure to do so means that self-represented litigants are potentially subject to 
conduct by lawyers that, while not clearly in violation of their ethical duties in the 
traditional sense, pushes the envelope regarding ‘norms of practice’; these might not 
otherwise be pushed if both sides were represented. 
 
In addition to various ethical considerations, a zealous approach to advocacy that 
does not take account of the particular position of the self-represented litigants also 
serves to undermine the democratic thesis more generally.  It discounts the deleterious 
affects that a negative interaction can have on the self-represented litigants’ perception of 
their ability to participate and willingness to engage in other forums and processes.  As 
such, it is imperative that account be taken of the inequality in power between many self-
represented litigants and counsel.  This accounting also necessitates a serious 
commitment from lawyers to promote and protect ‘the right to be heard’ in accordance 
with principles of procedural justice and their ethical responsibilities: this includes the 
                                                
92 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to draft appropriate rules of professional conduct regarding self-
represented litigant.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that such rules will likely, in cases involving 
self-represented parties, need to take account of certain practices that potentially result in unfair advantages 
to the represented party.  Also, any rules will need to address the broader framework of the legal 
profession’s responsibility to balance not only its duty to its clients, but also its duty to the administration 
of justice.    
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obligation to “promote the parties’ right to a fair hearing.” 93   Perhaps more 
fundamentally, these calls for change challenge the appropriateness of the current role of 
the lawyer in the adversarial system and demand substantive reform of the adversarial 
system.94  
 
In accordance with the democratic thesis, a shift in the role of the lawyer in the 
adversarial system has implications beyond that of opposing counsel’s behaviour in a 
litigation context.  At this stage, it is important to distinguish between a differentiated 
role for lawyers and a rejection of the role for lawyers in society.  In both the criminal 
and civil justice context, there are examples of the acknowledgement of the importance of 
legal representation.  From a constitutional perspective, the courts have also recognized, 
in both criminal and child welfare contexts, a right to state-funded counsel in narrow 
circumstances where necessary to ensure meaningful participation in the adjudicative 
process.95  Provincial legal aid organizations such as Legal Aid Ontario list criteria and/or 
factors that delineate certain types of cases in which legal representation is either 
important or necessary.96  Moreover, lawyers play a significant part in the development 
of the common law through the cases that are brought before the courts and the 
arguments made in the course of those cases.  All of this underscores the important 
function that lawyers play in society.  Therefore, without undermining lawyers’ roles, it is 
important to re-evaluate the traditional role and function of legal representation in the 
                                                
93 Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a recognition that the right to a fair hearing should not be 
undermined by the failure to comply with a requirement under the rules.  Both this recognition as well as 
the lawyer’s duties as officers of the court take on special significance in the case where lawyers are acting 
against self-represented litigants who are more likely to contravene inadvertently the rules. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rules 1.04 and 2.01. 
94 Allan C Hutchinson, Fighting Fair: Legal Ethics for An Adversarial Age (New York, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
95 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c.11 [the “Charter”]; New Brunswick (Ministry of Health and Community 
Services v G. (J.), [1999] 3 SCR 46 regarding the right of a parent to obtain legal assistance when faced 
with the prospect of losing custody of a child to the state.  Please see discussion in chapter three. 
96 For example, in Ontario, if you are charged with a crime and facing jail, are experiencing domestic 
violence, applying to enter the country or in danger of being kicked out of the country, or are dealing with 
mental health issues, then you are potentially eligible for legal aid.  Information drawn from the Legal Aid 
Ontario website.  Available online at www.legalaid.on.ca/en/getting/typesofhelp.asp. 
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context of the democratic thesis.  In other words, what would lawyering look like if 
approached from a more democratic perspective?   
 
Within most democratic societies, lawyers are uniquely positioned to know the 
rules and processes that individuals need to understand in order to participate 
meaningfully.97  In contrast to traditional ideas about lawyering and consistent with a 
broader conceptualization of access to justice, democratic or rebellious lawyers engage in 
non-hierarchical partnerships with clients: lawyers encourage client participation in the 
legal decisions and strategies that affect their cases as well as the implementation of those 
decisions.98  Underlying this approach to lawyering is the democratic principle that “no 
single person should have sole responsibility for making and implementing [such] 
decisions.”99  Lawyers and clients deliberate together to both frame the issue and then 
implement the decided-upon strategies in addressing the issue.  While this approach is not 
limited to the direct interests or needs of opposing self-represented litigants seeking 
assistance, such an approach does have the potential to and is consistent with encouraging 
more meaningful engagement of clients in the legal system more generally.  In this 
regard, a further potential benefit of this approach is a better understanding and 
awareness by individuals of the impact of their decisions.  Taken further, a democratic 
approach to lawyering challenges traditional notions of a binary adversarial system that is 
focused on wins and loses in a particular case; it asks lawyers to take a step back and 
                                                
97 While this is most often contemplated in the context of lawyers engaged with clients advocating social 
change, a democratic approach to access and by extension lawyering is not limited to cases engaging issues 
of social justice.  In their article entitled “Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and 
the Practice of Law”, Peter Gabel and Paul Harris argue that even in “non-political cases” (cases involving 
divorce, personal injury or unemployment - many of which will make up the bulk of many lawyers’ 
practice), it is important that lawyers de-professionalize the lawyer-client relationship such that when 
confronted with the client’s problem, the lawyer acts as an “ordinary person with special experience -  to 
emphatically comprehend these needs and help the client to articulate them in the most effective and 
meaningful way possible”, taking account of the political nature of the conflict rather than characterizing it 
as an abstract legal concept.  See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, “Building Power and Breaking Images: 
Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law” (1982-83) XI Review of Law and Social Change 369 at 
408.  See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s role(s) in Deliberative Democracy” (2004) 5 Nev LJ 
347 at 368 [Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy”]. 
98 Asciano Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering” [2006] 12 Clinical L Rev 541 
[Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering”]. 
99 Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering”, ibid at 600, see also Gerald Lopez, 
“Living and Lawyering Rebelliously” (2005) 73:5 Fordham L Rev 2041. 
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fulfill their public interest duties to promote access to social justice.  Moreover, it is 
worth noting that a portion of the participants interviewed in this study had retained 
lawyers in the past and/or had indicated that they would retain a lawyer in the future.  To 
the extent that this is reflective of self-represented litigants more generally, it will become 
more important to re-evaluate the relationship between lawyers and clients.   
 
One of the continuing challenges for democratic lawyers as legal experts is to 
resist the temptation to take over the process when it becomes difficult or “place pressure 
on subordinated groups to formulate their interests in forms that the law can process.”100  
To do so would entail a retreat to a more formal approach to lawyering that contemplates 
a division between the “active elites” who govern with little involvement from the 
“passive masses.”101  This approach is more consistent with principles of representative 
democracy than participatory democracy.  Pursuant to such an approach, lawyers 
continue to act on behalf of others’ interests in a traditionally adversarial process; the 
individuals are not involved in the process or the decision-making that ensues.  This 
approach was rejected by certain of the self-represented litigants interviewed in this 
project.   
 
In terms of participatory processes, this traditional view has also been challenged 
by scholars, such as Carrie Menkel-Meadow.  She is interested in “exploring how those 
with legal training can harness what they already know” and learn new skills.  In so 
doing, they will become not only "architects of process," but "architects of participatory 
democracy."102  Menkel-Meadow further suggests that in this respect the lawyer has an 
important role to play not only in both creating new processes and institutions but also 
engaging with those processes and institutions such as to “provide more participatory and 
legitimate outcomes and more humane processes”.103  Moreover, by engaging with 
                                                
100 Lucie E White, “To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Drefontein on Lawyering and Power” (1988) Wis L 
Rev 699 at 757. 
101 Piomelli, “The Democratic Roots of Collaborative Lawyering”, supra note 98 at 602. 
102 Menkel-Meadow, “The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy”, supra note 97 at 369. 
103 Ibid at 369. 
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lawyers, learning about various legal processes, and devising solutions to address their 
issues and concerns, clients become empowered to devise their own solutions.  In so 
doing, they relinquish their reliance on experts and have a direct ‘say’ in the legal 
decision-making that affects their lives. 104  It is worth noting that, in the course of 
observing volunteer lawyers and client at LHO, I noticed the volunteer lawyers moved 
away from a traditional legal role in which they assume responsibility for the client’s 
legal issue.  Instead, they adopted more of a teaching role through which they undertook 
to explain not only the procedure that the self-represented litigant was required to 
complete, but also the reason for the particular procedure and how it fit within the 
broader legal process.  Additionally, in defining their role at LHO, several of the 
volunteer lawyers suggested that their duties included a responsibility to encourage the 
self-represented litigants’ confidence and by extension, engagement.   
 
(iii)  Changes to the Litigation Process 
The continuing need for procedural clarification and change remains an important 
component of self-represented litigants’ ability to participate in the civil justice system.  
Several of the participants interviewed in this research project have suggested that one of 
the most significant challenges that they faced involved discerning when it was necessary 
or prudent to take certain procedural steps.  An illustration of this involves the 
enforcement of deadlines in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
measures available to a party when a deadline is not met (i.e., noting a delinquent party in 
default).  While there may be informal norms of practice that dictate when a lawyer is 
likely to pursue certain measures, those norms are typically not known to the self-
represented litigant.  As a result, self-represented litigants are often left questioning when 
they may adopt a particular course of action or may be subject to certain action by 
opposing counsel.   
 
In his call for more systematic reform, Thompson specifically addressed the need 
for the procedural rules to change in order to better accommodate non-lawyers in the civil 
                                                
104 Ingrid Eagly, “Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice” (1997-1998) 4 
Clinical L Rev 433 at 445 [Eagly, “Community Education”]. 
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justice system.  Currently, the rules are premised on an assumption that parties appearing 
in court are represented and, generally speaking, that lawyers understand both the 
interpretation and application of the rules.  However, Thompson suggests that what is 
needed is a new set of rules (or at a minimum, two sets of rules) that take direct account 
of self-represented parties and are designed from their perspective.105  In other words, 
these rules would not be drafted for lawyers.  Rather, they would be written for the 
myriad of non-lawyers now attempting to resolve disputes in the civil justice system.  At 
certain stages of the litigation process, such a set of rules and procedures may adopt a 
more active approach to judicial procedure that is focused on assisting the self-
represented litigant present their case.  At the same time, this would need to ensure the 
continued protection of certain principles of procedural justice.  
 
Another challenge raised by the participants related to the drafting of pleadings 
and affidavits; these remain technical and bogged down in formal legal terminology.106  
The self-represented litigants expressed difficulty in being able to conform their 
pleadings to the technical legal requirements.  When XE was preparing his statement of 
defence, this meant,  
 
I had to somehow figure out how to respond in a very professional way and 
to handle it as a lawyer would handle it.  That’s a steep learning curve.  So 
what I found was I did find some sample statements of claim which used the 
types of phrases like to the extent that this relates to me, so, and so and to 
the extent that it relates to the other person I have no knowledge or 
insufficient knowledge.  So I was able to find that language in these other 
statements of claim.  If I hadn’t found that I would have been out in the 
cold, I wouldn't have known what to do.  Another point in the statement of 
claim where a lawyer here (LHO) assisted me was when I tried to explain 
that the owners of the adjoining property were negligent because they were 
aware of the problem of negative airflow on to their property.  But I didn’t 
                                                
105 Thompson, “The Judge as Counsel”, supra note 28 at 6. 
106 Chayes suggests that the goal of a “liberalization of pleadings” by reform of the historically strict forms 
of action led to the creation of the ‘cause of action’ rules.  While these were less convoluted and technical 
than the forms of action, they still remained complicated and grounded in legal theory.  Thus, the need for 
even more flexible and informal approaches to pleading ultimately led to the further shift to a concentration 
on the factual context.  However I argue that the outcome of this shift is no longer sufficient given the 
presence of self-represented litigants.  See Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation”, supra 
note 27.  
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know how to express that in such a way so as to show that this was not my 
primary defence.  My primary defence was that it was accidental and I just 
didn’t know how to word that properly.  My lawyer (at LHO) helped me to 
do that to use the expression ‘in the alternative’, which I wouldn't have 
known.  That’s just almost entirely legalese because it’s not day-to day, in 
the alternative is not day-to-day language.107 
 
Thus, there is a continuing need for plainer language in legal documents that are 
used in court proceedings.  Also, more flexibility in the way in which self-represented 
litigants are permitted to articulate their positions would be helpful.108  This commitment 
to the use of plain language and a further move away from a legal language is consistent 
with the adoption of a new legal vernacular whereby individuals are engaged in the 
creation and use of a language that reflects their lives.  However, in undertaking to adopt 
plain non-legal language, it is important to take account of Roderick MacDonald’s 
criticism that “all attempts to make legal language accessible are bundled up in attempts 
either to cast non-official law as non-legal or to incorporate non-official law into the 
existing and stabilizing normative order in a way that reduces citizens’ input into its 
formulation and makes true justice inaccessible.”109 
 
In discussions with both self-represented litigants and volunteer lawyers, the 
notion of more extensive case management was often raised as a means of assisting self-
represented litigants in a very practical way.  One of the greatest challenges for self-
represented litigants is getting into court, becoming familiar with the procedures of court, 
and being able to stand up and make submissions before judges and opposing counsel.  In 
fact, several of the self-represented litigants interviewed characterized the process of 
                                                
107 Interview of XE dated July 27, 2015.    
108 It is important to note that some of these changes are occurring on an ad hoc basis.  For example, due to 
the number of self-represented litigants attending in civil court in downtown Toronto, a number of judges 
have waived the requirement that their endorsements be drafted as formal orders that are subsequently 
registered with the court office.  The preparation of a formal order with its technical requirements has been 
a cause of significant challenge for many self-represented litigants because, if the form did not meet certain 
formal criteria, it was often rejected by the court office; this delayed the effect of the endorsement 
unnecessarily.   
109 MacDonald, “Theses on Access to Justice”, supra note 2 at 32. 
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going to court as ‘foreign’ and ‘intimidating.’110  These concerns included navigating 
physically the courthouse, signing in to court, addressing the bench in the proper manner, 
and knowing when and when not to speak.  Consequently, providing for designated 
courtroom and/or judges who case-managed self-represented litigants’ matters would 
ensure a level of consistency and familiarity that might ease the anxiety of the self-
represented litigants and reduce confusion over formalities.  Another notion of a modified 
procedure for self-represented litigants involves more case management at the pre-trial 
stage where judges or properly trained court officers could “supervise the pre-trial 
process, assisting parties with filing forms, disclosure, identification of issues, 
preparation of the case for trial, and case management before trial.”111   
 
While case-management offers the potential to assist self-represented litigants in 
better preparing and presenting their case, it is also important to note the limitations 
associated with case-management.  Several of these problems were highlighted by Chief 
Justice Warren Winkler in his 2008 report.112 Specifically, the initial implementation of 
intensive case-management in all civil cases gave rise to a series of problems.  These 
included ineffectual mediations scheduled too early in the process, increased backlogs 
regarding trial dates within the civil justice system, reduced judicial resources for 
motions and trials (due to the fact that judges were consumed with case conferences and 
trial scheduling matters), and longer dates for the smaller number of matters that actually 
proceeded to trial. 113   While the premise underlying the implementation of 
comprehensive case-management was to compel lawyers to pick up and move files 
forward earlier with the assistance of active judicial intervention, the result was to burden 
further the civil justice system and tax already limited judicial resources.  Upon review of 
these implications, the conclusion reached was to develop a modified form of case-
                                                
110 See interviews of SE and QH dated December 23, 2014 and June 3, 2015, respectively. 
111 Thompson, “The Judge as Counsel”, supra note 28 at 6. 
112 The Honourable Chief Justice Warren K Winkler, Evaluation of Civil Case Management in the Toronto 
Region – A Report on the Implementation of the Toronto Practice Directive and Rule 78 (February 2008).  
Available online at www.ontariocourts.ca/coa/en/ps/reports/rule78.pdf [Winkler, “Evaluation of Civil Case 
Management”]. 
113 Winkler, “Evaluation of Civil Case Management”, ibid at 14-16. 
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management that did not contemplate case-management in every case and removed 
certain additional procedural steps that disproportionately consumed judicial resources.  
Notwithstanding the challenges associated with case-management, it is still contended 
that modified forms of these programs could work to ensure that the self-represented 
litigants are able to concentrate on making their submissions in the most meaningful 
manner.  Modified approaches to case-management might also contemplate involvement 
by actors other than judges and/or prioritized case-management in certain types of cases. 
 
Moreover, self-represented litigants liked the idea of reappearing before the same 
judge.  By proceeding in this way, the judge could also become familiar with the facts of 
their case and be in a position to guide them through the various procedural steps that are 
part of litigation.  Returning to the same judge or master also meant that there was a 
greater likelihood that the judge could better regulate opposing counsel’s behavior toward 
the self-represented litigant both in and out of court.  Assumedly, if the opposing lawyers 
knew that they would be back before the same judge at a later date and that that judge 
actively managed the procedural aspects of the file, it would be more difficult to engage 
in unethical or overly aggressive conduct toward the self-represented parties.  In addition, 
the regular engagement by a judge familiar with the case could assist in ensuring that the 
self-represented litigant is not unduly delaying the process or raising extraneous issues.  
The continued engagement by one judge, albeit done properly, is also likely to reassure 
self-represented litigants that their case is being heard and addressed.   
 
(iv)  The Role of the Judge  
One of the assumptions underlying the existing adversarial model of litigation is that 
judges will act as neutral umpires that facilitate evenly matched legal professionals being 
able to present their respective cases.114  Given the complexity of many legal procedures, 
not to mention the relevant substantive law, the preparation and presentation of a case 
typically necessitates expert legal advice and specialized information.  Notwithstanding 
                                                
114 While discussed in the criminal context, Lloyd Weinreb notes that, in many litigation contexts, a system 
is neither exclusively adversarial or exclusively inquisitorial.  As such, it is important to choose a procedure 
that best serves the purposes and goals of the particular process.  See Weinreb, “The Adversary Process is 
Not an End in Itself”, supra note 36 at 59. 
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this complexity, it is assumed that the judge remains a ‘neutral and impartial referee’.115  
If it is also assumed that the parties are in the control of the process, their ability to 
‘lawyer the case’ effectively becomes an important determinant of how the case will be 
decided.  Without active intervention or, at a minimum, some assistance from the 
adjudicator, there is an inherent disadvantage to those who attempt to participate, but are 
unfamiliar with the processes, particularly as it relates to the preparation of one’s case.  In 
this sense,  
[w]here the law, the rules of procedure, and the legal processes are 
unintelligible or unfamiliar to one or more of the litigants, cases stop being a 
dialogue between  informed and experienced participants within a 
framework designed to test evidence and facilitate truth seeking.  Instead, 
cases turn into a frustrating exercise in imposing legal norms on parties who 
do not grasp their significance, and who see them as arbitrary, unfair, or 
simply unintelligible.116  
 
The practical realities associated with the increase in self-represented litigants render 
traditional assumptions about judges and passive adjudication fundamentally 
untenable.117   
 
The adversarial system has traditionally operated on the assumption that parties 
require lawyers in order to successfully maneuver through the civil justice system: the 
same is not always assumed within the administrative law context, particularly as it 
relates to appearances before certain tribunals.  In the context of procedural fairness, 
there has been much debate about the extent to which tribunals should follow the 
                                                
115 Sande L Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”, supra note 35 at 994; a fact that was 
noted by Judge Posner in the earlier example provided regarding the unrepresented inmate. 
116 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, supra note 58 at 
121. 
117 Citing an increase in the number of self-represented litigants and the fact that there are some legal 
contexts that are not well served by an adversarial context, Lord Chief Justice Thomas in the United 
Kingdom recently suggested that “[a]n inquisitorial system might be an improvement for litigants in person 
and secure a fair trial for all whilst doing so within limited and reducing resources.”  Recognizing the 
significance of his comments within the context of the traditional adversarial system, Lord Chief Justice 
Thomas further commented that, “research would have to consider whether an inquisitorial procedure 
would require more judges or a ‘cadre of junior judges.’”  See Owen Bowcott, “Inquisitorial System may 
be better for family and civil cases, says Top Judge”, The Guardian (4 March 2014).  Available online at 
www.the guardian.com. 
 329 
procedural processes of the common law court systems.118  However, given that many 
administrative tribunals contemplate individuals appearing without counsel, perhaps it is 
time to reverse the process and examine the operationalization of tribunals in terms of 
civil court reform.  In calling on judges to adopt a more active role within the courtroom 
to ensure that self-represented litigants are provided with an opportunity to participate in 
a fair process, Russell Engler has suggested that,  
[t]he precedents from small claims courts and administrative agencies serve 
as an important reminder that impartiality does not require judges to be 
passive.  Like other judges, small claims judges must re- main impartial.  
ALJs [Administrative Law Judges] in Social Security, welfare, and 
unemployment benefits' cases must also remain impartial.  Judges may 
therefore be active in assisting unrepresented litigants without 
compromising their impartiality.119   
 This sentiment was more recently echoed by Thompson who also advocated the 
need for superior court judges to adopt a more active role at trial similar to administrative 
agencies. 120   Questions about the nature of the adjudicator’s role within tribunal 
proceedings have traditionally been examined within the context of the dichotomy 
between the adversarial-inquisitorial models of judicial procedure.121  However, Robert 
Thomas suggests that a better way to approach questions about the role of the adjudicator 
would be to examine the “degree of intervention – ranging from a passive, reactive stance 
                                                
118 Colleen Flood & Jennifer Dolling, “An introduction to Administrative Law: Some History and a Few 
Signposts for a Twisted Path” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 2nd 
ed (Toronto, Canada: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013) at 27 [Flood & Sossin, Administrative Law 
in Context].  See also discussion by Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the 
Perception of Bias” in which Michelle Flaherty comments on the fact that, “[o]ver the years, we 
[administrative justice system] has fallen very easily into a pattern of using the judicial model of 
adjudication as the basis for our understanding of a fair hearing.  As we have seen, however, this judicial 
model of adjudication is not effective in contexts where representation is the exception rather than the 
norm.”  Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, supra note 
58 at 126. 
119 Russell Engler, “And Justice for All”, supra note 86 at 2018. 
120 Thompson, “The Judge as Counsel”, supra note 28 at 5. 
121  Robert Thomas, “From ‘Adversarial v Inquisitorial’ to ‘Active, Enabling and Investigative’: 
Developments in UK Administrative Tribunals” in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Baglay, The Nature of 
Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013) 51 at 
51-52 [Thomas, “From Adversarial to Inquisitorial”]. 
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to a more proactive or intrusive one of the adjudicator.”122  Flaherty characterizes the 
nature of adjudicative behaviour as spreading across a spectrum that contemplates 
permissible judicial assistance or involvement at one end and clearly impermissible 
behaviour at the other end.  Between these two points, it is contemplated that there would 
be a range of judicial direction and assistance necessary to ensure that the parties are able 
to “meaningfully present their case” without giving rise to a claim of partiality on the 
adjudicator’s behalf.123  These approaches are particularly relevant in addressing the 
needs of self-represented litigants.   
The development of an “enabling approach” would require that a particular 
tribunal provide self-represented litigants with “every possible assistance to enable her to 
participate and to compensate her for her lack of skills or knowledge.”124  One of the 
benefits of this approach is that it allows a specific tribunal to adopt its own processes; 
this would include varying degrees of judicial activism depending on a variety of factors, 
one of which would be the presence of self-represented litigants and the need to ensure 
that self-represented parties are provided with a fair hearing.  Thomas notes that there are 
challenges associated with increased judicial activism. 125  However, the move away from 
a strict adherence to either an adversarial or inquisitorial model and the corresponding 
move toward an enabling approach does provide an opportunity to address better self-
represented litigants’ needs in a more realistic fashion. As such, the adoption of an 
enabling approach within the administrative law setting could provide important lessons 
for the reform of judicial procedure within the civil justice system.  
In light of very serious concerns about the fairness of the legal processes in which 
self-represented litigants are compelled to engage, many have called for judges to take a 
                                                
122 Thomas, “From Adversarial to Inquisitorial”, ibid at 52. 
123 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, supra note 58 at 
138. 
124 Thomas, “From Adversarial to Inquisitorial”, supra note 121 at 53. 
125 Specifically, Thomas notes an overly active approach places too much power and trust in the 
adjudicators.  There are concerns about pre-judgment and the need to ensure that adjudicators are properly 
trained to intervene.  Additionally, there are practical challenges associated with ensuring that adjudicators 
have the resources necessary to intervene and manage cases more actively.  See Thomas, “From 
Adversarial to Inquisitorial”, ibid at 61. 
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more active role in ensuring that self-represented litigants are provided with a fair 
opportunity to present their case.126  In particular, Russell Engler has suggested that 
judges should “assist the unrepresented litigant in developing a full, factual record, and to 
help the litigant with matters of procedure and substantive law.”127  Also, Brent Cotter 
has questioned whether in order to provide better justice for self-represented litigants, it 
will be necessary to consider less conventional judicial approaches that can better ensure 
meaningful access for self-represented parties.128  Thompson has suggested there are 
certain immediate and necessary steps for judges to take.  These include providing legal 
information to self-represented litigants (notwithstanding the judge’s role as a neutral 
umpire), moving the legal matter through the various procedural steps by providing 
information along the way, ensuring that procedural rulings move matters forward, 
effectively ‘telling’ the self-represented litigant what to do, and, finally, relaxing the 
procedural rules so that self-represented litigants can engage with the substantive issues 
sooner.129   
 
In the particular context of this research project, the self-represented litigants 
interviewed had very definite views on what they perceived as a fair adjudicative process 
and what left them feeling disempowered or excluded from the process.  As such, their 
experiences in court and the interpretation they impute to those experiences provide a 
useful basis of discussion about judicial reform.  For self-represented litigants who had 
positive experiences presenting their cases to judges and masters, there were certain 
similar characteristics shared by the participants.  First of all, on a very practical level, the 
adjudicators took account of the self-represented litigant in the courtroom.  For example, 
the judge might move the matter to the bottom of the list of matters to be heard that day.  
At first glance, this might appear to be unfair to the self-represented litigants.  However, 
it was noted that, by moving the matter to the end of the day, it was likely that the 
                                                
126 For example, see Buhai, “Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants”, supra note 35; Zorza, “An 
Overview of Self-Represented Litigation”, supra note 59. 
127 Engler, “And Justice for All”, supra note 86 at 2029. 
128 Brent Cotter, “Thoughts on a Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Access to Justice in 
Canada” (2012) 63 UNB LJ 54 at 63. 
129 Thompson, “The Judge as Counsel”, supra note 28 at 5. 
 332 
courtroom would be less full and, therefore, it would be a less intimidating experience for 
the individual getting up to speak.  Secondly, in these instances, the adjudicator took time 
to explain the process to the self-represented litigant; this included how the hearing 
would unfold, who would speak first, when there would be an opportunity to respond, 
etc.  This initiative has a dual effect of easing the self-represented litigants’ anxiety over 
legal formalities and providing them with a roadmap for the process.  This is particularly 
important when it is remembered that many of these steps are not always outlined in the 
Rules of Procedure; they are part of the informal court processes that lawyers learn 
through experience.  In her discussion about active adjudication, Michelle Flaherty 
outlined several steps she would take in human rights tribunal hearings in order to help 
alleviate self-represented litigants’ confusion and frustration about the process of 
adjudication.  Specifically, she would begin the hearing by outlining the legal issues (and 
provide an opportunity for the parties to comment on the articulation of the issues), 
explain the conduct of the hearing (again providing an opportunity for questions and 
comments from the parties), engage in a discussion of the issue in a chronological 
fashion, and allow each witness to give evidence on each issue with the adjudicator 
posing questions throughout.130  While the administrative context of a human rights 
tribunal contemplates the adoption of alternative processes, Flaherty’s example does 
highlight the fact that changes to certain procedures may assist in ensuring that self-
represented litigants both understand the process and are able to participate in a 
meaningful manner consistent with concepts of substantive impartiality. 
 
This method of informing the self-represented litigant about the process also 
extended to the delivery of an endorsement or a judgment in which the reasons for 
judgment were written and explained to the self-represented litigants in plain language.131  
In addition to taking time to explain both the process and the resulting decision reached, 
                                                
130 Flaherty, “Self-Represented Litigants, Active Adjudication and the Perception of Bias”, supra note 58 at 
127. 
131 Folger has suggested that when an individual does not have information about how decisions are made 
or receive ambiguous information about the decision-making process, the individual may rely on the 
outcome as evidence of the fairness of the process.  See Robert Folger, “Distributive and Procedural 
Justice:  Combined Impact of “Voice” and Improvement on Experienced Inequity” (1977) 35:2 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 108 [Folger, “Distributive and Procedural Justice”]. 
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the adjudicators also took additional steps to engage the self-represented litigants in their 
submissions by asking questions, allowing the individual time to respond without feeling 
that they were imposing on the court, and signaling to the self-represented litigants that 
they had read the self-represented litigants’ materials and made efforts to understand their 
position.  While many of these steps do not fundamentally change the judges’ role within 
the adversarial process, they do require judges to adopt a more active role that assists 
self-represented litigants appearing before them.   
 
In the American context, Richard Zorza has proposed certain best practices that 
should be adopted by judges when adjudicating matters involving self-represented 
litigants.  These proposals were based on research undertaken in family courts in the 
United States in which court staff and the judges made a commitment to developing and 
implementing ‘access-friendly’ policies aimed at assisting self-represented litigants.  The 
researchers determined (through post-court interviews with the judges and litigants) that, 
in adopting certain policies, there was better and more effective communication between 
the parties and the members of the judiciary.  As a result of their studies, the researchers 
were able to develop ‘best court practices’ 132  in respect of cases involving self-
represented litigants.  These best practices were subsequently used in training/educational 
sessions with other judges.   
 
Zorza maintained that the adoption of these best practices was part of a need to re-
conceptualize how judges engage with self-represented litigants in their courtrooms.  This 
reconceptualization encourages judges to engage actively with self-represented litigants.  
The researchers characterized the best practices as ‘engaged neutrality,’ a concept that 
assumes that judges can be “deeply engaged with the case without threatening, in any 
way, the neutrality of the court or running afoul of ethics prohibitions.”133  Consequently, 
                                                
132 These best practices for judges include: framing the subject matter of the litigation; explaining the 
process to be followed; breaking the hearing into topics; moving back and forth between the parties, 
paraphrasing; articulating and elucidating the decision; and explaining the next steps.  See Zorza, “An 
Overview of Self-Represented Litigation”, supra note 59 at 524. 
133 Richard Zorza, “An Overview of Self-Represented Litigation”, supra note 59 at 524.  It is also worth 
noting that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct prepared by the American Bar Association contemplates in 
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additional family courts undertook to revise existing procedures and practices based on 
integrating self-represented litigants’ needs and competencies in order to ensure that self-
represented litigants were in a position to participate in a meaningful manner.  Not 
unsurprisingly, many of the examples of best practices proposed by Zorza are consistent 
with the self-represented litigants’ experiences in this research project.  For example, as 
part of actively engaging with self-represented litigants, the best practices developed and 
adopted by judges in Zorza’s study called on judges to reorganize court procedures in 
cases involving self-represented litigants, take steps to explain the procedures, assist 
parties in framing the issues, and ultimately explaining the law and the decision 
reached.134   
 
While many of these actions appear modest in effort, the effect on the self-
represented litigants’ perceptions about their ability to participate and be heard can be 
significant.  Interestingly, in many of the positive incidents recounted by the self-
represented litigants in this research, the individuals were either unsuccessful or only 
partially successful in persuading the court of their position.  However, their assessment 
of the fairness of the proceeding was more encouraging and accepting.  Thus, while it 
may be frustrating from the judge’s perspective to have an individual appearing who is 
unfamiliar with the process and possibly uncomfortable speaking, there is an important 
benefit to be obtained by judges who say to self-represented litigants, “You have an hour.  
You booked an hour, you tell me everything you want to tell me for the next hour and I 
am going to write my notes.”135   
 
In this vein, the Canadian Judicial Council has taken a positive step toward a 
judicial approach that contemplates ‘engaged neutrality’ when faced with self-
represented litigants.  While advisory in nature, the Judicial Council’s statement of 
                                                                                                                                            
its commentary to Rule 2.2: Impartiality and Fairness that under subsection (4) It is not a violation of this 
Rule for a Judge to make reasonable accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have 
their matters fairly heard. 
134 Richard Zorza, “An Overview of Self-Represented Litigation”, supra note 59 at 524. 
135 Interview of SB dated July 9, 2015 at 7-8. 
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principles on self-represented litigants does highlight the important role that judges must 
play in ensuring that self-represented litigants are provided with an opportunity to 
participate.  Specifically, the Judicial Council states that “[j]udges, the courts and other 
participants in the justice system have a responsibility to promote opportunities for all 
persons to understand and meaningfully present their case, regardless of 
representation.”136  In the course of fulfilling this commitment, the Judicial Council 
suggests judges may, when hearing cases involving self-represented litigants, take added 
steps to explain the process, provide information about the law and evidentiary 
requirements, modify the order in which evidence is presented, and question witnesses.  
All of these steps contemplate a role for the judiciary that goes beyond the traditional role 
of a neutral arbiter of cases.  It requires that adjudicators actively ensure that individuals 
are able to participate in a meaningful manner despite not being trained legal 
professionals.  Arguably, such an approach is consistent with certain principles 
underlying procedural and democratic justice that seek to afford individuals a chance to 
participate in the decision-making process.  More specifically, these include disclosure of 
the information on which a decision is made, an opportunity to engage in the process, an 
opportunity to provide evidence, and an articulation of the reasons for the decision.137   
 
By contrast, present practices can have serious negative effects on the self-
represented litigant’s perceptions about the process and access more generally: failing to 
allow a self-represented litigant to speak (or otherwise advising that it was not necessary 
to hear from the individual); speaking in legal terms to opposing counsel without taking 
the time to explain the terms to a self-represented litigant who is likely unfamiliar with 
the term; failing to account for discrepancies in form that do not affect principles of 
procedural fairness, and/or yelling at the self-represented litigant.   
 
                                                
136 See Canadian Justice Council, “Statement of Principles on Self-Represented Litigants and Accused 
Persons.”  Available online at http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/general/news_pub_other_Principles 
Statement_2006_en.pdf. 
137 Flood & Sossin, Administrative Law in Context, supra note 118 at 27. 
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There is also an argument that, to the extent that members of the judiciary act in a 
certain fashion, it will have a ‘trickle-down’ effect on lawyers who appear before those 
judges.  As judges begin to address self-represented litigants in different ways, there 
might be a corresponding expectation on behalf of those judges that the opposing lawyers 
will also begin to engage in a different fashion.  In this regard, judges have a crucial role 
to play in setting the tone regarding conduct toward self-represented litigants as well as 
managing self-represented litigants’ expectations.  These efforts by adjudicators 
underscore more crucial questions about the role of the judge in the litigation process as it 
pertains to self-represented litigants.  While this thesis does not advocate a shift from an 
adversarial model to an inquisitorial model of dispute resolution, the research does raise 
serious and foundational questions about the extent to which judge should intervene to 
ensure that self-represented litigants are able to participate meaningfully.  At the same 
time, attention will need to be paid to ensuring a corresponding commitment to impartial 
and fair decision-making in accordance with principles of procedural justice.   
 
Related to these fundamental questions about the role of the judge are operational 
concerns that a more interventionist approach by the judiciary will cause additional delay 
and strain on the civil justice system.  However, Carrie Menkel-Meadow has cautioned 
that, in performing research about the function of courts and, more importantly how 
courts and process ought to function, care must be taken to ensure whose needs are 
represented.138  In this case, concerns about over-burdened courts, timely resolution of 
disputes, and a need for increased efficiency must be weighed against the views and 
perceptions of the self-represented litigants attempting to engage in the civil justice.  
Also, account must be taken of the harms associated with continued disengagement by 
large segments of the population.  Thus, one of the important aspects of future research 
must involve the role of the adjudicator and, more generally, the role of the civil justice 
system.  To the extent that the objective (for which solutions are sought) is to provide 
individuals with an opportunity to be heard in a fair and transparent process that resolves 
                                                
138 Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Bryant G Garth, “Civil Procedure and Courts” in Peter Cane and Herbert M 
Kritzer, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2010) at 699. 
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disputes in a manner that maintains the legitimacy of the legal system, it is necessary to 
revisit the role of judges as it relates to self-represented litigants.   
 
(v)  The Need for More Qualitative Research  
The need to weigh competing interests when articulating a research agenda raises a final, 
but important recommendation regarding the work to be done going forward.  This work 
involves the need for more qualitative research that engages self-represented litigants in a 
dialogue about their experiences participating in the civil justice system.  This initiative 
has the potential to demonstrate what will be needed in order to ensure that they are better 
able to participate in a more meaningful manner.  However, in undertaking this research, 
it is important, as noted by Albiston and Sandefur, to resist,  
 
the pull of the policy audience: …[l]imiting our efforts to evaluation 
research risks allowing the policy agenda to define the research questions 
before the problem and potential responses are fully understood.  It does 
little to identify the mechanisms through which civil legal services might 
address troubling inequalities or change society.  If we truly wish to address 
a crisis in access to justice, we need a broader understanding of both what 
access to justice means and what the current lack of access entails.139   
 
This broader understanding of access requires the infusion of self-representatives’ 
perspectives in identifying not only the nature of access, but also the impact that a lack of 
access has on citizens.  Such an approach to access to justice research is consistent with a 
broader conceptualization of access that encourages individuals to speak in their own 
voice and become engaged in the decision-making and problem-solving processes as part 
of a democratic sensibility.  Only then is it possible to explore potential policy 
approaches that encourage and support engagement, taking account of the practical 
realities of what individuals’ require and what can be provided.     
 
As the data collected in this research project disclose, there is a significant 
disconnect between some of the views and perceptions held by self-represented litigants 
                                                
139 Catherine R Albiston & Rebecca L Sandefur, “Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice” 
(2013) Wis L Rev 101 at 104-105. 
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regarding members of the judiciary and their expectations regarding the adversarial 
process and the role of the judge within the adversarial process.  Thus, there is also a 
particular need for additional qualitative research that engages members of the judiciary 
and the bar in discussions about the role they do or should play in respect of self-
represented litigants.  This should also incorporate how the relationship between all of 
these parties might be better reconciled going forward.  It is my belief that, in light of the 
critical role played by judges, particularly as it relates to the potential for self-represented 
litigants’ meaningful participation, this research is urgent if the civil justice system is to 
meet its democratic potential and maintain its legitimacy.   
 
Conclusion  
To date, the access to justice movement has had numerous successes, but they remain 
relatively limited in those it has reached and piecemeal in effect.  Driven by a range of 
different rationales, the reforms introduced have shared a similar and limiting 
institutional assumption – they have been hostage to a very lawyer-based conception of 
the problem to be solved.  In this thesis, I have sought to suggest a different way of 
approaching access to justice and, as a result of the research completed, have 
recommended a different approach to remedying some of the ongoing challenges in the 
access to justice movement.  Focussing on the increase in and situation of self-
represented litigants, I have proposed a democratic paradigm for appreciating the 
challenge of access to justice and working toward a more responsive collection of 
interventions that engage a variety of stakeholders.  Such a perspective is optimistic in 
the promise it holds for transforming not only the specific plight of self-represented 
litigants, but also the broader problems of access to justice.  As part of this endeavour, 
there will be a need for more and better qualitative as well as quantitative research if that 
promise is to be fulfilled.  This thesis offers itself as an important first step on that 
exciting journey. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Interviews with pro bono volunteers at LHO 
 
Demographics 
 
-  Year of Call? 
 
-  Type of practice – field / firm? 
 
-   How did you first hear about LHO? 
 
-  How long have you volunteered?   
 
 
Experience at LHO with self-help legal services 
 
- why did you decide to volunteer at LHO  - what did or do you hope to accomplish?   
 
- how do you view your role at the centre? 
 
-  what role do you think that self-help provides for individuals? 
 
- challenges for you in volunteering at LHO? What is the most difficult part? 
 
-  what do you find most rewarding?   
 
 
Thoughts on Self-Help and SRL’s 
 
- what is your general thoughts/perceptions about  SRL’s that you see come in to LHO? 
 
- in talking with SRL’s  - what is your sense of what they wish to accomplish in coming 
to somewhere like LHO?   
 
- In other words, what is your understanding of their expectations in terms of seeking 
help? 
 
- do you think you are able to assist them in this regard? 
 
-  biggest challenge facing SRL’s? In representing themselves?  
 
- what do you think about SRL’s ability to participate in these civil legal processes? 
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- what do you see (if any) long term affects or benefits of self-help?  
 
- In your opinion - what do you think SRLs need?  [Now putting aside lawyers – 
assuming this is not economically or practically feasible – what do they need?] 
 
-  What do you think would improve SRL’s ability to participate directly? 
 
- reflecting back on your experience at LHO are there any cases that stood out for you  - 
either positively or negatively? 
 
 
 
Thoughts on Access More Generally 
 
- generally speaking – what do you think about when you think about improving access 
to justice? 
 
-  what about more specifically in terms of access for SRLs?  
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Interview Outline 
 
 
1.  Are you involved with a case now or in the past year?   
 -­‐ can you describe the nature of the case?   -­‐ What kind of legal matter?  -­‐ What side were you on? -­‐ Is it settled or ongoing? If ongoing, what stage is it at? -­‐ Have you been to court?  
 
 
2.  Before this case, have you been involved in other legal cases? 
 -­‐ do you have any formal training in law?   -­‐ Have you sought legal advice in the past? Or retained a lawyer? -­‐ Alternatively, have you been a self-represented litigant before? 
 
 
3.  Initial reasoning for engaging in self-help? (Factors involved in decision to engage S-
H?) 
 -­‐ Putting aside the outcome you wished to achieve, could you reflect on what 
you hoped to achieve using self-help? What you expected? -­‐ Also - aside from wishing to get a positive outcome in your case, what other 
factors were important in deciding to pursue your matter on your own? 
 (Potential Prompts: ie - time, control over the matter/the principle of the 
matter/emotional reasons) 
 
 
 
4.  What type of services did you get at Self-Help? (Experience in conducting your own 
file) 
 -­‐ did those services help you with your case?  If so, how? -­‐ What other resources if any did the client make use of when dealing with their 
legal matter? -­‐ In hindsight - can you think of something that would have also helped? -­‐ What specific tasks have you undertaken in your case? -­‐ How did you feel about doing those tasks?  
(Potential prompt: Did S-H prepare you for those tasks?)  -­‐ Did you feel like you knew what to do? 
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-­‐ How do you value your legal experience  - do you think it was fair/even-
handed? If so, why/ If not, why not? -­‐ How do you feel about interacting with lawyers? -­‐ How do you feel about interacting with Judges? -­‐ Do you feel that you were able to make yourself heard?  -­‐ Did you feel that you were listened to? 
 
 
 
5.   What skills, if any, did you gain from the assistance at Self-Help?  
 -­‐ Thinking about what you learned about the legal process and the skills needed 
to participate in that process, can you think of any ways you might use that 
information/knowledge and skills in the future?  This could be legal or non-
legal? -­‐ Can you reflect on the impacts (other than purely ‘legal’ – ie a particular 
outcome) that this experience may have had on you? -­‐ What did you learn about this process? about legal proceedings?   
 
 
 
6.  Use of self-help in the future?   
 -­‐ if you had had a choice about using a lawyer would you have done so?   -­‐ What about in the future? (given this experience) -­‐ How would your answer change if you knew that you would get the same 
result even with a lawyer? 
 
7.  What does the term access mean to you? 
 -­‐ what does the term “justice” mean -­‐ What would ‘justice’ look like in their particular circumstances? -­‐ Given the above question, does the client feel that he or she was able to obtain 
justice?  If not, why not? -­‐ Having been through this - what does it mean to get justice in a case? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
 
Study Name: The Role of Civil Law Self-Help Centres in Promoting Access to Justice  
 
Researchers: Jennifer Leitch 
  PhD Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School 
[email address] 
   
Purpose of the Research: To examine the role that self-help law centres play in a 
broader conceptualization of access to justice that which contemplates direct and 
meaningful citizen engagement and participation in civil society.  
 
What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research: In order to help with this research, 
you will be asked whether you are prepared to have a researcher observe a meeting 
between yourself and a volunteer lawyer at LawHelp Ontario.  During the course of the 
meeting, the researcher will not participate in the meeting but simply observe the process 
and the discussion between you and the volunteer lawyer regarding your legal matter.  
Following this meeting, you may be contacted regarding your willingness to participate 
in an one-on-one interview with the researcher. This interview should take no more than 
one hour.   
 
Risks and Discomforts: I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation 
in the research.  
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and 
you may choose to stop participating at any time.  Your decision not to volunteer will not 
influence the nature of your relationship with LawHelp Ontario or York University either 
now, or in the future. 
 
Withdrawal from the Study:  You can stop participating in the study at any time, for 
any reason, if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer 
particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the researcher, LawHelp 
Ontario or York University, or any other group associated with this project.  In the event 
you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed 
wherever possible. 
 
Confidentiality: All information you supply during the research (including all 
information discussed during the course of your meeting) will be held in strict confidence 
and unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any report 
or publication of the research. If individual information is used, it will not be identifiable 
in any way. The data will be comprised of transcripts of the audio recorded interviews 
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and handwritten notes taken following or during meeting or interviews. While these will 
have identifying information for the convenience of the study, such identifying 
information will be kept strictly confidential. Your data will be safely stored in a locked 
facility and/or on a password-protected computer device and only research staff will have 
access to this information. Data will be stored for two years at which time it will be 
destroyed. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
 
Questions About the Research?  If you have questions about the research in general or 
about your role in the study, please feel free to contact me or my Graduate Supervisor – 
Professor Janet Mosher by e-mail [email address]. This research has been reviewed and 
approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics 
Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research 
Ethics guidelines.  If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a 
participant in the study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy Advisor for the Office 
of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York University (telephone ***-
***-**** or e-mail address) 
 
 
 
Legal Rights and Signatures: 
 
I______________________________________________, consent to participate in the 
research project entitled The Role of Civil Law Self-Help Centres in Promoting Access to 
Justice conducted by Jennifer Leitch.  I have understood the nature of this project and 
wish to participate.  I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form.  My 
signature below indicates my consent. 
 
 
Signature     Date        
Participant 
 
 
Signature     Date        
Jennifer Leitch 
Principal Investigator 
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Informed Consent Form - Interview 
 
 
Study Name: The Role of Civil Law Self-Help Centres in Promoting Access to Justice  
 
Researchers: Jennifer Leitch 
  PhD Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School 
[email address] 
   
Purpose of the Research: To examine the role that self-help law centres play in a 
broader conceptualization of access to justice that which contemplates direct and 
meaningful citizen engagement and participation in civil society.  
 
What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research: In order to help with this research, 
you will be asked whether you are prepared to participate in an one-on-one interview 
with the researcher. This interview should take no more than one hour.  The focus on this 
interview is on your experience as a self-represented litigant who has made use of the 
legal services at LawHelp Ontario. 
 
Risks and Discomforts: I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation 
in the research.  
 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and 
you may choose to stop participating at any time.  Your decision not to volunteer will not 
influence the nature of your relationship with LawHelp Ontario or York University either 
now, or in the future. 
 
Withdrawal from the Study:  You can stop participating in the study at any time, for 
any reason, if you so decide.  Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer 
particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the researcher, LawHelp 
Ontario or York University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event 
you withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed 
wherever possible. 
 
Confidentiality: All information you supply during the research (including all 
information discussed during the course of your meeting) will be held in strict confidence 
and unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not appear in any report 
or publication of the research. If individual information is used, it will not be identifiable 
in any way. The data will be comprised of transcripts of the audio recorded interviews 
and handwritten notes taken following or during meeting or interviews. While these will 
have identifying information for the convenience of the study, such identifying 
information will be kept strictly confidential. Your data will be safely stored in a locked 
facility and/or on a password-protected computer device and only research staff will have 
access to this information. Data will be stored for two years at which time it will be 
destroyed. Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. 
 
 365 
Questions About the Research?  If you have questions about the research in general or 
about your role in the study, please feel free to contact me or my Graduate Supervisor – 
Professor Janet Mosher by e-mail [email address]. This research has been reviewed and 
approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, York University’s Ethics 
Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council Research 
Ethics guidelines.  If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a 
participant in the study, please contact the Sr. Manager & Policy Advisor for the Office 
of Research Ethics, 5th Floor, York Research Tower, York University (telephone ***-
***-**** or e-mail address) 
 
 
Legal Rights and Signatures: 
 
I______________________________________________, consent to participate in the 
research project entitled The Role of Civil Law Self-Help Centres in Promoting Access to 
Justice conducted by Jennifer Leitch.  I have understood the nature of this project and 
wish to participate.  I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form.  My 
signature below indicates my consent. 
 
 
Signature     Date        
Participant 
 
 
Signature     Date        
Jennifer Leitch 
Principal Investigator 
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Informed Consent 
 
Study Name:  The Role of Civil Law Self-Help Centres in Promoting Access to Justice 
 
Researcher:  Jennifer Leitch 
          PhD Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School 
           [email address] 
 
Purpose of the Research:  To examine the role that self-help law centres play in a broader 
conceptualization of access to justice that contemplates direct and meaningful citizen 
engagement and participation in civil society. 
 
 
Dear                 , 
 
I am writing to ask if it would be possible for me to interview you about your experiences 
providing legal assistance to self-represented litigants.  My understanding is that you 
volunteer your time and legal services at LawHelp Ontario and in so doing, assist self-
represented litigants with their civil law legal matters.  
 
I am a graduate student at York University here in Toronto.  I am completing a research 
project on self-represented individuals’ experiences in the civil justice system in Toronto, 
Ontario, which includes their experiences with securing self-help and the ways in which 
self-help impacts an individual’s access to justice.  For the purposes of my research 
access to justice is defined quite broadly to include meaningful participation in various 
aspects of life in a democratic society.   
 
As part of my research, I am hoping to spend some time at LawHelp Ontario observing 
the process and procedures as well as sitting in on meetings between volunteer lawyers 
and self-represented parties that attend at the centre.  My goal in conducting this research 
is to familiarize myself with the way in which the centre runs (and thus be able to 
contextualize the experiences of the self-represented litigants) and potentially gain a 
better understanding of how self-represented litigants make use of self-help services.  
Additionally, as noted, I would like to conduct a brief interview about your experience 
providing volunteer legal services as well as your thoughts and views about self-help and 
access to justice.  
 
Our meeting would be in the nature of a conversation, initiated with open-ended 
questions on the research topics outlined above, as opposed to a formal interview or 
survey.  I expect it to take about 45 minutes to one hour.  In addition to ensuring that the 
content of our conversation is protected in accordance with the research ethics 
requirements of York University as noted below, I further confirm that your interview 
will remain anonymous and any identifiable information respecting any particular legal 
matter discussed including the court file number, the names of the parties, any reference 
to specific court dates or appearances or specific details about the case will be removed 
from the research file such that any reference to a specific legal case would not be 
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identifiable to an outside reader.  I confirm that this will be in keeping with a continued 
expectation of confidentiality, akin to what you would provide in a legal context as part 
of the legal services that you provide at LawHelp.  
 
My goal is to gain an understanding of your personal experience with a self-help program 
and self-represented litigants as well as your views and thoughts about non-lawyers’ 
ability to participate in the civil justice system.  With your permission, I may use 
quotations from our meeting in any published material that I may later produce.  If that is 
the case and I do wish to use a quotation, I will send you the quote before it is included so 
that you may have the opportunity to correct any misunderstanding that I may have.  I 
will use a tape recorder during this interview, but only as a supplement to my own note-
taking.  The data from this interview will be securely stored on the hard drive of a 
password protected computer and in the locked office of the researcher.  After the two-
year period, it will be stored in the researcher’s secure archives in a locked storage space.   
 
The research will result in a thesis that I will submit as a requirement for my Doctoral 
degree at York University.  Doctoral theses are not widely circulated, but they are 
available to the public.  I may also decide to publish portions of the research in academic 
journals. 
 
York University has a research ethics policy.  It indicates that, of course, you are under 
no obligation to meet with me or to answer any particular question that I might pose.  
You may stop the conversation at any point.  The notes from our meeting will be kept on 
file with me for two years.  They will be treated as confidential and kept in a secure 
location.  This research and the methods involved in conducting this research (including 
the conversations that are part of it) have been reviewed and approved by a university 
research ethics committee for compliance with research ethics protocols.  Should you 
have any questions about this study, you may contact me at [email address] or my 
Graduate Supervisor – Janet Mosher by email [email address].  If you have any questions 
or want further information about the ethics related to this study, please feel free to 
contact the Manager, Office of the Research Ethics, York University, 5th Floor, York 
Research Tower, phone ***-***-****. 
 
I will contact you within the next two weeks to see if a convenient time for meeting can 
be arranged. 
 
Regards, 
 
Jennifer Leitch 
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Legal Rights and Signatures: 
 
I, ______________________________________________, consent to participate in the 
research project entitled The Role of Civil Law Self-Help Centres in Promoting Access to 
Justice conducted by Jennifer Leitch.  I have understood the nature of this project and 
wish to participate.  I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form.  My 
signature below indicates my consent. 
 
 
Signature____________________________________ 
Date____________________________ 
Participant 
 
 
 
Signature____________________________________ 
Date____________________________ 
Jennifer Leitch 
Researcher 
 
 
 
